


1948

Education and Living: Volume 2

Ralph Borsodi

Follow this and additional works at: <https://research.library.kutztown.edu/soldocs>

 Part of the [Adult and Continuing Education Commons](#), [Curriculum and Instruction Commons](#), [Economic Theory Commons](#), [Educational Methods Commons](#), [Educational Psychology Commons](#), [Elementary Education Commons](#), [Higher Education Commons](#), [Home Economics Commons](#), and the [Secondary Education Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Borsodi, Ralph. Education and Living: Volume 2. Suffern, N.Y: School of Living, 1948.

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Living at Research Commons at Kutztown University. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Living Documents by an authorized administrator of Research Commons at Kutztown University. For more information, please contact czerny@kutztown.edu.

EDUCATION

AND

LIVING

PART III and PART IV

EDUCATION
AND
LIVING

BY

RALPH BORSODI



THE SCHOOL OF LIVING
SUFFERN, NEW YORK
MCMXLVIII

THE DEVIN-ADAIR COMPANY, NEW YORK
TRADE DISTRIBUTORS

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
COPYRIGHT 1948
BY RALPH BORSODI



CREATING:

**THAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF SUFFERING,
THE DIGNIFICATION OF LABOR,
THE SIGNIFICATION OF LIFE.**

—MOTTO OF THE SCHOOL OF LIVING

WHEN we lie down worn out,
other men will stand young and fresh.

*By the steps that we have cut they will climb;
by the stairs that we have built they will mount.*

They will never know the names of the men who made them.

At the clumsy work they will laugh;
and when the stones roll by they will curse us.

*But they will mount, and on our work;
they will climb, and by our stairs!*

No man liveth to himself,
and no man dieth to himself.

—Olive Schreiner

Part I. EDUCATION

I.	Education and Ideology	1
II.	The School, the Teacher, and the Educated Individual	16
III.	Adult Education and Adult Problems: The Function of Schools of Living and Universities: <i>Leadership</i>	27
IV.	Juvenile Education:	
	Part I. The First Six Years— <i>Character Building</i> : The Educational Function of the Home	72
	Part II. From Six to Twelve— <i>Introduction to Learning</i> : The Function of the Common School	85
	Part III. From Twelve to Sixteen— <i>Preparation for Work</i> : The Function of the Vocational School	93
	Part IV. From Sixteen to Twenty— <i>Vision</i> : The Function of the High School and College	105
	Part V. After Twenty— <i>Mastery</i> : The Function of the Professional School and University	108

Part II. MIS-EDUCATION

V.	Modern Man and Modern Mis-Education	115
VI.	The <i>Ideology</i> of Progress	179
VII.	The <i>Implementation</i> of Progress:	
	Part I. Centralization and Decentralization	198
	Part II. <i>Industrialization</i> : The Centralization of Production	204
	Part III. <i>Proletarianization</i> : The Centralization of Ownership	221
	Part IV. <i>Capitalization</i> : The Centralization of Control	232
	Part V. <i>Standardization</i> : The Centralization of Education	244
	Part VI. <i>Nationalization</i> : The Centralization of Government	259
	Part VII. <i>Urbanization</i> : The Centralization of Population	266
	Part VIII. Over-Centralization and Over-Decentralization	272

Part III. RIGHT-EDUCATION

VIII.	Right-Education: The Humanization of Man	279
IX.	The <i>Ideology</i> of Normal Living:	
	Part I. Definition and Method	289
	Part II. The Definition of "Norm" and "Normal"	296
	Part III. The Problem of Method	305
X.	The <i>Implementation</i> of Normal Living:	
	Part I. The Normal Individual:	
	Sec. I. The Bifurcation of the Individual	327
	Sec. II. The Life-Cycle of the Individual	338
	Sec. III. Function and Organization	403
	Part II. The Normal Family:	
	Sec. I. The Nature of <i>Family</i>	410
	Sec. II. The Functions of the Family	431
	Sec. III. The Organization of the Family	462
	Par. I. Composition of the Family	466
	Par. II. Management of the Family	497
	Par. III. Equipment of the Family	534
	Part III. The Normal Community:	
	Sec. I. The Nature of <i>Community</i>	554
	Sec. II. The Functions of the Community	577
	Sec. III. The Organization of the Community:	
	Par. I. Composition of the Community:	
	Sub-Par. I. Town <i>vs.</i> City	592
	Sub-Par. II. Region <i>vs.</i> Nation	617
	Sub-Par. III. World <i>vs.</i> Empire	625
	Par. II. Management of the Community	651
	Par. III. Institutions of the Community	663

Part IV. RE-EDUCATION

XI.	Re-Education: The Normalization of Man	677
XII.	Schools of Living: The Organization of Re-Education	683
XIII.	Education and Leadership: The Challenge to the	
	Teachers of Mankind	703
	Index to Norms	713
	Index to References	714

PART III
EDUCATION AND LIVING

爰

RIGHT-EDUCATION

爰

*Men of superior minds
busy themselves first in get-
ting at the root of things,
and when they have suc-
ceeded in this, the right
course is open to them.
—Confucius, "The Analects."*

CHAPTER VIII

RIGHT-EDUCATION: *The Humanization of Man*

To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven.—Ecclesiastes, 3:1.

TO MAKE clear what it is I refer to when I speak of *right-education*, to which the present part of this book is being devoted, it is necessary to bear in mind what I mean by *education*, which was discussed in the very first part; by *mis-education*, which was discussed in the second part; and by *re-education*, which will be discussed in the fourth and final part.

As briefly as possible, then:

I. EDUCATION
EDUCATION is more than schooling. As I am using the term it refers to *all* the influences which lead to the acquisition of the characteristics which man displays in the course of living.

II. MIS-EDUCATION
IF IT IS education which determines the manner in which human beings live, then any process of education which produces human beings who behave in an abnormal, animal-like manner, may well be called mis-education. And if, as I have tried to prove, the condition and behavior of modern man is un-human, inhuman and sub-human, then there is *prima facie* evidence that modern man has been subjected to mis-education.

The behavior of human beings, individually and in groups, is always a reflection of their ideologies; it reflects the ideas which they have been taught to embrace, not only because no individual can avoid choosing or accepting ideologies but also because no individual can act without practicing and implementing one or more of them. If the ideas in accordance with which an individual lives and acts have been accepted by him without adequate study, (as is the case with modern man), or he has adopted ideologies which cannot be rationally validated, (as is also the case with modern man), and if the manner in which he acts does not implement his ideologies, (as is again the case with modern man), he is a thrice mis-educated individual.

III. RIGHT-EDUCATION

IF THE ideologies upon which he acts are not only the result of conscious choice but also ideologies which reason establishes as humanly proper and humanly normal; if none of his ideologies represent the blind acceptance of merely traditional or fashionable folkways; if he has not unreflectively accepted indoctrination by the proponents of irrational and invalid ideologies; and if in addition the manner in which he lives and acts represents a rational implementation of the ideologies he should have adopted and should be practicing, he is a rightly educated individual. *Right education is that education which results in the acquisition by human beings of characteristics which lead them to act, individually and as members of groups, like normal human beings.*

IV. RE-EDUCATION

IF INDIVIDUALS behave like two-legged animals rather than like human beings, it is not because they are animals by nature but because they are animalized (or mis-educated) human beings. And if, as is unfortunately the case with modern man, they do not behave like normal human beings, right-education is impossible without re-education.

Modern man, as we have seen, behaves abnormally and the conditions of life which he has created for himself are abnormal. The abnormality of his behavior and condition is due, first of all, to the fact that he has consciously sometimes and inadvertently at others, accepted a mistaken teleological ideology; he has either deliberately chosen or has permitted himself to be persuaded to devote his life to a mistaken life-purpose.

But though his belief in Progress may be invalid, and his devotion to Centralization as the key to its realization, tragic, the primary problem which he presents to the educator is not that of his belief in Progress; it is the fact that *he has already acquired his beliefs*, and along with them the conviction that he, as a modern man, is properly educated. No such problem exists with children. With adults who know that they are uneducated, like children when beginning their schooling, the problem does not exist; the illiterate Chinese who know that they are illiterate are easier to educate than literate Americans who think that their ability to read newspapers and to ride about in automobiles makes them properly educated human beings. Doubts about the validity of the prevailing ideology, if not a conviction of its invalidity, is the first step in the re-education of mankind.

NO SUCH problem confronted ancient and medieval man, at least not in the acute form in which it confronts modern man. For the problem can hardly be said to arise in static cultures in which the ultimate purpose of life, as well as the activities and institutions of people, are prescribed by tradition; in which each individual inherits decisions upon these matters in much the same way that he inherits the color of his skin and the language which he speaks. It is an astonishing but nevertheless an historic fact, that these decisions were still made for most individuals by tradition until about the last half of the nineteenth century. The average individual in the United States up to that time was not only a Christian (by virtue of his birth in America instead of in Turkey) but he was a Methodist or Baptist because his

TRADITION

parents had been Methodists or Baptists before him. He thought it a good enough reason to vote the Republican ticket (if he lived in the North) because his father voted that way, and the Democratic ticket (if he lived in the South) for the same reason.

In a sense the continuity of every tradition is dependent on the sum of the individual loyalties of the people who inherit it. All traditional cultures prize most highly the virtue of loyalty and conformity. Men and women until comparatively recent times felt that no apologies were needed if the purposes to which they devoted themselves in life, the vocations they followed, the ideologies in which they believed, and the institutions which they accepted, were those prescribed by their inherited family and community traditions.



It is true that in the Western World what might be called total tradition, and the absolute authority of that single tradition, was shaken if not entirely shattered by the Age of Revolution. The English Revolution led finally to the realization of that freedom of conscience about which Milton had written; the American Revolution eventually to an enormous increase of political freedom; the French Revolution was the culminating event which finished the total authority of the medieval tradition in Europe. After that seismic disturbance few nations were exclusively devoted to a single religious, political and economic tradition. But long after the right of multiple traditions, so to speak, in contemporary life was recognized, individual departures from the traditions of family and group still involved the social stigma of disloyalty—the individual with the courage to choose a religious denomination or political party different from those which were his by inheritance was stigmatized as an infidel and apostate.



Into this area of living, juvenile education does not intrude. The common and high school, even when denominational as are Catholic parochial schools, do not teach children how to choose among traditions; they teach them merely why they should accept and how they should practice what has been chosen for them. Colleges and universities, it is true, deal with this matter of choice, but with too little appreciation of its supreme importance. The minimum of formal edu-

education which every individual is supposed to obtain in school does not help him, unfortunately, to decide the question of what life is all about and what religious and political and social ideas he should adopt. And very properly. Mere schooling of the immature child cannot possibly help it to make a rational choice in matters for which the individual will only be ready psychologically after he has reached the age of accountability. It cannot help him in dealing with genuinely adult problems: it can only indoctrinate him with views which adults have previously chosen for him. If it tries to do so, all that it succeeds in doing is to bewilder and demoralize him.

The public school in America indoctrinates the child with the competitive, materialistic, commercial, industrial, and urban ideals which prevail at this time. If a child, on the other hand, is sent to a parochial school, he is naturally indoctrinated with Catholic ideals and will almost certainly accept Catholicism, not because he has chosen Catholicism but because his parents have chosen it for him. And this, it seems to me, is right and proper. Who but the parents, the natural and rightful guardians of the child, should decide matters of this kind prior to the time that the child, when adult, is able to decide them for himself?



The climacteric fact with which we are confronted in this day and age is that not only is the individual without the guidance of the older religious and traditional answers to these problems, but he is also without the guidance of the family authority and the local standards which guided the generations during the transitional period from the total traditional world of the past to the present almost traditionless world. In the modern world there are very few individuals who still inherit a coherent and consistent tradition with regard to the major problems of life. In this, as in so many other aspects of living, neither *tradition* nor *education* is adequate to the problems confronting mankind. Rather it is *fashion* which influences the manner in which the man of today lives and which formulates his ideas for him.* Slowly

*It is possible to fix the distinction between *tradition* and *fashion* quite specifically. In the following table I assume that man was in existence at the beginning of the Pleistocene period. We have no sure means of estimating the duration of this period; estimates given by geologists vary from 250,000 to 1,500,000 years; the tendency is to accept the lower figure. The evidence points to man's departure

but surely everywhere that it goes, the doctrine of Progress makes absurd the idea of accepting solutions of the problems of living on the basis of tradition. Whatever remains of it is really mere acceptance by modern man of what he feels are anachronisms—out of deference to the loving remainders of an *ancient regime*.

THIS does not mean that modern man has managed to emancipate himself from thralldom to culture. He still reflects the influence of his environment; he is still a creature of his folkways. But his folkways prescribe behavior in accordance with the fluctuating *fashions* of the day rather than with fixed and immutable *traditions* from the past. The individual today enters the period of chronological and psychophysiological maturity not only unequipped to make rational deci-

FASHION

from an anthropoid status early in the Miocene period, certainly 1,000,000 years ago, perhaps more; it indicates that in the Miocene and Pliocene periods his body and limbs became adapted to the plantigrade posture, and that in the earlier part of the Pleistocene period his brain reached full human status and his ape-like appearance disappeared. Cro-Magnon man had as finely developed a skull as ours; to him is ascribed the remarkable drawings and paintings found in the caves of Southern France and Northern Spain; he is believed to have lived 25,000 to 30,000 years ago. On this basis, it is possible to see that total tradition ended recently:

	DATE	YEARS
Period of <i>homo alalus</i> , (speechless and traditionless man), beginning in the early Miocene	B.C. 1,000,000	750,000
Period of Primitive Tradition, beginning with <i>homo sapiens</i> early in the Pleistocene period	B.C. 25,000	24,500
Period of Speculative Tradition, beginning with Thales	B.C. 585	2,000
Period of Christian Tradition, beginning with the fall of Rome and ending with the Renaissance. (The strictly Christian Tradition was followed by a revival of the Speculative Tradition)	A.D. 410	1,200
Period of Physical Science, beginning with Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton	A.D. 1600	440
Period of Biological Science, beginning with Darwin and Wallace	A.D. 1859	80
Period of Psychological Science, beginning with Freud	A.D. 1900	40

No real break in tradition came until the rise of modern biology; it was the conflict between religion and science over evolution that set the stage for the final discarding of tradition. "Our fundamental ways of thinking about things," said William James in PRAGMATISM, "are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time. Other stages have grafted themselves upon this stage, but have never succeeded in displacing it. The importance of this common sense stage is not that it came first but that it might be final; that nothing that we can subsequently do will enable us to get rid of it." James liked to speak of the period which I am calling naive or primitive tradition as that of common sense, a stage which he thought ended with Democritus. To get rid of the errors of tradition and to avoid continuing them with fashion, is one of the tasks of right-education.

sions in these matters but in an environment in which there are no adequate educational institutions to which to turn for help in dealing with them in a systematic manner. He simply accepts, so far as behavior is concerned, the fashions of the moment. For the most part he devotes himself to activities within the narrow range of deviations permitted by modern industry; he restricts himself to those novelties of behavior and adventures in living which do not transcend fashion; he simply reflects advertising, salesmanship and propaganda. On the crucial question of choosing ideologies and methods of implementing them, he follows the dictates of impulse rather than reason.



What the situation calls for is neither a return to tradition nor yet another variation in ideological fashions; it calls first of all for an intellectually respectable method of choosing purposes in life and the methods which should be used in implementing them. What modern man actually receives, for the most part, is propaganda for things as they are; propaganda prepared by the protagonists of ideas which zealously safeguard the vested special interest of those who believe in or profit from them. If an individual breaks with established or conventional ideas, as some of them do, and as large numbers are ready to do in a time of crisis, and begins to listen to the protagonists of unconventional, of novel, and even of proscribed ideas, what he unfortunately gets is not a criterion for choosing between ideas but propaganda in favor of something new. In either event, he does not receive what is fundamental to rational choice and action.

W **RITING** at a time when social reform was beginning to become fashionable, Leo Tolstoy said in an "Appeal to Social Reformers:"

SOCIAL REFORM vs. RIGHT-EDUCATION

The alteration of the character and life-conception of men inevitably brings with it the alteration of those forms in which men have lived, whereas the alteration of the forms of life not only does not contribute to the alteration of the character and life-conception, but, more than anything else, obstructs this alteration by directing the attention and activity of men into a false channel. To alter forms of life, hoping thereby to alter the character and life-conception of men, is like altering in various ways the position of wet wood in a stove, believing that there can be such a position of wet fuel as will cause it to catch fire. Only dry wood will take fire independently of the position in which it is placed.

In effect Tolstoy—brooding over the futility of most of the endeavors of social reformers—voices his conclusion that changes in the forms of the social and political institutions under which men live are not only worthless but often harmful, unless they are preceded or accompanied by reforms in the ideas and methods of action of people themselves.

Virtually no attention has been paid to the truth to which Tolstoy called attention, not only by the reformers to whom he was addressing himself but also by those who are professedly educators and leaders of mankind. Because of their faith in mechanism—a faith seemingly vindicated by the efficiency of the “foolproof” appliances used by industry—both the reformer and the educator have come to assume that if only the right institutions are imposed upon society, men’s behavior will reform automatically. In effect they have come to believe that the only thing wrong with the world is that its economic, social, and political institutions do not perform the functions they are supposed to perform with a sufficient degree of efficiency.

Tolstoy may have exaggerated the importance of education and character-building; he may have made the mistake of thinking that merely moral behavior will automatically result in the creation of good institutions; he may have underestimated the extent to which bad institutions frustrate the best intentions of the good and even intelligent members of society; but this mistake is a much lesser one than that of the believers in social and individual salvation through laws, constitutions, and other institutional reforms; than that of the reformers who put their faith in the planning of the institutions of society by qualified social, political and industrial “engineers.” There is some hope to be extracted from the probability that if men are rightly educated, they will establish right institutions; there is no hope at all in the notion that if only the right institutions are imposed upon men they will then quite automatically live and behave rightly. As Tolstoy pointed out, this actually obstructs the most vital of all reforms by shifting attention from the need for personal education to the reorganization of society, as though it were possible to create, in Reinhold Niebuhr’s terms, a moral society even though the individuals who compose that society remain themselves immoral. Or to put it in the form in which the apologists for Progress and Centralization make it necessary to express the same idea—it obscures the fact

that it is impossible to create a really efficient society no matter how efficient the institutional mechanisms set up unless men themselves learn to be efficient. In effect Tolstoy implied that while we might be able to build automobiles more efficiently by setting up an institution—a factory—in which an assembly line compels men to behave or work in certain prescribed ways, you cannot build either good men or a good society upon that theory.

RIGHT-EDUCATION

WHAT now is the essence of what I have been calling right-education? As I see it, right-education involves leadership and guidance of adults primarily and children incidentally, in choosing—as rational human beings should choose—the ends and means of living. It means systematic research on one hand and organized instruction on the other, in helping people to deal with two great categories of problems in both of which they are confronted by many alternative courses, *and with regard to which they cannot avoid choosing*: (I) choosing ideas and ideologies for dealing with the major problems of living, and (II) choosing methods of implementing the theories of living which they have adopted.

I. EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY

BY CHOOSING ideas and ideologies I mean not merely the selection of some one ultimate purpose in life from among the many alternative ideologies dealing with the teleological problem, but the selection of ideologies for dealing with all the major problems of living—ideologies for dealing with (I) the *teleological problem*, of course, but also (II) the *epistemological problem*—the problem of how to validate action; (III) the *ontological problem*—the problem of action in accordance with man's real relationship to his entire environment; (IV) the *associational problem*—the problem of action individual-to-individual; (V) the *gregational problem*—the problem of voluntary group action; (VI) the *civic problem*—the problem of

coercive group action; (VII) the *operational problem*—the problem of organizing and planning action; (VIII) the *ethical problem*—the problem of action in the light of the consequences of actions; (IX) the *esthetic problem*—the problem of action with skill and taste; (X) the *educational problem*—the problem of the evaluation and integration of all values; (XI) the *occupational problem*—the problem of the use of time; (XII) the *possessional problem*—the problem of the use of things; and finally (XIII) the *psycho-physiological problem*—the problem of health.*

II. EDUCATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

BY CHOOSING means of implementation, I mean research and guidance in dealing with the three alternative choices with which individuals and groups are confronted in the course of their efforts to realize and to achieve the ideas and programs which they may have adopted: (I) the choice between implementing their ideas directly through *personal action*, or indirectly through organized *group action*; (II) the choice between *voluntary* group action, and *coercive* group action; and finally (III) the choice, if the activity has already been institutionalized or centralized, between continued *centralization*, and re-personalization and *decentralization*.



All other subjects of education, no matter how seemingly useful and no matter how seemingly more profitable, are good or bad only insofar as they help in the solution of these problems or help in realizing and achieving the chosen solutions of them.

*A more detailed description of these problems will be found on pp. 30-34. The whole of the second volume of this study, *EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY*, is devoted to the formulation of these problems in such a manner as to furnish a basis for choosing solutions of them.

CHAPTER IX.

THE IDEOLOGY OF NORMAL LIVING

PART I.

DEFINITION AND METHOD

Man is the measure of all things. He measures the existence of all those things that are, the non-existence of those that are not. As all appears to everyone, so it is.—Protagoras.

TO SUGGEST that there is any such thing as a definable normal way of living, is to run the risk of being considered facetious. For it seems perfectly obvious that the fact that man has lived, is living now, and will probably continue to live so long as such an earth as ours exists, in spite of the diversity of his ways of living, proves conclusively that there are no such things as norms of living applicable to all mankind.

In saying that there is still such a thing as a problem of *how to live*, I am in effect saying that in spite of our high cultural developments and marvelous scientific achievements, *modern man does not know how to live*. I am saying even more than this—I am saying that we have failed to solve the social problems with which we are confronted and the crisis which we face in our age simply because we have failed to develop norms of living; I am saying further that we will never really solve them until we develop a science and art of living based upon such

norms; finally I am saying that we will never succeed in living as human beings should live—that we will never cultivate the earth, utilize our material resources and cultural inheritance, and spend the years of our life individually and in groups healthily, affectionately, rationally, conscientiously, and with good taste—until we develop a system of education based upon some such idea as Normal Living. Or upon the idea, to use the words of Matthew Arnold, of “the humanization of man.”

Such an ideology and such a discipline is needed, however, not only for the purpose of teaching individuals how to avoid frustration and achieve satisfaction in living, but also as a basis upon which to organize a proper social order. For it ought to be obvious that until we know with some degree of assurance how human beings should live, formulating law, planning social institutions, and organizing governments is more or less futile. This was obvious to Hobbes when he projected an order based upon the principle of *universal strife*; to Rousseau when he projected one based upon the principle of *social contract*; and to Kropotkin when he projected one based upon *competition and mutual aid*. They at least recognized the need of some sort of norm as a basis for designing a social order even if all three mistakenly took as their norm what they assumed was man’s way of living in a “state of nature.” But today our social reformers, and, what is worse, our social scientists, are busily engaged in prescribing for our social problems without recognizing the futility and absurdity of venturing conclusions in the matter at all, until they have first established how man should live.

Unfortunately *normal living* means—to most people including our educators and social scientists—living in conformity with the conventions of the race, the nation, the community, and the group of which the individual happens to be a member. A distinction needs therefore to be drawn between *living in conformity with custom* and what I am calling *Normal Living*.

To make this distinction entirely clear I shall consider five problems and devote a chapter of this book to each of them.*

DEFINITION

THE first problem is simply that of defining the words *norm* and *normal*, and the concepts *Normal Living* and *norms of living*. The word *normal* is now loosely used; *Normal Living* suggests, even to those used to precise thinking, some average of *what is* rather than a statement of *what should be*. Unless some precise statement of what is meant by these words can be formulated, no rational basis for *Normal Living* is possible.

METHODOLOGY

THE second problem is that of method. No such norms of living as I am envisioning as a basis for a program of right-education can be formulated unless there are rational and scientific methods—methods which are objective and verifiable—which may be used to determine how human beings, both as individuals and in groups, should live. As we shall see, there are at least three such methods, one of them metrical in nature.

INDIVIDUAL

THE third problem arises, strangely enough, in connection with the term *individual*. The problem arises because of two facts: because individuals, in spite of the identity and continuity of the self, are changing creatures—creatures with a life-cycle each stage of which calls for different ways of living; and secondly, because of the bifurcation of individuals into two

*Perhaps there ought to be still another chapter dealing adequately with the definition of living in terms of the individual's relationship to the cosmic and the eternal. The religious individual, whose life purpose (and solution of the teleological problem) involves the quest of some form of eternal salvation, cannot live here and now like a reasonable creature without planning and ordering it to ensure that salvation. But the ideology of *Normal Living* is expressly restricted to the consideration of living on a human and not a supernal level; I have therefore reserved my consideration of the individual's relationship to the cosmos for discussion of the ontological problem in the second volume of this work.

sexes, male and female. There is not one but two quite different kinds of *homo sapiens* and the right way of living for one is not necessarily the right way of living for the other.

THE FIRST of these two difficulties arises because of the fact of THE LIFE-CYCLE human metamorphosis; because of what I think of as the human life-cycle. Human beings are not simple, uniform, and static objects; they are not units of some azoic and *homogeneous* substance but instead variable, complex, and *heterogeneous* organisms. Using the term metamorphosis in its morphological rather than its mystical and theological sense, every living individual is passing through a continuing process of transformation from one kind of individual to another—a fact which we ignore when we think of metamorphosis as a phenomenon restricted to plants, insects and the lower forms of life. At various periods in the course of each individual human being's life, and at various places in which the individual spends time, the individual is quite a different being—infant, child, youth, adult. The definition of normal for the individual during any one of the poet's "seven ages of man," is not necessarily normal for him during other periods of his life.

Since living is a process which takes place both in time and space—not only over *intervals of time* but also upon *various places* on the earth—the problem of the life-cycle involves both the determination of how the individual should spend his time and where he should at various times spend it. We shall have made some progress toward teaching people how to live normally, if we can even tentatively formulate general principles which should be observed by human beings in organizing life to fit each inescapable metamorphosis in their lives.

THE SECOND difficulty in defining the concept of individual arises SEX in connection with the fact of the bifurcation of human beings into two sexes. It is obvious that if the human species is composed of two different kinds of individuals, the general principles which should be taught to them about the organization of their lives must be as different as the real difference between the two sexes. Normal Living for men and Normal Living for women cannot therefore be one and the same thing. What is more, the principles which they should be taught

to observe at each stage in their life-cycles would have to be as different as the differences in the functions which each sex has to fulfill at each stage from birth to death.

FAMILY

WE come now to the fourth major problem in the definition of living—definition in terms of its *associational and gregational aspects* as distinguished from its *individual and psycho-physiological aspects*. Since it is impossible for individuals even to come into existence, much less survive and live normally, without sexual and filial association with other human beings, it is impossible to define Normal Living without definition of the social or gregational unit which should provide for this association. *The only unit which can provide this on a human—and therefore normal—basis, is the family.* No substitute for this such as the state, which Socialists ever since Plato have recommended, can fulfill this function except by substituting an impersonal, inhuman gregational unit for the intimate and human family. Since the individual is inescapably a part or fraction of this unit, complete definition of the fraction, (the individual), is impossible without definition of the whole, (or family), of which the fraction is a part.

COMMUNITY

FINALLY we come to the fifth problem in defining specifically and completely the idea of Normal Living, that of the definition of the relationship of the individual and the family to community, society, and humanity; to the rest of humanity with which individuals cannot avoid associating or disassociating, (too often violently), about access to land and the possession of things of all kinds. This involves definition of living in its *civic aspects*—its coercive and artificial aspects as distinguished from definition of the voluntary and spontaneous aspects represented by family life. Here too I shall approach

the problem in terms of the community, rather than the nation or society, because the smaller civic entity is less impersonal and therefore more normal than the larger units in terms of which the problem is usually studied.

THE LAW OF LIVING
CONSIDERATION of the evidence bearing upon all these various aspects of living, has led me to the conviction that it is possible to formulate a three-fold law of living—three-fold because it has to apply to man considered first as a *living creature*, then as a *bi-sexual animal*; and finally as a *human being*.

I. The law of living as it applies to man merely as a living creature; as it applies both to the single-celled amœba and to man; as it applies to every single species of organism without exception, can be reduced to one word: *survival*. For the normal individual, the law prescribes self-preservation.

II. The law of living as it applies to man as a bi-sexual animal, is two-fold and can be formulated in two terms: *survival and generation*. In addition to prescribing self-preservation for the normal individual, the law prescribes self-reproduction.

III. But the law of living applicable to man as a human being calls for much more than survival and generation. The complete law is therefore three-fold; it calls for *survival, generation, and expression*. For the normal individual self-expression involves the utilization of his entire personality, integrally and harmoniously, to realize his utmost *human* potentialities from birth to death.

25

This, of course, is not a concrete recipe for action; at best it is only the statement of the basic principle to which detailed formulas, recipes and prescriptions must conform. And these specific formulations of the way to live can constantly become more and more specific, and contain fewer and fewer errors, as

we define more and more precisely the norms of living. That is the reason that I shall keep on insisting—even to those who accept the general principle which I call the law of living—that the corollary of the law calls for unending research and education. All the knowledge and wisdom of mankind must be integrated to make more and more practicable the application of the general principle, not only to the daily problems of living, but to the specific and critical conditions with which modern man is confronted. Right-education, both in principle and in practice, alone offers hope that all the labors of mankind and the sufferings individuals undergo in the course of life can be rendered significant, and dignified and justified.

The man or woman who does not learn how to live normally; who does not observe the law of living in all three of its aspects, does not realize the full potentialities and creative possibilities of the human personality. The failure to realize these potentialities not only dooms the individual to dissatisfaction; it involves the substitution of frustration for satisfaction. Only by learning how to live normally in this full sense can modern man end the frustrations to which his present devotion to the ideology of Progress and its implementation through Centralization, condemns him.

If the quest of Normal Living is indeed all that I believe it may be—if it is indeed the proper purpose to which man should devote his life—then re-education or normalization is vitally necessary for mis-educated modern man.

THE DEFINITION OF "NORM" AND "NORMAL"

There can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his rationation from the definition, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan."

STRICTLY speaking, there are two kinds of norms of living between which it is important to distinguish: *norms of condition* and *norms of action*. Norms of weight, or "ideal weights," for men and women,* are norms of condition; dietary norms, on the other hand, are norms of action. The first prescribe effects which should be produced; the second prescribe actions which cause the effects. The first deal with the attributes of man; the second, with his behavior. *All the conditions of man, both normal and abnormal, are the consequences of his actions.* To this there are probably no exceptions. Even the attributes which an individual inherits, as for instance the color of his skin, is an effect caused by the acts of his parents. To normalize

*"Ideal Weights for Men," Statistical Bulletin Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York, Vol. 24, No. 6, June 1943, pp. 6-8; and "Ideal Weights for Women," Vol. 23, No. 10, Oct. 1942, pp. 6-8. The term *ideal* in these two articles is used in precisely the same sense in which I am using the term *normal*.

the attributes and conditions of man, it is necessary to normalize the manner in which man acts.

In the following definitions both types of norms are included; it is essential, therefore, not to forget that in the attempt to achieve Normal Living, it is the norms of action which matter most. The norms of condition are important only insofar as they help in the formulation of norms of action.

NORM AND NORMAL

A description of any one of the *physical attributes* of man, (such as his height or weight), or of his *mental attributes*, (such as his intelligence or memory); or a prescription for any of his *acts or patterns of action*, (such as thinking, eating, mating, working, playing, resting, residing), which describes it or prescribes for it by *defining the range within which it may vary and both fulfill the specific function of that attribute or activity and permit the fulfillment of all the other functions of man*, is what I shall call a norm of living.

THE NORMAL INDIVIDUAL

AN individual human being whose physical and mental attributes and whose acts and patterns of action fall within the normal range of variation of each such attribute or activity, and who fulfills all the functions of a human being during each period of his life and during his life as a whole, I consider a *normal human being*.

NORMAL LIVING

THE manner in which such a normal individual would live, is what I call *Normal Living*.

By this definition, of course, only the perfect individual lives truly normally. For most of us, mis-educated as we are and handicapped by the prior mis-education of our parents and all those who influence us, living can at best be only approximately

normal. But this approximation of the ideal would represent so great a humanization of existing life as to make even the most modest efforts toward Normal Living worth while.

COMMON usage with regard to the words *norm* and *normal*, is so vague that it is necessary to make certain that they are not confused with such concepts as (I) *natural*, (II) *average*, (III) *customary*, and (IV) *uniform*.

I. NATURAL VS. NORMAL

THERE are two concepts which are usually designated by the word *natural*—the concept of natural as opposed to supernatural, and of natural as opposed to artificial.

NATURAL VS. SUPERNATURAL

From the standpoint of the concept of natural as opposed to supernatural, both the *characteristics* of man, and man *himself*, (without regard to whether they may be normal or abnormal), are natural simply because they are *not* and he is *not* supernatural. *Natural* in this sense, and *normal*, should not be confused. What is normal is natural, but what is natural is not always normal. Every idea of man and everything conceived by man is either natural or supernatural; it has to be either within nature or outside of nature. Since both the normal and abnormal are within nature, what is abnormal is just as natural as what is normal. The blind, the maimed, the sick, the feeble-minded, and the insane, are just as natural as are the sane and healthy. But they are not as normal.

NATURAL VS. ARTIFICIAL

FROM the standpoint of the second concept of natural—that of *natural* as opposed to *artificial*—the various characteristics of individuals are natural or artificial in accordance with the extent to which their original natural state has been affected by the artifices and the artificial conditions to which they have been subjected directly or indirectly by the activities of man himself. The sum of these changes of the natural state is often called *culture*; the process of changing them from the natural is called *art* and *cultivation*. I prefer to use more neutral terms—words like *artificial* and *artifice*, and *domesticate* rather than *cultivate*, because they avoid the suggestion of superiority associated with words like *art* and *culture*.

The importance of the fact that man's behavior reflects both nature (instinct) and artifice (cultivation) cannot be exaggerated. Its importance is due to the really extraordinary extent to which the behavior and the mental and physical characteristics of man today have been artificially modified by man himself. The fact that the food he eats, the house in which he lives, the furniture he uses, and the clothes he wears may profoundly alter the actual condition and functioning of his organs, his muscles, his skin, and even his bones, and render them either normal or abnormal, enormously increases the importance of the habits he is taught to adopt. The wearing of clothes not only lightens the color of the skin and affects the operation of the pores, it thins the epidermis and lessens the extent to which the skin protects the body and preserves body-heat. Sitting on the floor, as is customary in Japan, or sitting on chairs, as is customary with us, has physical and perhaps mental effects which are quite different. Occupations not only cause occupational diseases; they shape the body—muscles, organs, and bones; even more, they influence the mental attributes of people. It is this fact which enables education to shape mankind so profoundly; to shape it by human artifice toward the normal or toward the abnormal.

II. AVERAGE vs. NORMAL

IT IS even more important not to confuse *normal* and *average*. Human norms can only be expressed in ranges. No mere average can be a norm. The *average* temperature of the human body is recorded as 98.38 degrees Fahrenheit;* the extreme deviations as 90 degrees and 109 degrees. The *normal* temperature, however, is not the average but a range of between 97.5 and 99.5 degrees.† *Within this range, any one temperature is just as normal as another.*

III. CUSTOMARY vs. NORMAL

NOR should *normal*, as I am using the term, be confused with *customary*. Conduct which conforms to the recognized behavior pattern of the culture to which an individual belongs—which is in accord with custom, convention, tradition, or fashion—I think of as *customary* behavior. The use of the term *normal*, where *customary* might better be used, is misleading unless the behavior which the culture prescribes

*THE RANGE OF HUMAN CAPACITIES, David Wechsler; Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1935; p. 140. †Ibid., p. 70.

happens also to be really normal in some such sense as is here used. In our business culture, a man who repeatedly refused to accept an increase in salary for fear it would raise his standard of living would be considered abnormal merely because the prevailing behavior pattern prescribes getting ahead and trying to earn more than other men. If, however, such a man who was without competitive drives lived in a Pueblo Indian village, his behavior would be considered quite normal, because in such a culture no one is expected to want to earn more money or to exert himself more than is absolutely necessary to satisfy his customary wants. It would be far less confusing to designate such conduct as unconventional, rather than abnormal, and as customary, rather than normal.

IV. UNIFORM vs. NORMAL

FINALLY, the concept of human *normality* should not be interpreted as human *uniformity*. A human norm is a standard only in the same sense that even the most perfect of all standards is uniform, within some margin of variation. We speak of engineering standards and gauges as "correct to .001 of an inch," which means that two objects intended to be uniform may still vary as much as .002 of an inch, one being .001 longer and the other .001 shorter than the theoretically perfect standard. In trying to establish norms for behavior, the best that can be done is to take a range which excludes only the definitely abnormal. In trying to formulate norms of living statistically, quartile deviations, mean deviations, and standard deviations may be used, but it is extremely probable that useful as these may prove, less arbitrary ranges based upon correlation will prove more useful.



In order to make certain that this definition of *norm* and *normal* neither begs the question nor evades the issues involved—that it is no indulgence in either the fallacy of *petitio principii* or of *ignoratio elenchi*—it is necessary to define very precisely what is meant by all the words and phrases which may seem vague and ambiguous.

I. The term *human being* is used with reference to individuals of the species *homo sapiens* in the same sense in which biologists speak of any individual plant or animal as belonging to a species because it bears a close resemblance to other existing individuals in its more es-

sential features and activities, and because it is capable of producing a fertile progeny bearing a close resemblance to its progenitors.

II. The phrase *fulfills all . . . the functions of an individual* refers not only to biological functions but also to economic and social functions. Biologically it means the production of fertile progeny sufficient in number to ensure survival of the family. Economically it means self-support and contribution to the maintenance of a family. Socially, politically, intellectually, ethically, and esthetically, it means a personal contribution to sustain, and to develop further, the culture of the society to which the individual belongs.

III. The modification of the phrase *fulfilling all the functions of a human being* by the addition of the phrase, *during each period of his life*, refers to the fact that normal individuals contribute to the maintenance of a family and to the sustenance of society as much as they are able during every period in life—during childhood, youth, and old age, as well as during maturity and their fullest period of productivity—accidents and conditions beyond their control alone excepted.

IV. By saying that *the range within which an attribute or activity may vary and both fulfill its own specific function and permit the fulfillment of all man's other functions*, I mean that an individual is not normal even though specific attributes of his—his arms, his legs, his hands, his brain—fulfill their specific functions sufficiently well to enable him to conduct himself in a seemingly normal manner, if they are not used, in addition, to support himself and make his proper contribution to family and society.

SATISFACTION vs. FRUSTRATION

THE consequences and accompaniments of all kinds of actions—and the states or conditions which actions engender in individuals—are both physical and mental; both objective and subjective. The most obvious physical consequence or state engendered by the act of copulating (by a woman) is pregnancy. The *physical and objective consequences* of this (and all other acts) may be either normal or abnormal. They are *normal* (in this particular example) if the pregnancy goes to term; if a healthy infant is born; if the mother is uninjured, and able to give suck to her child. They are *abnormal* if there is still-birth, abortion, premature-birth, congenital malformation or debility

of the child, or if the mother dies, is permanently injured, or unable to suckle the child. The *mental or subjective consequences* of all acts may likewise be normal or abnormal. They are normal (in this particular example) if the feelings of the mother are those of completion, of beauty, of pleasure; of loving and being loved and respected. They are abnormal if instead the feelings are those of anxiety, of fear, of ugliness, of pain; of hate and contempt, or of being disliked and despised. The normal subjective consequences—the normal feelings engendered in an individual by any kind of action, by any pattern of activities, and by any particular way of living—I think of as a state or condition of *satisfaction*; the abnormal, as a state of *frustration*.

Satisfaction and frustration, then, are subjective not objective terms; they refer to the psychological and not the physiological aspects of the state of individuals; they are the feelings or emotions felt as a result of some act or actions performed, or event or events experienced, by an individual. (Parenthetically it should be remarked that the acts or actions which produce this state and engender these feelings, may be either motor acts or mental acts; an individual may be frustrated by his inability to run fast enough to catch a bus; he may also be frustrated—if deeply religious—by uncertainty as to his ability to solve the problem of salvation).

Since it is my contention that normal behavior produces a state of satisfaction—and makes it possible to avoid a condition of frustration—we can use satisfaction and frustration as *criteria* by which to test the normality or abnormality of any act or prescribed pattern of living, just as we can also use physical *criteria* such as health and disease for the same purpose.

THE desirability of teaching people to substitute the ideology of Normal Living for that of Progress, has been questioned by those who assume that normality and mediocrity are one and the same.

Those who voice this fear acknowledge that the substitution of normality for sub-normality is desirable. The fewer dependents, delinquents, decadents, and degenerates we have, the better off society will be. But the question is, what effect would the abandonment of the ideology of Progress have upon the development of deviants from the normal who are not *sub-normal* but *super-normal*? What about

NORMAL vs. MEDIOCRE LIVING

geniuses like Isaac Newton, Charles Darwin, Louis Pasteur, Richard Wagner, Michael Angelo, Leonardo da Vinci, Saint Francis, Martin Luther, Saint Paul, Jesus, Buddha, Lao Tze, and Confucius? What about women like Florence Nightingale, Saint Theresa, Hypatia, and Sappho? If the substitution of Normal Living for other ambitions and ways of living would eliminate or reduce the number of geniuses in society, the final result might be a general state of mediocrity in which man would have been reduced to nothing much more than a species of healthy and happy and perhaps moderately intelligent animal without any trace of the divine spark.

THE obvious and most conclusive method of answering this question is, in effect, to dismiss it by calling attention to the fact that genius is one of those accidents which, like all mutations, originate in conditions and laws of its own. Genius arises under all conditions, among the poor and the rich, among the base-born and the noble. It is not confined to any one class. In some instances it is hereditary; in others, acquired. To the extent to which it is hereditary, no change in the mere environment can prevent its appearance. The world will always have its share of hereditary geniuses just as it will always have its share of hereditary sub-normals.

MOST of our geniuses, or deviants toward the super-normal, have come from what today we call the middle-class. Nearly all studies of human eminence confirm this fact. This may be due to heredity—to the fact that there are more genes of genius in the germ plasm in this particular social class than in the others. But it may be due to the fact that middle-class families nurture potential genius, develop it, and give it a better opportunity to express itself than it is given by families in either the richest or the poorest classes. There may therefore be such a thing as acquired genius—genius which comes into existence as a result of a favorable environment. The question we have then to ask is whether a change from our present manner of living toward Normal Living would lessen the probability of the development of such genius? I see no reason for thinking that it should. And there is one compelling reason for believing that, on the contrary, it would provide better conditions for the development of talent and genius.

As we shall see, *self-expression is a basic norm of living*. In a genuinely normal family, therefore, the environment in which the members live would encourage rather than discourage them in the realization of their potentialities. Even today there are countless instances in which the members of families have joined in sacrificing what they might have individually liked to do in order to make possible the education and cultivation of the talents of some one of their number. There is every reason for assuming that if normalization of family and community life became general, the encouragement and cultivation of genius and talent would increase rather than decrease.

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD

The proper study of mankind is man.—Pope

HAS civilized man accumulated the knowledge and wisdom needed for the formulation of norms of living? I believe he has, and I believe further that his total accumulation includes sufficient systematized and verified knowledge about human beings and human behavior to enable teachers of living to eliminate most of the serious pre-scientific errors of prophets and philosophers in the past.

Human behavior—the subject matter of observation and speculation by the greatest minds in all ages—has, it is true, changed enormously in form from age to age. Modern man's behavior, in form at least, is very different from that of medieval man; medieval man's from that of ancient man, and ancient man's from that of primitive man. But in essence the behavior of man as revealed in history and biography is surprisingly constant. Human nature, in its inherent characteristics, has not changed a particle in the milleniums since man evolved from *homo alalus* into *homo sapiens*. And because of this, the changes in his acquired characteristics have been changes in the form of his behavior rather than in their essence. What Socrates and Plato and Aristotle taught over two thousand years ago was based upon study of the same phenomenon—the behavior of

men upon the earth—as that which anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists today are studying. Even without the benefits of modern science, the first rate minds of all time have more to teach modern man, particularly concerning the integration and evaluation of the wealth of knowledge now available, than most of our modern specialists in minutiae equipped with all the latest instruments of science. There is need for digesting knowledge as well as accumulating it. To use all knowledge, both the traditional lore of the past and the scientific data of today, for the purpose of guiding mankind in living, it must be integrated and made usable by the individual by a mental process akin to the physical process of digestion.

I do not mean to suggest that we already know all that needs to be known. There are still enormous areas of knowledge about the problems of living unexplored and in need of scientific investigation. The more we learn about living, the more we discover that there is still to be learned. But this does not mean that with the knowledge which we now have, we cannot set up norms which would help human beings to live with a degree of satisfaction immeasurably greater than is the lot of most individuals today. Nor do I mean to suggest that there may not be other methods—perhaps better both in logic and scientifically—than those which I have used for the purpose of integrating some of this knowledge. All that I am saying is that what is needed to establish norms of living is not so much new scientific investigations as research into the facts and figures which are already available and awaiting evaluation and integration by willing hands. *All the major problems of living have been faced over and over again by the great minds of the past, and all the major solutions of the problems have been prescribed, and often tried over and over again, in the history of mankind.* At this moment, evaluation and integration is probably more important than additional accumulation of knowledge.

The methods available for this integration and evaluation of knowledge about living—or rather about those units or intervals in living which I call actions*—while necessarily not as exact as those available for inquiries in the physical sciences, are still sufficiently logical and verifiable to make conclusions based upon them rational rather than arbitrary, scientific rather than empiric, objective rather than subjective. Practically every method of scientific investigation can be used, including the historic method, the deductive, the inductive, the statistical, the experimental, and the comparative. My confidence in the possibility of establishing genuinely scientific norms is based mainly on the potentialities of three methods which I think of as (I) the deductive method; (II) the pragmatic method; and (III) the metric or homometric method.

IF THERE is even one thing about human life which we can assume to be normal, then we can use that one assumption as a criterion by which to distinguish between what is normal and abnormal; we can use it to establish by deduction both *norms of condition* and *norms of action*. As we shall see, there are at least three such assumptions which we can use. And by using all three of them, the validity of our deductions is increased geometrically rather than arithmetically. A condition, (like that of body weight), or of action, (like that of diet), which appears to be normal when tested by two of these assumptions, is at least four times as likely to be normal as when tested by only one; and when tested by three of them, at least nine times as likely to be normal as when tested by two. If we can establish the validity of these assumptions logically; if we can establish their validity both scientifically and artistically, and both in theory and in practice; and above all, if the assumptions themselves are concerned not with frag-

*In the precise sense in which I use the term *action*, man is always performing actions. Even when perfectly still or unconscious, he is still engaged in performing actions—he is *sitting* or *lying down*, and in any event must be *breathing* even when still, and if unconscious *sleeping*, and these are actions just as truly as are actions, like *walking*, which involve motions of some kind. Man always acts; he does not always move about. The full discussion of the implications of this important fact will be found in the second volume of this study.

mentary and secondary aspects of human life but with human life fundamentally and as a whole, then we can use the deductive method to establish norms of living with a high degree of confidence.

NO assumptions about the nature of *homo sapiens* are more generally accepted, and more thoroughly vindicated by reason and science, than the assumption that man has two basic instincts—two fundamental norms—hunger and sex. Or, as I think it more accurate to designate them, an instinctual drive for survival and self-preservation, and an instinctual drive for generation and self-reproduction.

THE THREE BASIC NORMS

It is *self-preservation* which drives every human being to hunt, to work, and to struggle for the goods which will keep him alive; which leads him to defend himself and if necessary fight for the things which he needs and desires, and which leads him to cooperate with his fellows in acquiring whatever he thinks necessary to the maintenance of his standard of living.

It is *self-reproduction*—the drive for the satisfaction of the sexual appetite—which leads men and women to mate; which leads women to bear children; which leads men to fight for their women and children, and which leads both individuals and the groups they organize to make whatever sacrifices are necessary or incidental to the production of progeny and the continuance of their families, their clans, their tribes, their nations, their races.

The argument for the use of the deductive method might be satisfactorily rested only upon the assumption of the reality of these two basic norms, not however because I think there are only two, but simply because the evidence for the existence of these two is so overwhelming. There is, however, ample evidence to establish the existence of three. I believe that man not only has (I) an instinctual *survival* drive which justifies testing his behavior and condition in terms of self-preservation; that he not only has (II) an instinctual *sexual* drive which justifies testing his behavior and condition in terms of self-reproduction; but that he also has (III) an instinctual *expressive* drive. I believe there is conclusive evidence establishing the fact that man has this third innate, hereditary, and inescapable instinct—a drive for the actualization of his ideals; for self-expression, self-realization, and self-perfection. I believe that he has, in Emerson's

words, "an instinct for perfection," which justifies us in testing conditions and behavior by the degree to which they enable man to express himself humanly.

If we can safely assume the existence of all three of these drives, it is possible to deduce much more accurate and much more complete norms of living than if we restricted ourselves to the universally accepted two. If only the tests of sex and hunger are used, the norms will be animalistic rather than humanistic; if all three are used, the norms become prescriptions for human beings rather than for two-legged animals.

The evidence and factual basis for the assumption of three, rather than two, basic instinctual drives is both scientific and artistic.

It is not rational to rely merely upon the evidence furnished by the natural sciences to determine what instincts are normal to man. To establish the facts about the matter in the case of *homo sapiens*, the evidence of the social sciences must also be used. But it is also not rational to rely only on the evidence furnished by anthropology, sociology, economics, and political science. It is actually irrational to attempt to form a true picture of the nature of man—and so determine the truth about whether he has or has not an inherent expressic drive—if the evidence furnished by his artistic and historic activities is ignored. History, biography, religion and philosophy, literature, poetry, music, the drama and the dance, furnish facts as real as biology and physics.

It may be true that the forms in which man expresses himself are conditioned and not innate; that they reflect his education and the culture of which he is a part. But what concerns us is not the question of form but of essence; of the essential truth of which the forms are merely changing appearances. The essential fact which emerges from the study of man's history and artistic activities is the perpetuity and universality not only of his drive to satisfy his craving for sex and survival, but also to satisfy his craving for expression.

SURVIVAL is a drive which man has *in common with all living creatures no matter how primordial*. THE SURVIVAL INSTINCT The cytological, botanical, and zoological evidence concerning this instinct is furnished by the life-cycles of all species of plants and animals ranging from single-celled

protozoa such as the *amœba* at one extreme, to mammals like *homo sapiens* at the other.

In the *amœba*, and all similar single-celled animals, there is only one instinctual drive—that of hunger and survival. The *amœba* is, for all practical purposes, nothing but a stomach. Sexuality, so far as we can tell, is non-existent. Reproduction, or more correctly binary fission* (the splitting into two individuals of each original individual), is as definitely a part of the *amœba*'s nutritional cycle as defecation is part of the nutritional cycle of man and the higher animals. Binary fission into two *amœbas* becomes essential after the animal has successfully nourished itself for a period of time; if the original *amœba* did not split into two, it would not continue to survive. In all these low forms of life, there is *duplication rather than reproduction*; duplication takes place not only without any manifestation of sexuality but without the phenomena of parents and progeny. The next generation is simply the original split into two *amœbas*; both are at one and the same time their own parents and their own progeny.

ON the other hand, the instinctive *sexual* drive is an instinct which man has *only in common with those organisms which reproduce by fertilization*.

THE SEXUAL INSTINCT

In all animals in which fertilization or conjugation of two individuals is characteristic of their life-cycle, we find not only an instinctive drive toward survival; we find also a similar drive toward sexuality. In protozoa like the *chilodon*, a minute fresh-water infusorium, it is difficult to say whether conjugation is a part of its nutritional cycle and manifestation of its drive for survival, or a part of a sexual cycle and manifestation of an instinct of generation. For the *chilodon* duplicates itself, like the *amœba*, for a considerable length of time by transverse division—by what seems like simple binary fission. But after a time it becomes physiologically necessary for the animal to conjugate; two *chilodons* place themselves side by side and partly fuse together; the nucleus of each divides into two

*In the binary fission of the *amœba* we have real *monogenesis*, with asexual reproduction. Asexual *reproduction*, which ought really to be designated asexual *duplication*, is a form of reproduction in which there is no prior conjugation of individuals or union of germ cells of different sexes; it is a form of reproduction found in species of plants and animals which generate not only by binary fission but also by multiple fission, spore formation, and budding.

portions; one portion passes each into the other to unite with the half nucleus of the other. Thereupon a period of renewed activity for each individual ensues manifested by rapid growth and duplication by division until weakening in the vital activities again create the recurring necessity of conjugation. The impelling cause of conjugation, however, is still in all probability not much more than sheer individual cell growth, and sexuality is potential rather than actual.

Beginning with this first manifestation of sexuality—of *bigenesis*§ as distinguished from *monogenesis*—it is possible to trace step by step in various plants and animals what ultimately becomes the distinct instinctive sexual drive which *homo sapiens* has in common with all the lowest and simplest forms of life. In the much higher hermaphroditic animals, such as the *earth-worm*, the distinction between the two instincts is already much sharper. The earth-worm is sexual but its sexuality is *monœcious*,† in contrast to the amœba, which is monogenetic and asexual. In the life-cycle of the earth-worm we find not only a distinct nutritional cycle but also a distinct genetic cycle, in contrast to the amœba in which duplication is still part and parcel of its nutritional cycle. It is true that each of the two worms which conjugate to generate progeny is both a male-and-female; each has both testicles and ovaries; but, unlike the chilodon, conjugation with another earth-worm is an invariable prerequisite to generation. There is no fission; we have instead distinct parents and distinct progeny.

As we rise higher in the scale of life, *diœcious*‡ forms of life begin to appear; the egg-cells and sperm-cells necessary to sexual reproduction are produced by individuals of different sexes, and sexuality in the fullest sense of the word develops. The individuals which produce egg-cells, or ova, are real females; and those which produce sperm-cells, or spermatozoa, real males. And the distinction between

§In all diœcious organisms—plants and animals with separate male and female individuals—reproduction is *bigenetic* and *sexual* and therefore requires cross-fertilization or conjugation by two individuals of opposite sexes. In the lower forms of life, sexual reproduction may mean merely fertilization by the union of egg-cells and sperm-cells in some manner; in all the higher forms of life—including man—it requires physical conjugation by a male and female.

†Monœcious plants, which have both male and female flowers on each individual, are called *monoicous*, while monœcious animals, which have both male and female organs of reproduction on each individual, are called *hermaphroditic*.

‡Diœcious plants and animals have male organs on one type of individuals of the species, (the male sex), and female reproductive organs on another type, (the female sex).

the nutritional cycle and the reproductive cycle, and the drive for survival and the drive for sexuality, is sharp in the extreme. It sharpens more and more as we pass from *fishes*, in which fertilization takes place outside of the mother's body, (the female fish lets her roe fall at favorable places usually secure against enemies; the male fish swims over the roe or spawn and pours its semen or milt over it), to *birds* in which the male has an organ or penis for the introduction of the semen into the body of the female and in which fertilization takes place inside the mother even though the fertilized eggs are laid and incubated outside of her body. But it is sharpest in the *mammals*, in which in addition to physical conjugation between male and female and fertilization within the body of the mother, (as in birds), the entire embryonic development of the fertilized ovum takes place in the uterus or womb of the mother's body.

THE SUBLIMATION OF SELF-PRESERVATION

IN a sense we may say that the evidence of evolution and biology indicates that sexuality is a kind of sublimation of self-preservation. Within every animal, including man, which reproduces sexually, there is a conflict between the drive for reproduction and for individual survival. Dramatically in the life-history of certain species of spiders, (in which the males fertilize the females in spite of the fact that they are eaten in the act by their monstrous paramours); of fishes like salmon, (in which both males and females struggle and if necessary die in the effort to reach their native spawning grounds); of animals like deer, (in which the bucks often kill one another in order to possess the does), there comes a time when sexuality makes them perfectly willing to sacrifice life itself in order to generate progeny. In most animals, however, hunger is subordinated to sex only during the rutting season. But in man hunger can always be subordinated—sex *sublimates hunger*.

THE EXPRESSIC INSTINCT

THE third instinctual drive which human beings alone among living creatures seem to possess in any form clearly distinguishable from hunger and sex, I think of as the drive for self-expression. This *expressic* instinct is that innate and presumably hereditary characteristic of man which drives him to struggle to realize and actualize potentialities peculiar to *homo sapiens*, and which leads him to devote

himself to arts and crafts and literary activities; to science and to invention and discoveries of all sorts; to both altruistic and egotistic forms of endeavor; to religious worship and the quest of immortality, salvation, and nirvana; and to philosophy and concern about the purposes to which life should be devoted.

In man, therefore, the evolution of the instincts goes one step further than in all other animals. Without turning to biography and history—to what furnishes a far better record of the characteristics which distinguish him from other animals than that furnished by science—there is ample evidence of the existence of this third instinct in the psycho-physiology of the life-cycle of man.

IN the beginning, during lactation and infancy, man displays only *one instinctual drive*, that of survival; he devotes himself to only one activity, the satisfaction of his hunger—the fulfillment of the nutritional cycle essential to sheer growth.

In early childhood—from infancy onward, according to Freud—he begins to show signs of sexuality and lays the foundation for the development of his *second instinctual drive*. Puberty is the culminating event in this development. At some time after puberty, in both men and women, this drive for the satisfaction of sexuality and for the fulfillment of the reproductive cycle, becomes, if anything, more powerful than that of survival.

But not long after he emerges from early childhood, he shows signs of the development of what I believe to be his *third instinctual drive*; he tries to express himself and begins to develop an individual personality. It is true that there is evidence of the development of personality in animals; all cats, all dogs, all horses, all cows do not have the same personalities, and even in a state of nature, without domestication, personality differences are found in baboons and in even lower species of animals. But only in man has self-expression developed characteristics so different from anything found among other animals, as to warrant recognition as a norm as basic as those of self-reproduction and self-preservation.

It is, of course, probable that Freud was right in calling attention to the evidence that these higher developments in man were intimately related to his sex-life, and in referring to them as the sublimation of sexuality. But this really involves no denial of the proposition

that self-expression is a distinct instinctual drive in man. Any more than the sublimation of the drive for survival by the drive for sexual satisfaction, involves a denial of the existence of a distinct sexual instinct. If Freud was right in saying that self-expression involves the sublimation of sexuality, then it is equally correct to say that self-expression involves the sub-sublimation of the drive for survival.

This last instinctual drive, (this sublimation of the sexual drive, if you will, or sub-sublimation of the drive for survival), manifests itself in many forms of which the most distinctive are language, artistry, and possession.

THERE is really nothing new in the idea of attaching such great LANGUAGE significance to the fact that *man alone is capable of expressing himself in words*. Countless scientists, philosophers, and sages* have called attention to the significance of this uniquely human attribute; it is not necessary to dwell at length upon the subject. It is sufficient to point out that while with other animals "speech" is reflexive, with man it is a means not only of communication but of abstraction.

*Many illustrations of this are found in religious writings of which Christian writings dealing with *Logos* are perhaps best known. Many interesting examples are found in less well known religious writings. For instance:

"And if thou desirest to have this intent (the grace of contemplation) lapped and folden in one word, so that thou mayest have better hold thereupon, take thee but a little word of one syllable, for so it is better than of two; for the shorter the word, the better it accordeth with the work of the spirit. And such a word is this word GOD or this word LOVE. Choose whichever thou wilt, or another; whatsoever word thou likest best of one syllable. And fasten this word to thy heart that so it may never go thence for anything that befalleth. The word shall be thy shield and thy spear, whether thou ridest on peace or war. With this word thou shalt beat on this cloud and this darkness above thee. With this word thou shalt smite down all manner of thought under the cloud of forgetting. Inasmuch that, if any thought press upon thee to ask what thou wouldst have, answer with no more words than with this one word (GOD or LOVE). And if he offer of his great learning to expound to thee that one word, say to him that thou wilt have it all whole, and not broken or undone. And if thou wilt hold fast to this purpose, be sure that thought will no while bide."—The Cloud of Unknowing, THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY, Aldous Huxley, p. 277.

Here was the Christian mystic, but the Mahomeddan mystic attaches similar significance to the use of language:

"The shayk took my hand and led me into the convent. I sat down in the portico, and the shayk picked up a book and began to read. As is the way of scholars, I could not help wondering what the book was. The shayk perceived my thoughts. 'Abu Sa'id,' he said, 'all the hundred and twenty-four thousand prophets were sent to preach one word. They bade the people say, 'Allah,' and devote themselves to Him. Those who heard this word by the ear alone let it go out by the other ear;

WITH the word *artistry* used, not in its studio-meaning but broadly, with reference to the fact that so many of man's acts and activities are endowed with characteristics utterly divorced from mere survival or sexuality, we may say that *man alone is capable of expressing himself artistically*. Other animals act, but their acts either reflect mere impulse, or are preservative or genitive, (when they gather or fight for food, or court and build nests for their young). Man alone acts self-consciously for the sake of the good, the true and the beautiful; man alone reasons; men only are scientists and artists.

FINALLY, *man alone is capable of expressing himself in possessions*. Other animals, it is true, may be said to be possessive—the squirrel hides his nuts; the beaver builds his house; the bee stores honey and possesses its hive, but man alone expresses in his possessions—in his clothes, in the furnishings of his home, in the architecture of his institutions—that which satisfies needs and desires other than those of hunger and sex.



The sum and substance of the matter amounts to this: expression is a basic norm of man; the individual of the species *homo sapiens* must express in his life the aspirations he clothes in words; he must try to actualize his abstractions and ideals in his arts and in his possessions, or, to the degree in which he fails, he fails to be human; he ceases to act like a normal human being.

THAT man has two basic instincts in common with all animals, is true, but the fact must not be forgotten that in man they are capable of variation to a degree impossible with other animals. In man all the instincts are malleable and plastic; they are self-controllable and self-

but those who heard it with their souls imprinted it on their souls and repeated it until it penetrated their hearts and souls, and their whole beings became this *word*. They were made independent of the pronunciation of the *word*; they were released from the sound of the letters. Having understood the spiritual meaning of this *word*, they became so absorbed in it that they were no more conscious of their own non-existence."—Abu Sa'id, *Ibid.*, p. 278.

In Hinduism, the *word* is OM—a spoken symbol that concentrates within itself the whole Vedanta philosophy. (The italics are mine.—R. B.)

directible; they can even be frustrated and denied by the individual himself. In other animals it is impulse alone which controls and directs; there is no animal self or ego with the power of denying or frustrating them. If they are in fact frustrated, as of course they often are, it is by natural forces outside the animal itself; very frequently by that outside force represented by mankind. All the domestic animals, for instance, are examples of man's ability to control and direct, and often entirely frustrate—as in the case of the capon, the barrow, the steer, and the gelding—the animal's normal instinctual behavior.

When human beings deny sexuality, as in genuine adult virginity, they do not destroy the sexual instinct, because they cannot; what they do is to frustrate its normal form of expression. When a human being decides that life is not worth living and commits suicide; when we teach a soldier to expose himself to battle and to die; when a religious fanatic persuades himself to accept martyrdom, man does not establish that he has no instinct for self-preservation; what he proves is merely that in responding to ideas—to the manifestations of his expressic instinct—he has the power to frustrate it. It is this power, which may be the cause or may be the effect of the plasticity of his instincts, which distinguishes man from other animals more than any other characteristic.

What this means is that no action or behavior is normal which precludes the harmonious satisfaction of all three of man's basic instinctual drives and basic norms.

#

Using the deductive method and applying it to a specific type of human being and form of human behavior, it is possible to say that childless women are abnormal. As we shall see, it is possible to deductively establish much less obvious norms of behavior.

#

Deductively we may distinguish between the normal and the abnormal by assuming that all actions and activities which do not and cannot satisfy man's fundamental instinctual drives harmoniously, are abnormal; that *only those acts and patterns of action which involve no frustration of the basic survival, sexual, and expressic instincts are normal.*

PRAGMATICALLY we can establish norms for living—norms of action rather than norms of condition—by determining, in one field after another, how alternative ways of living work; how well they succeed or fail in enabling the individual to maintain life and health, to generate progeny and satisfy his sexual needs, and to express himself like a human being.¶ We may sum up the pragmatic method by saying that it is *a method for distinguishing between activities which are normal and those which are not by the test of the way in which they work.*



Superficially we are tempted to say that the dietary habits of the American people *work*; that they must represent an acceptable way of dealing with one kind of living problem, even if they do not represent a theoretically normal diet. It is a temptation to say that ours is a good diet, if for no other reason than that we now live longer *on the average* than in the past, before we adopted our present diet composed mainly of refined and industrialized foodstuffs. Most of us are therefore tempted to dismiss people who talk much about diet as cranks.

But if we consider what we can learn—not without the difficulty of disregarding the mis-education to which we have been subjected by the advertising of our food industry—about the way in which our diet actually works, we will be driven to conclude that the prevailing diet of modern man is manifestly not a normal diet; that on the contrary, it must be an abnormal diet; for in truth it does not work well at all.* If life expectancy is increasing in spite of this, it must be increasing despite our dietary habits and not because of them. When we really examine how it works, we find that practically everybody in America suffers from constipation—most of the drugs in our drug-stores consist of laxatives and purgatives. We find that the American

¶THE WHEEL OF HEALTH, by G. T. Wrench, (C. W. Daniel Co., London, 1938), is an evaluation of alternative dietetic and other patterns of living, in which the normality of the pattern of one people—the Hunzas of India—is established in terms of longevity and health, (p. 26); in terms of heredity and virility, (p. 47); and in terms of craftsmanship and artistry, (p. 19).

*An early study of the abnormality of the modern American diet will be found in STARVING AMERICA, Alfred W. McCann, 1918; a recent study of the subject is THE NATIONAL MALNUTRITION, D. T. Quigley, Lee Foundation for Nutritional Research, Milwaukee, 1943.

people have the worst teeth in the world; that they nearly all suffer from colds and chronic catarrh; finally, that while there has been a gratifying decrease in the death rate from certain diseases, there has been an apparently inexplicable increase in deaths from what are called degenerative diseases—heart disease, cancer, diabetes. It is not difficult by careful analysis of data of this kind, all of which is directly or indirectly related to the dietetic habits of America, to conclude that the way in which our diet works is in fact very abnormal.

To determine what is normal, not only scientific experimentation but also historical, anthropological, and geographic research is necessary.† If we find that the diet of people elsewhere in the world, or of some primitive people, or even the diet of our own ancestors at some particular period in the past, works better than our present diet, then we have a basis for determining what is a more normal diet than our diet of today—a diet which represents what the food industry has persuaded us to consume not for our good but manifestly for its own. If we find that a diet of whole wheat flour instead of white flour; of clean raw milk instead of dirty milk which has been pasteurized; of honey or molasses instead of white sugar, works better than our present diet; if we have less constipation, better teeth, fewer colds, and suffer less from degenerative diseases, we can begin to establish norms of eating. Even without turning to laboratories for scientific verification of what we have learned, we can safely assume that a normal diet must consist mainly of whole and natural foods; that a diet consisting mostly of highly refined foodstuffs is an abnormal diet. It happens to be the case that we have an enormous amount of scientific verification for such a norm.‡ Establishing norms for eating is mainly a matter of integrating and evaluating what is already known about the way in which various foods and combinations of food work.

Mankind fortunately embarked on this important matter of establishing norms of living long before the development of modern science. From the beginning it established them pragmatically and embodied

†An excellent illustration of this kind of research is *NUTRITION AND PHYSICAL DEGENERATION*, Weston A. Price, Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1939. The sub-title of the book is "A Comparison of Primitive and Modern Diets and Their Effects." It could have been called equally well "a comparison . . . of the way they work."

‡In the *CHEMISTRY OF FOOD AND NUTRITION*, Henry C. Sherman, Macmillan Co., 1937, calls such a norm the "principle of natural and nutritional wholes."

them in its traditional lore, traditional folkways, and traditional wisdom. It is perfectly ridiculous to assume that all this traditional lore must be discarded now that we enjoy the blessings of science. We have much for which to be grateful in science, but one thing for which scientists will have to answer is the headlong manner in which they have led modern man to discard a traditional way of doing something before that traditional way had been subjected to adequate investigation. We have in tradition, as distinguished from fashion—even when the fashion is a scientific one—an epitome of the experience of mankind. Instead of discarding all prescriptions for behavior based upon tradition in toto, we should discard only its errors and superstitions and retain those parts of it which work until really better, (and not just newer), methods are developed. In addition, now that the thrall-dom of total tradition has ended, each individual can in his own life-time experiment pragmatically first with the old and then, if he can throw off the thrall-dom of Progress, with the new.

FINALLY we can establish norms of living *metrically*—or homometrically, as I think of mathematical and statistical methods when applied not to the problems of science, of government, of pedagogy, much less of industry and engineering, but to the problems of man. We can establish both *norms of action*, (as for instance with regard to *eating*), and *norms of condition*, (both physiological conditions, such as *weight*, and psychological states, such as *sanity*), and we can formulate these terms *numerically*. Instead of being satisfied with saying that fat men are over-weight and thin men under-weight, the metric method makes it possible for us to say that every man 5 ft. 6 in. in height who weighs less than 129 pounds is under-weight and every man of that height who weighs more than 157 pounds is over-weight. We would then be distinguishing between normal and abnormal conditions in numbers on the basis of a norm which ranges between 129 and 157 pounds for men 5 ft. 6 in. in height.* As we shall see, the metrical method may be used to formulate norms for dealing with all sorts of problems which most people think much more complex than that of body-weight.

*Statistical Bulletin Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., New York, June 1943, Vol. 24, No. 6, p. 7. On the basis of this study, the "ideal" weight of men with "small frames" 5 ft. 6 in. in height, ranges between 129 and 136; with "medium frames," between 134 and 144; with "large frames," between 145 and 157.

A SIMPLE illustration will help make clear the manner in which EATING statistics can be used to formulate norms of living.

Eating is an action. The diet of an individual, or of a family, or of a people represents a pattern of action. If all the time devoted to earning the money with which to buy food, to preparing and serving it, to the act of eating itself, and finally—in the case of modern man—to the time needed to pay for the medical consequences of eating the refined foods he has been taught to eat, is taken into account, not less than forty and often over fifty per cent of the whole time of living is devoted to eating and all that it involves.

But the problem of eating in all but one period in the life-cycle of man is so complex that its consideration would take too much time now when we are concerned not so much with normal eating as with methods of establishing norms of any kind. Eating during infancy; eating only during what I think of as the *lactation period of the life-cycle*, furnishes a relatively simple subject for investigation. What light does the use of the metrical method throw upon the question of the norm of this particular aspect of the problem of eating?

A statistical study* of the feeding of 20,061 infants in Chicago, unfortunately covering only the first nine months of their lives, showed that the death rate for those *artificially fed* was 8.4 per cent; for those *partially breast fed*, 0.7 per cent; for those *wholly breast fed*, 0.15 per cent. Here is a slaughter of innocents by women who follow modern fashions and who practice what they have been taught by Advertising and Salesmanship, fifty-six times as great as the death rate of the children of mothers who observe the norm confirmed by this study and embedded in the traditional lore of every people not yet subject to modern mis-education.

The study is, of course, inadequate. It is wrong on at least three counts: (I) it correlates premature death with three kinds of feeding methods, but does so for only nine months of the life of the selectees. It should show the relationship of premature death during the whole period of life affected by right or wrong methods of feeding during the lactation period. If this were done, the death rate for those artificially fed would be many times higher than indicated by the study.

*Quoted from the League of Nations Committee on The Problem of Nutrition, Interim Report, Vol. I, in *THE WHEEL OF HEALTH*, G. T. Wrench, p. 49.

(II) Secondly, it does not take into account disease, both physical and emotional, during the whole period of life which can be traced to the bottle-feeding of milk and use of artificial foods. (III) Finally, it does not take into account both the individuals most directly concerned—the mother and child. Failure to fulfill the functions of the mammary glands has profound effects, both physical and emotional, upon women. As a matter of fact, the woman aspect of the matter is the more important, for if we establish what constitutes the norm of behavior for woman, we automatically establish what is normal for her child.

Actually we are dealing not with one but with two problems: infant nutrition, and use of the mammary glands. A really adequate study would formulate the governing norm in terms not of how to feed infants but of how often in life a woman should use her mammary glands, (or how many children she should bear), and how long her breasts should be milked by a child each time in order to assure optimal longevity and health, (both physical and emotional), to both mother and child. The variations now practiced in both regards are enormous, ranging from zero use of the glands (and zero time of milking) in all truly modern women, to use of the glands a dozen or more times during the whole maternity span and for periods often of three years or more each time a child is born. Such a study would develop the normal range for this particular activity. And it would probably show that the normal range is from three to eight children, and lactation each time from 18 months to three years; that anything less than this, or more than this, is abnormal for both mother and child, for family and society, and for humanity as a whole.

COMMON USAGE equates the word *dwelling* with the word *house*. DWELLING
The word *dwelling*, however, is really the present participle of the verb *to dwell*. Dwelling, as it is here used, is not *a thing*; it is *an act*. Among the acts and patterns of action which revolve around the act of dwelling are sleeping, eating, resting and playing at *home*; for most men, commutation between work and *home*; for most women, working at *home*; for children, (in addition to the common activities of the family), commutation between school and *home*. From the *home* the members of the family vote; from it they go to church; around the *home* revolves their social activities. The foundation act, which de-

termines all the acts and habits which dwelling generates, is *the act of choosing the place of dwelling*.



In the following illustration of the use of the metrical method, statistics about *conditions*, (those of major psychiatric disorder*), are correlated with statistics about *actions*, (those of dwelling in communities of different densities of population). While the *explicit* purpose of the original correlation was not the determination of what I call a normal range of behavior, its *implicit* purpose was the establishment of such a range.

In 1944 Hyde and Kingsley made a study† of the major causes of mental rejections in 60,000 selectees for service in World War II, and of the density of the populations of the communities from which they came. All the selectees were examined by the same team of psychiatric examiners using the same criteria for diagnosis, at the Boston Armed Forces induction station during the winter, spring and summer of 1941-1942. The area from which the selectees came—the eastern segment of Massachusetts within 35 miles of the sea-coast—includes wealthy suburban communities, cities with active industries, poor industrial cities of low economic status, towns and villages of less than 2,000 population of varying economic status, some isolated rural communities, and finally, city slums in which all the distressing features of extreme poverty are found. The area tested is not, of course, perfectly representative of the nation generally. Most of New England, and particularly this section of it, has been heavily urbanized and industrialized for many generations. Between the West, with its fertile land, and the cities with their glitter, the smaller communities and rural regions of the area have been drained of their healthiest and most ambitious young people for almost a century. But even though the area

*Major psychiatric disorders are defined as (I) *mental deficiency*—mental age below 10 years; (II) *psychopathic personality*—inability to profit by experience and respond in an adult social manner; (III) *chronic alcoholism*—habitual use to a point of social or physical disability; (IV) *psychoneurosis*—conversion symptoms, hysterical paralysis, vasomotor disturbances, excessive concern over minor or imaginary bodily ailments, obsessions, compulsions, phobic manifestations, and emotional disturbances; (V) *psychosis*.

†“Studies in Medical Sociology,” Major Robert W. Hyde, M.C., A.U.S. and Sergeant Lowell V. Kingsley, A.U.S., “The New England Journal of Medicine,” Vol. 231, No. 16, Oct. 19, 1944; No. 17, Oct. 26, 1944; No. 18, Nov. 2, 1944.

is not a perfect sample upon which to base such a study, it is still representative enough to make its lesson portentous.

The age limits for the first 6,000 men were between 21 and 34, and and for the remaining 54,000 between 21 and 44, inclusive. Most of the selectees were unmarried, and no fathers with children born before Pearl Harbor were included. Here again, a perfect sample would have included a proportion of men, women, and children of all ages, and not men only considered suitable for military service. But though not perfect, the sample used is still sufficiently representative of the population in general "to point a moral, and adorn a tale."

The relationship of the percentage rejected for all major psychiatric disorders, to the density of the population of the communities in which they dwelt, was as follows:†


DENSITY PER SQUARE MILE	NO. EXAMINED	PER CENT REJECTED
Less than 500	2,856	12.1
500-999	4,478	7.5
1,000-1,999	6,340	8.5
2,000-4,999	8,056	9.2
5,000-9,999	13,322	9.5
10,000-1,999	14,108	10.6
20,000 or over	10,840	14.0

The rates for all communities with population densities of over 500 per square mile show a step-like increase in mental disorders, ranging from 7.5 per cent to 14.0 per cent, with each increase in population density. The sanest communities were those with population densities of between 500 and 999 per square mile. The worst, large cities with population densities of over 20,000 per square mile. On the other hand, the most isolated communities were almost as bad. What does all this mean, assuming that mental disorder is *prima facie* evidence of abnormality? It means that the normal range for dwelling is in communities with a density of population ranging between 500 and 999 per square mile. Dwelling either in communities or regions so isolated as to number less than 500 persons to a square mile, or so congested as to number over 1,000 per square mile, is abnormal.

But it should be pointed out that this study alone is not sufficient to establish a definitive norm of dwelling. The region selected for study is not sufficiently representative; the selectees are suggestive rather than really indicative of *homo sapiens* generally; above all,

†Ibid., No. 18, p. 572, Table I.

only one criterion of normality was used—the rate of mental disorder. To establish the true norm, the region would have to be really representative of all kinds of communities—rural and urban; commercial and industrial and mineral; sea-coast and interior, plains and mountains. The selectees would have to be really representative of humanity as a whole—old and young; men, women, and children. Above all, *criteria falling into at least three entirely different categories would have to be used.* Psycho-physiological criteria like *insanity* and *longevity* are perfectly good but by themselves not sufficient. In addition, entirely different criteria—economic criteria like *wealth* and *dependency*; moral criteria like *larceny* and *homicide*; educational criteria like *literacy*; esthetic criteria like *art and craft*. And these criteria of normalcy would have to be superimposed on on top of another. The manner in which this would tend to both shift the range about and widen or narrow it until it became truly definitive, can be shown most clearly by means of a diagram:



Fragmentary as is this particular study from the standpoint of homometry, (since it evaluates the problem of dwelling only from the standpoint of psychiatry), it nevertheless makes it perfectly plain that we are criminally mis-educating the people of the nation. In spite of this demonstration of the abnormality of both the over-cer

tralization and over-decentralization of population, our schools continue *to teach*, our real estate and building industry continues *to sell*, and our government—as for instance in using its taxing power to subsidize public housing—*to coerce* the people to abandon dwelling in small communities and rural regions, and to dwell in densely congested urban centers, the bigger the better!



At least four steps are involved in establishing definitive norms of living metrically: (I) Selecting a *representative* sample of mankind for study. If the norm to be established deals with all of mankind, an adequate sample of the *entire* population; if with only one sex, a typical sample of the *whole* of one sex; if with only one period of the life-cycle, as *infancy*, or *male adolescence*, or the *maternity span*, a sample limited to selectees of that period only.* (II) Correlating statistics dealing with the action or condition for which a norm is being established with *conditions* in the case of *norms of action*, or with *actions* in the case of *norms of condition*. (III) Superimposing upon one such correlation at least three criteria each of an *entirely different nature*. (IV) Establishing as the norm, the range of actions (or conditions) which multiple correlation establishes as common to all the criteria used.

Though this is multiple correlation, it is not the arbitrary, merely mathematical correlation with which it will be easy for lovers of statistics to confuse it. Its essence is not correlation but integration—integration of the fragmented data available in such enormous quantities in biometry, psychometry, sociometry, and econometry, in order to throw light upon how *homo sapiens* should live.



Confirmed sceptics, even if they might be persuaded to admit the possibility of metrical norms applicable to such seemingly simple

*There are two ways in which it is possible to make the samples representative: one *positive*, using selectees representative of the total population; and the other *negative*, using selectees representative only of abnormals in the population. The second is the easier to use. The final result should be the same. For instance, in showing that 7.5 per cent of the population in communities ranging in population from 500 to 999 persons per square mile have major mental disorders, the fact was also established that 92.5 per cent of the population in such communities does not.

problems as those of eating and dwelling, may deny the possibility of using homometry for the purpose of establishing norms applicable to what they think the much more difficult social, economic, and political problems confronting mankind. After years of experimenting with the method in every one of these fields, there is not the slightest question in my mind about two things: first, that this particular form of multiple correlation can be used successfully in formulating norms of all kinds; secondly, that there is sufficient statistical material available with which to begin the establishment of norms upon which to base the social, economic, and political re-organization—and normalization—of mankind.

CHAPTER X.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART I.

THE NORMAL INDIVIDUAL

SECTION I.

THE BIFURCATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Promiscuity, polygamy, polyandry, partial marriages—obliging those joined together for a portion only of the week or of the month, and permitting simultaneously a dozen or twenty unions—monogamy, exogamic marriage, all these will be found to exist capriciously in the different human societies.—Charres Letourneau.

IT IS only being realistic to speak of the *atomization of the individual* in the modern world. For an atom, in its original meaning, was that ultimate unit of matter which admitted of no division either mechanical or chemical; it was not only ultimate but because really considered ultimate was assumed to be a perfect and complete representative of one species of matter. The prevailing tendency to treat the individual as though individuals were the ultimate units of society; to assume that in the eyes of the state, of the law, of industry and business, of education and all other social institutions, individuals should be considered sexless. This tendency to treat men and women as though they were alike, and not different, is one of the most fantastically unrealistic and unscientific of all modern tendencies. For the most conspicuous fact about *homo sapiens* as an individual

is sex and mating; every individual is sexually either masculine or feminine;* neither statutes nor customs can alter the fact that no individual alone and by himself is an ultimate and complete unit of mankind.†

The further fact that human beings can only come into existence by reason of the copulation of these two quite different kinds of individuals—that the race can only be continued by the mating of the sexes—and that the young of the species can only be reared to independence and maturity as a result of co-operation and association of many kinds between the members of a family group of some kind, furnishes climacteric proof of the truth that the individual, whether male or female, is an incomplete and partial being; that no individual living alone can be considered a normally organized and functioning unit of the species to which he belongs; that the individual is, in short, a fraction of which the whole integer is a family. For mating and

*The hermaphrodite is no exception to this norm because he is not a normal individual; he is a psycho-physiologically abnormal creature; he is, like a dwarf or giant, biologically a monster. Neither do homosexuals or other psychically as contrasted with physiologically inverted individuals, constitute exceptions. The mere fact that in the modern world a substantial minority of individual men and women, estimated usually at three percent of the population, consists of such abnormal, has to be disregarded in establishing norms for normal living. A genuinely normal pattern of living would aim at the reduction and elimination of such individuals by eugenic marriage, by re-education, and perhaps by sterilization, isolation, institutionalization, and even euthanasia, not at reorganizing society or reconstituting the mores and folkways for their benefit.

†Gina Lombroso discusses this: "We see nature, in all its evolutions, always trying to differentiate the male from the female, to awaken in the female qualities which make her most apt to fulfill her functions of continuing the species, and to guarantee between father and mother differences which will facilitate differentiation. Animals and plants, which were first female, then hermaphrodite, then monoic, gradually evolved toward the differentiation of sex, for progress, evolution and life are possible only through this differentiation. It should be noted that where this differentiation has not already been attained, as in certain monoic plants, nature obtains it by proterandry, proterogyny or heterostyly—means by which she tries to conquer monoicism or at least replace it by dioecism, where the latter does not already exist. If therefore nature at its very beginning, even in plants, takes so much pains to separate the sexes and to make them different; if she has made this difference more marked as one passes from the lower plants to the higher, and then to savage and civilized races, one must at least look twice before starting out along the opposite road in an effort to revert to a single type from which nature has evolved with so much pain and care." *THE SOUL OF WOMAN*, by Gina Lombroso, p. 264.

marriage is only a first step toward completion and perfection of the individual: full maturation and normalization requires family life.

NO individual can remain truly sane, or even healthy, without mating, and no woman whole and healthy without bearing children. Yet in spite of the fact that not even a hermit can come into existence adult and complete, like a factory-made product,* the isolated and atomized individual is a common fact in modern society. Over ten per cent of all the so-called families occupying separate households

*Even if an individual "does not know his own father," as the saying goes, he usually knows a mother. Even foundlings, who know neither father or mother, have to be brought up by some sort of foster-family even though it be nothing better than an orphan asylum. The individual simply cannot come into existence at all without the benefit of some sort of minimal family association.

As might be expected, Sigmund Freud developed a parallel line of thought, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, but emphasized sexual fractionalism rather than social or genetic fractionalism. "Are we to . . . make," he asks, "the daring assumption that living substance was at the time of its animation rent into small particles, which since that time strive for reunion by means of the sexual instincts? That these instincts—in which the chemical affinity of inanimate matter is continued—passing through the realm of the protozoa gradually overcame all hindrances set to their striving by an environment charged with stimuli dangerous to life, and are impelled by it to form a protecting covering layer? And that these dispersed fragments of living substance thus achieved a multicellular organization, and finally transfer to the germ-cells in a highly concentrated form the instinct for reunion?" He calls attention to two striking myths which show how widespread has been the recognition of the idea of individual fractionalism. The first is a Platonic myth recorded in the "Symposium:" "Human nature was once quite other than now. Originally there were three sexes, three and not two as today: beside the male and female sex there existed a third sex which had an equal share in the two first . . . In these beings everything was double: thus, they had four hands and four feet, two faces, two genital parts, and so on. Then Zeus allowed himself to be persuaded to cut these beings in two, as one divides pears to stew them . . . When all nature was thus divided in this way, to each human being came the longing for his own other half, and the two halves embraced and entwined their bodies and desired to grow together again." Essentially the same idea is found in another myth recorded in the Upanishads. Freud quotes the following description of the creation of the world from the Atman, (the self or ego); from the Brihad-Aranyaka 1, 4, 3: "Nor did he, (the Atman), experience any joy, and for that reason no one has joy when he is alone. So he longed for a partner. He was as big as a woman and a man together when they embrace. He divided himself into two parts, which made a husband and wife. This body is therefore one half of the self, according to Yajñalkya. And for the same reason this empty space becomes filled by the woman."

The Biblical account of the creation of individual human beings in Genesis I:27 is identical in essential thought: "And God created man in his own image—male and female he created them." God must therefore be either sexless or an hermaphrodite as Honore de Balzac suggested in *SERAPHITA*.

in America consist of individuals living alone, and the proportion of such so-called families is constantly increasing.§

But for the vast majority of individuals, even in the abnormal modern world, some kind of family and married life is still the most fundamental fact in their existence. They are raised in a family; they rarely cease having relations of some sort with their parents even though they may live in rooming houses of some kind far away from them; they usually marry and then organize a conventional modern family of their own. Individuals who do not marry usually find a substitute for married sexuality in promiscuity, prostitution or perversion. For home life, single men and women substitute boarding or sleeping in rooming houses and eating in restaurants.



The atomized individual of today is more and more frequently rejecting the normal means for completing himself or herself in family life. But he cannot in that way escape the consequences of his refusal. The penalty for trying to live in disregard of this norm of living is invariably partial or total physiological and emotional abnormality. If the atomization is pushed too far, life ceases to be worth living; the individual escapes first into neurosis, then into psychosis, and finally escapes altogether in suicide. The penalty for teaching mankind and organizing social life in disregard of this fact is, first, the disorganization of the family, then its disintegration, and ultimately the destruction of social order through mass-frustration, degeneration, sterility and voluntary race-suicide of the individuals upon which it is dependent.†

All the evidence of anthropology and sociology, of psychiatry and medical physiology, and of human biology in all its branches, indi-

§In 1930, 7.9 per cent of all "families" consisted of one person only; by 1940 the proportion increased to 10.1 per cent. The proportion of all small families is also increasing; the proportion of large families decreases correspondingly. For instance in 1930, 23.4 per cent of all families consisted of two persons only; by 1940 the proportion was 25.7 per cent. Source: Sixteenth Census.

†All forms of Totalitarianism, including both Communism and Fascism, assume that the atomized individual can complete himself by reducing himself to a cog in the machinery of the total state. Totalitarianism, (the ideology really ought to be designated by its classic term of Despotism), therefore furnishes no real solution of the problem of the atomized individual; it is merely the product of industrialized man's despair; it is really the beginning of his total end as a personality and a normal human being.

cates that courtship and copulation, mating and marriage, and home and family life are both psychological and physiological‡ necessities if men and women are to live their lives like normal human beings. It is necessary for mankind to recognize, in the organization of its pattern of living, not only the gross fact that *homo sapiens* reproduces sexually but the crowning advantage of sexual as compared with asexual reproduction. For sexual reproduction not only favors the emergence of new variations, it makes possible the evolution of higher forms of life. If men and women were taught to substitute voluntary eugenic mating for mere romantic love, account would be taken of the fact that mankind alone has the power not only to avoid producing sub-normal progeny but also to produce progeny nearer and nearer to a genuinely human norm.

The individual need of marriage and family life is therefore no mere surviving folkway, having its roots in the dogmas of religion or superstitions inherited from primitive ancestors; it has its source in the bifurcation of the individual, in the physical and mental differences of the two sexes, and the control which this enables individuals to exercise over future generations of mankind.

PRIOR to the “emancipation of woman,” and particularly during the triumph of the Victorian conception of masculinity and femininity, women were not only considered different but also unequal and inferior to men. Into this long accepted folk belief, the feminists, (beginning in England with Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin in 1792 with

MASCULINITY vs. FEMININITY

‡All the evidence indicates that it is impossible to rear a normal human being unless infancy and childhood, at the very least, is spent in a home and family in which emotional security for mother and child is an indubitable fact. Promiscuous breeding of human beings—as prescribed by the ideology of Free Love, with state responsibility for the child—provides no such security. To provide it there must be a secure marital relationship between mother and father, (long enough to raise their children), and the parents must feel the security provided by the possession of a homestead and of other productive property sufficient to enable them to support themselves. The state can, of course, provide a substitute for this. But if the state takes over this function from the family, the state will eventually assert the right to prescribe when and what kind of children shall be borne. In this respect Nazi German practice and Soviet Russian practice were both ruthlessly logical—the Soviet government deliberately adopted the policy of eliminating “kulaks” and other so-called “anti-social” classes, and the Nazi government that of preventing the birth of Jews and other so-called “non-Aryan” nationalities. The state’s intrusion into this field results not only in destroying the emotional security of the proscribed classes but of all individuals, since everybody lives subject to a regime in which anybody might, at any time, suffer similar proscriptions.

her VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN, and in America with the convention organized in 1848 by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony and Lucretia Mott), threw the bomb-shell of the "equality of the sexes." At that time women were perpetual minors in the eyes of the law. They existed legally only through their husbands or fathers. They could be taxed, but they could not vote. They could earn money, but they could not own it. They could suffer the birth of children but they had no legal rights over them. This false ideology, based upon the idea of the inferiority of woman, was challenged and eventually replaced by an equally false ideology based upon the idea of the equality of the two sexes. The obvious truth about the matter is that while the sexes have many characteristics in common, they have enormously important characteristics in which they are not only different but in which one is superior in some respects and inferior in others.

The consequences of organizing life upon the basis of the mistaken ideology which prevailed in the patriarchal past were sometimes comic and oftentimes tragic. The consequences, however, of trying to live in accordance with the prevailing ideology is proving that the ideology of equality is no more normal than that of male supremacy.

In the past, all men were trained to think of themselves as virile and dominant; to indulge in "manly" dissipations; to quarrel about their "honor;" to be chivalrous to women because of their physical and intellectual "inferiority." On the other hand, women were taught to be submissive, modest, coy, clinging vines; to indulge in fainting; to avoid the higher learning; to confine themselves to cooking, house-keeping and motherhood. What was even worse, all the institutions of society—marital, occupational, possessional, legal and civic—were organized upon this mistaken theory of male superiority and female inferiority.

The substitution of the prevailing ideology of equality for the ideology of masculine superiority, has resulted merely in substituting one mistaken set of ideas for another, and of superimposing a new set of mistaken institutions upon an older mistaken set. For at least a full generation it has been the prevailing habit to emphasize the similarities between the sexes. To an extraordinary extent all modern institutions reflect this emphasis. As a result both men and women today receive the same educations; both are supposed to hold money-

making jobs; both are supposed to leave homemaking to institutions like hotels and restaurants; both are to play—and to dissipate—in the same ways, and both, if they are to be truly equal in the modern way, are to abandon fatherhood and motherhood. Only by eliminating pregnancy and maternity, can women reduce the differences between the sexes to a minimum.

From this dilemma there is only one rational way of escape, and that is the organization of the life of individuals of each sex, and of the relations between them, upon a basis which reflects the real nature of both. Since Weininger there have been many studies, most of them fragmentary, of the characteristics of the sexes.* Scheinfeld's recent summation of what modern science has discovered about the nature of men and women, makes it clear that the more the question is studied, the more serious become the differences which have to be taken into account.†

FEMALE babies are generally born five to nine days sooner than males; they teeth and talk earlier; their bones harden sooner; they have fewer red corpuscles; they are more emotional—they have more active thyroid glands; they mature more rapidly. The female sleeps more than the male, needs less food, has a lower metabolism rate, is warmer in winter and cooler in summer. Though her sheer muscular strength is only half that of man, the female organism is better able to survive. Her hormones protect her better against illness and shocks. Males are more likely to inherit physical defects; a third more of them are blind; eight times as many are color-blind; hemophilia is exclusively a male disease. Although women have a twenty per cent higher illness rate in almost every disease, men have a much higher death rate in all diseases except dementia præcox. Males have a twenty-five per cent higher prenatal and infantile death rate; a five-year shorter life expectancy. Although more males than females are conceived, fewer males grow to maturity; the United States is approaching the European condition of a large surplus of females over males. Though more vulnerable to death and disease, the male surpasses the female in every test of physical capacity except those requiring fine, coordinated movements; the woman is naturally adapted to sewing,

*SEX AND CHARACTER, Otto Weininger; Heinemann, London, 1906.

†WOMEN AND MEN, Amran Scheinfeld; Harcourt Brace & Co., 1944.

knitting, weaving. But no woman has ever equalled men's records in any athletic activity.

One of the striking differences between male and female is their relative capacity for producing body fluids and tissues. The greater volume and speed of blood formation in women is no doubt necessary to enable her to furnish nutriment to the fœtus. The monthly emission of menstrual blood, which in the course of a lifetime amounts to many gallons, indicates that the female organism not only is able to produce this fluid readily but must discharge it to maintain health and avoid morbidity. Woman's greater capacity for manufacturing blood makes it easier for her to replace blood lost in operations and to stand the loss of blood in childbirth. Perhaps the most striking difference between the sexes in this respect is the woman's capacity for producing milk—"white blood" as it has been called, because it consists of a serum of white blood corpuscles laden with nutritive elements. In multiparous motherhood the total volume of this body secretion may amount to a hundred gallons or more. A counterpart for the human female's capacity to produce fluids and tissue is found throughout the animal kingdom—a hen is able to produce 200 times her own weight in eggs during the course of her life. The only corresponding phenomenon found in man is furnished by the production of semen. Quantitatively it is, of course, infinitesimal in comparison. But just as the rhythmic production and discharge of blood and milk is necessary to the health of woman, so the rhythmic production and discharge of semen is also necessary to the health of man.

SCHEINFELD INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCES observes that no over-all comparison of male and female intelligence can be made. Women average higher in languages, certain esthetic skills, such as matching colors, and social accomplishments. But men are better in reasoning, ingenuity, comprehension, abstract thinking, mathematics and science. Scheinfeld thinks that it is wrong to attribute to mere male dominance the fact that no woman has ever produced a great invention, composed a great piece of music, or ranked with the greatest artists and writers. Women must always be handicapped in these activities by the physiological facts of life. He observes that even Soviet Russia, after conducting the greatest equal rights experiment in history, abandoned it; has come to stress motherhood; has introduced beauty parlors! He suggests that wo-

men can be most successful at home—or anywhere else—by making the most of their special gifts of “sympathy, kindness and human warmth.”

On this point Scheinfeld substantiates the distinction upon which Gina Lombroso laid such stress, and which led her to describe women as *alterocentric* and men as *egocentric*.^{*} Both men and women display these characteristics to a degree, but women develop to a much higher extent special attachments not only to children but to all persons whom they can help or who help to make them happy. The biologists who conducted the Peckham experiment noted the fact that the majority of boys became fascinated by the *activities* which they watched; the majority of girls, by the persons who performed them.[†]

To this enormous array of relatively minor differences, there has to be added the major differences in their genital and reproductive systems. Maternity and paternity are totally different; the one is a female, the other a male function. It is women who menstruate, who bear children, who are intended to suckle them. The differences between the sexes which flow from this climacteric difference, are legion. It is not human, but inhuman, to ignore them.

These differences call not for an identic pattern of living but for complementary relationships between the sexes—for the mating and marriage of every normal man and woman. What we know of modern psycho-social loneliness and its relationship to insanity and suicide, is susceptible of no other interpretation than that identic and atomistic living for the sexes is violative of the norms of living. We know that frequency of mental disease and suicide is highest among divorced persons; that single persons come next in line; the widowed next, and that the married have the lowest rate.[‡] In the face of facts of this sort, one is driven to the conclusion that all generalizations about men and women which disregard the fact that they should both spend their lives as members of a family, are generalizations not in the interest of human beings but of an inhuman industrialized and urbanized world.

From this it follows logically that no solution of the problems of modern man in terms of higher standards of living even with eco-

^{*}THE SOUL OF WOMAN, Gina Lombroso, p. 11.

[†]THE PECKHAM EXPERIMENT, Innes H. Pearce and Lucy H. Crocker,; George Allen & Unwin, London.

[‡]THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE, P. A. Sorokin, pp. 207-209.

conomic security, or in terms of sublimation in religious, or artistic, or scientific, or social work, have validity if they involve partial, (much less total), sacrifice of individual completion, self-expression, and satisfaction in marital and family life. The real problem of modern man is not that of how to succeed as an atomized unit in a truly socialized world, but that of making it possible for him to live as an integral member of a normal family group. His primary problem is not how to socialize his world but how to normalize the family of which he is already a member, some family which he joins, or some family which he helps establish. Those leaders of modern man who think they can solve the problem of living for man outside of the framework of normal family life, blind themselves to the fact that they are trying to organize men and women to live abnormally. The atomized individual can exist, it is true, outside of the family. But he cannot live normally in isolation no matter how ingeniously he organizes his life, nor what industry, or the school, or church, or state, or psycho-analysis, may do to help him forget, and try to sublimate, his masculinity if a man or femininity if a woman.

WHAT now does analysis of the facts about the nature of the two sexes suggest concerning the organization of relations between man and woman?

NORMALIZING BIFURCATION

To begin with it calls for recognition of the fact that an adequate solution of the problem with which sex confronts human beings is possible within the frame of reference of the associational problem—of one of the thirteen major problems into which I have found it possible to classify all the problems with which living confronts man.* If this is correct, then normalization—and humanization—of man's sexual life is possible if, *firstly*, the teachers and leaders of mankind choose from among the five possible alternative solutions of associational problems.

*The associational problem is the problem with which individuals are confronted in all *individual-to-individual* relationships as distinguished, for instance from the gregational problem, the problem with which they are confronted in all *group-to-group* relationships. In this particular instance the associational problem is that of the relationship of *male-individual-to-female-individual*.

that solution which best fits the particular form of association with which we have to deal; if, *secondly*, human beings, (both adult and juvenile), are taught that association with other individuals insofar as sex enters into it, should be governed by the norms and principles prescribed by this solution; and if, *thirdly and finally*, the adult population is persuaded to organize, and if necessary re-organize, all institutions and customs—moral, legal, economic—which in any manner affect the association of the sexes with one another, in accord with this solution.

The facts, it seems to me, overwhelmingly negate (I) *authoritarian* resolution. They seem to me just as clearly to negate (II) *fraternal*, (III) *educational*, and (IV) *co-ordinal* resolution. They seem to call for resolution (V) *functionally*.

For we are not confronted (I) with two sexes one of which is capable, the other incapable; we do not have to organize a relationship which calls for authoritarian domination by one sex and submission by the other. (II) Nor are men and women competitors and rivals sexually considered; they do not belong to the same but to different fraternities. (III) Nor are they as male and as female, one ignorant and the other learned, confronted with an educational problem in which one sex is called to instruct and the other to be instructed. (IV) Nor are they sexually equal and identical and therefore confronted with a relationship calling for federation and co-ordination. (V) The fact which emerges from all the facts as primary is that men and women are different. Their relations with one another can therefore be normalized only by voluntary and co-operative division of their respective labors. The bifurcation of the individual calls for resolution functionally. If the rights and obligations of both sexes are to be observed in the manner in which men and women treat one another, their relations must be complementary—from each according to ability, and to each according to need.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART I. THE NORMAL INDIVIDUAL

SECTION II.

THE LIFE-CYCLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

*And one man in his time . . .
acts . . . seven ages.—Shakespeare*

THE FACT that the individual not only grows but *changes* in the course of his life from birth to death—that he actually undergoes *metamorphosis* into different kinds of individuals at different ages—introduces problems into the formulation of norms of living which must be faced. This inescapable biological fact makes it obvious that norms of living cannot be the same for the entire life of an individual; behavior which is normal for him during one period of life is not necessarily normal for him at others. Behavior which is entirely normal for an adult may be quite abnormal and actually impossible behavior for an infant, a child, a youth. The needs and capabilities of *homo sapiens* change as the individual of the species passes from one period of his life-cycle to another; the norms of living which I think need so desperately to be established on a truly scientific basis will therefore have to be different for each of the periods into which the individual metamorphoses in life.

SHAKESPEARE, with his extraordinary insight, divided what I am calling the life-cycle into seven "ages." The inadequacy of the consideration given to the subject by modern science makes what he said well worth quotation:

At *first* the infant,
 Mewling and puking in the nurse's arms.
Then the whining schoolboy, with his satchel
 And shining morning face, creeping like snail
 Unwilling to school. And *then* the lover,
 Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad
 Made to his mistress' eyebrow. *Then* a soldier
 Full of strange oaths, and bearded like the pard,
 Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel,
 Seeking the bubble reputation
 Even in the cannon's mouth. And *then* the justice,
 In fair round belly with good capon lin'd,
 With eyes severe and beard of formal cut,
 Full of wise saws and sudden instances;
 And so he plays his part. The *sixth* age shifts
 Into the lean and slipper'd pantaloon,
 With spectacles on nose and pouch on side,
 His youthful hose, well sav'd, a world too wide,
 For his shrunk shank; and his big manly voice,
 Turning again toward childish treble, pipes
 And whistles in his sound. *Last scene* of all,
 That ends this strange eventful history,
 Is second childishness and mere oblivion,
 Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.

Compare this with our English common law which knows only two ages—*infancy* and *majority*. In common law an infant is a person under 21; an adult, a person over 21. In many American states the law has come to grips with reality so far, at least, as to say that for some purposes—sexual relations, for instance—a woman attains her majority at 18. Roman law was actually far more scientific and far less arbitrary; it divided the life-cycle into four ages: *infantia*, which ended at seven; *pubertas*, which ended for females at 12 and for males at 14; *adolescentia*, which ended at 25; and *majoras*, which began thereafter.

Among the various *ages* of such great practical importance that the law has had to take them into account, are:

The age of innocence. In common law, an infant under seven years of age is considered *ipso facto* incapable of criminal intent; between the ages of seven and

fourteen a child is presumed incapable of criminal intent until the contrary is proven. Before majority comes the age of consent, the age of discretion, and, in most nations, military age.

The age of consent, in law, is the age at which the individual is competent to give legal consent, especially to marriage or unlawful sexual intercourse. The age of consent to unlawful sexual intercourse was in English common law fixed at ten years, but has been generally raised by statute to ages varying from 13 to 18 years. The age of consent to marriage was 14 for male minors and 12 for female, but these ages have also been generally raised by statute.

The age of discretion, in law, is the age at which the law imputes to a person sufficient knowledge for him to become responsible for certain acts or competent to exercise certain powers. At 14 a minor is presumed to have sufficient discretion to be responsible for all criminal acts. At 14 a minor may choose his own guardian; and so on.

Majority, in our common law, is fixed at 21 for both men and women. In some of our states, women attain full majority on becoming 18 years of age.

PHYSIOLOGISTS usually divide the life-cycle into five periods: THE LIFE-CYCLE *infancy*, from birth to seven; *childhood*, from seven to 14; *youth*, from 14 to 21; *adult life*, from 21 to 50, and *old age*, from 50 to death. The facts which have to be taken into account, however, make a far more comprehensive scheme necessary. And there is no good reason for constructing one scheme, which fits the needs of medicine and physiology; another which fits those of jurisprudence and penology; still another which fits the needs of education and psychology; and so on, *ad infinitum*, to fit the needs of each compartment into which life is divided and upon which the specialists concentrate, with no one concerned with the problem of living as it is in reality—*one whole* which individuals, willy nilly, must live.

That the individual passes through a physiological cycle of growth and change in the course of life is obvious. At birth, weight averages around 7½ pounds;* it increases to around an average of 150 pounds

*This is the average weight, *not the normal weight*, which probably ranges around 6½ pounds. We are educated today—by a foolish fashion which makes men feel that they should be able to boast about the size of their children at birth—to think that big babies and fat babies are healthy babies. Nature, however, has fixed the size of the pelvic structure within a definite range; women who are over-fed during pregnancy violate the norm. The penalty for the violation is prolonged and painful labor; often permanent mutilation; possible congenital injury to the child; and increased excuse for substituting cesarian section and instrumental and surgical procedures for normal delivery. For a discussion of *normal weight* at childbirth see the *THE TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH*, Anthony M. Ludovici, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938.

at maturity; it declines in old age. Eating, exercising, sleeping, and other physiological activities vary at different periods of life. During early infancy, for instance, the infant spends nearly all its time sleeping; not to permit it to do so would very quickly send it into convulsions. During early childhood, while the child needs much less sleep than during infancy, it needs many more hours each day than later in life. The normal food of an infant is mothers' milk. Cows' milk, which may be a normal food for children and adults, is an abnormal food during infancy. During childhood the individual needs to spend a greater proportion of his time in very active play and exercise than during later periods of life; it is quite probable that the many sedentary hours which children are required to spend in school represent a violation of a norm of living. For the aged, on the other hand, less active and more sedentary work than during maturity may be more normal. I say *may be* advisedly, because among the Hunzas† and many other peoples among whom macrobiotics are not unusual, the period of old age comes much later than in our own mis-educated population; nevertheless even among them it does ultimately come, and then it calls for less vigorous activities.



The individual passes through a psychological cycle—intellectual and emotional—as real as his physiological cycle. Mental characteristics like intelligence change greatly from one period to another. Measurements of intelligence from infancy to old age indicate that there is a very sharp rise until about the age of 15. From 15 to 25 it continues to grow but more slowly. After 25 it begins to decline but shows no substantial change until after about 40. Thereafter it declines steadily until, during senescence, it begins to drop sharply.*

†“As to care after forty, the Hunza are vigorous in age as they are in youth. So it was that Mr. Skrine saw the Mir of Hunza at polo when nearly seventy. As captain of his side, after a goal, he had to gallup at full speed half-way up the ground, fling the ball into the air and smite it towards the opposing goal. ‘I saw the Mir, who in spite of his years is still a wonderful player, perform this feat, known as *tambok*, eight times in succession and never once did he hit the ball less than a hundred yards.’ ” THE WHEEL OF HEALTH, G. T. Wrench; p. 39.

*THE RANGE OF HUMAN CAPACITIES, David Wechsler, 1935; pp. 85-86. The trait called *intelligence*, which the psychometrists measure, should not be confused with either *knowledge* or *wisdom*. That the use of *intelligence* and *intelligence quotient* to designate the thing measured is a misnomer is recognized by many psychologists—C. Spearman, for instance. That adults continue to add to their stock of knowledge long after the curve of these measurements begins to decline,

We cannot, of course, be too certain of the interpretation of these psychological measurements. Yet even though this may be true, the facts revealed by them make it plain that many of the accepted activities and occupations prescribed for modern man at different ages are abnormal.

The fact that it is the fashion today to virtually prohibit boys and girls from doing any useful and productive work, and that, instead of permitting them to take on in their late 'teens the responsibilities appropriate to all adults, they are kept in school and made to devote themselves to irresponsible "extra-curricular" juvenile activities, lays the foundations for what has been called, with magnificent irony, *adult infantilism*.

Nor is the work which is provided for most men and women for their most productive periods in life at all related to their psychological development. Vast numbers of individuals are, no doubt, strictly limited in the extent to which they can develop mentally, but it is exceedingly probable that the repetitive work which nearly everybody is required to perform today in offices, stores, and factories—and the vicarious play which people are stimulated to extract as a consequence—disregards what they should do with their minds from age to age.



Summing up, the evidence seems to me clear that the organization of normal living for the individual is not possible on the basis of some one normal pattern for the whole of life but that instead it requires organization on the basis of norms appropriate to each and every age through which men and women pass in the course of their lives.

is a matter of common observation. And that they increase in wisdom, as they acquire more and more experience with living, perhaps more rapidly as they become older and more and more mature, is also a fact which seemingly belies the indication that intelligence reaches its peak in youth, around 15 or 16 and begins to decline after 25 to 30. The question then is, *Precisely what is it that the IQ measures?* I suggest that it measures *acculturation*. It ought properly to be called the AQ—the acculturation quotient: the capacity of the individual for adjustment to the culture in which he finds himself. And such adjustment is a very good index indeed of the innate capacities of individuals. An idiot, for instance, is never able to properly acculture himself. Neither, for that matter, is any abnormal person—whether subnormal or supernormal. The first cannot rise to the level of his culture; the second finds difficulty in falling down to it. Proper re-designation of the "IQ" would not lessen but increase its usefulness.

THERE are not, however, *seven*—as Shakespeare would have it—but at least *nine* ages of man every one of which represents a change sufficiently sharp and distinct to warrant use as a basis upon which to organize living. They are here submitted as *suggestive* rather than *definitive*. My schematic outline of them is probably no more than a fair approximation of what collaboration by various scientists integrating all the existing data dealing with the life-histories not only of our own but of many races and cultures, would produce. But it will serve as a beginning. The danger is not that the scheme will be made too complex, but that in fear of complexity, we will be tempted to ignore the facts and over-simplify it. Life, unfortunately, is never simple. The sages who have tried to concentrate its essence into one rule (like the Golden rule) or even one word (like Love) in reality do not face the real problems which confront mankind.

	DEVIATION*	RANGE*	
I.	- $\frac{3}{4}$ to 0	$\frac{3}{4}$	Composition, [‡] Conception [†]
II.	0 to 3	3	Pre-Natal Period (Pregnancy)
III.	3 to 12	9	Infancy
IV.	11 to 16	1	Childhood
V.	14 to 26	12	Puberty (Adolescence)
VI.	25 to 40	15	Youth
VII.	40 to 60	20	Majority
VIII.	60 to 80	20	Maturity
IX.	After 80	-1	Seniority
			Senescence
			Death, [†] Decomposition [‡]

PARADOXICAL as it may seem, it is difficult to decide whether consideration of the life-cycle should begin with death or with life; with human behavior insofar as it should take into account the *decomposition* or the *recomposition* of the infinitely complex substances, (if

*Considerable variations from the ages and ranges in the above schematic outline may be found to exist among different races, (Eskimo and Negro, for instance), and among people living in different climatic zones, (Norwegians and Italians, for instance), but these variations are probably due more often to the operation of cultural forces than to those of innate genetic forces. The marked deviations from the norm of races such as Negritos, raises the question of whether they represent actually a different species of primate or whether they are merely a degenerate form of the species *homo sapiens*.

[‡]*Composition* is a period not in the life-cycle of the individual but of his parents, and *decomposition* of the body of the individual takes place after death, not during the life-cycle. [†]*Conception* and *death* are not periods but events.

substances they should be called), of which the living body is composed. For whether life is considered *philogenetically*, as the evolutionist considers it, or *ontogenetically*, as the physiologist considers it, consideration of human life confronts us with the problem of the formation of the soil from which each human being is evolved and to which in the normal course of events each is returned. With extraordinary prescience the great poets who contributed to the creation of the Old Testament anticipated the very latest discoveries of modern science; over and over again they return to the same theme:

And the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.*

Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.¶

... the Lord knoweth... our frame; He remembereth that we are dust.‡

Thou takest away their breath, they die, And return to their dust.§

Even more scientific, if possible, is the Hindu conception of what I call recomposition. The Wheel of Life affirms with a finality which all science supports, the interrelationship of all living things, from the lowliest microbe in the soil to that proud two-legged animal which thinks of itself as the lord of creation. Any attempt, therefore, at the disassociation of decomposition and recomposition—of disregard of the Wheel of Life as a whole, is unscientific in the extreme. Individual birth simply climaxes the long period during which *parents* absorb from the soil, and from the life-giving sun and atmosphere, every element necessary, *first*, for the composition of the fertile sperm and ovum with which individual life begins; *then*, for the composition by the mother of the somato-plasm and germ-plasm of the nascent individual she carries during pregnancy, and *finally*, again by the mother, for the composition of the milk upon which the infant individual should be fed until the individual is able to begin feeding himself.†

*Genesis 2:17.

¶Genesis 3:19.

‡Psalms 103:14.

§Psalms 104:29.

†The *composition* of both somato-plasm and germ-plasm by the parents precedes *conception*; and *decomposition*—of the body—naturally follows after death. They are related phenomena, usually overlooked. Howard validates their inclusion not only in scientific but also in poetic terms: “. . . . an ever-recurring cycle, a cycle which, repeating itself silently and ceaselessly, ensures the continuation of living matter. This cycle is constituted of the successive and repeated processes of birth, growth, maturity, death, and decay. An eastern religion calls this cycle the Wheel of Life and no better name could be given to it. The revolutions of this Wheel never falter and are perfect. Death supersedes life and life rises again from what is dead and decayed. Because we are ourselves alive we are much more conscious of the processes of growth than we are of the processes involved in death and decay Yet, if we are fully grown human beings, our education should

If, however, a whole agriculture and physiology is not to be inserted here, the subject of composition will have to be dismissed with not much more than the formulation of three basic norms, and with references to some of the authorities upon whom I have relied in formulating them. Fortunately these can be used as criteria by which to test the validity—and normality—of almost every pattern of action which affects life psychologically and physiologically.

THE FIRST of these norms is what Howard calls *the law of return*.* THE LAW OF RETURN
Any agriculture which is not based upon the return to the soil of all plant wastes, animal wastes, and human wastes—including after death the very bodies evolved from it—is an abnormal agriculture. The norm calls for the decomposition and return of all animal and human manure, both liquid and solid, to the soil. Upon this is dependent not only the fertility of the soil and the health of plants and domestic animals but the health and fertility of man himself. Every agriculture which ignores this—as primitive and barbarian agriculture ignored it, and as modern agriculture with its inorganic chemical fertilizers and its poisonous spraying of soil and vegetation ignores it—mineralizes and devitalizes not only the soil but destroys the nutritive value of the food grown upon it and so the very foundations of human life itself. The penalty for disregarding the law of return is not only a *reduction* in the quantity of crops harvested; it is not

have developed in our minds so much of knowledge and reflection as to enable us to grasp intelligently the vast role played in the universe by the process making up the other or more hidden half of the Wheel. In this respect, however, our general education in the past has been gravely defective partly because science itself has so sadly misled us. Those branches of knowledge dealing with the animal and vegetable kingdom—botany and zoology—have confined themselves almost entirely to a study of *living* things and have given little or no attention to what happens to these units of the universe when they die and to the way in which their waste products and remains affect the general environment on which both the plant and animal world depend For though the phases which are preparatory to life are, as a rule, less obvious than the phases associated with the moment of birth and growth, they are not less important. If we grasp this and think in terms of ever-repeated advance and recession, recession and advance, we have a truer view of the universe than if we define death merely as an ending of what has been alive." *THE SOIL AND HEALTH*; p. 18.

*The work of Sir Albert Howard is covered in three of his books: *THE WASTE PRODUCTS OF AGRICULTURE; Their Utilization as Humus*, (written with Yeshwant D. Wad); Oxford Univ. Press, 1931; *AN AGRICULTURAL TESTAMENT*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1940; *SOIL AND HEALTH, A Study of Organic Agriculture*; Devin-Adair Co., 1947. A more concretely American treatment of the theme is *PAY DIRT*, by J. I. Rodale, Devin-Adair Co., 1945.

only increased insect infestation, and plant and animal and finally human disease, it is *human infertility and human degeneration, and ultimately, decay of civilization and depopulation.*

THE SECOND of these norms is what Sherman calls "the principle of natural and nutritional wholes."* This is a dietetic norm. If the period of parental composition—of recomposition of the life-elements decomposed in the soil—is to be normalized; if it is to make possible the conception of healthy and happy individuals, the food eaten by the parents must contain the entire complex of substances, and not only some of them, essential to proper nutrition. This is a principle which applies, of course, not only to the parents but, once the individual begins to feed himself, to the individual as long as he lives. Anything which we do to our food in processing it, or storing and distributing it, or cooking it—as in refining molasses to make white sugar; as in milling wheat into white flour to make possible its mass-production and mass-distribution; as in pasteurizing milk—involves the loss of some of the elements essential to health and, as Sherman makes clear, there is no way of avoiding this except by eating whole foods. It is an act of pure mysticism upon the part of scientists to hope that some day they will succeed in determining all the elements essential to complete nutrition, and so make it possible for us to feed ourselves with synthetic chemical foods neatly manufactured in giant factories and distributed to us in sterilized—and sterile—cans, bottles, and packages.

THE THIRD of these norms I think of as harmonic. Imbalance even of what is good itself, is a danger. A normal agriculture and a

*CHEMISTRY OF FOOD AND NUTRITION, Henry C. Sherman, Macmillan Co., 1937. "An organism is more than a mere summation of its parts, it is an *organized* whole and *functions* as such in nature. Many of nature's wholes have evolved under the influence of each other and bear relationships to each other which have been more or less fixed by the evolutionary process. Hence, while it is true that if we tried to subsist upon mixtures of the known chemical essentials in artificially purified forms, we should probably sooner or later find ourselves inadequately nourished for lack of something still unknown, it is also true that if instead of artificially purified foodstuffs we use natural foods such as have constituted a part of the environment in which our bodies have evolved and to which they are nutritionally adjusted, then any essentials which may be still unknown are consumed as they occur in the natural wholes we eat Practically, the more nearly natural our food the less is the danger of shortage of any nutritional factor, known or unknown." (pp. 507-508).

normal diet may be primary in normalizing composition, but they are not in themselves all-sufficient. Just as the proper adaptation of each part to each other in anything which forms an integral whole is necessary if the thing is to be complete and perfect, so *all the activities which in any manner affect health must be evaluated, properly practiced and adapted to one another if good, or abandoned if injurious.*

Not only what we eat but what we do not eat is important. Men and women who live upon whole foods grown in soil to which every essential element has been returned, cannot afford to ingest excessive quantities of foreign substances—they cannot smoke tobacco or take opium; they cannot drink alcohol, tea, and coffee, or even the synthetic “soft” drinks in the quantities in which they are persuaded to use them by the manufacturers and purveyors of these substances—without injuring their health and capacity for proper composition. They cannot even afford to overeat what is genuinely good. But not only is the refusal to burden the system with substances inimical to health essential, proper *breathing, proper clothing and shelter, proper sun, air and water bathing, proper posture and exercise, proper intercourse, and proper thinking and feeling,* is also essential to the observance of the harmonic norm.



There are good, and brilliant, and apparently effective, men and women who, quite in accord with the modern gospel of specialization, believe that all problems will be solved if only the particular problem which they think most important is solved. So they join the Friends of the Land, or some similar association or movement, (which ignores the balance for which I am calling), by making soil conservation the be-all and end-all of living. And there are others who, believing that all problems will be solved if the problem of nutrition is properly solved, ignore or under-rate the importance of posture, of exercise, of breathing. They become food-faddists even though their preoccupation with the problem is scientific in the best sense of the word. They forget that man does not live by bread alone.



The temptation to dispose of the problem of composition, recombination and decomposition in purely physiological terms is enormous. But it must be resisted. It is necessary to remind ourselves that we are

not mere animals; that we are human beings and that no problem is properly solved and no prescription for action truly proper unless this fact is taken into account. If, however, I am to avoid anticipating the whole subject which is to be discussed in the second volume of this study, I shall have to content myself simply with emphasizing the fact that the regimen which provides for composition properly must consist not only of a balanced program for dealing with our physiological problems, but also of a completely balanced philosophy of living. We do not, in other words, observe the harmonic norm unless intellectually, occupationally, possessionally, socially, ethically, esthetically, educationally—and not only physiologically—we live like normal human beings.

CONCEPTION is not, of course, a period in the life-cycle of the individual; it is merely the event—in the life of his parents—which results in his inception. So while note should be taken of it here, its consideration properly belongs to that period in the life-cycle when the conception of children should normally begin to take place—the period of youth and young womanhood between 16 and 25.

CONCEPTION is an *event* not in the life of the individual but in that of his *parents*; pre-natality is a *period* not in the life of the individual but in that of *mothers*. The problems of pre-natality are really problems of pregnancy.

I. THE PRE-NATAL PERIOD

The facts about pregnancy which call for consideration are its fears; its costs; its pains. Gestation and parturition are natural processes; like respiration, digestion, motion, micturition, and defecation, they ought to be pleasurable and not painful to women. The fact that so often they are not pleasurable is evidence of the fact that something in our pattern of living is abnormal. To establish the fact that pregnancy is fearful to women is an act of sheer supererogation; it is feared because of *ignorance*, (about which everything can be done); because of *ill-health*, (about which much can be done); because of *costliness*, (about which something can be done); because of *law and convention*, (about which little can be done very quickly). If the ignorance were dissipated by sex education; if ill-health were eliminated by proper eating; if the cost of having a baby were reduced by making it possible to have it at home, by using trained mid-wives in-

stead of doctors, and operating a productive home instead of a home in which everything has to be bought; and if laws and conventions were bent where they can not be broken, pregnancy would cease to be fearful. Until pregnancy is thus normalized, we shall continue to have an average of one still-birth and four miscarriages to every twenty-five conceptions; until we abolish illegitimacy and legalize medical abortion, illicit abortion will remain a profitable and deadly profession; and until we organize family life so that it becomes economically and socially possible for marriage and mating to be contemporaneous and for child-bearing to begin before twenty, labor will be long and parturition painful. The price—if it is truly a price—which the modern woman will have to pay to normalize pregnancy is the abandonment of a money-making career early in life. Right-education of girls and young women will put preparation for motherhood first, and preparation for business second.

THE outstanding fact about the first few years of life is their deadliness.* Not until nearly seventy does the individual enter upon a period as deadly. The deadliness falls into two principal categories: mortality due either directly or indirectly to mal-nutrition, (bottle-feeding or improper eating by the mother), and mortality due to abnormalities in dealing with conception, pregnancy, and parturition, (lack of sterilization or birth-control by unfit parents, and improper hygienic and obstetrical care). Each is, roughly, responsible for half of all the deaths.†

Some of all this appalling mortality is no doubt due to nature's brutal insistence upon excessive fecundity in order to assure survival

*The annual rate of mortality per 1,000 births in the first year of life during 1939-1941 was 48.12 for white males; for white females it was somewhat lower; for negroes it was nearly twice as high. Not until between 65, (when the death rate of white males reaches 36.85), and 70, (when it reaches 54.54), does the individual enter upon an equally deadly period. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1944-1945, p. 87.

†Mortality due to premature births in 1939 was 14.2 per thousand; to congenital malformations, 4.6; to congenital debility, 1.4; to injury at birth, 4.5; to syphilis, 0.6—total due to causes having to do with conception and pregnancy, 25.3. Source: *Ibid.*, p. 86. Not only are diseases like diarrhea, enteritis, ulceration of the intestines, and other diseases of the stomach in infancy, due mainly to the failure to nurse infants, nursing them too short a time, or improper eating by the mother, but diseases in infancy like pneumonia and influenza, (which are among the greatest killers today), are ultimately caused by mal-nutrition and the failure to build natural immunity into the infant blood-stream.—R. B.

of the species, and to the unhuman indifference of evolution to everything but the survival of the fittest. But a staggeringly large part of it is due to modern woman's substitution of bottle-feeding for breast-feeding during what I think of as the lactation period of the life-cycle. Mankind does not behave normally if it permits survival of the race to depend upon surplus fecundity and infant mortality. Neither do women behave normally if they permit fashion, and mis-education, to kill half the children they bear with substitutes for mothers' milk.‡

But mortality and even physiological morbidity are not the only criteria by which to determine what is abnormal in our treatment of our infants. Emotional or neural morbidity—the psychic traumas of childhood the profound significance of which Freud made plain to us—is equally important. Crying, according to one authority, furnishes a clue not only to what is wrong physiologically—to the fact that an infant is hungry or thirsty, or stuck with a pin; that it needs to be changed, or turned over, or is hot, or cold—but to what is wrong

‡“Complete breast-feeding of infants is of very great importance. Impressive evidence of this was supplied by a large-scale enquiry from the Infant Welfare Centre of Chicago, in which 20,061 infants attending the centre between the years 1924-29 were closely followed up for the first nine months of each infant life. Of these 48.5 per cent were wholly breast-fed, 43 per cent partially breast-fed, and 8.5 per cent wholly artificially fed. The artificial feeding was carried out on a definite plan, and all infants—artificially fed and otherwise—were attended by the officials of the centre. The mortality rates of these different groups of infants were as follows:

	NUMBER OF INFANTS	TOTAL DEATHS	PERCENTAGE OF DEATHS
Wholly Breast-fed . . .	9,749	15	0.15
Partially Breast-fed .. .	8,605	59	0.7
Artificially fed	1,707	144	8.4

“It will be seen that the mortality rate among the artificially fed infants is fifty-six times greater than amongst the breast-fed. The difference in the death-rate between these classes of infants was largely due to deaths following respiratory infections, and to a less degree, gastro-intestinal and other infections. Thus whereas only four out of 9,749 of the breast-fed infants died of respiratory infections, eighty-two out of the 1,707 artificially fed infants died from this cause.

“No clearer evidence could be obtained to enforce the advantages of breast feeding. Similar impressive evidence on the value of breast-feeding was afforded by the enquiry of the League of Nations into the causes of infant mortality in six European countries and four South American countries, which also demonstrated the part played by bad feeding in infant mortality. Where this mortality was low the digestive troubles usually caused by bad feeding were rare; where it was high digestive troubles were prevalent—they were the outstanding cause of death, and it is by reducing them that mortality can be reduced. Conversely, where breast feeding was general, the ‘nutritional peril’ was usually small; where artificial feeding predominated, it was great.” Quoted from Interim Report, Vol. I, of the League of Nations Committee on The Problem of Nutrition, by G. T. Wrench in *THE WHEEL OF HEALTH*, C. W. Daniel Co., Ltd., London, 1938; pp. 49-50.

emotionally. "The more care, the less crying," is what Aldrich found. It is the neglected or unmothered child which cries. § Mothering and breast-feeding are undoubtedly the most important norms applicable to infancy. ¶ The scientific evidence bearing on this is overwhelming. In orphan asylums—institutions established to substitute for mothers and families—foundling mortality is often total, clear evidence of the fact that substitutes for mothers' milk and mothering are abnormal. Breast-feeding and mothering are, however, just as essential to the physical and emotional health of mothers as they are to their infants. In spite of the fact that so many doctors conform to fashion, to the interests of hospitalization, the dairy industry, and the manufacturers of substitutes for mothers' milk, and prescribe no period of breast-feeding or a period of only a few months, there is ample evidence to indicate that the normal lactation period for human beings ranges between two and three years.* General recognition of the normalcy

§cf. BABIES ARE HUMAN BEINGS, C. Anderson Aldrich, 1938. In our hospital nurseries, where there is no time for the individual care and mothering of babies, Dr. Aldrich found the babies averaged 11.9 prolonged spells of screaming daily; in 42 homes, in which the babies received loving care and frequent attention, crying spells averaged 4.0 daily.

¶Birth and eugenic control is a conceptual, rather than a pregnancy or infancy norm. If properly observed it abolishes—by elimination—both abnormal pregnancies and infancies.

*Whenever possible, the nursing period should last for at least 20 to 24 months. It takes this long for the baby's teeth to become developed sufficiently to chew solid foods, and until they are so developed a strictly liquid diet consisting chiefly of milk is called for . . . Many object that they cannot nurse their babies 20 to 24 months. This is entirely unnatural they say. It may appear to be so, judging from the experiences of civilized women, but when we observe primitive and semi-primitive races we find that the long nursing period is common. The Egyptian women frequently nurse their children from three to four years, and there are records available which indicate that this practice has been in existence for thousands of years. The early North American Indians nursed their babies for two to three years, and the Guiana Indians of South America employed a three to four year nursing period. Most of the Chinese mothers nurse their children from two to five years. Considering primitive races as a whole, we find that the three year nursing period is most common. This is very difficult for civilized mothers to understand. If they are able to nurse their babies for six months they feel they are doing well. The secret lies in the diet employed by primitive mothers. Instead of using refined foods they use natural foods which contain an abundance of the vitamins and minerals needed by the nursing mother. If you want to nurse your child for the recommended length of time you should use foods which are highly nutritious . . . In addition, make sure that the breasts are completely emptied at each nursing. If this is not done the supply of milk will diminish no matter what you eat. Do not hesitate to nurse your child after its teeth are developed if you wish. The 20 to 24 month nursing period represents the absolute minimum time a baby should be nursed or given other milk. The ideal nursing period is

of such a long period of nursing would help to space conception in a less artificial manner than is recommended and practiced today.

III. CHILDHOOD
THE changes which mark the end of infancy and the beginning of childhood are rather obvious—the child eats, it no longer suckles; it walks, it no longer crawls; it talks, and begins to express itself. The child is not only “breast-weaned” but “skirt-weaned.” The end of the period of childhood is even clearer: it is marked by the menarche in girls, the first emission in boys. The period begins between the ages of two and three; it ends, for girls, between 11 and 14; for boys, between 13 and 16.

The most conspicuous fact which calls for recognition is the irresponsibility of the child. Childhood, like conception, pregnancy, and infancy, is not an individual, as individual, problem; it is still a parental problem. And since the child is not responsible for what he does, the family is. If our over-centralized society truly accepted this as the norm—instead of shifting responsibility from the family to all sorts of social institutions which proliferate as a result like the proverbial green bay tree—parents would be more adult, and juvenile delinquency cease to be a problem. Disregarding the norm, we find it impossible to establish nursery schools, settlement houses, juvenile courts, and houses of detention sufficiently rapidly to cope with the problems which its rejection creates. Nor has the extension of schooling, by lengthening the school day, providing school lunches, and increasing the years of schooling, solved the problem. There just seems to be no adequate public substitute for family responsibility.



A second fact almost as conspicuous, which equally calls for recognition, is that the child, up until the onset of puberty, is still—and ought to remain—only nascently sexual; its interest in sex, which can be enormously stimulated by repressing its curiosity, is not emotional so much as intellectual. By making nudity shameful and curiosity about intercourse and birth downright sinful, the child's attention is prematurely focussed upon the sexual organs and its imagination

probably longer and may well extend to three or four years if the mother's milk supply lasts that long.”—THE FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH, Arnold De Vries, Dunlay Publishing Company, New York, 1946; pp. 253-254.

fired with sexual fantasies.* The norm calls not for secrecy and sexual precocity but for publicity and asexuality. Bathing, clothing, pregnancy, birth, intercourse, should aim not at innocence and ignorance but at the objectification of sex. It is here that country life, if organized so that the child observes courtship and fecundation in cats, dogs, chickens, rabbits, and other domestic animals in a perfectly natural setting, powerfully aids in permitting sexuality to emerge as a real problem in its life only when it normally should.



Sometime before the child is six—after it has learned how to use its body and its senses; after it emerges from what Maria Montessori called the “sensitizing period;” and is ready to “graduate” from what Comenius called “the Mother’s School”—what I call the occupational problem takes the center of the stage. The problem of the dichotomy between work and play becomes the major problem which the parents of the child have to solve. It is their problem—not *the state’s*. For while it is a misnomer to say that the child *belongs* to the parents, (it does not, of course; the child is really their ward, and ought to be

*“It is a well known fact that our present methods of sex education are woefully inadequate in almost every respect. Parents give their children very little information, and this is generally provided many years after the children’s curiosity about sex should have been satisfied. Schools are even more defective in this regard. They offer virtually no courses in practical sex instruction. And for that matter, the teachers are usually not qualified to provide the instruction even if it were desired. Most children gain their information of sex from sources outside the school and home. Such information is generally gathered in a hit-or-miss fashion and may or may not be accurate. Certainly it does not provide the child with a clean, clear-cut picture of sex as it should have. More often than not the child gains the impression that sex is something so shameful that it must be spoken of in hushed voices or not spoken of at all. Sex becomes synonymous with sin. It is looked upon as an unholy curse which uses its delicious fruit to attract its victims. The eventual result is that a large percentage of the female children become frigid in later life, with the male children often developing many other types of abnormalities. In a state of nudity there is no erotic suggestiveness through the sense of vision. But this fails to remain the case when clothes are habitually worn. The child soon notices that the chief object of clothes is to cover the sexual regions of the body. It further becomes aware of the fact that it is only the members of the opposite sex from which it must remain concealed. This induces the development of a certain air of mystery about sex. The imagination becomes active, often giving the child false impressions of what is actually true. The normal, healthy curiosity becomes prurient in character. The very concealment of the sexual regions draws to it the greatest attention. The child develops a morbid interest in sex before puberty and its normal sexual development is reached. The result is frequently the incitation of sexual precocity, and in a number of cases, of sexual perversions on the part of the child.” NUDE CULTURE, Arnold De Vries, Dunlap Publishing Co., New York, 1946; p. 28.

a *voluntary ward*, free to attach itself to another family or to claim the protection of the state if for any reason it feels itself unloved, unwanted, neglected), it is a monstrous perversion to say that it belongs to the state.

Today for the most part parents dispose of this problem by compelling children to spend most of their time in schools and by legislating against what is called "child labor." They tend to equate schooling and working, as though they were—for children—one and the same thing.† This is really an evasion rather than a solution of the problem of how much time the child should devote to useful work, what this work should be, and where it should be performed. Insofar as all work during childhood is equated with "child labor" and abandoned in order to avoid child-exploitation by industry, a time-vacuum is created. Schooling, even though it is considered the equivalent of work, does not properly fill this vacuum. The indicated normal method of filling this vacuum is home work which contributes to the support of the family of which the child is a member—work which the child knows from first-hand observation to be useful, productive, and important. In a country home a child can become virtually self-supporting during this early period in its life merely by doing "chores" which are within its strength and capacities.

The economic consequences of preventing children from engaging in any useful work before they have finished schooling and are considered ready for gainful employment, denormalizes living not only for children but also for their parents. A pattern of living which places upon the parents the entire burden of supporting their children until they can hold down a job in industry or support themselves in a profession, inevitably encourages two equally abnormal tendencies—the tendency either to have no children at all, or the tendency to have children one after another and to shift as much as possible of the cost of supporting the family to charitable or state agencies.

PUBERTY is the shortest period in the life-cycle of the individual. But that does not make it the least important. In a period of a few

IV. PUBERTY

†The educational—and school—problems of the period were discussed at some length in Chapter IV, *Juvenile Education*; Part I, *The First Six Years—Character-Building: The Educational Function of the Home*; and in Part II, *From Six to Twelve—Introduction to Learning: The Function of the Common School*, pp. 72-92.

months, a child, still only nascently sexual, changes into a youth sexually mature and capable of begetting or bearing offspring. With girls the period culminates in the menarche, usually between 11 and 14; with boys, in the first emission, usually between 13 and 16. Its appearance varies not only among different races and in different climates but very markedly in different environments even in our own. But while the extreme deviations in the ages of menarche or first emission *in different individuals* range over a period of four to five years, it must not be forgotten that the actual period of pubic change *in each individual* is very much shorter—at most one to two years.

The significant fact about puberty which calls for recognition is that *puberty signalizes the readiness of the individual for mating*. In effect nature seems to say in a way which cannot be overlooked, "This individual, whom you are still thinking of as a mere boy or girl, is ready for intercourse and reproduction." Unfortunately, in spite of the enormous importance of this fact—by our mores and folkways—puberty is socially and publicly ignored. By every means in our power we not only try to hide it but to make it impossible for boys and girls to change their pattern of living from that of childhood to that which is called for by the new period in life upon which they have entered. We continue to send them to school. We organize our economic activities so that there is no vocation to which such extremely "young" couples, (young, however, by our and not by nature's standards), can turn and be self-supporting. We condemn child-marriage socially and pass laws making it illegal to marry at the age which nature seems to prescribe. Finally, we flock into cities and turn our backs upon country life, probably the only way of living in which it is possible for a young couple to mate when they should and still be able to contribute the equivalent of their cost of living to their families. As a matter of fact, we make it fashionable for even country folk to organize their pattern of living and their farming operations so that their children cannot mate and marry until they are old enough to earn money enough to support themselves.

As a result of this denial and violation of the normal, puberty and youth is made a bewildering and often demoralizing period—physically, emotionally, morally. Yet there are good grounds, as we shall see, for feeling that this is entirely unnecessary; that the storm and stress of adolescence—the revolt of youth—is the product of our mis-

taken methods of dealing with this problem and not something innate in the nature of man; that in a normal community and normal family, the period of change from childhood to early manhood and womanhood would cause no more neurotic manifestations than those of any other periods of life.*

In this respect the pattern of living of many primitive peoples and much of ancient society was a more normal pattern than our own. Puberty was celebrated with feasts and religious ceremonies. In Rome a feast was given to the family and friends; the hair of boys was cut short, a lock being thrown into the fire in honor of Apollo, and one into the water as an offering to Neptune. Girls offered their dolls to Venus, and the *bullā*—a little locket of gold worn around the children, often by boys as well as girls—was taken off and dedicated in the case of the former to Hercules, or the household lares; in the case of the latter to Juno. Among primitive peoples parallel feasts and ceremonies signaling puberty are general if not universal. The boys and girls change or put on more attire; they wear ornaments, cut their hair, or scar and tattoo the body in a manner permitted only to those ready to marry. The boys are initiated into the secrets of, and often moved into, the bachelor's house; the girls, into the women's secret societies. Finally Hindu custom, which has gone much farther than this, should be mentioned. What has been bitterly condemned by occidentals as "child-marriage," (but what is in practice much more a

*"The developing girl is a constant factor in America and Samoa; the civilization of America and the civilization of Samoa are different. In the course of development, the process of growth by which the girl baby becomes a grown woman, are the sudden and constant bodily changes which take place at puberty accompanied by a development which is spasmodic, emotionally charged, and accompanied by an awakened religious sense, a flowering of idealism, a great desire for assertion of self against authority—or not? Is adolescence a period of mental and emotional distress for the growing girl as inevitably as teething is a period of misery for the small baby? Can we think of adolescence as a time in the life history of every girl child which carries with it symptoms of conflict and stress as surely as it implies a change in the girl's body? Following the Samoan girls through every aspect of their lives we have tried to answer this question, *and we have had to answer it in the negative . . .* If it is proved that adolescence is not necessarily a specially difficult period in a girl's life—and proved it is if we can find any society in which that is so—then what accounts for the presence of storm and stress in American adolescents?"

"There must be," says Margaret Mead, "something in the two civilizations to account for the difference," and then devotes the last two chapters of her book, *COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA*, to proving that it is education. These chapters significantly are devoted to "Our Educational Problems in the Light of Samoan Contrasts," and "Education for Choice." FROM THE SOUTH SEAS, Margaret Mead, William Morrow & Co., New York, 1939; pp. 196-197. The italics are mine.—R. B.

species of child-engagement), makes it certain that mating takes place promptly after every young couple is physiologically ready for it.

Without burdening this volume with evidence bearing on all these matters and so duplicating their detailed consideration in the second volume of this study, the facts indicate that the menstrual span begins with the menarche, usually between 11 and 13, and ends with the menopause, usually around 50. For women, the orgasmic span begins with menstruation but does not usually end with it—the span extends long beyond the menopause. For men, orgasm, (perhaps by emission), begins somewhat later, usually between 12 and 16, a circumstance which suggests, that since women mature before men, wives should be chronologically younger than their husbands. For women, the optimum period for pregnancy begins around 16.

The enormous importance of organizing the pattern of living upon the basis of these facts cannot be exaggerated. We do not organize it in accordance with them today. Quite the contrary; education, industry, fashion, and religion combine to teach men and women to disregard these facts. Boys and girls, though physiologically ready for mating, are told that they are too young; that they should spend their time in high-school and college; that until they succeed in their careers of money-making they cannot afford to marry; that it is unwise, from a worldly standpoint to marry when nature seems to indicate that individuals should; and that it is immoral, from a religious standpoint, to mate when nature indicates that intercourse should begin. The conclusive argument today is usually the economic argument: until a man is old enough to "support" a wife, he should not marry. But men—we think of them today as still boys—are ready for mating long before they are taught to or permitted to become self-supporting in the monetized economy of the modern world. Unless the norm is to be indefinitely violated, the facts call for a revival of a pattern of living in which they become fully self-supporting in their early 'teens; for organizing life for young and old around the work which productive homesteads provide.

Ben B. Lindsey, who created the famous juvenile court of Denver, Colorado, had ample opportunity to observe the bitter consequences of the incongruity between what custom prescribes and actual fact:

Every girl has three ages. First, she has a chronological age that tells how many years she has lived. Second, she has an intellectual age that gauges her in-

telligence; which is to say that with a chronological age of seventeen she might have an intellectual age of twelve; or vice versa. Third, she has a biological age, which means that some girls mature into womanhood very early, say eleven, and that others mature very late; and that girls who mature early, while they are still very young chronologically and intellectually, are the most likely to get into sexual trouble with boys. Sex overwhelms them before their minds and their powers of restraint and judgment are mature enough to cope with it.

Of 769 girls of high school age we made a special study of 313. We found that 265 of the 313 had come to physical maturity at eleven and twelve years, more of them maturing at eleven than at twelve. Dividing the 313 into two groups, we found that 285 of them matured at the ages of eleven, twelve, and thirteen; and that only twenty-eight of them matured at fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen.

The significance of this is very great. It is perfectly in line with a fact that I have constantly observed through the many years I have worked in this field, that girls who mature early are in much more danger of getting into sex trouble than those who mature late. For one thing, they are usually more attractive to boys; and, as I have already indicated, they are physiologically awake, with the desires of maturity, without the intellectual restraints and sophistication of maturity. They are women with the minds of little children; and for many of them, the burden and the responsibility are too much. *If we educated them properly this would not often be the case; but we give them no hint of their own danger.*

Such children, at eleven and twelve years, may have the desires and physical needs of the girl of eighteen and older. Thus the biological age becomes dangerously preponderant in the combination. Physical maturity, devastating in its demands when not controlled, is on them at a time when it is not fair nor reasonable to expect adult judgment. But we do expect just that; as we quickly make them understand when, blindfolded by our conventions, they fall into the ditch.*

That some more nearly normal method of dealing with puberty and adolescence is needed is perfectly obvious. We can lay down various principles to embody in the formulation of such a norm—for one, the principle *that puberty should not be ignored* not only physiologically but socially; the initiate into manhood and womanhood ought not to be the butt of ribald jokes but ought to be made to feel a pride proper to so important a stage in his maturation. It ought to be an occasion for feasting and rejoicing, not of shame and bewilderment. We can lay down a second principle to be embodied in the norm: *intercourse should not in itself be considered an impropriety.* We should not assume that sexual innocence is in some manner the equivalent of a special goodness. In spite of religious creeds and codes

*THE REVOLT OF MODERN YOUTH, Judge Ben B. Lindsey and Wainright Evans, 1925; p. 81. The italics are mine.—R. B.

which declare virginity and celibacy to be holier states than matrimony and parenthood, there is not the slightest worthwhile evidence which establishes their real moral superiority. On the contrary, the weight of the evidence indicates precisely the opposite of this; for every instance in which celibacy results in a life of sacrifice and self-abnegation, there are many more cases in which motherhood, and often fatherhood, represents a life of sacrifice and altruism of similar nature. Finally we can lay down a third principle, *to carefully consider at least the basic alternatives available for dealing with puberty*; we can choose the best method, (best in terms of human health, of humane generation, and of self-expression), of the three major ways open to us for dealing with the fact that puberty has made the individual ready for intercourse with the opposite sex: (I) *formal and public and perhaps even official provision for it* as provided by ancient and primitive custom, by old Hindu law, and as Lindsey suggested with companionate marriage;* (II) *clandestine and illicit provision*—or rather surrender—to the imperious mandates of nature with promiscuity or prostitution; or (III) *suppression and repression*—by insisting upon continence until marriage becomes socially acceptable and financially possible, even though this does not come, on the average, until nearly a decade after puberty.

Of these three alternatives it is easiest to dismiss the second—clandestine—as obviously abnormal. Yet this is the solution to which, for the most part, modern man, compromising his Hedonism with his Christian morality, has turned. The third alternative—suppression—seems almost as obviously abnormal because, with rare exceptions, it leads to neurosis, and neurosis is manifestly abnormal. Even sublimation, which is occasionally possible, is itself an abnormality; the supernormal life (as it can be seen in the lives of saints and sages)

*After World War I there was a "revolt of youth," (cf., p. 358), against the marital prohibitions of our Puritan code. Judge Ben B. Lindsey suggested that *companionate marriage*—legal marriage of boys and girls still going to school, living at home, and being supported by their parents—be substituted for the promiscuous intercourse and clandestine mating to which youth had turned; that at the time of marriage full instruction be given in contraception; and that divorce be permitted at the request of either party without the formality of a judicial divorce trial *provided no child had been born*, in which event divorce could only be granted after a trial in which proper provision could be made for the child. This ingenious idea, if coupled with patrilocal or matrilocal marriage in a productive country home, would make marriage possible long before it is considered feasible today.

may be more desirable than the subnormal, (which often takes the form of sadism or masochism), but it is just as truly abnormal.

There remains only the first alternative: recognized mating and marriage not too long after puberty. And if that is normal, all our social, legal, economic, familial, and educational activities should be organized so as to permit even the adolescent to live like a normal human being. The cart should not be put before the horse, and the individual malformed to fit the needs of industry, of the school, of the state. At the onset of puberty, courtship should begin, not clandestinely to the accompaniment of ribaldry, but openly; suitable candidates for mating should be sought by the elders of the family; the personalities of both and the character of both their families taken into account; and courtship—not necessarily for years—continue until propinquity flowers into love and mating and marriage.

There are, of course, important distinctions between mating and marriage, and between marriage and generation, which need to be considered. At the moment it is sufficient to emphasize the abnormality of ignoring puberty, and the folly of organizing living so that sexually mature individuals devote their entire time to going to school, and teachers have to add inaninity after inaninity to the school curriculum—in the form of extra-curricular activities—to absorb the energies with which nature, after puberty, endows them.

WECHSLER, in a brilliant summation and integration of the available metric data about *age* and *growth*, makes it perfectly plain that there is no real break in the period of rapid mental and physical growth between infancy and about 25, when it ends and mental and physical virility is the highest in the life-cycle of the individual.* Thereafter what I think of as the rate of acculturation of the individual—of adjustment to his culture and of equipment for dealing physically with his environment—levels off until after 40, when it begins to decline. If puberty, which usually ends not later than 16, is the period during which the child is metamorphosed into a young man or woman, then the period which actually ends around 25 is the period during which young men and women are metamorphosed into men and women. Legally it is true that youth—or minority—ends

V. YOUTH

*cf., Chapter III, "The Burden of Age," in *THE RANGE OF HUMAN CAPACITIES*, David Wechsler, Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1935; pp. 78-100.

at 21. But the weight of the evidence upon which Wechsler relies, indicates that there is no significant change in the characteristics of men and women around 21. The period of youth begins, therefore, around 16 and ends around 25, the law notwithstanding.

The significance of this legally, and also with regard to the reciprocal relations of sons and daughters to parents and families, is very great. The period which follows puberty is the first period in the life-cycle in which the individual, as individual, becomes truly responsible for his own acts and in which "his" problems are no longer exclusively or primarily those of the preceding generation. If youth mates and marries during this period in order to make primaparae possible before 20, young men and women become parents years before either arrives at productive maturity or the husband at full earning power. If the norms of conception are to be observed, complete economic independence becomes nearly impossible, and *individual responsibility but not independence of the family* becomes a norm in youth. If responsibility but not independence is the norm, family organization should implement it. The individual—at the beginning of the period no matter how young—should be recognized as a responsible member in the family councils and of the family as a corporate entity because both boys and girls should, in a normal and productive home, be contributing by that time to the work of the homestead more than their sheer cost of living and creating the surplus of savings needed for the completion of their educations. But not only family organization, legal and civic organization—instead of relying upon custom and precedent—ought to be brought into line with reality. For the natural minority of a young man or woman plainly ends not at 21 but at 25.



The most important problems with which living confronts youth during the decade which the period spans are probably economic, educational, and genetic. The economic problem of youth can be solved in many ways of which three may be mentioned in order to make the norm clear: (I) As it is too often solved today, by complete monetary dependence upon parents—by having parents support the young in college and in the university without expecting them to do any productive work whatever, (or by some form of government dole

of which the NYA§ and GI Bill of Rights† are precursors); or (II) it can be solved by having the young take money-making jobs and sooner or later leave home if that enables them to find better jobs or to spend more freely the money earned; or (III) non-monetarily by working in the family home, on the family farm, or for the family business. The indicated norm calls for *primary, but not necessarily exclusive, reliance upon cooperation in the family's work*. An outside job, particularly if it furthers vocational education and does not preclude contributing to family activities, is not excluded. But complete separation and independence in youth is manifestly abnormal; it tends to delay marriage; to have both husband and wife hold jobs; to postpone having children when they should; to have too few children; or to make it difficult to provide proper care and home-life for children if nevertheless they are conceived.



The educational problem has already been considered at length.‡ But the fact that this is the period of greatest intellectual growth; the period when really adult problems first begin to concern the young—when birth and death and what life is all about, challenge them; and when idealism can be stimulated as perhaps never in later life, is worth re-emphasis. During this period youth needs inspiration much more than knowledge, (which can be incidentally acquired), or even wisdom, (which time will supply and which their parents should contribute when needed). A vocational or technical or professional education *without this inspiration*, no matter how much money it enables them eventually to earn, is abnormal. The educational norm for youth calls for some travel, (there is inspiration in seeing the world); it calls for some attendance at the theatre, (but in the Aristotelian sense), at concerts, at museums, at libraries, (there is inspiration in discovering the world of poetry, literature, drama and art);

§NYA (National Youth Administration) was established during the so-called "New Deal" in 1934 to help deal with the great depression which began in 1929. The NYA provided national funds for the maintenance of young men and women while going to school.

†President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the statute called the "GI Bill of Rights" on June 22, 1944. After having by other statutes given adequate dependency allowances, hospitalization, etc., etc., this statute made *individual grants of \$500 per year for training and education for four years with subsistence pay for the veteran, his wife and children during this period*.

‡cf. Chapter IV, Juvenile Education, Parts III, IV, and V; pp. 93-111.

but above all it calls for enlivening lectures and discussions about the major problems of living. Right-education during this period should endow the young with vision, with inspiration for creative work and play, and with a passion for truth and beauty and goodness.



Finally there are the sexual and genetic problems which youth faces during this period and which must be properly dealt with under pain of frustration and perhaps perversion. The central question is, *What is sexually normal?* When should courtship between boys and girls begin? When should intercourse first take place? What part should the family play in selecting and providing mates for their children, and what part should be left to chance and to romance? When should marriage take place? When should a woman have her first child? When her last? And how many should she bear?

Since a merely animal yielding to the craving for intercourse and a merely animal process of reproduction—with a pregnancy nearly every year—is manifestly abnormal, a *eugenic span* must take the place of the long *physiological span* with which nature has endowed human beings. To establish the beginning of this eugenic span, the normal age of primiparæ must be taken into account; to establish its end, the normal number of children to which every normal woman should give birth ought to be taken into account.*



The issue cannot be decided solely in terms of personal health, much less of personal pleasure. The future of the child and therefore of the community in which the next generation will live must be taken into account; social well-being as well as personal well-being must enter into the formulation of what is normal.

Assuming *firstly* our own relatively low death rates in infancy, childhood and the reproductive span, and *secondly*, dwelling in a region where there is a normal, or optimal, population,† the minimum

*Little is being said about sexual and genetic norms for males; if the male is married, and taught to regulate his impulses by what is normal for the female, their formulation is by comparison very simple even though their observance—for mis-educated men—may not be so easy.

†The term *normal population* really refers to *normal density of population*; to the relationship between the population and the area of the community or region and its natural and economic resources. Such a density may be said to be normal if it causes—among other things—no differential increase in mental and physical

number of children which should be born by every normal woman is between two and three.‡ Nulligravida (celibacy and childlessness) is manifestly abnormal; marriage and childlessness almost, though not quite as abnormal as nulligravida, (except for those abnormal genetically); but for men and women, (properly endowed genetically), fewer children than the minimum essential to a woman's health and development, is equally abnormal. It is abnormal *socially* because it fails not merely to continue the race but to carry on evolution from its most promising blood-streams. It is abnormal *physiologically* because it does not provide for proper use of two all-important sets of bodily organs—pelvic and mammary. Finally it is abnormal *psychologically* both because it prevents full personality development of the father and mother and because the one-child family—and if there are no other children in the household, even the two-child family—is too small to furnish children with the home conditions essential to their normal emotional development. It is for this reason that such enormous numbers of children from one-child families become problem children and develop into neurotics of one degree or another.

But just as having no children or too few children is abnormal, so having either too many, (if the parents are normal), or having any at all, (if they are subnormal), is abnormal. Nature has in the case of *homo sapiens*, as in the case of all other species both animal and vege-

disease or degeneracy; in crime or delinquency; in poverty or dependence. In congested, over-populated regions—like New York, Chicago, London, Paris—the birth rate should be zero. In isolated, under-populated regions—as was the case on the American frontier and is still the case in many rural regions and communities—normalization justifies either an increase in the birth rate up to the normal maximum per woman, or immigration by the surplus population of over-populated regions. Immigration, however, does not solve the density problem of over-populated regions unless the parents in the region act like normal human beings and do not increase their birth rate until density begins to fall to normal.

When the problem of reproduction is not affected by dwelling in a region which is either over- or under-populated, a high culture and civilization can be maintained with a birth rate which simply maintains the population. In an over-populated region such as metropolitan New York, no woman ought to bear any children at all until decentralization reduces its density to normal; the only way in which a woman living in such a city can justify bearing the number of children it is healthy for her to bear, is to move out of it.

‡In the United States at present only 2.2 children per woman of child bearing age are required to maintain the population, according to HUMAN BREEDING AND SURVIVAL, by G. I. Burch and E. Pendell, Penguin Books, New York, 1947; p. 58. But this average is based upon present over-breeding by the subnormal masses and under-breeding by the superior classes in the population. If subnormal breeding is reduced or eliminated, breeding by the superior classes would have to be correspondingly increased to maintain the population.

table, provided for an immense excess—or reserve—of fecundity;§ the reproductive span in man is fully three to four times as long as that which is needed if mankind were taught to normalize and humanize living. And if man does not deal with this fact at least as rationally as he deals with it in breeding cows, and pigs, and chickens, and other domestic animals, nature kills off the misfits and surplus he produces as ruthlessly as it kills them off in all other species of creatures.

For a couple to conceive children throughout the whole of woman's reproductive span is to behave like animals and not like normal human beings. Normal living calls for the establishment of not only a rational minimum but also a rational maximum. The minimum, we have seen, is between two and three. What is the maximum? Again assuming present death rates and dwelling in a region with a normal population density, *the maximum number would be determined by the relative birth rates of the subnormal population on one hand and the superior population on the other.* The minimum would be determined by primarily personal considerations; the maximum by considerations primarily social in character. The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that between one-third and one-half of all children born in the United States are bred and reared by men and women whose intelligence quotients, whose earning-powers, whose occupations, and whose educations, are subnormal.¶

§For instance, in the ovaries of the average woman there are approximately 300,000 ova. About 400 of these mature, usually at the rate of one every 28 days over a period of about thirty years.

¶If we use the IQ's of the parents as evidence, then one-third of all children in the United States were born to parents with IQ's of less than 89—18 per cent to those rated dull and backward, and 15 per cent to those rated as borderline feeble-minded or idiotic. Source: DYNAMICS OF POPULATION, F. Lorimer and F. Osborn, Macmillan, 1934; p. 196. If we use the education of the parents as evidence, then 28 per cent were born to parents with not more than seven years of grade schooling, and if those with eight years are included, 56 per cent to parents with no more than the miserably low level of formal education required in grade schools today. Source: WOMEN BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN, pp. 155-156, Sixteenth Census, 1940. If we use the earning powers of the parents as evidence, then in 1940, 39 per cent of all children were born to parents the rental value of whose homes was less than \$19 per month, and 58 per cent if those whose rentals ranged from \$20 to \$29 are included. Source: *Ibid.*, pp. 386-400. And if we use the occupations of the parents, then 61.3 per cent of all *white* children were born to parents whose major occupations were repetitive and really sub-human—farm laborers, other laborers, operatives, service workers, and clerical, sales and kindred workers, while only 38.7 per cent were born to those whose major occupations were responsible and relatively human—farmers and farm managers; craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers; professional and semi-professional workers; proprietors, managers and officials. Source: WOMEN BY NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER FIVE YEARS

Ever since Malthus* first scientifically explored the subject, there has been some realization by a few men of the infinity of personal and social suffering and horror which can be traced to the sheer animal-like breeding of mankind. But what calls for recognition here is not only the abnormality and inhumanity of uncontrolled breeding, it is also the intensification of all this misery by the differential decrease in breeding by the superior stocks in the population and the increase in breeding by the inferior. That is what has taken place in industrialized Europe; that is what threatens to take place in Asia as that continent industrializes itself, and that is what is taking place in the United States at present.† Even if it is incorrect to say that wars, revolutions and dictatorships; poverty, hunger and famine are primarily caused by over-population, there can not be the slightest doubt about the fact that every one of these evils are intensified by it.

The biting words of Walter B. Pitkin do not exaggerate the error of our mis-education of people about this matter:

Unless we change present trends, five generations hence, your descendants (if you have any) will be the stupidest great great grandchildren of the stupidest great great grandchildren of the stupidest grandchildren of the stupidest children of parents now living. Uncontrolled breeding, as many students have long seen, favor the survival and the multiplying of the least gifted. Unless men see the problem and work on it, America, soon after the year 2000, will be a nation of high-grade morons ruled by the few surviving clever people. It will be no more of a democracy than a monkey-house . . . As the world adds more and more millions of common men, its problems will increase in complexity to the point at which hardly anybody can even state one, let alone solve it. And so that ancient drift, which Walter Lippman once deplored, will end not in a mastery of the world but in a new mastery of the common man by the uncommon. And whatever the men of that dark age may call it, we shall know it in prescience as tyranny. I would like to go on record as believing that, unless the round table conferees who will be working on peace problems in the coming five years face and at least partly solve world population problems, this immense war just finished will have been fought in vain.‡

OLD, Sixteenth Census, 1940. cf. Population Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 2, June, 1947; Population Reference Bureau, Washington; "Is American Intelligence Declining?"

*Thomas Robert Malthus started exploration of this subject in 1798 with his famous work *An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other Writers.*

§cf., THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES, Jose y Gasset, 1932.

†HUMAN BREEDING AND SURVIVAL, G. I. Burch and Elmer Pendell, Penguin Books, Inc., New York; p. 131.

If all the abnormals in the United States—including not only all the morons and those with very low IQ's but also those superior persons with high IQ's who are physically and genetically pathological—were to be eliminated as breeders of the race by contraception and by voluntary and compulsory sterilization, this would mean that the norm for men and women whose genetic endowment is really good would be very nearly double the minimum of two or three children. The norm of number would then be something like this: (I) for genetically normal individuals—dwelling in an over-populated region from which they might move, or living under abnormal conditions which they might change; for individuals about whose hereditary normality there is any doubt; and for individuals who may be able to correct acquired genetic abnormalities, *contraception*; (II) for individuals about whose hereditary abnormality there is no doubt, and for individuals with acquired genetic abnormalities for whom there is no reasonable chance of cure and normalization, *sterilization*; and (III) for genetically normal individuals—with present death rates, in optimal regions, and as the existing subnormal population begins to cease breeding—*from three to six children*; and for genetically normal individuals—other conditions being the same excepting dwelling in a sparsely populated region (without taking immigration into account)—*from four to eight or more children*, in accordance with the emotional and maternal endowment of the woman in the case.†

For the genetically normal and superior individuals—for those best equipped to bear and rear children physiologically, intellectually, educationally, economically, and occupationally—the social implication of observing the norm and bearing the number of children they should is *using every possible means of dissuading the responsible and preventing the irresponsible subnormal population from breeding*.

†This calls mainly for right-education but also, in some states, for legislation permitting voluntary sterilization, and in most states for legislation making sterilization compulsory in various cases. But compulsion would be mainly needed in dealing with morons and lower grade intellects. Most abnormals have no good reason for opposing sterilization and would gladly subject themselves to it if they knew that it made it possible to avoid child-bearing without any diminution of ordinary orgasmic and sexual satisfaction. For it would mean, in the case of the morally indifferent, (prostitutes for instance), that they would avoid pregnancies, miscarriages, and the need for abortions. While in the case of the morally sensitive, it would mean that they would avoid passing on to their children their own genetic handicaps. For the supernormal who are genetically subnormal, the norm is *adoption*, not conception.

The challenge to them is to organize life for the subnormals so that they not only do not breed but enjoy life more because they do not.



So much for the number of children per woman. What now about the time when they should be born?

Conception can take place throughout the entire reproductive period of men and women—a very long period, beginning in both men and women shortly after puberty and extending in the case of women to about 50, and in the case of men often 20 or more years longer. If human beings were mere animals, women would continue to bear children and men to fertilize women as long as potency continued. But in reproduction, as in all his other activities, man—if he is to behave like a human being—must express himself not upon an animal but a human level of behavior. Conception and the reproductive span must be normalized.

We need therefore to establish definitive norms of conception, and to teach human beings to substitute a *eugenic* reproductive span for both the *physiological* and the *fashionable* reproductive spans of today. That span should begin for women about one year before normal primiparæ; it should begin therefore, according to Ludovici, around 16* because the evidence indicates that the most favorable age for first childbirth, (primiparæ), is between 17 and 20.† The penalty for postponing orgasm and mating unduly is psychiatric,‡ the penalty for postponing primiparæ until after 25, as is the custom

*“. . . the widespread popular horror shown at the marriage of a girl of 16 today . . . is not based on biology or obstetric science, but purely on Feminist and Puritan bias.” THE TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH, A. M. Ludovici, 1938; p. 152.

†“The principal causes of the persistently high rate of maternal morbidity and mortality, as also of the general prevalence of difficulty and pain in childbirth, is the *Relative Senility of the Average Mother at her First Childbirth.*” Ibid., p. 163.

‡“Denial of the body means repression, which in turn means dislocation of the normal psycho-physiological balance, with all the neurotic symptoms that ensue. . . . The teaching of psycho-analysis is clear regarding the psychological instability due to repression, and we do not need Dr. Blake Eggen to show us the connection between celibacy and nervous disorders, in order to be aware of the grave psychological consequences of the conflict between the libido and sexual repression.” Ibid., p. 119. See also the chapter on “Sex and Insanity”, in *SEX IN CIVILIZATION*, edited by V. F. Calverton and S. D. Schmalhausen, London, 1929; pp. 589-590. Also A. Debay, op. cit., p. 244, who, describing conditions a hundred years ago, speaks of the high percentage of spinsters in the principal lunatic asylums of Paris. Repression, without regard to the period of history or the culture investigated, always seems to produce neurosis and psychosis.

today, is physiological. § Childbearing is transformed into an illness. But the evidence indicates clearly that if conception and the reproductive period were normalized, childbearing would be not painful, as it is at present, but pleasurable. ¶

If every child is entitled to lactation and mothering for the first two or three years of its life, spacing from conception to conception should be around three years. For normal women with minimal endowments for maternity, (who would probably bear two or three children), this would make the eugenic span a mere six to nine years; add three years so as to include the period of most intense maternal care of the last born and this would make the maternity span* from primaparæ, to the time when maternity would no longer be primary and other activities could begin to make greater claims upon mothers' time, from nine to twelve years. This would mean that procreation and maternity would span the period ranging from the age of 17 to 26 or 29, or from 20 to 29 or 32, depending upon age at primaparæ.

§ According to Ludovici, if primaparæ is postponed, premature ossification and senility of the entire female pelvic structure develops. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105. Unless a woman has her first child between 17 and 20, childbirth is associated with pain, mutilation, and invalidism. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 25. Ludovici calls attention to Genesis 3:16: "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children," and then quotes a famous woman physician: "The curse of Eve," says Dr. Mary de Garis, "has hypnotized the clinician, the physiologists, and the woman herself." ¶ "There are people who quite seriously compare the mortal risks of childbirth with those of a battlefield. This is merely one of the many insane manifestations of our age, bowed down beneath the weight of its uneasy conscience." *DAS BUCH VON ES*, George Groddeck, M. D., Leipzig, 1923; p. 75. ¶ "Labour is not an illness; it is not a disease; Nature has not prescribed injury as an essential factor in the reproduction of the species."—Grantley Dick Read, M.A., M.D., *NATURAL CHILDBIRTH*, London, 1933; p. 50. ¶ "In this happy climate, childbearing is divested of all its terrors, and is only considered as a party of pleasure . . . This lady (Princess Portana) has had twelve children, and is still in her bloom; she assured me that she never enjoyed more perfect health than when she was in childbed."—Patrick Brydon, *A TOUR THROUGH SICILY AND MALTA*, London, 1776, Vol. II, pp. 77-79.

*Very intense maternal care of children does not require more than six years, perhaps even less. This means that the maternity span would not have to be more than three years longer than the eugenic span—it would add the years which the mother would have to devote to the care of her last-born. It is possible that in a wholly normal pattern of living the two would be identical; in most primitive and many agrarian cultures the mothers are relieved of the care of their children, once they cease nursing them, by older sisters, by other women of the household, and in some cultures by the father. (cf., *SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES*, Margaret Mead; William Morrow & Company, New York, 1939). Normalization of family life would probably relieve mothers of the nerve-wracking care which modern women give their children not merely for the first six years of life but often for much longer periods of time.

For the normal woman of the distinctively mother-type, the maternity span would be correspondingly longer, absorbing the time during her majority and maturity which women with other aptitudes would devote to occupations and avocations other than motherhood.

For abnormal women, of course, this whole problem has no existence since they should bear no children at all.

The norm of spacing thus involves recognition of the two roles which every normal woman has to play in life, one *maternal*, and the other—let us call it—*personal*. During the period of youth and young womanhood, beginning between 17 and 20, motherhood would come first and personal life second. Between 25 and 30—for the distinctively mother-type, after 30, would come a reversal in the primacy of these two roles; maternity would come second, personal and social life—and perhaps even business life—first. While still in their bloom, women would be ready for those activities—business, public, artistic, religious, cultural, scientific, educational—which custom today prescribes should precede motherhood, and ready to devote time to them uninterrupted by pregnancies during the rest of their lives.



Feminists may wish to ignore the realities represented by the maternity span, but the fact that women menstruate throughout a long period of life does make a difference. It not only differentiates them from men, it handicaps them in competing with them as they compete with them today in industry, business, and the professions. And if they bear children, as all normal women normally should, normal organization of their life must not only provide for the fact and handicap of monthly menstruation, but for the handicap of pregnancies, of periods of lactation, and of caring for very young children. The occupational norm for women and for men is, therefore, different. It is only when child-bearing is over and child-care no longer intense, that they are equally able to work outside of the home. Maternity affects the life-cycle of women, whereas paternity affects that of men relatively little. This does not mean that men have no correlative function to perform for their families; it only means that it reduces the productive powers of women, (mainly in a financial sense), and the time which they can devote to art and science, and to social and and to public life of all kinds.

That in this matter of childbirth we are observing neither the norm of number nor the norm of time, is perfectly obvious. Modern life for youth and young manhood and womanhood is a deliberate flouting of these norms. Feminism constitutes such a flouting; the cult of youth and flaming youth pursuing a good time smoking, drinking, and "going places," another; the gospel of success in careers of money-making, another; and the high standard of living with the latest in clothes, in automobiles, in furniture, in housing, in radios, still another. For our violations of the norms of youth we pay a fearful penalty which can only be visualized by studying the facts about prostitution, promiscuity, abortion, illegitimacy, miscarriages and still-births, congenital morbidity and infantile mortality; about childlessness and loneliness, divorce, neuroses, insanity, problem children, juvenile and adult delinquency; about the increasing dullness and feeble-mindedness of the population; about over-population and poverty, hunger, war, revolution, and tyranny if the norm of number is exceeded; and about race-suicide, degeneracy, and depopulation if the norm is not maintained; about the enormous monetary cost of trying to establish welfare and judicial and penal and military institutions to deal with these morbid consequences of modern living.



At 13 most girls mature sexually; at 15, most boys. At 17 most women enter upon their optimal period for primaparæ; just when men enter upon a corresponding period we do not know and perhaps cannot establish. Between 45 and 50 menstruation ends for nearly all women; at 60 spermatogenesis ends for most men. These are the basic genetic facts which affect the age at which men and women should mate and marry.

If an undesirable gap is not to be created in the sexual life of men and women—a gap too long for mere continence and masturbation and apt therefore to be filled by promiscuity, prostitution, repression, or perversion—intercourse between the sexes should begin not too long after puberty. Unless marriage takes place soon after puberty, (permitting intercourse within marriage), intercourse must take the form either of promiscuity or of pre-marital mating. If optimal primaparæ is used as the norm for the time of marriage for women, they will marry around 16, and the gap for them between puberty and

marital intercourse will be relatively short. If men, who mature usually two years later, marry correspondingly, then men will marry around 18, thus also shortening the gap for them and balancing the sexuality of both at the *beginning* of both their genetic spans.

But this does not take into account the fact that women lose sexual potency 10 to 15 years before men. If the unhappiness caused by the fact that men retain their desire for intercourse so long after women lose it, is to be avoided, husbands should be at least 10 years their wives' seniors, and a woman of 16 should marry a man of 26 to 30 thus balancing sexuality at the *end* of both their genetic spans. But marriage on this basis, creates a gap of 10 to 15 years for men at the beginning of their genetic span—a gap which cannot normally be filled by continence and which is certain therefore to lead to masturbation, promiscuity, prostitution, repression, and perversion. What is more, with so great a disparity in the ages of husband and wife, the relationship between them is almost certain to be authoritarian and patriarchal instead of complementary, and such domination seems to me abnormal in the extreme. Furthermore, so undesirable is a long period of bachelorhood in early manhood, when desire is most intense, that on balance a gap at the end of the genetic span seems less undesirable than one at the beginning. The Chinese, like many other peoples, provide for this "post-prandial" gap by permitting concubinage, but the gap can also be filled by wives if they accustom themselves to the idea of furnishing gratification to their husbands even after intercourse has come to mean little to themselves.

Social convention, in frowning on marriages where there is a great difference in the ages of bride and groom, reflects on the whole what is probably the norm involved. The evidence indicates that prospects of unhappiness and divorce are least in marriages where the husband is one or two years older than the wife. And there is some evidence indicating that prospects are not much different even if the wife is a year or two older than the husband. But when there is a gap of many years, the probability of unhappiness increases enormously.*

* "For reasons not too well understood, marriages in which the husband is from four to seven years older than his bride are less happy than those involving any other age difference. However, if the man is eight or more years older, no special handicap seems involved. Taken as a whole the happiest—and most socially approved—marriages are those in which the man is one to two years older."—How To PICK A MATE, Clifford R. Adams and Vance O. Packard, E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1946; p. 29.

If education at the beginning and maternity at the end are pre-eminently functions of young women during youth, what are the functions of young men during this period? The traditional answer is *education at the beginning of the period, and war before its end.*

There is probably nothing which more clearly establishes the error of the ideology of Nationalism than the fact that it has rationalized for modern man and "sicklied o'er" with chauvinism and patriotism the ancient idea of tribal conscription for war. That war—the organized killing of man by man—is a monstrous travesty upon man's assumption that he is human not brute, is something so obvious that no words ought to be wasted competing with the champions of peace in depicting its imbecilities and establishing its subnormality. Man alone among all species of living creatures indulges not only in the perversion but the justification of organized extermination of his own species. Hobbes was wrong in his natural history when he said "man to man is as wolf to wolf." Wolf does not prey upon wolf; only man preys upon man. The norm is, *wolf may prey upon man, and man may prey upon wolf.* Unfortunately we have to live in the world as it is and not as it should be, and war—defensive at its best, offensive and predatory at its worst, ideological (religious and revolutionary) at its cruelest*—is a part of that world. If time must be allotted to soldiering, late youth and early maturity, *but only after the male has fulfilled his function of breeding,* may be the normal one. Early youth, before marriage, which is universally recognized as the appropriate one today, is appropriate only for military education. To use the healthiest and most vigorous males of the rising generation for combat is to cap the folly of war with the greater folly of dysgenic fathering of the next generation.

In one respect, however, most militarists are right and most pacifists wrong. War does furnish supreme opportunities for the exercise of certain enormously important virtues—courage, friendship, loyalty, leadership—even at the risk of pain, bodily injury, and life itself. Cultivated in the wrong way, bravery becomes akin to brutality.

*The term *militarist* should not be restricted to militarists in uniform. *Revolutionists*, even when they cloak themselves in a cloud of exalted idealism, are usually just as ruthlessly militaristic as the militarists they like to condemn. *Religionists*, too, have been militaristic; the history of mankind is not only blackened with bloody revolutions but with bloody religious wars. It is not difficult to rationalize sadism and masochism by calling it reform or redemption.

But unless bravery and courage is cultivated in youth—along with other equally important gentler virtues—we do not make a man. The challenge is to so organize living that young men, naturally hungering for adventure, will find what William James called “a moral equivalent for war.” That this can be done is proved by the history of all pioneering—and particularly such pioneering as we find in the history of the building up of our own America. But pioneering is not restricted to conquest and settlement of distant wildernesses. Pioneering is simply doing first what is challenging *without regard to difficulty and danger*. Ever since man began to till and plant he has been engaged not in taming the wilderness but in despoiling it—in predatory pioneering rather than conservation pioneering. He has pioneered not only in building more and more comfortable homes and magnificent cities but in exploiting the soil and transforming it into desert, in denuding forests and destroying streams. Perhaps the time has come for a new kind of pioneering—for the rebuilding of homes and communities and for reclamation of what Albert Howard poetically calls the “earth’s green carpet.” There is now needed in every community and region a call for rebuilding and reclamation; there is no reason why this should not be so organized as to become an acceptable substitute for frittering away young manhood in “extra-curricular” activities or meaningless—bottle-neck—jobs.

One of the great tasks before the world . . . is to *found our civilization on a fresh basis—on the full utilization of the earth’s green carpet*. This will provide the food we need; it will prevent much present-day disease at the source and at the same time will confer robust health and contentment on the population; it will do much to put an end automatically to the remnants of *this age of banditry now coming to a disastrous close*. Does mankind possess the understanding to grasp the possibilities which this simple truth unfolds? If it does and if it has the audacity and the courage to tread the new road, then civilization will take a step forward and the Solar Age will replace this era of rapacity which is already entering its twilight.*

MAJORITY, as I think of the period which follows youth, begins around 25 when *minority*, in the terminology of ancient Roman law, ends. If the biometrists and psychometrists are right, 25 is the time when both rapid physical and rapid intellectual growth ends and a

VI. MAJORITY

*SOIL AND HEALTH, Sir Albert Howard; Devin Adair Co., 1947; p. 261.

period of stability and slow decline begins. If this new period begins at 25, when does it end? Around 40. Because, again according to the homometrists, at 40 to 45 there is another change; the period of relative physical and intellectual stability ends at that time and changes into a period of relatively rapid decline in both. *Majority*, as I shall use the term, covers a period of about 15 years beginning around 25 and ending around 40.



Wechsler summarizes the evidence upon which I am relying in his discussion of the "Burden of Age:"*

Age curves, supplemented by certain data derived from biographical studies of men of genius, show: (1) that the native capacities of most men tend to attain their maximum between the ages of 22 and 28 years, and in some cases even earlier; (2) beginning with about age 25, there starts a steady decline in both physical and intellectual vigor which increases progressively with advancing age; (3) the decline between 25 and 40 years is relatively small, but nevertheless perceptible, and does not justify the belief that there is even an approximate maintenance of vigor over any considerable number of years; (4) there is no evidence whatsoever for the belief that the average man maintains either his intellectual or physical vigor to the end of his natural life (50th year and beyond), even when spared from the ravages of disease; (5) the age-curves of such mental abilities as have been measured indicate that intellectual capacity, contrary to current belief, begins to decline earlier rather than later than most physical capacities.

Personally I think there is no quarreling with Wechsler about the facts; the problem is as to their interpretation. If I am right in saying that his use of the word *intellectual* is a misnomer, we can quickly come to a point at which it is possible to reconcile the facts upon which Wechsler relies with the interpretation which I make of them. What the facts prove, as I see it, is first, that from infancy to about 25 there is a very rapid increase in *physical maturation and mental acculturation*; secondly, that between 25 and 40, both are stabilized; and finally, that after 40 both decline more and more rapidly. What Wechsler does is to restrict *intellectual* too much to *the capacity to do new things and the capacity for changing ideas*. What he overlooks is that after 25 *refusal to change ideas or to adjust to new things* may be just as truly evidence of intelligence as the acceptance of what is new and willingness to change is evidence of it before 25.

*THE RANGE OF HUMAN CAPACITIES, David Wechsler, p. 99.

The point involved may be best made by illustration. When a child studying geography first discovers that its naive notion that the world is flat is mistaken, it absorbs the new idea about its roundness without the slightest hesitation. To changes of ideas, to new techniques, and to different habits, human beings can adjust themselves with amazing rapidity before 25. But there finally comes a time when the tempo at which adjustment takes place declines, not because the capacity for intellectual action has declined but for exactly the opposite reason, *because growth of intellectual capacity leads the individual to recognize that to change his ideas, his techniques, or his habits would be to practice nonsense instead of good sense.* An adult's refusal to change his ideas about the roundness of the world—perhaps not back to the idea that it was flat but to the idea that it was four-dimensional instead of three—does not indicate any decline in his intelligence. Quite the contrary; the more slowly adults discard ideas and techniques and habits which experience has validated for them, the more they show an increase rather than a decrease of intelligence. This deceleration of the tempo of adjustment physically and change mentally is what really takes place after 25. Failure to stabilize and mature after 25 instead of indicating a continued growth in intellectual capacity, indicates just the opposite; it is the hallmark of individuals properly considered credulous fools.

No decline in intellectual capacity therefore takes place until the individual reaches the period when he begins to refuse to change ideas or becomes unable to make adjustments *without regard to their desirability or validity* simply because they are different from those previously accepted by him. The normal individual becomes normally conservative as he grows older; he refuses to lay aside lightly beliefs and behavior which his study and experience has seemingly demonstrated to be valid. It is only when no amount of demonstration of improvement and evidence of error can make him change his ways and ideas that he shows a definite decline in intellectual capacity. And that does not begin at 25. When that begins the individual—regardless of age—has entered upon senility.



What now is the difference in function between young-manhood-and-womanhood and majority on one hand, and majority and full

maturity on the other? With extraordinary prescience ancient Hindu law dealt with this problem—a problem the very existence of which modern man has refused to recognize. The Code of Manu divides the life-cycle into four parts, the first devoted to *education* or *brahmacharya*; the second to *family* or *grahastha*; the third to *state* or *vanprastha*; and the fourth to *salvation* or *sanyasa*. “Every individual should go through these four institutions so that the purpose of his life may be fulfilled. At each stage he should receive what is his due. Each stage is a preparation for the next.”† During his first seven years the child has to “sense” the world about him; beginning with his eighth year, formal education claims him; at 16 education ends with the ceremony of investiture with the sacred thread. At 20, devotion to education—to things primarily of the intellect—ends, and devotion to the satisfaction of his natural desire for sex and progeny, for property and the material goods of life, begins. Family and home management, in the classic Greek and not modern meaning of economics,* properly engrosses and occupies him for the next 20 years. This is the period which most nearly corresponds to what I am here calling majority. At 40, when grand-children begin to be born to his sons and daughters; when gray hair begins to make its appearance; when the “lusts of the flesh” lose their novelty, devotion to householding and strictly private affairs should end, and public life and community action should begin. This is the period—not that of youth—for military service; for Hindus not born to the warrior caste, the period of political and humanitarian service. To free himself for public life, the good Hindu at this time hands over everything to his son; he continues to dwell in his household, but dwells in it in an entirely detached manner. “Old men,” says Motwani, “sticking to their jobs till death removes them are obstacles to the younger generation.” At 60 devotion to daily life and the affairs of this world should end. Complete retirement to the forest is called for; devotion to things of the spirit should become primary. Meditation, practice of Yoga, and study of the Vedas, Upanishads and other scriptures should occupy him in preparation for death and ultimate metamorphosis.

Western culture is very different from that of ancient India, yet

†MANU, A STUDY IN HINDU SOCIAL THEORY, Kewal Motwani, Ganesh & Co., Madras, India, 1934; p. 66.

**Oikonomikos*—of or pertaining to the management of the household and private estate, as contrasted with commercial and political—or national—economy.

there is overwhelming evidence that not only in our culture but in all cultures, normal living during the period which brings youth to a close and before the individual crosses the threshold of full maturity, calls for behavior substantially similar to that prescribed by the Laws of Manu. The 15 years of majority which begin around 25 and end around 40, are the years normally of greatest *natural desire* and also the years when normally the individual is most ready to enjoy the *material satisfactions* of life. The penalty for anticipating this period is *ennui*; the penalty for prolonging it too long, *adult infantilism*.

By 25 most individuals should be economically full producers—all housewives, husbandmen, craftsmen should have acquired sufficient mastery of their vocations to produce with maximum efficiency; and by 35 even those in business and in the professions—artists, lawyers, teachers, doctors, writers—should have reached that stage in their development when they too produce, at least in sheer financial and economic terms, with full efficiency. During majority, therefore, men and women should normally not only be able to support themselves but to *produce and earn much more than they themselves consume*, firstly, in order to support the progeny they should have begotten, (who will still be too young to fully support and educate themselves); secondly, in order to help free their mothers and fathers for social life and public service; and finally, in order to save not only for their own old age but for the time when their parents will be too old to fully support themselves—when they should discharge the obligations incurred during their own pre-natality, infancy, childhood, and youth. True, at this time, their parents should still be earning so much that this is no immediate problem, but unless the younger generation is adding to the family estate during this period, the homestead will be inadequately equipped to provide privacy, medical—and loving—care, and above all the opportunity for useful work attuned to their strength, for its aged later on. The failure of our urban and industrialized masses to observe these norms is responsible for the ever-increasing demand for state or public aid during pregnancy, infancy, in educating children, in sickness, accidents, and unemployment; and above all, old age. Since the modern urban family cannot be equipped to supply this security, some alternative they must have. And with modern education ignoring decentralization—the true alternative—naturally people turn to the state to supply it.

IT IS easy to fix upon the time when *full* manhood and womanhood (majority) changes into *mature* manhood and womanhood; when the period I call *maturity* begins; but it is not so easy to fix upon the time when it ends. For maturity begins when the novelty of living ends—when in the natural course of events fascination with the *novelties of life* begins to change into *awareness of their recurrence*. If in the pattern of living *primaparae* has neither been anticipated, (as it is among most primitives), nor postponed unduly, (as it is in the modern world), and our daughters and daughters-in-law begin to have their children by the time they are 20, we will be confronted with the fact of grandchildren sometime around 40. The miracle of recurring birth, which is such a novelty when our own children are first born, rather than the physical and mental changes of middle-age, seem to me to furnish the soundest basis upon which to formulate the distinctive norms applicable to middle-age.

VII. MATURITY

If forty and grandparentage may be used to fix for us the beginning of maturity and middle-age; what can we use to fix its end? The temptation to fall back upon traditional wisdom and the common lore of mankind is enormous. The Hindus, as we have seen, fix the end of the third quarter of the life-cycle at 60. That is the age common to most traditions. Pythagoras of Samos, who lived five centuries before the Christian era, delimited the various periods which Greek tradition came to recognize as *child*, one to 20; *young man*, 20 to 40; *man*, 40 to 60; *old man*, 60 to 80; *dead*, 80 years and over. There is, however, ample scientific evidence to justify fixing the end of the period around 60; science simply vindicates the ancient tradition.



Maturity calls very definitely for a change. Satisfaction can no longer be obtained solely out of the thrills furnished by novelty; the enduring values of life must take primacy. Mere continuance in existing tracks of habit, no matter how easy or profitable it may seem to continue in them, is therefore abnormal. But the call is not necessarily for a complete new occupation as prescribed by the Laws of Manu; there is no good reason, if the occupation itself is normal, why it should not be continued. There is no good reason why the farmer should cease farming, the teacher cease teaching, the housewife cease doing housework, but there are very good reasons for a profound

change in relations between the older and younger generations engaged in the same work. Up to around 40, the personal benefits and personal thrills to be extracted from work may very well be primary, but after maturity, the benefit to others—the social implications—should become primary.

A parallel change is called for recreationally. In youth, men and women are not much more than the bundle of boiling desires locked up in their own bodies; during their majority they should have pretty well discovered the limitations of catering to their own wants; in maturity, *egocentricity* should be laid aside and men and women no longer select their recreations primarily for the thrills to be extracted from them. As in the case of work, there are a world of social implications even to recreation, and public and civic activities should become their primary recreations, if indeed they should not be primary in both. The norm of recreation in maturity is therefore precisely the same as that for work: *alterocentricity*.

There is another way of expressing all this: after maturity stop making believe that you are still young; *be your own age*.



In 1915, Dr. William Osler made his famous statement at Johns Hopkins University about the “uselessness of men above forty years of age.”* Wechsler, in the work to which I have already called attention, supports Osler.† But what it seems to me is here involved is

*The speech is quoted in “His Life,” by Harvey Cushing. “I have two fixed ideas . . . The first is the comparative uselessness of men above forty years of age. This may seem shocking, and yet read aright the world’s history bears out the statement. Take the sum of human achievement in action, in science, in art, in literature—subtract the work of men above forty, and while we should miss great treasures, even priceless treasures, we would be practically where we are today. It is difficult to name a great and far-reaching conquest of the mind which has not been given to the world by a man on whose back the sun was still shining. The effective, moving, vitalizing work of the world is done between the ages of twenty five and forty—these golden fifteen years of plenty, the anabolic or constructive period, in which there is a balance in the mental bank and the credit is still good. In the science and art of medicine, young or comparatively young men have made every advance of the first rank. Vesalius, Harvey, Hunter, Bichat, Lænnec, Virchow, Lister, Koch—the green years were yet upon their heads when their epoch-making studies were made. To modify an old saying, a man is sane morally at thirty, rich mentally at forty, wise spiritually at fifty—or never. . . . My second fixed idea is the uselessness of men above sixty years of age, and the incalculable benefit it would be in commercial, political, and in professional life if, as a matter of course, men stopped work at this age.”

†cf., pp. 86-99 of Wechsler’s THE RANGE OF HUMAN CAPACITIES.

the error of equating *originality* of ideas with *usefulness* in their development. The time when great men have their most original ideas—and when ordinary men expend the greatest amount of thought and energy—is not necessarily the time when they do their most useful and effective work. There is not a single idea credited to a great genius for which there were not many precursors, who had the same idea but did little or nothing to make it a living force in the world. It is not enough to have bright ideas—what finally counts is whether or not the first strokes of genius are actualized. And the period of full realization in most instances comes late in life—after maturation has taken place and experience has taught the individual how to make ideas and ideals come alive.

About the physical decline of *modern* man after forty there is no question. The senses begin to fade—sight, hearing, taste, smell cease to be so keen. Strength declines. Obesity becomes common. Neurosis increases. Chronic and degenerative disease incapacitates. But whether all this is *normal* in middle-age is part of the issue involved. For if Howard and McCarrison are right, these are mere effects of which abnormal agriculture and abnormal food are the cause; and if Mayo and Sutherland and Sorokin are right, of abnormal patterns of work and leisure. The evidence indicates that while there may be some normal decline in energy after forty, there is no reason why it should not be offset by increased experience in using it; and that there is no reason at all for any such physical and mental decline as that recorded by the biometrists and psychometrists who confine themselves to the measurement of *modern* man.



The production, and productive capacity, of an individual varies greatly from age to age. During infancy and in very early childhood, productivity is virtually nil. It is true that from the time a child is able to do anything at all, it desires to help and to participate in the productive activities of adults, but this help cannot in the very nature of things amount to much. From this time on, however, productivity increases rapidly until by the tenth or twelfth year, boys and girls have the capacity to render their families sufficient help to be completely self-supporting. In farm homes, or family businesses, where the children still have the opportunity to work in accordance with

their strength, (particularly where their schooling is so organized as not to prevent them from contributing time and work at crucial times daily and crucial seasons of the farm year), the value of the work which children can perform is fully equivalent to their cost of maintenance. But all such work by children calls for frequent recognition and appreciation by the family particularly when there is as yet no warrant for monetary compensation.

Productivity thereafter rises steadily and attains its maximum *not* between 25 and 40—the period when the energy of individuals is normally greatest—but during maturity, after 40, when physical power has not yet begun to decline and long experience contributes most to total efficiency. During youth total production cannot be much in excess of cost of maintenance. During majority, between 25 and 40, production should be considerably in excess of maintenance; but egocentric desires are then so strong that it is probably normal to save only part of the surplusage and normal to expend part of it “to have a good time.” But during maturity, after 40, two great changes have to be taken into account: the fact that normally production of surplusage reaches its maximum, and the fact that egocentric desire normally changes into alterocentricity. Truly mature men and women simply get greater satisfaction out of giving to those they love what they cannot or do not provide for themselves, than out of gratifying their own personal desires and impulses; out of saving than out of spending; out of building up an estate rather than out of consuming one: out of providing for their old age and even for their funerals* rather than out of indulging in luxuries, not so much out of concern for themselves as to reduce to a minimum the burden which their old age and their deaths would otherwise place upon their families.



During maturity the increased experience, and the skill with which this should endow the average individual, should more than offset

*It is rather interesting to note that Chinese custom provides that during this period men and women plan the details and accumulate what is needed for their funerals; during late maturity and early old age they accumulate the funeral garments, the coffin, and other funerary accessories. Funerals everywhere, but perhaps most inexcusably in our monetized and commercialized society, are expensive. It is perfectly right, of course, that death should be ritualized. But unless the individual during maturity provides for his death—as individuals do in our monetized society with insurance—the burden falls crushingly upon their children.

any decline in sheer creative originality and mental and physical energy.† Unless grossly mis-educated perceptually, emotionally, intellectually, and volitionally, there is no reason why net productivity should not increase for many years after energy has stabilized and even for some years after it begins to decline. This is the age which Devine insisted should be the most productive in life:

It is now that artists should paint their best pictures, poets write their great poems, scholars produce their *opera magna*, preachers convert the heathen and edify the faithful, blacksmiths hit their hardest and surest blows, gardeners cultivate their most superb roses, firemen and policemen be most ready to risk their lives and lose them least often, physicians and surgeons command most completely the confidence of the sick and disabled and deserve it most, bankers and directors of railways and industrial corporations stand highest as stewards of great trusteeships and, to express it modestly, run least risk of criminal prosecution.‡

True as this is, it does not sufficiently distinguish between the two kinds of skills which have to be taken into account. What comes with maturity is not only, or necessarily, increased skill in dealing with *things* but skill in dealing with *people*; and even in doing and making things, it is knowledge of how others should make and do, which increases most. Maturity equips the individual for trust and directorship even when it deprives him of the energy and ruthlessness necessary for executive administration itself.

After middle age, the decline in energy is so marked that the increase in experience and wisdom of the individual cannot ordinarily offset it; there is a more and more rapid decline in productivity until earning power declines below maintenance. During senility, productivity declines to zero, and cost of maintenance must therefore be defrayed by other means than the individual's current "production."

In the modern world of industry and business, production is restricted almost exclusively to money-making, and the period of maximum efficiency in money-making is relatively short—in the case of men, it ends around 45; in the case of women usually not long after 35. This foreshortening of the productive span places an abnormal

†The decline in energy comes earlier in our urban and industrial civilization than it normally should, and in interpreting statistics bearing on this, it should not be forgotten that our statisticians have confined their observations and measurements almost exclusively to populations which are subnormal. Among peoples such as the Hunza, whose pattern of living is at least physiologically much nearer normal than ours, it is quite probable that the decline in energy comes much later than indicated in our statistical data.

‡THE NORMAL LIFE, Edward T. Devine, p. 198.

financial strain both upon each individual and all those related to him. The individual is generally prevented by convention, if not by law, from supporting himself before he is 16, thus burdening his parents with his full support and introducing an element of strain between the two generations. During his period of greatest financial earning-power, he is forced to work harder and to save more not only because of this prolongation of child-parasitism but in order to provide for the longer period of complete dependence after middle age than would be the case in a less monetized scheme of living. If he does provide adequately for old age by saving, he may have to deprive himself and his family of satisfactions which they might have enjoyed if his productive period were longer. After middle age and certainly during old age, if he has failed to save sufficiently, as is the case with the great masses of people, declining earnings and longer periods of unemployment make him partially or totally dependent upon others, either directly upon his children or indirectly upon the rising generation through charity or social security.

The family stresses which follow from this monetization of production are among the most distressing developments of modern life. The burden of rearing children who are prevented or forbidden by law from contributing to their own support makes children unwelcome; the burden in turn of supporting aged parents, who cannot earn enough money to support themselves, makes the rising generation resentful and indifferent to any obligation to provide for them a pleasant old age. No wonder desertion is so common—desertion of wife and children by harassed workmen unable to earn enough money to support them and obtain some enjoyment in life, and finally desertion of their aged parents by children with money-incomes insufficient to support the parents and properly provide for their own needs.

VIII. SENIORITY

SOMETIME after 60 there is a marked decline in *both* physical and mental energy and capacity. § During middle age there is *some* decline in physical energy no matter how normally the individual has lived, but *any* decline in mental energy can be more than offset by the powers which come with experience: these powers are the hallmark

§Energy is here used as virtually synonymous with rapidity, and *capacity* as the length of time during which energy can be expended without exhaustion.

of maturity. But with old age the individual comes face to face with the fact that no matter how normally life may have been and is still lived, *the decline in mental energy cannot be offset*—a decline in mental capacity and of the length of time during which mental energy can be expended must be accepted.

But in spite of this, *experience and wisdom can still be increased* as long as memory is unaffected and as long as the individual continues to live in the present—as long as he neither escapes into the future nor retreats into the past. During seniority judgment can still be exercised and advice contributed; reflection and contemplation continue; and experience and wisdom therefore increased. Wisdom can continue to be applied to the problems of the family, of organizations, of the community to which the individual belongs, in spite of any decline in mental energy and capacity as long, again, as memory is unaffected. The use of this wisdom should be the characteristic distinction of seniority. The greatest obligation of children to their aged parents, and of the community as a whole to its aged as a class, is not to pension them, (and forget them), but *to so organize life as to make it possible for this wisdom to be used*. At the very outset, therefore, in order to furnish a basis for evaluating what follows, the norm of seniority—the principle which can make old age just as useful and just as satisfactory as any other period in life—may well be stated: *during seniority men and women should continue to function upon current problems but avoid over-long exertions without adequate intervals of rest*. If this norm is observed, the individual can avoid frustration not only during old age but to the very end of life itself.

Sooner or later, therefore, no matter how normally we may have lived nor how far into the years we may find it normal for us to live, all must accept and adjust to the recognized indications of age.*

The body shrinks in height and weight. On the average, the man who at maturity is 5 ft. 8½ in. in height, shrinks by 70 to 5 ft. 3½ in.,. The loss in height is caused by a progressive bending of the spine, bowing of the head, general involution of the whole skeleton; the loss in weight, which usually amounts to six pounds by 70, to the reduced ability of aging tissues to retain water.

The body and features change form. Body fat tends to move slowly downward with age. Even before 30, the round, youthful face begins to disappear; gradu-

*I am indebted for most of the facts which follow to the admirable summary of the process of aging in Dr. Martin Gumpert's book, *YOU ARE YOUNGER THAN YOU THINK*, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1944; pp. 26-32.

ally the cheekbones become more apparent; the nose, ears and lips more prominent; the fat cushions around the eyes and eyeballs shrink; hollows appear at the temples and on the lateral parts of the cheeks. In women abdominal and hip fat deposits enlarge; there is a progressive loss of fat in the limbs and face; the breasts grow larger; if over-milked, pendulous; if under-milked, shrunken and atrophied.

Facial expression changes and wrinkles appear. As early as the 20's linear wrinkles appear on the upper and lower eyelids. In the 30's, small wrinkles radiate fan-like from the exterior angles of the eye; a deepened fold develops from the exterior angles of the mouth toward the nose; horizontal wrinkles of great depth usually appear on the forehead; vertical wrinkles between the eyebrows. In each successive decade these wrinkles deepen, enlarge, and spread down the neck. The expression is affected by constant smirking, frowning, or scowling over the years; hollow cheeks and sunken lips are caused by defective and missing teeth.

The teeth decay—at least with us. After 40 the teeth begin to wear down; the gums shrink; the teeth protrude more and more. By 60 bridges and false teeth are common, though Price, in his famous study of decay,* insists that normally we should retain them free from cavities until death.

The hair whitens. In the 40's graying begins; in the 60's the pigmentation almost entirely disappears. The quantity, gloss, and strength decreases; baldness becomes common—with us. There are good reasons for questioning whether this baldness is normal; it is rare in women; unknown among primitive races.

The eyes are affected. The eyeball sinks into its cavity; the sclera takes on a yellow color, the pupil grows smaller and less elastic, its color becomes grayish, the eye lens loses its elasticity and causes far-sightedness. These changes, too, may be abnormal, or at least appear prematurely among us.

The hands grow larger. The veins protrude, fat deposits diminish, folds and wrinkles appear, the bony structure becomes apparent, the finger-joint bones thicken, the skin becomes less elastic.

Rigidity increases. The joints stiffen; the cartilage disks between the vertebræ become thinner and smaller; cartilage tissue generally calcifies and elasticity decreases. The chest becomes rigid, the ribs do not respond so freely to breathing, the space between the ribs becomes smaller, as do the abdominal openings of the chest. The fibres of the muscles tend to atrophy and to be increasingly replaced by connective tissue, causing stiffness, fatigue, physical weakness.

Posture, walk, motility are different. Elasticity, strength, and motility are symptoms of youth; balance, precision, and control, symptoms of maturity and middle age; thoroughness, steadiness, and cautiousness, of old age. After 60—with us—movement becomes awkward and slower; walking becomes slow, wooden, troublesome, precarious. At the climax of senescence, trembling is rather constant, the posture bent, movement difficult, walking consists of short, tripping steps.

Cellular changes take place. The highly differentiated body cells, like the gland tissues, are reduced in number and are replaced by connective tissue; the connec-

*cf., NUTRITION AND PHYSICAL DEGENERATION, Weston A. Price, Paul B. Hoerber, Inc., New York, 1939.

tive tissue degenerates through loss of water, decrease of surface permeability and absorptive power; cellular capacity for dissolving substance in tissues with weak metabolism, (tissues like cartilage, the lens of eye, cornea, eardrum, arteries), lessens, and closterin, calcium salts, fat, and pigments accumulate in concentrated form increasingly impairing the functioning of such cells.

Glandular imbalances develop. The thyroid gland, the sex glands, the insulin-producing islands of the pancreas, the adrenalin-producing suprarenal glands, the growth-hormone producing pituitary gland—or more specifically the anterior lobe of the pituitary, all of which can be compared to an orchestra each instrument of which should respond at a given signal and then fall back into the harmonic stream, fail and begin to function discordantly.

Emotional insecurity seizes the individual—with us because of premature, abnormal old age. Fear of sickness, of sudden death, of destitution, of impotence, of senile incompetence and insanity, begin to haunt and poison the emotions and behavior. In women, menstruation ceases; the menopause, with its unnecessary neurotic storms and stresses, comes to $\frac{1}{8}$ th of all women before 40; to $\frac{1}{4}$ between 40 and 45; to $\frac{1}{2}$ between 45 and 50; and $\frac{1}{8}$ th after 50. In men, sexual potency declines after 50; spermatogenesis ceases around 60; ability to have intercourse (erection) ends around 70; libido and desire finally end. Impotence in men and loss of all sex-appeal in women, probably create more bitter unhappiness than loss of working capacity and financial fear, for sexual potency is regarded not only as a sign of health, strength and youth but of deserved social prestige. For most men and women deprivation of all sexual experience is harder than acceptance of dependence; harder than renunciation by life-long addicts of alcohol and tobacco.

The sexual and orgasmic span does not normally end, it is true, with the ending of the reproductive span between 50 and 60; in normal individuals it should continue satisfactorily, even though less vigorously, for many years. Normally it should unprotestingly—without neurotic symptoms—gradually, painlessly fade away. It is evidence of infantilism to seek rejuvenation in old age, and of the infantilism of modern man that he should seek, and modern nescience develop, “monkey-gland” surgery and testosterone injections† to prolong what genuinely mature old men and women should accept with grace and resignation, and should be willing to abandon once a normal regime of living no longer enervates them sexually.



Just about two thousand years ago, Cicero in his *De Senectude*, disposed for all time of the idea that old age need be a period of unalloyed misery. Systematically he faced the facts: (I) Old age, he said, calls the individual away from the transaction of affairs; (II) it renders the body more feeble; (III) it deprives him of almost all pleasures; (IV) it is not very far from death.

†Brown-Sequard, E. Steinach, and S. Voronoff, are famous names in this field of so-called science.

Indignantly he denied the implications of the first of these facts—the old, in abandoning the occupations of youth and maturity, can occupy themselves with better things. Where, he asked, is there a better place to spend time than on a farm, and what more useful task is there for waning strength than cultivating the earth? Where can age warm itself better in the sunshine, or by the fire, or be more refreshed by shady nooks and cool baths?

As to the feebleness of age, he called attention to the fact that an old man need no more feel the lack of strength of young men than the young man feels the lack of strength of a bull or an elephant. What a man has, that he ought to use.

As to the matter of pleasure, the old stoic considered one of the most delightful facts about old age, the fact that it no longer craved the pleasures of youth. Age gives up banquets, Cicero said, and piled-up boards and fast-coming goblets, but it can be free from drunkenness, indigestion, and sleeplessness. It can enjoy the pleasures of country life. Specifically he cites the manuring of the fields as one of the most important pleasures in which the old can indulge. The maintenance of the fertility of the earth he was wise enough to see was not only a duty but a pleasure. Nothing, he said, is richer in utility or more attractive in appearance than a well-cultivated field.

As to death in old age, he saw it not as death in youth—as a sort of violation of natural law—but as if the individual after having been on a long voyage out of sight of land at last comes back gently into harbor.



Life insurance companies, those interesting institutional inventions which modern man has developed to make the insecurities of urban and industrial life tolerable, have trained their agents to frighten prospects with the fact that out of every 100 men at age 20, at age 60:

- 35 will be dead;
- 1 will be wealthy;
- 4 will be moderately well-to-do;
- 5 will be poor but self-supporting;
- 55 will be dependent upon charity for existence.

Thrift, on the basis of this table, seems to have not only become an old-fashioned but an obsolete virtue. Thrift, except in the form

of life insurance and stocks and bonds, (in which form it is highly profitable not to those who save but to those who issue the policies and sell the securities), is in rather bad odor in our modern commercialized society. Those who save money and who do not spend it freely, are considered unsocial—they block the wheels of business, cut down sales, reduce the consumption which keeps factories busy. Thrift, which means *husbandry* in an agrarian culture, is a species of treason in industrialized society. What is a virtue in one culture becomes a vice in the other. The result is that more and more the old, as the insurance agents delight to point out, become dependent upon their children or charity, in their old age.

The aged therefore clamor for old age pensions. Fantastic schemes like the Townsend plan* can obtain millions of followers, and social security replaces both personal and family responsibility in old age. All the social security programs—not only the programs for old age pensions, but also for unemployment, compensation for sickness and accidents, for marriage grants, birth grants, and finally, grants for burial—which are being promoted by so-called liberals in every industrialized nation in an effort to assure “freedom from want,” are in the final analysis nothing but programs for the relief of irresponsibles. The right to public support in old age involves a principle diametrically opposed to the principle that, given equal access to the bounties of nature, the individual and the family are to be held responsible for taking advantage of the opportunity to support themselves—the principle that the ordinary mishaps and accidents of life are to be taken care of with personal savings and the helping hand of the family, and that public relief is to be provided not as a matter of rule but only to take care of exceptions.

The prevailing principle is the exact opposite of this. It assumes that neither the individual—and certainly not that outmoded institution, the family—is responsible; that means of dealing with the vicissitudes and climacteric events of life, and each condition of depen-

*The Townsend Plan was originated by a retired Los Angeles dentist, Dr. F. E. Townsend, who lost all his savings in the 1929 crash. Within 14 months there were 3,000 Townsend Clubs with 450,000 paid supporters. In 1935 a petition with 30,000,000 signatures called on Congress to pay every citizen over 60 years of age, not convicted of a felony, a pension of \$200 monthly *provided they followed no gainful pursuit and spent the entire sum in this country every 30 days*. For a careful study of this amazing phenomenon, see *THE TOWNSEND CRUSADE*, by the Committee on Old Age Security of the Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1936.

dence whether brief or prolonged, are to be provided for by the state from public funds dispensed by bureaucrats and obtained by compulsion. The individual, under this theory, is to be freed to live his life with complete irresponsibility; the young freed from all responsibility for their aged parents; the parents for their children, and the family dismissed as a factor in the socio-economic situation.

It can, of course, be argued that the modern mis-organized state, since it does in fact handicap the individual and the family with a stupid system of land tenure, an even more stupid money and credit system, and a still more stupid system of mis-education, is really responsible for the inability of individuals and families to achieve independence and to acquire, when they do not inherit, a homestead large enough to furnish permanent employment in accordance with their strength, and maintenance, for all the members of the family, young and old. But if that is the situation—as indeed is the case in most states—the causes should be dealt with; a rational system of education substituted for mis-education, a just system of land tenure substituted for our premium upon speculation, and an honest medium of exchange for our usurious and inflationary money and credit. Instead of that the people are being taught to clamor for social security, for government intervention, for Socialism, and to support an enormous non-productive bureaucracy with everybody in public life having a vested interest in keeping the public in ignorance of the reforms which would make government centralization unnecessary. If re-education took place, the progressive substitution of printed forms and official regulations for the emotionally-essential human relationships of family life in dealing with old age, would end.

The modern world, preoccupied with progress, completely matter of fact and *materialist* in its philosophy and values, has no use for the aged once their ability to function industrially comes to an end. So it pensions them off. Or prescribes retirement from business. Either plan, it has been found, kills them off quite promptly.

But neither has ancient India, conscious as its saints and sages have been of the problem and explicit as is the Law of Manu in prescribing for the last quarter of life. The Hindu, primarily *supernalist* in his philosophy of life, engrossed in his religion, is expected in old age to retire into the forest, depend upon the begging bowl, and devote himself to preparation for his end.

Only the Chinese, who are essentially *humanist* in their philosophy and organization of life, have so functionalized old age as—surprising as it seems to us imbued with the cult of youth—to make it the most important and the most desirable period of life. It is profoundly significant that Confucius, in his vision of the ideal commonwealth, said: “The old are to enjoy their old age; the young are able to employ their talents; the children are free to grow.” In the Chinese family, the function of the old is, on one hand, counsel; on the other, ritual. With ancestor veneration and worship as a symbolic discipline, each generation is taught to prepare itself for, and to aspire to, a dignified eldership or seniority, while an attitude of respect for and gratitude to the old is inculcated and established in the younger generation.



I called attention in the discussion of the first three periods in the life-cycle of the individual—his pre-natal period, his infancy, and his childhood—to the obvious fact that these periods constituted problems not for him but for his parents; they were more truly periods in their lives than in his. At each succeeding period I have tried to show that there ought to be a gradual shifting and finally a complete reversal of relationship between the two generations. It is abnormal and inhuman if the younger generation does not assume the responsibility and take the initiative for organizing family life for the new role which the old—who become great-grandparents between 60 and 80 if each generation has married normally—should be permitted to play.

What is that role? What is the final function in life which the individual should fill? It certainly is not work; productivity gradually diminishes to the vanishing point. Nor, plainly, is it play; the old can join in play but they cannot and should not try to lead in dance, and song, and frolic. Nor is it administration; authority should go with responsibility, and that requires more energy than the old should expend. As I see it the one real function which they can fulfill and which entirely avoids the stigma of hopeless inferiority, is a form of teaching; *passing on to the rising generation the wisdom they have garnered from the evaluation of recurring experience.*

How is this wisdom to be passed on by them without encountering that resistance which comes from any too didactic a method of in-

struction? Here too the answer comes from Confucius: *through ritual and ceremony*. Every holy day and holiday in the year—not those invented to stimulate modern business but the whole round of festivals which we find in the calendar of all agrarian cultures, (Easter and sowing time; harvest and Thanksgiving, for instance), need to be ritualized until not mere jollity, important as that is, but their real significance and wonder, is appreciated.* And this applies not only to general holidays but even more to family holy days—to weddings, to birthdays, to funerals. The elders should function and take the lead in making certain that all these climacteric events in life acquire at least equal importance in the eyes of the younger generation as that of acquiring the latest model automobile and dressing in the newest fashion. Every family should not only have its shrine; its *lares* and *penates* as had every ancient Roman homestead; it should have elders trained to function in cultivating and enriching the inescapable verities of life.

It is a little difficult for the aged to fulfill that role in a modern apartment house. That is one reason that I think urban dwelling abnormal. So long as we stick to our cities, men and women will continue to park the aged where they won't get in the way of everybody's having a good time.

IX. SENESCENCE

THE final period in the life-cycle can come as it normally should: *a short period of increasing weakness and weariness fading painlessly into permanent sleep*; or it can come as it usually does: *prematurely, resentfully, with poverty and dependence and ugliness, with fear and horror, with sickness and insanity*, the fitting end to a life unplanned and thoughtlessly mis-spent. The final period presents us with a sharp dichotomy: *senescence* is one thing, *senility*, another.

The fact which must be faced today is that senility grips more and more people as modern medicine, with its progress in the study of the pathological, succeeds in keeping the sick alive, and grips them

*A very moving account, (in English, not Hungarian), of a calendar of such festivals, which makes clear the difference between what I have in mind and our conception of holidays as stimulators for business and amusement resorts, will be found in HUNGARIAN PAGEANT; Life, Customs and Art of the Hungarian Peasantry, Alexander F. Karolyi, Vajna & Co., Budapest, 1939. For an account of such festivals all over the world, see THE BOOK OF FESTIVALS, Dorothy G. Spicer, The Womans Press, New York, 1937.

for a longer and longer period in their lives. An appalling increase in the number of elderly people delivered over to institutional care is the reaction of modern man to this fact. He cannot build hospitals and train doctors and nurses fast enough to cope with his solution of the problem. From 1910 to 1936 the admission to mental hospitals per 100,000 of the population increased 67.5 per cent in the age group 60 to 70; and 181 per cent in the age group of 70 and over. The rate of admissions due to psychoses of cerebral arteriosclerotic origin rose 536 per cent in the same 26 years. "Most of these institutions," Dr. Gumpert remarks with savage irony, "are merely devices for putting old people out of circulation, whose only means of escape is the morgue. And very few attempts at therapy are made beyond doping and providing general care."† With senility, (along with deterioration of all sense organs and increased physical debilities of all kinds), there is a tendency to fear and suspiciousness; to stinginess; to feelings of insecurity often hidden behind a mask of conceit; to persecution complexes occasionally breaking into violence and suicide; to self-pity; to infantile craving for attention and affection; to credulousness and susceptibility to those who flatter them and to fakers and criminals who exploit their loneliness; to stubbornness and senseless obstinacy; to sullen resignation or apathy; to lying and refuge in fantasy to conceal mental inadequacy; to breaking into tears or laughter at the slightest provocation; to shamelessness with infantile sexuality and perverse tendencies of various kinds; to dirtiness, carelessness in dress, and bad manners; in short, to all the infantilisms which have led to the designation of the period as *second childhood*. Of all the tendencies of senility, that of loss of memory is probably central, for nearly all the other tendencies are plainly efforts at compensation for this absolutely essential characteristic of personal adequacy.



In dealing with old age, physicians and social workers actually prolong not life but senility. *Materia Medica* has thus far been baffled by the diseases of old age and particularly by the huge increase in the mental diseases of the old. But in a society in which there is no useful work suitable to the strength of the very old, the longer the period

†YOU ARE YOUNGER THAN YOU THINK, Martin Gumpert, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1944; p. 226.

of old age is prolonged and the larger the proportion of old to young in the population, the worse off everybody is. Occupations suitable to very old men and women are almost non-existent in an industrial and urban civilization. Unlike children, who can at least be incarcerated in schools and told to devote themselves to getting an "education," there is nothing significant in our hospitals and asylums which the old can be challenged to do. There may be a valid social reason for trying to prolong the working period of life in such a society, but none for prolonging the age when the individual can no longer keep up with machines. As we progress further and further in industrialization and urbanization, it will become more and more evident that primitive peoples like the Eskimo, whose folkways provide for ceremonial and voluntary abandonment of the aged, have solved the problem of senescence by placing the welfare of the tribe ahead of the right of the senile to support once they can no longer function. Demand for the institution of euthanasia, not only for the purpose of reducing the mounting burden of relief and hospitalization but also for the purpose of painlessly putting the suffering out of their misery, is certain to develop. Perhaps we shall some day discover that there are only three valid reasons for prolonging old age and permitting the old to die a natural death: the fact that they live on the land and and so find it possible to contribute something to the maintenance of their families as long as they have even a little physical strength left; the fact that their families are so organized that they can function as teachers, counsellors, and as sacramentalists; and the fact that the members of their families happen to love them enough to enjoy having them with them as long as possible. In the functionless and loveless institutions and so-called "homes for the old" in which society is beginning to incarcerate them, none of these reasons for prolonging life apply; the problem is simply how to get them out of the way in some painless fashion fast enough to make room for the increasing numbers clamoring for admittance.



In a normal community, with a rightly educated population, senescence would represent so short an interval of time as hardly to constitute an age of its own. The more that eugenic—and human—breeding replaces breeding—animal-like—by impulse, and the more normally these properly endowed individuals learn how to live, the

less will senescence confront us with a distinct problem of its own. When finally worn out, the normal human organism should not go to pieces horribly, organ by organ, with the brain wearing out long before the body. On the contrary, ontogeny should recapitulate phylogeny to the very end. § That extraordinarily developed brain of man—the last organ which *homo sapiens* has evolved—should, analogically, be the last organ to wear out. No matter how much physical culture may contribute to the longevity of the body, the cultivation of the brain should contribute more to the longevity of the mind. Tissues, muscles, limbs, hands, stomach, lungs, glands, heart, should all wear out before the rhythmic pulsations which are the most typical attributes of life gradually slow down. Even when the heart slows down in the individual's last period of life, the light of reason should never disappear from his eyes; his memory and his mind should never fog out, but smiling his *good-bye* to those who care enough to stay with him to the end, the brain should merely—as it rested itself diurnally throughout his life—go to sleep once again, but this time for the last time.

DEATH

THE penalty for subnormal living in any or all of the nine periods of the life-cycle is not merely frustration; it is not merely suffering and disease; it is usually *both* unhappiness in life and—in addition—premature death. Many students of gerontology, the science of the old, are convinced that the normal life-span of *homo sapiens* is not the average of a little more than 60 years ‡ but nearer 120. On the basis of what H. Friedenthal calls “the cephalization factor”—the relationship between brain weight, body weight, and longevity—the normal life-span may well be over 100 years. Since we have not as yet been able to establish for this a definitive norm, we can at least tentatively assume that it is quite possible to live usefully and happily to between 80 and 90 years of age. In spite of Osler's famous dictum about the complete uselessness of men and women above 60, † there are facts which cannot be denied.

§This famous theory of Ernst H. Haeckel was that the life history or development of the individual, (ontogeny), repeats the evolution of the race, (phylogeny).

‡In 1939-1941 the average life-expectancy at birth was 62.81 years for men and 67.29 years for women. Source: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1944-45; Life Tables by Sex and Race, for the years 1939-41.

†cf., footnote p. 380 for the full statement. Osler said: “My . . . fixed idea is the uselessness of men above sixty years of age, and the incalculable benefit it

Benjamin Franklin wrote his *Autobiography* after 80; Darwin wrote his *Power of Movement in Plants* when over 80; Titian painted his *Venus and Adonis*, *The Last Judgment*, *Magdalen*, *Christ Crowned With Thorns*, and *Christ in the Garden*, after 80, and his famous *Battle of Lepanto*, at 98; Buffon was still adding to the fourteen volumes of his *Natural History*, at 81; von Ranke started his brilliant *History of the World*, at 80, and finished its twelve volumes at 91; von Humboldt started his *Cosmos, Description of the Physical World*, at 74, and finished all but the last few sentences of his *Natural History*, at 85; William Cullen Bryant, who translated his *Iliad* at 76, and *Odyssey* at 77, continued as editor-in-chief of *The New York Evening Post*, and died at his desk at 84; Goethe finished the second part of *Faust* at 82; Miss Sommervell finished her *Molecular Science* at 88; Gladstone was still Prime Minister at 83 and made his memorable speech on the persecution of the Armenians at 86; Disraeli, Bismarck, and Metternich reached the climax of their political power after 80; Verdi composed his *Ave Maria*, *Te Deum* and *Laudi alla Virgine* at 85; Hahnemann married at 80, resumed the practice of medicine, and was still the leading society doctor of Paris until he died at 88; Clara Barton founded the American Red Cross at 61, was President until 83, resigned to found the American National Association for First Aid at 84, and was its active leader until she died at 91; Wesley preached every day at 88; Voltaire published his *Irene*, and Tennyson his *Crossing of the Bar*, at 83.

If living were rationally organized, there is no doubt that men and women could live useful and happy lives through a much longer life-span than they endure today. If we assume 80 as the tentative norm, then three-quarters of all individuals die prematurely; if we use the traditional norm of 70, then just about half die prematurely. But this does not take into account the misery and suffering caused by foetal mortality in mis-carriages, still-births, abortions, and parturition. This is usually considered to represent one in every four conceptions.



Normal Living, however, cannot possibly call for the survival and full life-span of all the subnormal and feeble-minded masses who now clutter up the earth. It may be an exaggeration to say that "every would be in commercial, political, and in professional life if, as a matter of course, men stopped work at this age."

prospect pleases and only man is vile," but to say that millions *are* vile, is not. Probably half of all individuals born ought never to have been conceived at all. More than a third of all those living today are doomed by hereditary taints or by patterns of living which their parents or they themselves follow often deliberately, to frustration and premature death. Using all the tricks of modern surgery and hospitalization, and all the schemes of social work and public relief, to keep them precariously alive and begetting and rearing progeny like themselves, poisons the very stream of life and burdens those who might otherwise be able to normalize and humanize civilization. Normalization calls not only for eugenics and teaching people, (such as those who insist upon swarming like flies into our congested metropolitan cities), contraception and sterilization; it calls also for euthanasia and teaching the individual when and how to die. Right education is not complete unless it includes study of the circumstances in which it is nobler to die than to continue living. The annals of mankind do not record the countless instances in which ordinary men and women, confronted by circumstances in which the alternatives were life and death, did not shrink from choosing death. History records only the outstanding instances of martyrs, like Jesus; of soldiers, like those who refused to surrender the Alamo; of scientists and explorers like Amundsen and Shackleton. If there is anything genuinely human in the behavior of countless men and women who did not shrink from dying heroically, (and I believe there is, in the very best significance of *being human*), then there are reasons and there may come a time when we should choose to die deliberately and as gracefully as possible rather than cling to life and make living as ugly as possible for ourselves and those about us. It may be difficult to formulate the principles which justify not only what is called "mercy-killing" but what might also be called "mercy-suicide," but formulate such principles we must, or sheer sentimentalism in dealing with the subnormal will blast all hope of normalizing and humanizing civilization in our cycle of time. If we dare to organize juries which have the power of decreeing death to murderers and monsters such as those who were executed at Nuremberg in 1946 for precipitating World War II, we

**Euthanasia*—from the Greek *eu*, meaning *well* and *beautiful*, and *thanatos*, meaning *death*—means not one but two kinds of death: painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing states and diseases, and also painless self-death when living is likewise no longer justifiable.

should certainly dare to organize juries, composed of physicians and psychologists, of members of their families and of their neighbors, to decree and to permit euthanasia for those for whom living is a hopeless burden both to the world and themselves.



No matter how long denied, the final event in life is death. For all of us must die. It is not, therefore, enough for us to learn how to live; we must also learn how to die. No matter how perfectly we may succeed in living, we can only postpone . . . we cannot in the end escape dying. What is the reasonable way in which to regard and the normal way with which to deal with this culminating event? What is the relationship of this fugitive cycle of living to the apparently eternal universe of which life has made us conscious?

All of the answers made to this question seem to fall into three distinct categories:

I. The answers in the first category assume that matter is a function of life and the body a mere manifestation of spirit; that matter changes but life itself is eternal; that there is an eternal soul which manifests itself in a material body, or that the individual life we know is an illusion which disappears with death when its identity with the one and eternal reasserts itself.

II. The second category of answers assumes the exact opposite: that life is a function of matter; that when the particular combination of matter which gives form to human life decomposes after death, individual life disappears altogether; that when the unique concatenation of circumstances which make possible life here on earth ends, not only our own life but all life will end and lifeless matter again claim its own.

III. The third category assumes that both life and matter are integral; that they are both correlative and co-existent; that the forms we know, animate and inanimate, are one thing, life and matter another; that the forms of life and matter change and are obviously mortal, life and matter itself apparently not; that it is neither life nor matter with which we have to deal but the whole phenomenon in which reality manifests itself, and that our personal conscious selves about which we concern ourselves so intensely and naturally, are but the expressions of forms, which come and go apparently forever, the

real nature of which we do not know and may never be able to know.

This is an inquiry into education and living. It is necessary therefore to ask first as individuals and then as teachers of other individuals, what follows logically from each of these three different kinds of answers to the question of man's relationship to the universe in which he finds himself; what light does each of them throw upon that great practical problem which all must some day face: the problem of dying—the final event in the life-cycle we have been exploring.

I. If we accept the supernal or religious answer to the ontological problem and assume that the conscious life we are experiencing here and now is but a moment in eternal life—that this life is nothing and eternal life everything—then we must somehow or other pierce the veil which hides absolute truth from us intuitively by *revelation*, and turn either to a revelation vouchsafed (perhaps rather capriciously) directly to us, or to the revelations of Jesus, of Buddha, of Moses and the Prophets, of Mohammed, of Zoroaster, of Manu, or of Lao Tze, for light on God's will about how we should live and how we should die; to revelations which, differ as they do and conflicting as may be their many prescriptions and proscriptions, all agree that our principal concern should be not life but salvation, and our principal criterion in disposing of every problem we face, including above all that of death, "What shall I do to be saved?"

II. If we accept the materialistic answer to the ontological problem and assume that life, as man experiences it, is but a brief event accidentally deriving from a particular concordance of colloidal matter, then *sensation* must take the place of revelation; the senses must become the teachers to which we turn for instruction in how to live and how to die; the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain become the only logical ends and objectives in life; duty ceases to have meaning except as stratagem, and common sense prescribes that death be postponed as long as any pleasures whatsoever can still be extracted from living. We become not only materialists but hedonists, and we turn to Aristippus, to Hantzu, to Hobbes, to Machiavelli, to Nietzsche, to Max Stirner, and Karl Marx, for guidance.

III. If we accept a realistic answer to the ontological problem and assume the integrality of life and matter, then we must rely upon *reason* in trying to answer each particular question with which life confronts us; we are precluded from relying upon dogma and the

authority of revelation, and we have to reject all purely sensory interpretations of experience. We have to subject to logical analysis all our percepts and knowledge, whether obtained intuitively or through the senses, and in particular those prescriptions and proscriptions which deal with the crucial problem of human behavior. We turn to the sum total of mankind's knowledge and wisdom; to great humanists like Aristotle, and Confucius, and Mencius, and Cicero, and Shakespeare, and Voltaire, and Goethe, and John Stuart Mill, and Jefferson, and Lincoln, (to mention but a few indicative of their infinite variety); to all the leaders and teachers of mankind, not only humanist and philosophic but also materialist and scientific, religious and artistic; and even to the masses of primitive and civilized mankind with their common lore and traditional wisdom, for light; testing rationally and by the scientific method what we find in each and find anywhere applicable to each problem with which life confronts us.

Such inquiry, it seems to me, points to some such norm as this: *Action here and now is the only thing which really counts. It is what to do here and now about this life which is our only proper concern. If the manner in which we deal with each problem which confronts us here and now is the manner in which it is normal for human beings to deal with them, we shall not only enjoy all our rights and fulfill all our obligations to the past but to the future and to the eternal and absolute, whatever that may prove to be.* And the moment when continuance of living violates the rights and no longer fulfills our individual obligations to the dead, the living, and the unborn, we should recognize that life is no longer worth living and be willing, and ready, to die. The norm roots itself in an indisputable fact: the reciprocal relationship between the rights and obligations of each individual and the living, the dead, and the unborn.

It is impossible to dispose of any very important problem humanly without asking four questions: What have we inherited from our ancestors which must be taken into account in present behavior? What has posterity the right to inherit which we must provide in the present? What do we owe the living? Finally, what do we owe ourselves as individuals after having taken into account what we have received from the past, what we are receiving in the present, and what everybody receives as they enter upon the future?

The skeptic, the materialist, and the cynic may ask in the words of Havelock Ellis, "What has posterity done for me that I should do anything for posterity?" I think Havelock Ellis answers very eloquently the question he asks:

What has posterity done for me that I should do anything for posterity? But it is not really posterity which is involved. Posterity is only another name for mankind. When we pose the question rightly there can be no dispute about the answer. If we put aside what we owe to nature or good, we owe everything to mankind. All that we are, and all that we possess of civilization, we owe to our ancestry—to the everlasting aspirations and struggles of mankind down to the very minute that this is being read and to the slow accumulation of knowledge and art and wisdom which we now enjoy. Our immense debt to mankind in the past can only be repaid to mankind in the future. It is our privilege, if we do not regard it as our duty, to pass on, in ever finer shapes, the great traditions which have been handed down to us.*



The great defect of modern specialization in learning is nowhere more apparent than when dealing with death. Philosophy, at least that branch of it which is called ontology, is so far removed from the ordinary vicissitudes of life that it deals with *being* only in the abstract. Yet there is such a thing as *being* in the concrete, and education must be made to contribute something to the solution of the problems with which actual living, breathing, puzzled human beings are confronted. Death is one of those problems. What is the relationship of death to being? Is death an end to life; the beginning of a new life; or merely an event in a continuum? None of these questions need be dealt with in terms of pure abstraction if once we begin to deal with them within the frame of reference of family life. As a member of a family, the individual is poised for a time between his ancestry and posterity. Only against the background of family can events in the life of the individual such as birth and death acquire their true dimensions and real significance. The concept of family equips us with the only proper basis upon which to undertake the task of educating adults both in the problems of living and the problem of dying. With this concept—which reduces abstract concepts like *mankind* and *humanity*, *civilization* and *race* and *nation*, to a human dimension—we concretize, humanize, personalize, and normalize, our problems.

*WHITHER MANKIND, edited by Charles A. Beard, 1928; p. 228.

EDUCATION FOR LIVING

THAT this attempt at defining the concept of the *normal individual* in terms, firstly, of bifurcation into two sexes and then of the life-cycle, is more often suggestive than definitive I fully recognize. But it is impossible to contemplate organization of living in these terms without being forcibly struck with one thing: the utter inadequacy of what education today is doing to prepare the individual for living. In accepting the prevailing doctrine that once the problem of training the individual to earn enough to buy a high standard of living has been solved, all his problems of living have been solved, education is simply following the pathetically inadequate leadership of Industry, of the Labor Unions, of Commercial Agriculture, and finally of the Socialists and believers in the bureaucratic paternal State.

If education once faces the total complexity of the problem with which his life-cycle faces man, it must surely recognize that the pre-occupation of the leaders of modern man with the purely economic is the most convincing argument for the need of radical re-education.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART I. THE NORMAL INDIVIDUAL

SECTION III.

FUNCTION AND ORGANIZATION

There can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan."

TWO TERMS—*function* and *organization*—which have recurred again and again thus far in the discussion of the implementation of Normal Living, and which will have to be used even more frequently in the discussion of the normal family and the normal community than in the discussion of the normal individual, need definition. Not perhaps because their *general* meaning may be unfamiliar to the reader, but because I am using them not vaguely but *specifically* with reference to matters about which there ought to be no ambiguity. My purpose is not just to write about Normal Living but to make clear its practical meaning; to make clear that it constitutes not merely a subject for discussion but also a program for action. Yet without agreement upon the meaning to be attached to these two terms, the very idea of Normal Living becomes virtually meaningless and the distinction between acting normally and acting abnormally, arbitrary and unscientific.

I. FUNCTION

EVERY activity and undertaking—every project and enterprise—of an *individual*, a *family* or any other group or association of individuals, or a *community*, state, nation, or empire, can be analyzed in terms of its *purposes* and of the *methods* used in trying to fulfill them.

A purpose may be defined as *that condition which an individual or any group of individuals sets before himself or before themselves as a group, to be attained as a result of one or more actions performed over a short or long interval of time*. Even when the purpose is unformulated; when the act merely reflects what is the customary purpose for which individuals and groups perform certain acts and the act may be seemingly purposeless, it is still possible to analyze action in terms of purpose.

All purposes may be divided into two categories: *functional* and *non-functional*, in accordance with whether or not the acts performed and the ends which individuals seek to attain are essential to the existence, to the continuance, and to the characteristic form of action or expression of both the specific organs of human beings and of human beings as a whole. That our judgments as to whether various purposes are functional or non-functional need not be capricious and subjective but may be entirely objective and scientific, may be illustrated in connection with the act of eating. The function of eating is nutrition and the maintenance of health. This is its *function* because eating is essential to the existence, continuance, and to the characteristic form of action of both the digestive organs and of human beings as a whole. Human beings may and do eat foods, over-eat of good foods, and eat intoxicating foods simply for the purpose of obtaining pleasure out of titillating the palate. Insofar as pleasure is *not* incidental to nutrition; insofar as pleasure *without regard to nutrition* becomes the purpose for which they eat—as is unfortunately the case with advertising-taught mod-

ern man—the purpose is not only non-functional, it is also improper. Nothing is truer than the statement that *most people dig their graves with their teeth*, which is just another way of saying that the purpose for which they eat is an improper and inappropriate one.

Non-functional purposes may therefore be either proper or improper. They are proper so long as they are merely incidental to the fulfillment of purposes which are functional and essential; they are improper to the degree in which they interfere or displace essential and functional actions and purposes.

THE consequence of substituting improper purposes for functional purposes is not necessarily painful; on the contrary, very often—at least immediately—it is pleasurable. The penalty for such substitution is in the most literal meaning of the term, *frustration*—frustration sometimes of the normal action of particular organs, (the heart, the lungs, the stomach); frustration sometimes of the individual as a whole human being.

FRUSTRATION vs. SATISFACTION

The consequence of fulfilling function is not always pleasure. Very often it is, but sometimes it involves discomfort, pain, suffering. The reward for fulfilling function is not therefore happiness or pleasure; it is *satisfaction*, the feeling of satisfaction which may be accompanied by happiness and pleasure but which is felt even when they are absent. The mother who gives birth to a child fulfills the function of woman and gets satisfaction out of that fact even though she may or may not get pleasure out of the months she devotes to pregnancy, the ordeal of labor, and the exhausting nursing and care of her child during the first few years of its life.*

There is a norm to which all the evidence on this subject points: *Normal Living is impossible unless there is harmonic fulfillment of all the major functions of man.* The individual cannot pick and choose among his purposes on the theory that some functions may be disregarded because a few of them have been fulfilled. There is, of course, ample range of variation within the normal pattern of living and in the degree and manner in which each function has to be ful-

*cf., pp. 301-302 for detailed definitions of *satisfaction* and *frustration*.

filled. Normal human beings do not have to live exactly alike. On the contrary, the range of variation within the normal is greater in *homo sapiens* than in any other species of organism. But the penalty for disregarding any major function or for stepping outside the normal range of any of them is either immediate or ultimate frustration.

I HAVE spoken of self-preservation, self-reproduction, and self-expression as instinctual drives and basic norms of living. But being essential activities of man, it is equally correct to speak of them as functions each of which men and women must fulfill and none of which they can disregard if they are to live like normal human beings.

To say that it is man's function to survive and generate, is to say what is true, *but only on the animal level of life*. For human beings, maintenance and sexuality are as much forms of self-expression as are music and poetry. Only when flood, famine, war and similar catastrophes reduce men to sub-human levels, do they fail to express themselves humanly in their struggles to avoid starvation and to satisfy their sexual cravings. With man, expression is everything. Whenever it ceases to be so, he ceases to be human.

But to reduce the answer to the problem of function to one all-inclusive term like self-expression, is to over-simplify the problem to the point of futility. It is possible to suggest all that has to be expressed, and also the relationship of survival and sexuality to self-expression, by listing the major problems with which men and women are confronted in trying to behave like normal human beings:

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS:	GENETIC PROBLEMS:	EXPRESSIC PROBLEMS:
Occupational	Occupational	Occupational
Possessional	Possessional	Possessional
	Psycho-physiological	Psycho-physiological
		Educational
		Esthetic
		Ethical
		Epistemological
		Ontological
		Teleological
		Associational
		Gregational
		Civic
		Operational

Sheer *survival* can be achieved by the mere solution of economic problems—by combining exertion with access to natural resources. Even animals as lowly as the asexual amoeba solve economic problems. *Generation* requires, in addition, the solution of physiological and psychological problems. But animals too solve these problems, as is evident to anyone who watches a gobbler strut, or a boar court and fecundate a sow. *Expression*, however, not only confronts *homo sapiens* with the problem of humanizing his economic and genetic activities but in addition requires artistry—skill and good taste—in the solution of all the major problems with which life confronts him. It is in the normal and human solution of these problems that human beings satisfy their instincts, (if we think of survival, generation, and expression as instinctual drives, hungers and fundamental needs); observe them, (if we think of them as basic norms of living), or fulfill them, (if we think of them as functions of living).

Throughout the discussion of each period in the life-cycle of the individual I have tried to make it clear that it is possible to organize individual living to fulfill the major functions of man. In the discussion which is to come, I will try to make it clear that it is possible to organize family and community life with the same purpose in mind.

II. ORGANIZATION

SO MUCH for function. Now for organization—the other term which I am sorry to have to use *ad infinitum*.

Every activity or undertaking can be analyzed not only in terms of its *purposes* but also of the *methods* used in trying to fulfill them. Method may be defined in its broadest sense as simply the procedure or process followed in doing anything—the way or manner in which things are done. All methods may be divided into two categories, *organized* or *unorganized*, in accordance with whether the processes followed reflect thought and planning—with whether they are orderly, or whether they are impulsive, thoughtless, planless, disorderly, and disorganized or unorganized. The methods used by very young children, and by feeble-minded or insane adults, in doing even the simplest tasks—let us say cleaning up a room—are not organized.

Instead of first getting all the equipment needed—the broom, dust pan, dust-cloth—starting at one end and moving gradually to the other, moving the furniture systematically out of the way, and finally moving everything back to its proper place, they may start to pick up things; may suddenly stop and get a broom; start sweeping in the center of the room; drop the broom and go for a dust-cloth; start dusting; suddenly start sweeping again; they do whatever impulsively occurs to them as part of the work of cleaning but do everything without regular order of any kind. But perfectly sane adults who are untrained or who undertake projects or enterprises beyond their capacities or experiences, frequently proceed without organization until they learn what is the efficient sequence to follow in doing whatever is involved in carrying on their undertakings.



Organization, in its most fundamental sense, is not the organization of equipment; it is not the organization of space; it is not even the organization of personnel. These are, of course, parts of what is involved in organization, but they are incidental, not essential. *The essence of organization is time; the occupation of time; the planning of the spending of time*, and that quite without regard to what the purpose for which the time is used—whether to build a house, run a farm, cook a meal, conduct a retail store, manufacture automobiles, or play a game of baseball, conduct a country club, worship in a church, teach in a school, operate a hospital, or win a war. Organization, not with reference to an association but with reference to the act of organizing, means nothing if it does not mean the division of time, *the division of either the time of one individual*, (as when we divide up our own time and plan or organize the steps which we shall follow in regular order to bake a batch of bread most effectively), *or the apportioning of time among a group of in-*

dividuals, (as when in organizing a bakery we divide the labor of baking hundreds of loaves of bread among dozens of different workers).

When, therefore, I speak of organization, I am referring to the organization of the time which each individual spends in the course of his entire life-cycle, which can be as truly planned as we plan the short interval of time involved in baking a batch of bread; to the organization of the activities of the group of persons who live together as a family; and to the organization of the activities of the citizens and rulers of communities, states, and nations. Space is involved and so is equipment. They are both always important if time is to be effectively used. But they grow to their present enormous dimensions, until they dwarf the human factor, only when the scale of enterprise becomes always bigger and bigger. The bigger the institution, the bigger the factory, the bigger the city, the bigger the office, the more machinery displaces man; the more precedence we have to give to things and the less time can we waste on living.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART II.

THE NORMAL FAMILY

SECTION I.

THE NATURE OF FAMILY

Home is the girl's prison and the woman's workhouse.—George Bernard Shaw, "Maxims for Revolutionists."

THE fractional—and fragile—organism which I am calling an individual, can only complete himself and express his real potentialities through a hierarchy of relationships with other individuals; with (I) an individual of the opposite sex with whom association is both physiologically and psychologically most intimate; then in descending order of intimacy, with (II) a chum, or "alter ego," (who may or may not be a member of his own family); with (III) the members of the family with which he lives; with (IV) the members of his church, his union or business or professional association, his political party, his clubs, lodges and fraternities of various kinds; with (V) the people of his neighborhood and race; with (VI) the members of his community; with (VII) the individuals who constitute what is sometimes called society and sometimes the nation; and with (VIII) that still larger circle of human beings of all races and nationalities which comprise humanity as a whole.

The primary importance of the relationship of the individual to his family grows out of the obvious fact that in the whole history of mankind, in all the infinite variety of cultures and civilizations with which *homo sapiens* has experimented not excluding our own with its disintegrating family life, virtually all individuals have been born into families and spend their crucial

formative years in intimate association with the members of a family of some kind. Marriage, which it is true involves a greater degree of intimacy between two human beings than that between parent and child, or sibling and sibling, or any other relationship within the family circle, is really either *adoption into a family*, (in patri-local and matri-local marriage), or the *beginning of the establishment of another family*. Friendship, which is often characterized by an intimacy second only to that of marriage, is usually episodic, and often develops between individuals belonging to the same family. The primary problem of the individual today, if he is to live a normal life, is not a money-making job, as modern man has been taught to believe, nor friendship, nor even mating and marriage, important as these may be, but *learning how to live normally either in the family in which he was born, in some family which he, or she, joins, or in some family which they help to establish*.

Until the individual learns how to solve this problem, he is imperfectly equipped to live. He may continue to exist, but he cannot live normally no matter what he does with himself nor what society, through various surrogate-institutions—free-love, restaurants, hotels and the like—does for him. Normal Living presupposes the solution of the associational and gregational problem of the individual not in terms of a fractionalized bachelor-life in an atomized or collectivized society, but in terms of life as a corporate member of a truly normal family. Since the so-called family of today is not a normal one, it is impossible to normalize individual life without also normalizing the family.

MULLER-LYER, whose work has left an almost indelible impression upon modern "progressive" thinking, divided the history of mankind into three periods, (I) the clan period, (II) the family period, and (III) the personal period.† According to Muller-Lyer, mankind

CLAN VS. FAMILY VS. PERSON

†DIE FAMILIE, Franz Muller-Lyer, 1912.

long ago passed through the *clan period*; more recently it passed through the early, middle, and late stages of the *family period*; it is now in the early stages of the *personal period*. If his theory is correct, and the family is merely an instrument developed to meet the needs of a particular stage in the historical evolution of man; if civilized man has already passed through that stage in his evolution, then the family as we have it today is nothing but a vestigial survival of what was at one time a necessary social institution, and the thing to do is to get rid of every trace of the family as rapidly as possible so that modern man can enter upon the personal stage of civilization unencumbered by such an outmoded institution. But Muller-Lyer may have been mistaken. There is no more scientific reason for assuming that social institutions may not perfect themselves than there is for assuming that the physical characteristics of man may not perfect themselves; that characteristics like man's plantigrade posture may not become for all practical purposes, perfect. Man may, it is true, pass through a course of devolution; he may cease to be a biped and once again become a quadruped. Social institutions suitable for man, the biped, would then become unsuitable for man, the quadruped.* The point, however, must not be forgotten that after such a change man would have ceased to be *human* man; he would no longer be *homo sapiens*, and neither the institutions nor the pattern of living normal for human beings would be normal for the animal into which man had degenerated.

But if we assume that there is some development of man's arms and legs which represents the peak of possible development of limbs for *homo sapiens*, it is possible also to assume that there is some development of his social institutions which likewise represents the peak of what is normal for human beings. Within the range of this development details may vary greatly and be susceptible of infinite improvement, but the essence of the institution, once it has reached its full development instrumentally, is unlikely to change.

It is of the essence of the argument for the family as against the

*Or he might change his line of evolution, and cease to be heterosexual; he might evolve into a species of hermaphroditic two-legged animals which no longer reproduce bi-sexually. In that event, marriage and all the other institutions which have developed with it, would become anomalies. The argument I am making would be unchanged by such a development; man would cease to be human, and of course institutions normal for human beings would become absurd for the animal into which he had evolved.

atomization of the human race suggested by Muller-Lyer's concept of a *personal stage*, that family life is essential to living like a normal human being; that when the individual abandons family life, as modern man has been abandoning it, and relies upon substitutes for it, man himself begins to degenerate. And this I have tried to show is what is actually happening to modern man; as rapidly as the family disintegrates, man himself is degenerating, and this degeneracy is no mere metaphorical figure of speech; it records itself in the statistics of modern dependency and delinquency, of modern neurosis, insanity, and suicide.

ESSENTIAL to the validation of the idea *normal family*, (and to a program of normalizing the existing modern family through individual action family by family, through re-education of people in general, and through reformation of family law), is adequate definition of (I) the nature of the family, of (II) the functions which it should fulfill, and of (III) the form of organization which will enable it to fulfill the purposes which justify its existence. An adequate idea of the nature of the family is essential for the simple reason that the conception of family which prevails in the modern world is a travesty which caricatures and renders ludicrous the most important social institution developed by mankind. To modern man almost any group of persons living together and calling itself a family, is all there is to the idea of family.

But the only idea of family which is not one-dimensional and which is not so thin as to leave the individual with a feeling of isolation in time, is *three-dimensional*; it conceives of the family as a continuum with a past, present and future. This continuum is a *corporate entity*; with a *corporate name, corporate values, corporate history and traditions, corporate customs and habits, corporate reputation and good-will*; with a *corporate estate, real and personal*; composed not only of its present membership, but a membership in the past, and a membership in the future, of which the members in being and in occupation—the living family group—are representatives, entitled to the usufruct of the family's corporate heritage, but obligated, as trustees for their posterity, to the conservation of that heritage; and, finally, conscious of the nature of the institution of which they are members. Anything substantially different from this, or omitting any

essential element in it, is not a normal but an abnormal idea of family.

When the word family is used today, the family which the average person conjures up in his mind is the abnormal modern family group which has confused us in our thinking about this whole subject by usurping the place of the more nearly normal ideal of the past and identifying itself with the more nearly normal family group which existed prior to the rise of industrialism and modern urbanism.

We still hear the strains of "Home Sweet Home" when a dance orchestra wishes to announce the end of a ball, but the music conjures up nothing in the minds of modern man that bears the slightest resemblance to the home which the generations which hallowed that song had in mind.

A GROUP of lodgers in a boarding house; a number of working girls or business women sharing a common apartment; a number of men "baching" on a ranch; a widowed, divorced, separated, or deserted mother and her child or children in their home; an unmarried man and woman living together—that is to say, any two or more individuals who associate together for a considerable time; who may live and even work together for many years, may be said to constitute a household but certainly not a family. Nor does mere addition to such households of unmarried couples, or *the inclusion of the homes of married couples with one or more children even if they all live together long enough for the children to be reared*, transform such households into families. Not even the observance of the conventions of home life by such groups, nor the designation of such groups colloquially and statistically as families, can make such households families in anything but name.

All such groups should be designated as *households*. What a married couple establishes when they set up separately in accordance with the customs and conventions of the industrial and urban world, is a household. It remains a household even when children come—and eventually all go, leaving the household again reduced in numbers to the original couple. It remains a household unless with time it comes to consist of three or more generations and becomes the point of beginning of a new family. The term family should be reserved for groups living together which are in fact normal links in the continuum

which I am designating a family.

It is most unfortunate that the Census Bureau has for so many decades accepted not only the popular but the prevailing sociological conception of the family and enumerated and designated households as families. The census—and the prevailing usage—is reduced to absurdity by the fact that over ten per cent of all so-called *families* enumerated by the 1940 census consisted of households in which one person lived all alone.* About one-fifth of these households consisted of broken families in which death, divorce, separation, or desertion left only one of the parents at home.†

Up to 1920 the only concept of family used in the census was defined as follows:

The term "family" as used in the census, signifies a group of persons, whether related by blood or not, who live together as one household, usually sharing the same table. One person living alone is counted as a family, and, on the other hand, all the occupants and employees of a hotel, boarding house, or lodging house, are treated as constituting a single family.

In spite of the fact that it was long recognized that this provided no information about either the biological or the legal family, it was not until 1930 that any distinction at all between households and so-called families was made. In the last two censuses the family has been defined "as a group of persons related either by blood or marriage, who live together as one household, usually sharing the same table."

The inadequacy of not only identifying the concept of family with that of *household* but of identifying it with that of the *biological and legal family* is of the essence of this argument. Neither a married couple, who constitute what is called a legal family, nor a mother and her children, who constitute what is called a biological family, deserve the designation *family*. If all the rights of every normal individual are to be realized; if all the obligations of such an individual are to be discharged, both those owing to the living and to the dead and unborn; and if man is to express and realize to the fullest extent the potentialities of the human personality in the art of cultivating the earth and the myriad of things, animate and inanimate, with

*In the 1940 census, 10.1 per cent of all the families in the United States were said to consist of one person only, and 25.7 per cent of two persons only.

†There were 6,262,000 broken families included in the 1940 enumeration of families; these constituted 17.8 per cent of all families. But if the absurd "families" consisting of one person only were eliminated from the total, it is probable that the broken families represented over 20 per cent.

which it is filled, then the idea of family must be made to mean more than a mere household; it must be made to mean more even than that of the living family group. The idea must be made to refer to the family as a *continuum* and to the living members as its agents—and beneficiaries—in being. The dour humorist who left a will for his heirs reading, "I leave my heirs the earth; they always wanted it; now they can have it," was only saying what is the literal truth. Every generation enters into the occupation of land, houses, and things both tangible and intangible, bequeathed to it. We ought to recognize the fact, and organize family life so that each generation does not begin naked, so to speak, and is not confronted with having to buy everything from the preceding generation.

THE NORMAL FAMILY is really a *corporate entity*. It does not come into existence and cannot be ended like that fortuitous aggregation of two or more persons called the family today, at the convenience—and on the impulses—of two persons. It is a corporation because its existence both antedates and postdates the life of those who at any given time happen to constitute its membership. The stockholders, and the existing group of persons who constitute the living membership of a normal family, operate an institution which has been acquired from the former stockholders or bequeathed to them by its former members with the intention ordinarily of continuing its operations even though they themselves may die off or particular members for some reason or other cease to belong to it. The family, like a corporation, is therefore an *artificial person* created for the purpose of implementing this fact and should not be confused with the group of *natural persons* who are at one and the same time its agents and beneficiaries.


On the one hand this corporate entity functions for a *group* of persons of various ages and relationships—consanguineous, agnatic, and vassal—who from time to time belong to the group and live on the family estate; on the other, it may be said to function for a *line* of individuals—the ancestral members of the family, the living members, their descendants or successors.

In the modern, materialistic world, with its emphasis on the sensate and practical, the tendency is to think of the family—and to teach family life—solely with reference to the interests of the living members of the family. Yet it is perfectly obvious that to do so is

to ignore the character-building value of consciousness of the inter-relationship of past, present, and future. With history, no matter how moving the historian or effective the teacher, consciousness of this relationship is unavoidably *abstract, distant, impersonal*. But within the frame of reference of a normal idea of family, consciousness of the relationship not only of the family's estate and membership to its ancestry and posterity but of the inter-relationship of the family with humanity as a whole—past, present, and future—becomes *specific, intimate, personal*.

The family, thus conceived and idealized, is composed of individuals who have obligations to discharge and not only benefits to confer upon themselves. Their relationship to the rest of humanity, and the legal and ethical code which implements that relationship, has length, breadth, and depth. It is three-dimensional. It is multilateral not unilateral. It is not only one-directional, pointing toward themselves, but also two-directional, pointing to others. It calls for the evaluation of conduct both *horizontally*, with relation to the existing members of the group, and *vertically*, with relation to the dead and those yet to be born, as is shown in the very intriguing chart which Shirley Miles has drawn to illustrate this point. The prevailing idea of family, and the prevailing education of people with regard to family life, ignores the fact that it is actually true that (I) it is through family lineage that each family group and every living individual, even if living all alone, is socially and, ultimately, consanguineously related to all humanity—living, dead, and yet to live; that (II) it is through the family line that every individual is distinguished from other individuals and *receives* both his genetic and environmental personality characteristics, and in turn *transmits* them to future generations; and that (III) it is through the family homestead—through what used to be called the family estate and what is in reality that part of the earth which a family has developed—that each individual and the family have to solve the problem of association not only with neighbors, (with those individuals and families who occupy the rest of the land in their community), but with all the races and nations which occupy the whole earth.

No individual, says modern sociology and economics with their emphasis upon interdependence, can live entirely to himself. It is even more important to recognize that no individual and no group can



ANCESTRY

FAMILY GROUP

PROSPERITY

FAMILY

HUMANITY

-5, MILES-

live like normal human beings if they live only on a single level in the present tense and only with regard to association with the generation of which they are a part. For life to be organized without regard to these vertical relationships of benefit and obligation—without regard to what the individual has received from his ancestors and what he owes posterity—is to organize it not upon a human but upon an animal plane. It is abnormal for human beings to ignore the fact that they have both memories and imaginations. For human beings to organize life only in the present tense is for them to disregard their possession of these enormously important attributes. To live normally, human beings must weigh what they do not only in terms of the present but of both past and future.

THE family group—the living individuals who belong to a family as distinguished from the corporate entity itself—may be normal or abnormal; the group may or may not be able to fulfill functions essential to normal family life. The group—because of the mis-education of the individuals of which it is composed and the mis-influence exerted upon them by the ideas prevailing in the culture in which they find themselves—may be improperly *composed*, improperly *equipped*, improperly *organized*, improperly *ideated*. It may be in fact nothing but a household even though it has *both the membership and the equipment essential to normal functioning*; it may have everything but a completely wrong set of ideals and patterns of behavior. Or the group, perhaps composed only of an old couple whose children have all left the homestead as is the case with so many farm families today, may have *all the equipment needed by a normal family group* but because of improper composition, be abnormal. Or, as is the case with many immigrant families which have piled up in our great cities, the group may have *the necessary numbers to compose a normal family group* but be without the equipment—land, house, livestock, tools—to function properly.

Persons of the same kinship—who are merely related to one another by blood—but who do not live and work and share together the same homestead—though they may think of themselves as belonging to the same family, do not constitute a family group. They are blood-relatives; they are dispersed parts of a *biological family*; they are not members of a normal family group.

Neither does what is called a *legal family* necessarily constitute a normal family group. If such a group comes into existence by marriage; if the married couple do not live on the homesteads of either of their parents' families, (that is if the new marriage is neither patri- nor matri-local); if such a married couple establishes no homestead to be shared with their children; if no children are born or adopted by them and the group consists only of two persons (even with servants) of the same generation; or if such a married couple have children but the group as a whole remains a two-generation group only until the children are old enough to leave their parents and within a period of 20 to 25 years the parents find themselves back at the point of beginning as an all-adult, one-generation, two-person group, it is a legal but not a normal family group. To constitute a normal family group, the group must meet all the requirements and perform all the functions not only of the living group but also of a true unit or link in a family continuum and vertical family line.

A normal family group, as distinguished from a mere household, consists of (I) a *group* living on the same homestead or estate; composed (II) of a sufficiently large *number* of persons, of both *sexes*, and all *ages* from infancy to old age, belonging to not less than three *generations*, (III) related to one another by *kinship*, (consanguineously and genealogically), by *law*, (agnatically by marriage or legally by adoption), or by *vassalage*, (as servant, lodger, or guest); equipped (IV) with a permanent and hereditary estate and homestead, (land, buildings, furnishings, tools, machines, animals), consisting of all the room and things necessary to produce the group's most important needs and desires including that of privacy; organized to (V) *associate together* intimately, to (VI) *work together* on the maintenance of the homestead, and to (VII) *contribute severally* to its support from their outside earnings; and (VIII) *conscious of the nature of the institution to which they belong*, of the rights they enjoy—the right to whatever they may genuinely need and the family can furnish them—to which they are entitled by virtue of membership in the group, and of their obligations to it in consideration of which they make such contributions to its life and for its support as they are capable of making.

Such a family group may consist of a number of households, or sub-families. (Every generation and each married group does not

necessarily have to live in one house). They do not all have to eat at one table at the same time and eat exactly the same dishes. (Eating at the same table and dwelling in the same room or house is essential to a sub-family or common household; it is not essential to the family group as a whole, though quite frequent feasts and festivities in which every sub-group and each member of the family join is of the essence of normal family life).

What is essential to the normality of such a group is only such composition, such equipment, and such organization as is necessary in order to enable it to fulfill all the functions of a normal family. Everything else, if not exactly non-essential and superfluous, is a matter for individual taste and variation.

BY this criterion the modern family is manifestly abnormal. It does not and cannot fulfill the functions essential to its normality as an institution.

THE ABNORMAL MODERN FAMILY

In 1940, according to the census, over ten per cent of the households called families consisted of one person only—of an individual living all alone; 25.7 per cent consisted of one-generation groups—married couples or adults mainly; 39.4 per cent consisted of three or four persons only—mostly couples with one or two children. A total of 75.2 per cent of all so-called families consisted of families which are abnormal because they do not have enough children to maintain the existing population; less than a quarter of our families are in this respect normal. Half the families in our great metropolitan centers had no children at all in 1930; one-third of those in small towns; and out in the country on farms, one in five had no children.* This decline in the number of children per wife is one of the most marked abnormalities of both the modern family and the modern wife. If we go back far enough, the number per wife, of both children and pregnancies, was abnormally large; now it is abnormally small. Previous to 1700 the average number of children was 7.37; between 1870 and 1879 it was 2.77;† in 1940, 2.5. City wives averaged only 2.2; small-town wives, 2.7; farm wives, 3.5. But this does not take into account the women who bear no children at all. If all women between

*RECENT SOCIAL CHANGES, p. 687; McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933.

†From a study of the average number of children per wife based upon 22 genealogical records of American families in E. A. Ross' PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY.

15 and 74 years of age are taken into account, the number of children ever born to our modern women drops to 1.8. Yet it takes at least 2.2 per woman to keep the race alive.

What adds to the gravity of this decline, as has already been discussed, is the fact that the decline is most marked among the best families—the average is raised by the fact that it is the feeble-minded, the least-efficient, the worst-educated, and the most poverty-stricken parts of the population who are bearing the most children.

If, however, this book is not to be devoted to the enormous mass of statistical material evidencing the abnormality of the truly modern family, I shall have to content myself by emphasizing one climacteric fact—the fact that it is abnormal because it cannot fulfill one of the most important functions of a normal family: it cannot provide its members the security essential to living like normal human beings. *It is not equipped with a home of its own.* It lives in a rented home of some kind; it shifts about from so-called home to home; it is dependent upon its job or money-income for a roof over its head; its children are born without this elemental security; it has no home to bequeath to the next generation—only rent-receipts which its heirs too must spend a quarter of their lifetime collecting. If we take all families, both the most modern, such as live in Chicago and New York, and the least modern, such as the declining number still living in the country, 56.4 per cent are tenants; only 43.6 home owners. And this rise in tenancy and decline in home ownership is one of the most conspicuous trends in modern life. In fact, we consider it progress to have the government not only build barracks but subsidize the provision of dormitories which the people can rent: this is called *public housing*. But if we take the urban population only—those modern enough to live in cities of at least 2,500 population—then for the whole country, 62.5 per cent are tenants; only 37.5 per cent home owners. In the country they are still old-fashioned. More than half the rural farm families still own a part of America; only 46.8 per cent are tenants who rent from landlords the privilege of living on the earth. But modernization is reaching out into the country too—the proportion of home owners is declining in the country as we substitute giant commercial farms for homesteads and family-sized farms.

But it is when we come to the really modern families which live in large cities like New York—that shining diadem of modern man—

that we come face to face with the fact that 84.2 per cent live in rented homes; only 15.8 per cent own the homes, less the mortgages on them, in which they live. And it must not be forgotten that New York City includes five boroughs, of which one, Richmond Borough, (Staten Island), is an enormous relatively rural area, while large parts of Queens and Brooklyn are still suburban and semi-rural. The facts are so significant that they deserve tabulation; they make it clear that as we shift from the rural and less modern, to the urban and more modern sections of not only New York but all our metropolitan centers, tenancy increases, and equipment of its own shelter by the family declines:‡

	RENTED %	OWNED %
Queens Borough	45.0	55.0
Richmond Borough	46.6	53.4
Brooklyn Borough	74.4	25.6
Bronx Borough	89.4	10.6
Manhattan Borough	97.5	2.5

The climacteric proof of the abnormality of the modern family is furnished by its disintegration. A normal organism does not go to pieces; men and women do not abandon an organization to which they belong by virtue of birth as long as it continues to perform vital functions for them. If the increase in the number of divorces, desertions, single persons who do not marry at all, and families in which both husband and wife work outside of the home and have separate friends and interests, are taken altogether, evidence of disintegration is overwhelming. In recent years, divorce has increased until for the country as a whole there is one divorce for every five or six marriages,§ with a marked increase in the divorce rate as we shift from small communities to large cities, and from rural to urban—and more modern—life. Some divorce is no doubt normal; it would be absurd to hope that all mating should be perfect, but a constant shifting of men and women into one alliance after another is proof positive that they are not getting out of love, marriage, and modern family life the satisfaction and happiness they crave and continue to seek.

‡Source: ABSTRACT OF THE CENSUS, 1930, p. 436.

§Source: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1944-45, p. 95.

THE present trend away from the family as a permanent institution and toward relatively fugitive, one-generation groups is defended by a host of thinkers and writers, largely on the theory that it represents progress. It is necessary to examine carefully the grounds upon which they, first, criticize the traditional idea of family, (for they have obviously given no consideration to the possibilities of any other form of the institution they criticize), and, secondly, the reasons which they advance for advocating more and more atomization of society and disintegration of the family as an entity.

The traditional family nearly everywhere in the world differed from the modern family in one important respect: it was patriarchal in its organization. The man was not only the head in authority, but even more the owner legally of both its property and income. No matter how much it may have conformed to the requirements of normalcy in other matters, in this it undoubtedly violated one of the norms of living; it subordinated women; it denied them proper educations; it failed to permit them to realize their full potentialities as persons. At its worst, as in Russia under the Czars, when the father was frequently a petty tyrant and the family was part of a tyrannical society, it inhibited not only the full development of its women members, it mis-educated and malformed every member of the group by making the father despotic and all the rest of the family servile.

Peter Kropotkin eloquently describes such family life as:

. . . a whole series of habits born of domestic servitude, outward scorn of the individual personality . . . despotism by fathers, hypocritical submissive wives, sons and daughters. At the beginning of the century domestic despotism prevailed everywhere in Europe—witness the writings of Dickens and Thackeray—but nowhere so much as in Russia. The whole of Russian life, in the family, in the relations between heads of departments and their subordinates, between officers and soldiers, employers and employed, bore the stamp of despotism. A whole system of habits and methods of thought, of prejudices and of moral baseness . . . had grown up.*

THE classic analysis, criticism, and proscription of the patriarchal family is probably that of August Bebel in his book, *WOMAN UNDER SOCIALISM*. "Woman was the first human being to come into bondage:" he begins, "She was a slave before the male slave existed."† His ap-

*Quoted by Boris Souvarine in his *STALIN: A Critical Study of Bolshevism*, 1939.

†*WOMAN UNDER SOCIALISM*, August Bebel, 1904; p. 9.

proach to the subject is from the standpoint of the position of woman; his criticism is that of the patriarchal family as an institution; his prescription calls for freeing the woman from the thralldom of the family through the socialization of not only private property but also of the family itself. And *socialization*, as in the case of private property, meant to him *abolition*.

The feminist movement from the beginning, no matter what form it took, whether as a fight for the ballot, or for the right to gainful employment outside of the home, or for equal legal right to hold property, or for control over children, or for sexual equality, always was a protest against injustice, oppression, or "bondage," as Bebel feelingly expressed it. But Bebel assumed that it was bondage to the family as *institution*. He overlooked the fact that it was really bondage to the *patriarchal* family. Having made this fatal blunder, his erroneous conclusion and prescription of socialism naturally followed. Like all collectivists, he believed that the end of social development meant a revival of the economic principle which prevailed in the beginnings of human society; that the original community in property should be revived.

In Socialist society, where alone mankind will be truly free and planted on its natural base, it will direct its own development knowingly along the line of natural law. In all epochs hitherto, society handled the questions of production and distribution, as well as of the increase of population, without the knowledge of the laws that underlie them—hence, unconsciously. In the new social order, equipped with the knowledge of the laws of its own development, society will proceed consciously and planfully. (*Ibid.*, p. 371).

To what? To the abolition of marriage and the family as a social group, or, as I think of it, as a corporate entity:

Bourgeois marriage . . . is the result of bourgeois property relations. This marriage, which is intimately related with private property and the right of inheritance—demands "legitimate" children as heirs:§ it is entered into for the purpose of acquiring these: under the pressure of social conditions, it is forced even upon those who have nothing to bequeath; it becomes a social law, the violation of which the State punishes by imprisoning for a term of years the man or woman who live in adultery and have been divorced. In future society there is nothing to bequeath, unless the domestic equipment and personal property be regarded as inheritance; the modern form of marriage is thus devoid of foundation and collapses. The question of inheritance is thereby solved, and Socialism need not concern itself about abolishing the same. No right of inheritance can arise where there is no private property. (*Ibid.*, pp. 346-347).

§This absurd assumption is widespread, especially among Socialists, yet it has no real validity. It is perfectly true that men and women are at present condi-

What would be the situation of woman in the new social order? Bebel becomes lyrical in his picture of its possibilities:

The woman of future society is socially and economically independent; she is no longer subject to even a vestige of dominion and exploitation; she is free, the peer of man, with such exceptions as the difference of sex and sexual functions demand . . . She chooses her occupation on such a field as corresponds with her wishes, inclinations and natural abilities, and she works under conditions identical with man's . . . In the choice of love, she is, like man, free and unhampered. She woos or is wooed, and closes the bond from no consideration other than her own inclinations. This bond is a private contract, celebrated without the intervention of any functionary—just as marriage was a private contract until deep in the Middle Ages. Socialism creates in this nothing new: it merely restores, at a higher level of civilization and under new social forms, that which prevailed at a more primitive social stage, and before private property began to rule society. Under the proviso that he inflict injury upon none, the individual shall himself oversee the satisfaction of his own instincts. The satisfaction of the sexual instinct is as much a private concern as the satisfaction of any other natural instinct. None is therefore accountable to others, and no unsolicited judge may interfere. How I shall eat, how I shall drink, how I shall sleep, how I shall clothe myself, is my private affair—exactly so my intercourse with a person of the opposite sex. (Ibid., p. 344).

BEBEL wrote a little over fifty years ago, at a time when every one of these statements was packed full of social dynamite. Yet without having abolished private property; without having abandoned the legal machinery of inheritance or changed very drastically the traditional form of marriage, women already have achieved under our commercial, industrial, capitalist, and urban social order, a position to which he looked forward as a distant socialist ideal. The American woman has the ballot; she is economically independent; she is in all social matters the peer of man; her education is identical, (when he wrote she could not even enter a university); all the gainful occupations are open to her; in the choice of a mate, prevailing customs leave her free and unhampered. It is true that marriage is still not

tioned to be jealous, and that men are conditioned to put a high importance upon the legitimacy of their children. But that this is purely a matter of conditioning is demonstrated by the extent to which the adoption of children has developed during recent years, and the extent to which adoption is practiced among savages and primitive peoples. Just as men and women can be (and have been) conditioned to accept a myriad of different forms of law regulating inheritance, so they can be conditioned to be jealous, or not to be jealous; to prize legitimacy, or to be indifferent to it. Right education could shift the concept of inheritance from legitimate heirs, to a continuum of ownership in the family, thus making the entire rising generation of the family the heirs rather than one individual designated by the father.

a private contract, to be entered into at will or broken at will. But the development of divorce has in effect made the marriage tie almost entirely dependent upon the private wishes of either party to the contract. And even in the matter of free sexual intercourse, though it still labors under social disapproval, particularly in rural communities and among devout religious groups, it has become so far free that in most cities and modern communities, the extent to which it is accepted without condemnation in the most respectable circles and among the most reputable families, is astonishing.

Even as to the abolition of private property, without abandoning capitalism, we have gone far in the direction Bebel recommended. The modern urban family possesses little private, tangible, family property. The vast majority have proletarianized themselves to such an extent that they have no inheritance for which they have to produce "legitimate" heirs. Social security administered by public officials, is steadily expanding and so making it less and less necessary for the individual to provide for his old age and for his dependents by saving money, accumulating tangible property, and leaving an estate. Most families have no estate except that consisting of life insurance. Most of them have some personal belongings; few of them any real estate. The real estate in the case of the limited numbers owning a home usually consists of a house and lot, heavily mortgaged. The family homestead, even in the rural regions, is no longer the family heirloom; it too is becoming merely a form of investment.

But the result of these improvements in the condition of women has not produced conditions as ideal as Bebel and the leaders of the feminist movement all over the world, (most of whom never heard of him), anticipated. It is evident that along with the emancipation of women there has come not only a disintegration of the patriarchal family but also the disintegration of the family itself. And the condition of not only women, but also of everybody in society, and above all of the children of the modern world, has not resulted in the improvement anticipated; on the contrary, in many respects it represents a regression from the standards previously achieved. Modern children are far less responsible than children used to be, and they seem to carry infantilism with them into manhood and womanhood. What we have to face is the stark, staring fact that along with the decay of the family has come a decline in the extent to which the family

group of today performs the functions—biological and educational, economic and political—which the family of yesterday performed. And along with that, there is evidence to indicate that industry, public schools, and the welfare and charitable institutions of various kinds which have taken over some of these functions, are not fulfilling them as well as the family used to do.

FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY
WHAT, now, are the functions which families have fulfilled, or may fulfill, and which a family is compelled to fulfill if it is to avoid the abnormality of leaving their fulfillment to other institutions which fulfill them less effectively? There are at least eleven; the eleven as a whole constituting the purposes for which the family itself originally came into existence, and will probably always exist if humanity is not merely to survive but to attain higher levels of culture:

- I. The maintenance function;
- II. The security function;
- III. The endowment function;
- IV. The disciplinary function;
- V. The vocational function;
- VI. The recreational function;
- VII. The recuperational function;
- VIII. The character-building function;
- IX. The eugenic function;
- X. The erotic function;
- XI. The harmonic function.

So important are all these functions that they need not only specific definition but very careful study and research at our hands. It is the habit of sociologists today to gloss this subject over with a few trite and often merely sentimental phrases; to call attention to the fact that with the urbanization and industrialization of society and the accompanying decay of family life, the average family can no longer fulfill its functions in a satisfactory manner, and then pass on to the consideration of how the state, the school, and other social agencies are fulfilling

and should fulfill them. If the experiments thus far made in shifting the fulfillment of these functions from the family to other institutions have failed to result in their proper fulfillment, or if they are being fulfilled at greater cost than would be possible by normal family life; above all, if there are good grounds for believing that no other institution can properly and adequately fulfill them, then the existing trend toward the socialization of these functions is not genuinely progressive; revival or new development of the family is needed, and a reversal of the trend toward the development of any and all institutions which prevent the family from discharging them is a vital necessity of mankind.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FAMILY

IF THE family is to fulfill these functions, it must be organized so that it is possible for it to do so. The modern family neither fulfills all of them, nor is it organized so that it is possible to fulfill any of them properly. In order to organize itself for Normal Living, reorganization—*normalization*—is needed.

I. It must be *composed* of a proper number and kind of persons.

II. It must be properly *managed*.

III. It must be properly *equipped*.

I can do nothing better to justify a plea for careful consideration of these functions and of organization of the family to fulfill them than to quote what James E. Breasted said in a very remarkable study he made of the educational and moral influence of the family:*

The surviving documents demonstrate historically that the thing which was long called "the moral consciousness of mankind" has grown with each generation out of the discipline and the emotions of family life, supplemented by reflection and the teaching of experienced elders. The supreme values which lie within the human soul have therefore, as a matter of historical fact, entered the world for the

*THE DAWN OF CONSCIENCE, Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1935; pp. 410-411.

first time through the operations of those gentle and ennobling influences which touch us continually in our daily life. Whether in the beginning they were anywhere else out yonder in this vast universe, we shall never know; but they were not anywhere here upon our globe until the life of father, mother, and children created them. It was the sunshine and the atmosphere of the earliest human homes that created ideals of conduct and revealed the beauty of self-forgetfulness.

Bertrand Russell, in his latest book, "Education and the Social Order," espousing the cause of communism, tells us that the most important change which communism would introduce is the abolition of the family, and throwing human experience entirely overboard, he advocated this change. Notwithstanding the revolt of the new generation, human experience cannot be annihilated, nor can the traits it has produced in us be obliterated or ignored. The young people of today have indeed revolted against authority, whether it be that of the church or the mandate of Scripture. To invoke authority is always to invite opposition, especially in the minds of youth. But the human past shines upon us like a great light, and there is no need to invoke authority . . . If any young readers take up this book, I beg them merely to contemplate the facts of human experience now revealed to us in fuller measure than ever before. There is one supreme human relationship, which has created the home and made the family fireside the source out of which man's highest qualities have grown up to transform the world. As historical fact, it is to family life that we owe the greatest debt which the mind of man can conceive. The echoes of our own past from immemorial ages bid us unmistakably to venerate, to cherish, and to preserve a relationship to which the life of man owes this supreme debt.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART II. THE NORMAL FAMILY

SECTION II.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY

I go (always other things being equal) for the man that inherits family traditions and the cumulative humanities of at least four or five generations. — Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table."

THE family came into existence and acquired its pre-eminence among all of mankind's social institutions because of the efficiency with which it can provide its members with at least eleven of the essentials of humane living:

I. Their needs for survival. Providing for the survival of its members constitutes what I think of as the family's *maintenance function*.

II. Their need of protection against the vicissitudes of life. Providing this protection constitutes what I shall call the family's *security function*.

III. Their need of tangible equipment for a start in life. Providing this constitutes what I think of as the *endowment function* of the family.

IV. Their need of controlling their fellow members. Providing for this constitutes what I consider the family's *disciplinary function*.

V. Their need of work. Providing for this constitutes what I think of as the family's *vocational function*.

VI. Their need of play and revival of their spirit. Providing this constitutes what I think the family's *recreational function*.

VII. Their need of rest and recovery from exertion. Providing for this constitutes what I think of as the family's *recuperational function*.

VIII. Their need of education. Providing this constitutes what I think of as the family's *character-building function*.

IX. Their sexual and genetic needs. Providing for this constitutes what I think can be most appropriately called the family's *eugenic function*.

X. Their need of love. Providing for this constitutes what I think of as the family's *erotic function*.

XI. Their need of association. Providing this constitutes what I think can best be called the family's *harmonic function*.

Whether we like it or not, the family as an institution stands or falls upon its fulfillment of all eleven of these functions. To be a normal family, the family as a group—as a corporate entity—must fulfill them all. Any family group which fails to fulfill any of them by shifting that function to some other institution—to business or industry; to the school; to the church; to the state—makes itself as abnormal as would be the case with an individual who had shifted such a function as that of locomotion from his legs to a wheel-chair.

I. THE MAINTENANCE FUNCTION
AMONG these functions maintenance* comes first. Not because maintenance and survival is first in importance in living like a normal human being but because today—after two centuries of life in a civilization dominated by trade, by manufacturing, by money, and by economics—it is difficult for us to avoid giving first consideration to the

*I am using the word *maintenance* to describe this function deliberately, in preference to that of *survival*, with which it is often designated, because survival suggests mere maintenance of existence. Maintenance is a legal concept which means much more than provision for survival; it means that a husband and parent is required not merely to keep his wife and children alive but to maintain them upon a scale which is customary in the social circle to which they belong and which his means permit. Maintenance suggests better than survival the provision of a sufficient quantity and quality of goods and services to enable the members of the family to exist upon a human and not a merely animal level.

problem of obtaining not only our physical needs in food, clothing and shelter, but all the goods and services which we feel we need and desire in order to maintain existence upon the plane upon which technology has made it possible for *homo sapiens* to live.

For survival in the case of man means much more than subsistence even if that subsistence is very considerably above a merely animal level. At every stage of culture, from the most primitive to the most civilized, there is a standard of living prescribed for its members by its folkways and reflecting its technological development. Survival, when applied to *human* beings, means living upon a plane which does not fall too far below what is standard in the specific society to which they belong. If the family's maintenance function is properly fulfilled, the individual members of any particular society must enjoy at least what might be called that society's minimal standard of living, a standard probably much higher than the lowest plane upon which unfortunate members of it may actually live. If individuals and families in a society live upon a plane below this minimal standard, they are not really surviving as human beings; they are surviving as sub-humans rather than as fully human members of that society.

While maintenance (upon the standard to which their culture has developed) is the rule among primitive peoples, and is still the rule in agrarian cultures which have not been corroded by Western industrialism, commercialism and imperialism, it is not the rule in our own civilization. In the United States in the year 1933, the condition of the people was aptly summed up in Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous phrase that one-third of them were "ill-fed, ill-clothed and ill-housed." Today, in the midst of the greatest boom in the history of the nation, no such statement would be made. But if the statement is properly interpreted, it is still applicable to the people not only of the United States but every industrial nation in the world. Not one-third but probably two-thirds of the people in those nations *do not live upon a plane that is equal to the standard which the technological development of the world makes possible*. The people who do live upon such a plane, or upon the high level to which everybody is taught to aspire, only aggravate the unhappiness of the great majority who are unable to do so. Once the majority feel that it is no longer possible for them *by their own efforts* to attain the standard prescribed by the folkways of industrial society, the prosperity of the few, instead

of inspiring them to better their own lot, only inspires them with envy. Then they naturally enough look for something outside of themselves and outside the family upon which to place the responsibility for their unhappy condition.

When social scientists and social reformers seek the reason for this anomaly, they look for it in the economic and political institutions of the country; they seek improvement through changes in the laws of the land or in the organization and control of industry. Marxians, for instance, recommend the transfer of property from private ownership, including family ownership, to state ownership and operation. The rank and file of politicians—New Dealers, for instance—dispose of the matter by such devices as subsidizing the underprivileged. Industrialists recommend expansion; labor unions higher wages and shorter hours; farmers higher agricultural prices.

There are, of course, plenty of things wrong with the economic and political institutions of the world today. But it is astonishing how rarely anyone asks whether or not it is the organization of family life in accordance with the conventions prescribed by industrialism and urbanism upon which responsibility may not have to be placed for the inability of most of the population of the modern world to provide itself with the minimal standard of living which modern technology makes possible. If that question were asked, political and economic reform would shrink in importance in comparison with right-education for family life.



In law, maintenance is that which one person is required to furnish to another for support; it is, for instance, the legal obligation of fathers to maintain their children until they are old enough to support themselves. The father who fails to fulfill this obligation and who neglects, maltreats, or abandons his children violates the law and is punishable for his dereliction.

In living like normal human beings, maintenance is that which the family as an entity is under obligation to provide for the consumption of all its members. The family which fails to fulfill this obligation—which shifts the support of any or all of its members to social security or public relief—disintegrates and its members are penalized by a neurotic and often psychotic dissatisfaction with life.

Every individual member of a family—young and old, sick and well, working or unemployed—is entitled as a matter of right to maintenance by the family to which they belong. *But maintenance is a family, not an individual obligation.* It is not an obligation of the head of the family only; nor of the husband and father; nor of both the parents. While the right to what they need creates an obligation upon them *and upon each and every member* to contribute to the family as a whole in accordance with their ability, the magnitude of the right, (measured, let us say, in dollars), is not necessarily identical with the magnitude, (measured likewise in dollars), of what they are obligated to contribute. At certain periods in the life-cycle of the members, (in childhood and old age, and for women during pregnancy and lactation), the value of what they contribute will ordinarily be less than what they receive; at other ages, (during early youth and late middle-age), the two will just about balance; at still other times, (during the whole period of maturity), their contributions to the family income should far exceed the value of the maintenance provided for them from it.



‡ There are two ways in which the family may furnish this maintenance: it may furnish it (I) by providing shelter, goods and services *which it buys*, or it may furnish it (II) by providing *what it has produced itself*. In primitive societies, reliance is placed almost wholly upon the second of these two methods. But in all societies in which barter and exchange has developed, *both ways must be used* if the average family is to be certain of its ability to provide maintenance upon the plane to which society has attained. The norm which governs is that of efficiency. But efficiency both in terms of cost and of value—of objective costs in materials and labor and subjective values realizable, both during consumption and production. The evidence indicates that even without taking into consideration these subjective values—that even in strictly economic terms *about two-thirds of the maintenance provided should be produced in the home and on land owned by the family, by the members of the group for their own consumption; and only about one-third purchased.**

*This evidence I have presented at length in THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION, (1929), Chapter 3, "Efficiency," pp. 18-49, and Chapters 13 to 18. In Chapter 14, "Food, Clothing and Shelter: The Essentials of Comfort," pp. 296-309, the evidence is

If the family shifts from reliance mainly upon its own production to reliance upon what has to be purchased—if it turns to apartments, restaurants, stores, and manufactured goods generally instead of its dwelling, its own kitchen, its own gardens and livestock, its own canning and butter-making, its own sewing room and shops of various kinds—for the production of what it consumes, it not only lowers its plane of living, *it makes it impossible for it to fulfill this most basic of all its functions.*

The proof of this is furnished by what is actually taking place as we progressively industrialize and commercialize family consumption. As our urbanized families have shifted from reliance upon what they produce at home to reliance upon earning-and-buying, they have increasingly shifted the maintenance of their children, their aged, and even their mature members when unemployed or otherwise faced with misfortune, to social agencies and public relief. The government subsidizes more and more families to enable them to buy what they need. The public schools take over more and more of the burden of raising their children; it not only furnishes them instruction but recreation; it furnishes them not only text books but transportation; it even furnishes them with their luncheons. In highly socialized nations, the government subsidizes families when faced with a birth or with a burial; it furnishes them doles when their members are unemployed; it pays for their medical treatment and hospitalization when they are sick; finally it pensions them when they are too old to work any longer.

So prodigiously costly and wasteful—and inefficient—is this substitution of government for family maintenance that every nation in history which has adopted it has sooner or later faced fiscal disaster.

II. THE SECURITY FUNCTION

THE concept of maintenance does not sufficiently distinguish between two quite different problems with which life confronts human beings: the problem of obtaining what is necessary to survival *physiologically*, and the problem of securing to the individual what is necessary to survival *psychologically*. To make it possible for individuals

summarized. I have also dealt with it in *FLIGHT FROM THE CITY*, (1933); in *PROSPERITY AND SECURITY*, (1938), and in *AGRICULTURE IN MODERN LIFE*, (1939). The Research Bulletins of The School of Living are all devoted to the evidence bearing on this question.

to live like human beings, life must be organized so that they not only obtain what they need *ordinarily* from day to day, but so that they know they will receive whatever they may need during the *extraordinary* events to which life subjects them. The fulfillment of the first of these needs I have called the maintenance function; the fulfillment of the second I shall call the *security function*.

The security function is that of securing the members of the family as far as possible against the vicissitudes of life—in the literal meaning of the word *vicissitude*, protecting them during changes and misfortunes—*maintaining* them (I) when unemployed; (II) when pregnant, in parturition, and during lactation; (III) when orphaned or widowed temporarily by absence and war or permanently by death; (IV) when divorced, separated, or deserted; (V) when old and no longer able to work sufficiently to fully support themselves; *providing what they need and should receive* (VI) in business or financial difficulties; (VII) in fires, floods, storms and similar catastrophes; (VIII) in sickness, both mental and physical; (IX) in accidents and crippling incapacities, temporary or permanent; (X) in death and burials; *protecting and helping them* (XI) when injured or victimized by crimes against their property or persons and (XII) in securing right and justice in their legal controversies—in divorce cases, when suing or being sued, or charged with crime or delinquency; and finally *disciplining them* (XIII) when the misfortunes are of their own contriving and the family has to take the responsibility and the burden of seeing that right and justice is done not only to the family itself, not only to the specific members of the family involved, but to all persons and to the community at large.



The need of security is two-fold: subjective and objective. The *objective need* is intermittent. When it develops it is for *concrete and tangible things* like money, lodging and board, doctoring and nursing. The *subjective need is continuous*; it is the need of *feeling* adequately prepared for the hazards of life. It is virtually impossible for an individual endowed with an average complement of imagination to enjoy a sense of present well-being if worried about what may happen to him in the future. If life is not organized so that individuals feel reasonably certain that they can obtain what they need,

or their dependents need, when misfortune renders them incapable of helping themselves or of making their usual contributions to support of their dependents, they suffer from a gnawing even if subconscious mental malady.

The range of material goods and specific services which have to be provided in the fulfillment of the security function over and above maintenance alone, is very wide. In the case of *unemployment*, they are not only that of maintenance but of the opportunity to work productively. Since the individual when unemployed is at least temporarily not able to support himself in his usual outside job, provision of the opportunity to work means some work on or in the homestead. In the case of *illness*, it means not merely the ordinary nursing which is part and parcel of maintenance but may mean medical and surgical help and perhaps hospitalization. In the case of *orphanage or abandonment, and widowhood, separation, desertion or divorce*, it means not only the privilege of dwelling and of return to the family, it means the planning and provision of a future which will as far as possible repair the misfortune of which the individual is the victim. The wide range of the more exceptional implications of the idea of family security can be illustrated in the case of the *legal difficulties, both civil and criminal*, which loom so large among the hazards of civilized life. In any normal social order, not the state but the families of both the parties involved would assume primary responsibility for seeing that justice is done. In his legal difficulties the individual should feel not so much that he can turn to his family for help without regard to what he has done or may be doing, but that when right, the family will see to it that his rights are protected, and when wrong, that the injury he has done is in some manner requited and what is wrong in him corrected.



There are at least four distinctive ways in which mankind today is dealing with this problem of security.

I. The first is *individual*. The individual thinks of the problem as primarily if not wholly individual, and tries personally to earn enough and save enough and become rich enough so that he has money enough to deal with any contingencies which he may be called upon to face—to replace what he may lose, (let us say in a business ven-

ture or the stock market); to pay for any accidents which may befall him, (to pay the repair man when his car gets smashed); to buy help when he needs it, (to pay the doctor, the druggist and the hospital when he is sick). The trouble with individual security is not only its difficulty but its inadequacy: on the one hand few individuals except those who inherit immense wealth ever earn enough or acquire enough to achieve a condition of real security; on the other, no amount of mere money, as so many even wealthy isolated old men and women discover, can buy disinterested service and guarantee them against the loss of their fortunes.

II. The second method of trying to achieve security is *institutional*. This takes two quite different forms, that of *fraternity*, which is very old and steadily decreasing and that of *insurance*, which is relatively new and constantly increasing. The trouble with insurance is its cost. Important as it is, it furnishes only partial protection unless the individual is willing to pay out the bulk of what he earns in premiums. Most individuals cannot afford to carry enough life insurance much less carry all the forms of insurance necessary to secure himself against the most important hazards and liabilities to which he is subjected. The trouble with relying upon what still remains of *fraternity*—upon an order, (like that of Free Masonry), or upon a labor union, (which is all that we have left of the medieval guild system), or upon a religious denomination or congregation—is that while all of them make provisions for the misfortunes of their members, the provisions are essentially charitable in nature.

III. The third method of solving the problem is *political*. Individuals *en masse* turn to the government for social security. The trouble with social security in all its forms is not only its high cost, (largely hidden because defrayed by taxation), nor its inefficiency, (gigantic bureaucracies are notoriously slow or corrupt, or both slow and corrupt), but above all its cost in freedom. If public officials are asked to take the responsibility of providing for the needs of the people, they will eventually insist that they exercise the authority which makes it possible for them to do so. People then discover that they have substituted economic security for political independence, and exchanged one kind of insecurity—economic—for another kind—political—which is often much worse.

IV. The fourth solution of the security problem is *familial*.

That our families, abnormal though most of them may be, still furnish more security than all the other institutions we use for this purpose combined, is obvious. That furnishing security is a family function even modern man unconsciously if not avowedly recognizes. He turns to his family in all sorts of contingencies even after he has left it and even after marriage. He recognizes it when lay-offs or depressions come—when unemployment drives him back to the “farm” or when families “double-up.” In spite of the intrusion of child welfare agencies, of settlement houses, of childrens’ and domestic relations courts, and of day and boarding schools into the field of child care, taking care of the mishaps of childhood and youth remains overwhelmingly a family function.

But so pervasive has been mis-education upon this subject that most of us have long ceased asking ourselves whether the family might not be better able to furnish protection in most of the vicissitudes of life—if normalized and organized to fulfill all of its functions—than the substitutes to which we are turning over the task today. We simply take it for granted that we should turn to insurance companies, to charitable agencies, and above all to social security and public welfare agencies for such protection. We devote our utmost ingenuity to making these institutions work. We do not ask ourselves whether, if we devoted a tithe of the effort we put into making them function into making it possible for the family to furnish its members adequate protection, we would not furnish it far more humanely and at a much lower cost.

It is true that there will always be outside of families a residue of isolated individuals with so little in the way of savings and resources that they would have to be taken care of when inevitably struck by misfortune. But if the load of caring for the mishaps of the vast majority of the population were taken care of family by family, the load, with which charitable and government relief agencies are now being burdened would become infinitesimally smaller. There is need therefore for re-examining the validity of the present trend toward the substitution of non-familial processes for family processes of dealing with the hazards of fate. Let me give three illustrations of how varied such re-examination ought to be:

I. Have we in America been right in transferring childbirth from the home to the hospital? Isn't it a fact that properly trained mid-

wives bring children into the world with a lower death rate than doctors? Isn't it true that childbirth is far more costly with doctors in hospitals than with midwives in homes? Since this is so, would it not be wiser from the standpoint both of health and of personal and social cost, to train midwives for this work and make childbirth a family and not a hospital responsibility? If this were done, would not the lowered cost of this burden make financial assistance from the state, or from charitable agencies, less necessary?

II. Is the world-wide movement toward social security in matters like unemployment—toward relieving both the individual and the family of responsibility for this hazard of industrialism—really the rational solution of the problem? Would it not be wiser to try to do away with the problem as a serious social problem altogether, by encouraging the members of families, acting as a group, to exercise their almost instinctive tendency to help one another in distress? Isn't it a fact that industrial, commercial, and even political employment is by its nature unstable—*seasonal*, as in building, canning, meat packing; *periodic*, during certain hours of the day, as in transportation, stores, restaurants; *protean*, with each change in demand and fashion; *mutable*, with new inventions and technological changes which render existing industries obsolete; and *transient*, with each change in ownership, management, and politics? If this is so, would it not be wiser to accept this fact, decentralize the over-centralized enterprises upon which people are so dependent and make it possible for people to work part of the time only for money and the rest of the time on homesteads belonging to their families, instead of pretending that industry can furnish year-around, full-time, and permanent employment to all individuals and burdening the whole economy by taxing it to support them when it fails to do so?

III. Is the solution of the problem of caring for the ever increasing proportion of aged in the population with old-age pensions, normal or abnormal?

Malinowski, in one of his classic studies of savage society,* draws a parallel, step by step, between the functions of animal and human families, and proves conclusively that what takes place in animal families solely and simply because of instinct, takes place in the human

*SEX AND REPRESSION IN SAVAGE SOCIETY, Bronislaw Malinowski; Harcourt, Brace & Company, New York, 1927.

family as a result of education and organization—that whereas animals can rely upon their instincts in dealing with their problems, in man the instincts are so plastic and unreliable that human beings have to be taught how to behave so as assure even the survival of the race. In describing the difference between the two types of families, he says:

. . . under conditions of culture the protective attitude (of the male toward his pregnant mate and her offspring) has to last much longer—beyond the biological maturity of the young—while again, a much greater burden is placed upon the initial installment of emotional tenderness. And here we find the essential difference between the animal and the human family, for while the animal family dissolves with the cessation of the biological need for parental care, the human family has to endure.

But Malinowski does not tell us *why it has to endure*; what specific development in the evolution of *homo sapiens* led the human species to create a permanent family, and which did not take place in other animals. I am venturing a hypothesis dealing with this question. In my opinion it was not the need of parental care for offspring nor paternal care of the pregnant wife or mother still suckling her young, but the development of the exact opposite of this, namely, *filial concern upon the part of the children for their parents*, which led to the invention of the family. The moment the pre-human progenitors of *homo sapiens* began to take care of their aged mothers and fathers instead of deserting them after reaching their own maturity, a reason for continuing the family beyond the period of the youth of the children came into existence, and the creation of the permanent family with its sentimental attachments, its property to assure future security, and its training of the young for family responsibilities, became imperative. It follows from this that such a social change as the abandonment of concern and responsibility by children for their parents involves not merely the destruction of the “enduring” family; of the one institution which nourishes all the other institutions of civilization, but the substitution for the normal method of dealing with the problem of old age, of a more costly and less desirable method.

YOUNG men and women in civilized societies are ready for many undertakings—including marriage and father and motherhood—long before they are ready for the full financial and economic burdens which these impose upon them. Every individual needs “a start in life;” youth needs, in a word, *endowment*. Since this matter is dis-

III. THE ENDOWMENT FUNCTION

cussed rather fully in connection with the composition of the family[¶] and the management of the family's income and possessions,[‡] it is unnecessary to anticipate and duplicate that discussion. It is sufficient, for the moment, to make the point that the evidence indicates that the endowment of the young must be recognized as a family function—if we are neither to revert to a primitive plane of living, nor avoid all personal responsibility for undertakings like marriage by shifting responsibility for their consequences to the state.

IV. THE DISCIPLINARY FUNCTION
AN essential corollary of responsibility is authority. If the family assumes responsibility for the security of its members, (and for that matter for the fulfillment of any of its obligations to its members), the authority for disciplining them must be delegated to it.* There is, of course, no real question about whether the family should or should not assume this responsibility. Not the public but the family is primarily responsible for the character of the individuals which the members of families loose upon society. Every individual is in the very nature of things a disciple of his family, and the family—willy-nilly; for better or for worse—is in fact the disciplinarian of every individual.

Not only modern criminology but modern legal theory ignores this. In dealing with delinquency it fixes responsibility for crime upon the individual and absolves the family of all responsibility for the individual's misdeeds.[‡] This is the exact opposite of the theory of primitive peoples, of the ancient world, and still to a great extent of the oriental world, in which the family and clan are considered responsible for the acts of its members. The first fact which strikes one in comparing delinquency in a society which has abandoned the concept of *family* responsibility for that of *public* responsibility, is the appalling increase of crime, vice, and misbehavior of all kinds. Without assuming that this one change is the sole cause of this increase in

[¶] cf., pp. 513-514.

[‡] cf., pp. 522-528.

*I wish to emphasize in the strongest possible manner that this is a delegation of function to the *family* and not to the *father* or *head of the family*. The norm can be implemented in many other ways than patriarchally or by centralizing it in a single person or head.

[‡]This should not be interpreted as implying abandonment of individual responsibility. Of course the individual must ultimately be held responsible for his own acts. The question is whether, in dealing with delinquency, society should not first call upon the family to deal with the individual involved and society itself only do so when the family fails, or is unable, to control him.

misbehavior and delinquency, it is yet not unreasonable to conclude that it does play a very great part in destroying the influences which most effectively train and discipline the individual to observe the mores of his culture.

It is necessary to ask ourselves whether, in trying to deal more efficiently with crime and criminals and to avoid visiting injustices upon the members of families to which delinquents happen to belong, modern society has not in effect utterly ignored the patent fact that it is parents who are in reality most of all responsible for the behavior of their children—and the kind of adults into which they later grow. That it is family life and the kind of family training which each individual receives which determines to an enormous extent how adults behave throughout the whole of their lives, is one one of the incontrovertible lessons we owe to Freud and the psychology which stems from his work.

Is it not possible that if we spent more time exploring and implementing the idea of family responsibility for misbehavior and less to the establishment of meliorative, punitive, and other social institutions which relieve the family of this function, that we would greatly reduce the extent to which society at large would have to deal with desertion, drunkenness, prostitution, and similar social diseases? Building new penal institutions; inventing childrens' courts, domestic relations courts, women's courts; expanding parole systems, and other devices for controlling the behavior of delinquents and criminals, seems to me to offer less hope than recognizing that families are responsible in major degree, if not wholly, for the conduct of their members; determining what that degree should be; training the members of families to protect society against not only the misfortunes but the misbehavior of their members, and to act as the court of first instance in disciplining them when they do misbehave.

The Japanese emigrants who settled in California used to have a high degree of such family responsibility. They brought with them the oriental concept of family, and their isolation from the American population by the racial exclusiveness of the whites made it easy for them to retain their original family values. Commenting upon their status, a writer in a local newspaper remarked:

Prior to the evacuation . . . the Japanese had the lowest delinquency rate of any group in the United States; the lowest mortality rate. You seldom heard of

Japanese on relief. They were known far and wide for their industry and for the pride which made them good citizens . . . the Japanese (were) the American public school's best students.

When the hue and cry on the West Coast led to their segregation, after Pearl Harbor plunged us into war with Japan, all responsibility for their maintenance and for their whole social, political, and educational life was assumed by the Army. Institutional life in concentration camps called War Relocation Centers replaced their former clannish family life. What was the effect upon their standard of behavior? For directions for turning such self-reliant and law-abiding people into sickly, lazy, irresponsible, impudent, and delinquent individuals, the local newspaper said "turn to Mr. Shimano's article:"

The most obvious symptom . . . of the spiritual crack-up that becomes more and more evident in the centers . . . is the growth of adolescent delinquency and a perverted "slum" attitude on the part of the youngsters, a distorted sense of values. *Delinquency in city slums rises out of the loosening of the family tie.* In the newly created government slums, dependency on the government is an added impetus to family disintegration. I heard one 14-year-old boy taken to task by his father for staying out late one night say, "Aw, the hell with you. The government is taking care of me now. You don't have to pay for my room and board and clothes. I don't have to do anything you say."

Last Christmas, when evacuees were allowed to go shopping in small towns . . . a few of the boys openly bragged about the articles they had lifted from the stores. Perhaps a few cases might have been expected, but not the shocking general acceptance of shop-lifting by those who heard about it. These people, before evacuation, had the lowest delinquency rate in the United States. Yet now there was no voice lifted loudly in condemnation. Somewhere in the evacuation, they had lost their pride.*



The means for disciplining the members of the family are many. (I) Physical chastisement is the means to which the most unimaginative and the least cultured families resort. Among savage peoples this crude method of disciplining is almost unknown. The practice of Solomon's injunction about *sparing the rod and spoiling the child*, they consider inhuman. In addition to this rather crude method of discipline, useless in dealing with free adults and usable only in dealing with slaves, there is (I) admonition, (II) family disapproval, (IV) withdrawal of specific privileges, (V) temporary ostracism, and as a last resort in dealing with an incorrigible member, (VI) disin-

*These quotations are from an article entitled "Blueprint for Demoralization" in the June 21, 1943 issue of the "Los Angeles Tribune," reviewing an article by a Japanese journalist originally published in "Common Ground," a publication of the Common Council for American Unity.

heritance and expulsion from the family—the equivalent of the old punishment of outlawry. Perhaps the most important disciplinary force in the family is indirect rather than direct—the more good behavior is recognized and appreciated, the more powerfully does even the slightest sign of disapproval affect each member of the group.

✂

Whether involving merely bad manners and boorish violations of rules of etiquette, or a violation of the mores, of contract or civil law, or criminal law, *misbehavior and breach of contract always create a two-fold problem*—the problem of dealing with the *misdemeanant* and his *victims*; the problem from the standpoint of the *plaintiff* and from that of *defendants*; the problem of what to do for the *sufferers* from a crime and what to do to the *delinquent*. Family responsibility for the behavior of its members and for fulfillment of what I have called the disciplinary function, deals with both of these aspects of the problem insofar as it leads not only to reparation and restitution but also reformation of the misdemeanant. Only when the family fails voluntarily to deal with both aspects, or is incapable of doing so adequately, does it become necessary for the community to exercise its police powers and then only in dealing with the small amount of misbehavior which will remain.

V. THE VOCATIONAL FUNCTION

WORK, broadly defined as the activity to which most human beings have to devote time in order to obtain what they need or desire, is unavoidable for all but the minority rich enough to be able to dispense with it. But even for the rich, some sort of useful work is essential if they are to maintain complete sanity. Productive action is as necessary to the well-being of the individual as consumption. Providing for the consumption needs of its members constitutes the family's maintenance function; providing opportunities for productive work constitutes its vocational function.

There are four ways—two of them honorable; two of them not—in which it is possible to fulfill this function: (I) The family can have some one or more of its members *earn enough money* with which to buy what it needs and desires; or (II) it can have the family as a group *produce the goods and perform the services*; or (III) it can have one or more of its members acquire the money they need by some sort of *predation*—by engaging in some form of fraud or theft; or

(IV) it can have them acquire it by a sort of *parasitism*—by having other people, or some charitable institution, or a public relief agency furnish them the necessaries of life. Dismissing, in spite of their popularity, both predation and parasitism, which I have discussed at length in a previous book,* there remain two methods which are personally and socially valid—the first I think of as money-making; the second as domestic production.

Most families today solve the problem posed by what I have called the vocational function, by the first of these four methods. For all practical purposes, the modern family is simply two or three individuals who live together to spend the money which they earn. The family functions as a convenient, and from the standpoint of extreme modernists an unfortunately inescapable, instrument by means of which its members can obtain more for their money than they can by living alone. The over-reliance upon money-making is, perhaps, the principal reason for the disintegration of families in the modern world. It tempts everybody to try to solve all the problems of living by spending money; it drives the whole family to concentrate upon the problem of increasing its total money-income; it tends to make every member, without regard to age or sex, try to obtain a money-making job of some kind.

There is, of course, need, for money-making if the standard of living is not to be a primitive one. This need the family can meet by enabling its members to make money out of a family farm or business, by training them for a craft or profession, or helping them to find employment. But furnishing opportunities for money-making represents only partial fulfilment of the vocational function. To completely fulfill it, productive non-monetary occupations must also be provided not only for the members while unemployed but for every member—the women who do not and should not go out to work, and those too young and too old to do so. The fact that most of the goods, services and facilities which people need or desire can be produced and furnished less wastefully and less insecurely if the family relies primarily upon home production, makes it possible to provide its members with an endless variety of such occupations.

But in order to provide occupation by this method, and to effect the economies it makes possible, the family cannot be fugitive; it

*PROSPERITY AND SECURITY: A Study of Realistic Economics, 1938.

must be organized for permanence—for existence generation after generation. To provide this permanence and to permit this general participation in production, the family must own and use land, must be equipped with buildings, tools, machines, livestock—with real capital or “means of production,” and the idea of self-employment.

PLAYING is just as essential to living like a normal human being as working on one hand and resting on the other. Furnishing both old and young facilities for play—for what is essential for the literal *re-creation* of enthusiasm and good cheer after work and exertion have exhausted the spirits—is a function quite distinct from recuperation, with which it is easy to confuse it. Work, play and rest are equally essential if the individual is to live like a normal human being.

VI. THE RECREATIONAL FUNCTION

Among the facilities for recreation which the family can furnish more economically and more satisfyingly than any other institution are (I) places in which to play, (II) things with which to play, and (III) companions with whom to play: living rooms and parlors in which to sing, dance, have parties and entertain; play rooms, music rooms, libraries, studios and hobby shops; lawns and shady nooks; flower, rock, and herb gardens; brooks, ponds, swimming pools; games such as checkers, chess, cards; musical instruments; books, magazines, newspapers; pets—white mice, cats, dogs, horses; bicycles—perhaps even automobiles; tools, machinery and equipment for sewing, weaving and other arts and crafts; and companionship of both sexes and all ages. This last the family can supply only if it is properly composed of a sufficiently large number of persons and if the habit of playing together is considered as important as that of eating together. But the companionship provided must include that of friends, neighbors, and relatives. To make it possible for each individual and each generation to enjoy such companionship, the home must provide privacy both indoors and outdoors in which intimacy can be enjoyed, courtship is possible, the old do not dampen the spirit of youth, or the young irritate the old. This extension of companionship outside the immediate family circle requires reciprocal entertaining and visiting, and the use of eating and drinking for hospitality and festivity.

Finally the family, rather than the amusement industry, should take the initiative in providing for outside and commercialized forms of play and recreation. To try to confine recreation to the home only

is certain to create an unwholesome breach between family and society, and between youth and age. By taking the initiative, *balanced* provision can be made for home recreation and for theatre, concerts, baseball, football, and other sports; for dining and wining in hotels and restaurants, and even for clothing, hairdressing, and other fashions which convention prescribes.

RECREATION is the time it is necessary for man to devote to revival of the spirits; recuperation to revival of the body.

VII. THE RECUPERATIONAL FUNCTION

Human beings spend fully one-third of their life in sleep. The time which has to be spent in sleeping varies according to age and perhaps also according to sex. Women seem to require more sleep than men. The popular notion that a child sleeps half its time, an adult one-third, and a very old person, like an infant, most of the time, is probably not far from the human norm. In early and late life the nervous system is quickly exhausted, and frequent if not prolonged sleep is necessary for recuperation. But even during the period of maximum vitality, seven or eight hours out of every day need to be spent sleeping. If the function of recuperation were confined exclusively to providing for sleep, it would still be immensely important.

If, however, recuperation is defined as recovery from physiological exhaustion, it must include provision for many things besides sleeping—for washing and bathing, and for resting as distinguished from sleeping. That privacy must be provided for each individual, other than the very young, is obvious.

That no other institution can furnish these facilities as economically and satisfyingly as the private home needs no elaboration. All efforts at the institutionalization of recuperation in hotels, resorts, sanatoria and hospitals substitute mere agglomerations of individuals for organic relations between them. No matter how useful in emergencies and natural in a civilization in which the family and home is disintegrating, they simply do not furnish the feeling of *belonging* which is apparently essential to revival from the wear and tear of daily life.

THE instillation and cultivation by the family and in the home not only during childhood but during every age in the individual's life-cycle, of the basic personality characteristics of genuinely humane and

VIII. THE CHARACTER-BUILDING FUNCTION

civilized human beings—that is what I think of as the character-building function of the family.

Somewhere Blackstone remarks, in discussing duties required of parents by law, that the greatest of the three—protection, education, and maintenance—was education. Not the mere increase of population, he said, but the increase of a well-ordered, intelligent and honorable population determines the strength of the state. At the time Blackstone wrote his famous Commentaries, a little less than two centuries ago, the process of shifting the responsibility for education from the family to the state had not yet begun. Today, with the fourth and fifth generation which has been raised subject to state responsibility for education before us, it is high time that we asked ourselves whether the experiment has been successful and whether its continuance is not proving disastrous to the individual and to the family and at the same time to state and society.



No other reason is needed for assigning this great responsibility to the family than the inescapable fact of *the very early beginning of character-building*. It begins not at birth but long before the birth of the individual. The first act in the formation of character is that of the individual's parents in mating. This action predetermines not only his hereditary characteristic but also the environment in which he will be raised. But this is not all. It is not a matter of speculation but demonstrated fact that the behavior and condition of the pregnant mother affects the well-being, both physiological and psychological, of the unborn child. It follows from this that the behavior of the father and the other members of the family, to the extent to which it affects or communicates itself to the pregnant mother, also affects the character of the child.

But this inescapable parental act of prenatal character-formation is not the only reason for making the family responsible for the education of its members.



An equally important reason is that furnished by the time-proven fact that no rival institution—not even the most modern creche and nursery school, kindergarten, progressive school, public school, or boarding school—has ever proved an adequate substitute for the fam-

ily as a primary nursery of character. In childhood and youth not even the church, which at least recognizes the enormous importance of the spiritual element in the formation of character, can substitute for the family. There is simply no comparison between the worth of the average individual raised in the most religious of orphanages or convents with those raised in the average family. Something is missing. The long history of the race proves that whenever for any reason the family ceases to educate the children, it is just a question of time until social disintegration sets in. This applies to all the various kinds of institutions for juvenile education with which mankind has experimented—military institutions, as in ancient Sparta; the church, as in perfectionist denominations such as the Shakers; and now the modern secular school system.

Because the basic personality characteristics of the individual are formed by his parents—or those who take their place—it is impossible to relieve the family of this responsibility without abolishing the family itself. From Plato on, one theorist after another has played with the idea that in order to produce model citizens the children should be taken from the parents and educated by experts at the expense of the state. The fact that none of these experiments has produced a satisfactory way of living is at least presumptive evidence that there is something wrong with the idea. Over and over again it has been shown that even untutored and inexperienced parents in families in which love is not subordinated to other values, produce more normal individuals and better citizens than professional experts no matter how expert they may be. The exceptions to the rule are furnished by families in abnormal communities or neighborhood environments. It is impossible in a big city—not only in their slums but also in their most fashionable neighborhoods—for even a normal family to fulfill its character-building function. Such a situation, however, does not call for shifting the function to a school. Such a situation calls for reformation or decentralization of the community, and if this cannot be done quickly enough, for abandonment of the community by people determined to live like normal human beings.



Not only prenatal, not only juvenile, but adult education calls for the fulfillment of this function by the family. No matter how ingenious and efficient the institutions which may some day be devised

for informing and instructing adults—not even if by good fortune every community were to have its School of Living—the fact remains that what the individual learns needs to be digested and its application to his specific situation properly considered by those who are most affected by what he believes and does. If education is lifelong, as it should be, this analysis and counsel by the family must also be lifelong, and must be brought to bear upon each new idea which the individual learns, each new technique which he thinks of practicing, and each new project upon which he considers embarking. This is evaluation by those who are affected by what he does, and who care.

I think the facts justify the conclusion that not only no other institution *has*, but no other *can*, furnish an adequate substitute for family education. I base this extremely strong statement mainly upon the fact that education of the individual is usually worthless, and often positively harmful, unless it includes education in values. If these values are to be neither purely material nor purely supernal, some method of instilling them must be used which is neither purely intellectual nor purely mystical. Human values are not matters exclusively either of the intellect or emotions; they require education both intellectual *and* emotional in its nature. Intellectual education the individual can obtain in many ways—in schools, in libraries, in associations; and religious and spiritual education he can likewise obtain outside of the circle of his intimates—in church, from reading, in solitary meditation. But the simplest and most effective method of teaching the human values which make possible living like a normal human being begins with family pride and family self-respect. How the family symbolizes and articulates what it believes—what the family *is*—motivates the individual subconsciously and consciously, and determines his feeling of responsibility for the future. The values which the present generation obtains, mostly unconsciously, in this way, is what in turn it passes on to future generations.

But there is no reason why this should be only unconscious. If the family is to fulfill its educational function most effectively, it must symbolize and articulate its ideals. There are many ways in which this can be done. All family ritual and ceremony, family festival and holiday making, from mere grace at meals to birthdays, weddings, and funerals, represent such visualization. Quaker family ritual eschews all decoration; Catholic ritual strives to the same end

but with the support of all kinds of religious objects of art. Perhaps the architecture and furnishing of no home is complete without the equivalent of the Roman *lares and penates*, the Chinese hall with its *tablets of the ancestors*; the feudal *chapel and gallery of ancestral arms and portraits*; or even the old fashioned *family parlor* with its family Bible and record, its family album and portraits, and outside on the hillside the family graveyard. Someday we will discover that we need a shrine in every home, and that the relegation of the ennobling and cultivation of the emotions to an occasional attendance at church, a political rally, or a dramatic performance—perhaps in a movie house—tends to reduce the home to the status of a dormitory and quick-lunch room.

IF the sexual and genetic impulses of man called for reproduction and nothing more, the species would still be a duplicate of what man was in the beginning—perhaps *pithecanthropus erectus*; perhaps not even so human a creature but merely some weaker kind of gorilla-like primate. But if men and women are to live like human beings, their problem is not sheer reproduction; their problem is the improvement of their own breed. For man is not a wild but a domesticated animal—the only self-domesticated animal of which we know. For every good reason which can be found for improving the breed of horses, cows and pigs, there are a thousand better ones for improving the breed of man.

Primitive and ancient man recognized the existence of the problem. He recognized it by laying down rules governing marriage—rules such as those prescribing exogamy; he recognized it by regulating the increases of the population of the tribe with rules such as those for the destruction of congenitally maimed offspring and for the exposure of surplus infants.

At least three of the various ways in which the problem of responsibility for the function may be disposed of deserve brief consideration: (I) the responsibility may be left to the individual man and woman. This is the prevailing method of disposing of the matter. Individual inclination makes the decisions, influenced sometimes by clerical insistence upon the scriptural injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply;"† sometimes by the modern penchant for contraception

†Genesis 35:11.

with equally little rhyme or reason. (II) Or it can be considered not a matter for personal but of state responsibility. (III) Or it can be considered a problem with which the family as an entity should take the responsibility.

I. In a society *without* private property, in which everything is owned more or less in common, as in Soviet Russia, mating affects the lives not only of the two individuals directly involved, but of everybody. In a society *with* private property, as with us, it affects the lives not only of the children of the two persons involved, (if they already have any); it affects the lives of brothers and sisters, parents and grandparents—in short, it affects every member of *both* the families of the man and woman involved. But this is true not only when children are born; it is also true when birth is prevented—failure to generate eliminates the future “hands” needed to maintain the homestead and make it possible to continue functioning as a family. That sexuality and generation are personal responsibilities is perfectly true, but they are not exclusively personal; they cannot be left—if individuals are to live like normal human beings—solely to individual impulse and caprice.

Havelock Ellis, it is true, has constructed a formidable base for the doctrine of individual inclination. But the doctrine of the primacy of individual rights both in mating and in breeding seems to me nothing more than a rationalization of the gospel of romantic love. It pushes to its logical extreme the idea implicit in Goethe's theory of “electric affinities.”† Ellis assumes that the present tendency to marry primarily for sexual love with the deliberate intention of having no children will never interfere with the family, “since that rests on a biological foundation which cannot be destroyed.”‡ It is difficult to understand how such an optimistic idea can be justified. It seems to ignore the fact that countless families whose genealogies date back centuries have disappeared—that whole civilizations have vanished into limbo—and that once densely populated regions have, in spite of the “biological foundation” of which he speaks, been depopulated.

†It is difficult to overestimate the influence exerted upon the modern idea of love and marriage by Goethe's novel, *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*, (1809), and the literary, social, and scientific movement which it inspired.

‡WHITHER MANKIND, edited by Charles A. Beard, 1928; p. 210.

II. The second method of dealing with the problem assumes that the individual is nothing and the social organism everything. Insofar as states have acted upon this theory, they have usually simply encouraged the increase of their populations. Population is power. Every state wants soldiers to recruit its armies; workers to expand its industries; multitudes to support its officials. Sometimes states which have assumed responsibility in this matter have been indifferent as to whether breeding—as with other livestock—takes place in or out of wedlock. Sometimes they have left the matter to individual inclination, as in Soviet Russia; sometimes, as in Nazi Germany, they have regulated breeding, restricting it as far as possible to selected racial stocks. No state, however, has yet gone as far as Plato considered possible in his model Republic. None has yet restricted breeding to selected females and to a selected “stud” of males; none has succeeded in proscribing, and relieving, the less perfect specimens in the tribe of this function.

But the trouble with acting upon this assumption is that man is *not* an azoic unit in a fictitious social organism. Mating and breeding cannot be dealt with realistically if the fact is ignored that men and women have personalities which have to be developed if they are to live like human beings. Human beings are dehumanized if they are denied the opportunity to use any of their attributes or are relieved entirely of responsibility for the consequences of their acts. The temptation to deal with sexuality as though human beings were livestock, must be resisted.

III. The whole history of mankind evidences the fact that if sexuality and generation is neither to be entirely individualized nor entirely socialized, it must be treated primarily as a familial function. In fulfilling what I think of as its eugenic function,* the family must take the initiative and assume the responsibility for seeing to it that (I) every one of its members fit for mating, finds a mate; that (II) the members of the family who are mated and fit to bear children, bear neither fewer nor more than is good for them, good for the family, and good for the community at large; that (III) those members of the family who are not fitted either to mate or to bear, neither

*I have deliberately substituted the term *eugenic* for the more usual terms, *reproduction* and *generation*. *Eugenic*, from the Greek word *eu*, meaning *well*, and *genos*, meaning *race*, literally means the breeding of perfectly healthy, sane, and beautiful human beings.

mate nor bear children; and finally that (IV) children are adopted by those members who for any reason should not or cannot bear any. Individuals who are victims of hemophilia and other hereditarily transmissible abnormalities, may live quite happy lives in spite of the fact that they should be without issue if they are encouraged and helped to adopt children.

X. THE EROTIC FUNCTION

IN the fulfillment of the eugenic function, primacy must be given to the problem of generation; sexual love represents an incidental aspect of the problem. On the other hand, in the fulfillment of the erotic function,* sexual love between those married takes on primacy. But sexual love, important as it is in order to avoid frustration and achieve satisfaction in life, is only one of many forms of love essential to living like a normal human being. It is easy, preoccupied as modern man is with sensate indulgence, to ignore this fact. Every individual needs love and loving relationships not only with (I) a sexual mate but with (II) children, with parents, with brothers and sisters, and with other members of their family; with (III) a friend or chum; with (IV) neighbors and the members of the community, and with (V) humanity in general. The alternative to *love* is either *indifference* or *hostility*, and the abnormality of both of these is established by the adverse neural influence which they exert upon those who are either callous or imbued with hate. An atmosphere of loving kindness is essential if human beings are to live humanly.

It is the essence of this argument that the family should take the initiative and responsibility in providing this. No attempt at the fulfillment of any of the family's other functions which ignores this is valid. Maintenance, for instance, must be provided lovingly if both the maintenance and the erotic functions are to be fulfilled. This fact bears powerfully upon the fulfillment of the eugenic function. The marriage of convenience—the marriage which provides a sound economic base—in spite of its long history and the extent to which the French upper and middle classes have developed it, may fulfill eugenic norms but if it does not at the same time fulfill erotic needs,

*From the Greek *erotikos*—pertaining to love. I use it literally, not only with reference to sexual love and with love in its religious signification but also with regard to love as contrasted with dislike or hatred in all relations and associations between human beings.

solves neither problem. It leads, as in so many French families, to compensation with illicit lovers; sometimes with recognized mistresses. In Chinese families, imperfect matings in which sexual love does not develop permit the men to indulge in concubinage and "green skirt" wives, but make no provision for love for unhappily married women. If this sort of compensation is to be reduced to a minimum, mutual love must be considered as important a consideration in match-making as the respective ideals, educations, means, and social standings of the two persons being mated.

We know that suicide is one of a number of growing tendencies in modern life symptomatic of deep-seated personal and social maladjustments. Every suicide, and before that the conditions of which that is the culminating tragedy, has its roots in some abnormality of the emotional life of both the victim and his intimates—or lack of them. The very fact of social atomization—of the absence of any family group concerned in creating a sense of love and security for the individual—is one of the greatest of all the factors making for the increase of suicide. The statistics of suicide show that the rates for those who live alone and for those who have been divorced—who are the victims of a family breakage—are among the highest. It is perfectly obvious that failure to achieve a life in which the loving kindness of intimates provides armor against the hazards of fate, plays an enormous part in suicide. Family life tends to reduce, according to the statistics, the incidence of suicide and, of course, the mental conditions which lead to it. Is it not much wiser to revivify the family and place the responsibility for the fulfillment of erotic needs upon it, rather than continue the process of abolishing it, and trying to invent social institutions which may, or may not, prove adequate substitutes for it?



The penalty for our disregard of love in the intimacy of family life is neurosis. No rise in the standard of living; no amount of riches or success in money-making; no career or other achievement can compensate for failure in this respect. Suicide is usually simply the final end of a life in which emotional and erotic needs have been so badly handled that life ceases to seem worth living.

THE fulfillment of what I am calling the harmonic function* of the family, calls specifically for assumption by the family of responsibility for dealing with certain problems now being left sometimes to policemen, judges and lawyers; sometimes to psychiatrists and psychoanalysts; sometimes to ministers and social workers. The fact that individuals are not expected to deal with them—the fact that men and women today are taught to leave them to these substitutes for the family—is responsible for both the enormous increase in the magnitude of the problem with which these outside agencies are trying to deal, and the perfectly obvious fact that they are not coping with it. The situation calls not for more curative instrumentalities; it calls for reduction and prevention of the abnormalities of behavior with which they are confronted.

If the antipathies and antagonisms which create these problems are to be dealt with preventively at their roots—"nipped in the bud," so to speak—then families must organize themselves, educate their members, and equip their homesteads to cope with six tendencies which accompany association of individuals with one another:

I. The tendency toward hostility to strangers—toward those whom the individual considers strangers because they belong to other regions, other nationalities, other religions, other races. These prejudices and the evils to which they give rise have their sources in fears and anxieties which the individual imbibes, figuratively, with his mother's milk;

II. The tendency toward domination—and sometimes exploitation—of the young by the older members of the family and of the younger generation by the older, and the reciprocal tendency toward the "revolt of youth;"

III. The tendency toward sib antagonism—toward domination of younger siblings, for instance, by the first-born, or heir, and toward jealousy among all siblings for the love and favor of their parents;

IV. The tendency within a family toward incest—a tendency so great that it has nearly everywhere produced the rule of exogamy, though the evidence about the evil of incest is by no means as conclusive as the prevalence of the rule suggests;

*From the Greek *harmos*, meaning suiting or fitting together. As I use it, harmonic refers to the adjustment—the suiting and fitting together—of individuals to one another.

V. The tendency toward mother-fixation upon the part of sons, and of father-fixation upon the part of daughters with their accompaniments of father-to-son, son-to-father, mother-to-daughter, and daughter-to-mother antagonisms. The first tendency Freud very appropriately called the Œdipus complex; the second, the Electra;

VI. The tendency toward sexual adventure—a tendency which grows out of the fact that man, unlike other animals, has no rutting season and no instinctual regulator of his sexual life—men always and women at all times except when pregnant, are ready for sexual play and genital intercourse. The possibility of sexual boredom between husband and wife is so great that sexual adventures and sexual promiscuity are a constant source of husband-to-wife jealousy and antagonism, and a constant threat to the continuation of marriage and of flight to divorce.

These tendencies, as the psychoanalysts on one hand and cultural anthropologists on the other clearly show, are by-products of profound discords and dissonances in the composition, equipment, and management of the family. Most of the antipathies and antagonisms which individuals develop are epiphenomena of family organization—they grow out of the kind of family life to which they are subjected during the formative years of their lives. If these tendencies develop to any large degree in a particular society—as they have in our distinctly modern world—it is *prima facie* evidence of some deficiency in the organization of family life. The Œdipus complex, for instance, is a by-product of that particular abnormal form of family which is called patrilineal and patriarchal; it is non-existent, as Malinowski showed,* in matriarchal societies. The normally organized family which should be *functional* rather than *authoritarian*—communal and cooperative rather than patriarchal—in its management, and in which there would be group rather than either individual male or female heritage of the family estate, would eliminate the tendency toward the development of mother-and-son fixations and father-and-son antagonisms because the causes which lead to the germination of the Œdipus complex would be non-existent.

Since we live in an abnormal culture in which individual jealousies and group prejudices are endemic, and since we cannot out of

*cf., Bronislaw Malinowski's *SEX AND REPRESSION IN SAVAGE SOCIETY*, 1927; *THE SEXUAL LIFE OF SAVAGES*, 1929.

hand change our culture, if we are to do anything at all about preventing their development individually in the intimacy of our own lives, some instrumentality less remote than church or state must be used for the purpose. It is my contention that the logical instrumentality for dealing with the problem is the family. So natural is this that most families do to some extent deal with it, not consciously, however, but just in the ordinary course of events. Like bystanders in a quarrel, there is a natural tendency for those nearest and most intimately acquainted with the individuals involved, to take a hand in composing matters. Just as it is natural for a family to instill—and also to prevent—the development of prejudices and jealousies in its members, so there is also a natural tendency for the family itself, usually through its head and older members, to deal with the problem of harmonizing—or antagonizing—the relations of its members with one another and with those outside of the family with whom they come in contact. The rational thing is to take advantage of this fact, and to make harmonization a conscious family function.

The harmonic function is not fulfilled with any of the vague programs for instilling love which most people of good-will feel is all that is involved. Neither is it fulfilled in a genuinely humane manner by any "spare the rod, spoil the child" program, nor any program of conferring despotic powers upon some head of a family. Harmonization, as I see it, usually calls for (I) *changes in the composition of the family*—for eliminations and additions to its membership. It always calls for match-making and right-marriage for its members; sometimes for divorce and re-marriage; sometimes for the adoption of children and even of "grandparents;" sometimes for the employment of servants; often for long visits by the chums of a member and regularly for sabbatical leaves and trips for them. Harmonization likewise calls for (II) *changes in the management of the family*—for both participation in its management and rotation in its administration so as to give all members an opportunity to express themselves in accordance with their capacities and maturity. It may likewise call for (III) *changes in equipment architecturally*—for separate compartments or houses for each marital group and, of course, for the current and older generations; separate rooms for each child and for boys and girls as they approach puberty; above all, separate rooms for parents and children. Incest and other sexual

perversities may not be wholly matters of architecture but they are certainly encouraged by an architecture in which a whole family sleeps in one room. Finally, it calls for (IV) *constant education and re-education within the family group*—for the kind of katharsis at which psychoanalysis aims but which can be provided at much lower cost and without the dangerous transference which that method involves. Harmonization, particularly insofar as it deals with already existing antagonisms and psychic traumas, calls for family counseling and arbitration, and for recurring group character-analysis of each and every member of the family.

RIGHTS vs. OBLIGATIONS

IN a sense, what I have been calling functions of the family are definitions of the obligations of the family to its members; of the rights and benefits which flow from membership in an enduring corporate entity in contrast to those which might be enjoyed in a fluctuating and temporary family group. These benefits, however, generate obligations upon the part of the individuals who enjoy them, and they cannot, of course, be realized and enjoyed by the group as a whole unless each member discharges his or her obligations to the group.

The family, as an entity, has therefore not only obligations but also rights—rights to which it is entitled and for the fulfillment of which it can call upon each of its members up to the limit of their abilities. In describing what is essential to the organization of the family for the fulfillment of its obligations, we are in substance defining what these rights of the family are.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART II. THE NORMAL FAMILY

SECTION III.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FAMILY

Scientific management . . . can be applied with equal force to all social activities: to the management of our homes; the management of our farms; the management of the business of our tradesmen, large and small; of our churches, our philanthropic institutions, our universities, and our government departments.—Frederick Winslow Taylor, "The Principles of Scientific Management."

IN the implementation of not only such an idea as Normal Living but of any idea whatsoever, the methods and institutions used may be divided into two categories, *organized* and *unorganized*, in accordance with whether the methods used and the institutions established are planned, thoughtful and orderly, or whether they are animal-like—impulsive, thoughtless and planless.

If we exclude very young children and idiots, virtually all the methods and institutions used by human beings are organized—they are usually more or less orderly, they usually reflect thinking by somebody, if not in the present then at some time in the past, and most of them represent some kind of planning even if short-range or unconscious. But though organized, in this sense, their forms of organization are of quite two different kinds—they consist of methods and institutions *accidentally* accepted by mankind for no better reason than because they

have evolved or are prescribed by tradition, or of methods and institutions *deliberately* adopted after thought and planning. The organization of the family in many ancient cultures—as prescribed, for instance, in the ancient Hindu Code of Manu—represents an institution and pattern of living deliberately adopted; the organization of the modern family, on the other hand, reflects no such thought and planning—it consists of forms of family life *accidentally* accepted by modern man because consonant with the development of what modern man has planned and organized—his industrial, commercial, urban and national institutions. The ancient planned family may or may not prove to be what the evidence indicates is a normal family, but for the inchoate modern family, which like Topsy, “jes growed,” to be normal would have required modern man to be the beneficiary of a miracle of good fortune. Plainly no miracle has taken place.

The essence of organization is the planning of time—the division of either the time of one individual, or the apportioning of tasks among a group of individuals. In the case of the family, organization involves planning for a group, and what this involves can be made sufficiently clear by considering three of the nine steps involved—(I) composition, (II) management, and (III) equipment. The first step obviously is that of the composition of the group—the determination of the number and kind of persons to be included if the group is to fulfill the purpose for which it is organized.*

*The full discussion of the problem of organization—of what I think of as the *operational problem*—cannot be included in this book; the subject will be covered in the second part of this study, EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY. If the most important steps involved in the planning of operations are considered, at least nine must be taken into account: (I) evaluation, (II) conception and formulation of purpose, (III) composition and personnel organization, (IV) saving, (V) equipment, (VI) direction or management, (VII) production, (VIII) delivery, (IX) consummation. In this discussion of family organization, consideration is limited to three of these steps only—(III) composition, (V) equipment, and (VI) management. Conception and formulation of purpose has already been discussed in terms of the functions of the family.

TRADITION vs. FASHION

IT IS always interesting—and frequently illuminating—to examine the manner in which people long ago dealt with such problems as the organization of the family. In ancient societies the composition, management and equipment of the family was based upon unwritten, traditional folkways which often prescribed in minutest detail how family life was to be lived. Even after making all possible allowance for practices which had their source in nothing more valid than magic and superstition, it is still plain that the oldest of these traditions were based, for the most part, upon countless trials and errors in dealing with the same recurring problems over æons of time. Tradition represented, so to speak, the least common denominator of the whole experience of the race. Ancient family and marriage customs, ancient land and property systems, represented the time-distilled essence of experience. They did not consist of practices, as is unfortunately the case today, based upon a mixture of traditional residues, of scriptural injunctions, of statutory laws, and of ideas and institutions which people have been persuaded to accept by public officials, social reformers, preachers, teachers, authors and journalists, artists, doctors, lawyers and scientists, and above all the business men who have undoubtedly become—through salesmanship and advertising—the most powerful architects of the folkways of the modern world.

Monogamy is prescribed by the folkways which we follow mainly upon *religious* grounds. Allodial tenure of land is prescribed by our folkways mainly because of *statutory law*. The folkways prescribing for the organization of the family today are based primarily neither upon religion nor statute but upon *fashion*. Marriage, the status of the husband and wife, the children and the grandparents; the kind of home in which the family lives, the furniture and clothing its members use, and the selection and preparation of the food they eat, are prescribed by fashions devised by real estate subdividers and speculative house-builders; by clothing and furniture manufacturers; by canners, packers and bottlers, who persuade people to adopt them through advertising and salesmanship. The folkways of modern man are a hotch-potch with neither the virtues of ancient tradition nor those of a genuinely rational science of living. Very frequently, the very latest scientific discoveries, instead of confirming the validity of modern fashions we think progressive, confirm the validity of long

discarded ways of living which we think old-fashioned and primitive.

This I believe with regard to the composition of the family. The composition of the ancient family was much more nearly normal than is the composition of what we call the family today.

NEARLY everywhere in the world, the oldest folkways prescribe THE JOINT FAMILY organization of the family into groups which the anthropologists call *joint families*. The joint family is a family group composed of a number of sub-families the heads of which claim descent from a common ancestor, (usually patrilineally but sometimes matrilineally); bear a common surname, (as for instance Macgregor); are subject to common authority; observe common religious rites; practice economic communism; live, sometimes in one *long* house, sometimes in houses or compartments built around a compound, sometimes in adjoining houses, usually on one tract of land owned or held in common and usually worked in common though sometimes allotted without being alienated to some of the sub-families in the group. In numbers, joint families range from as few as two or three dozen to several hundred persons. And in membership, they include two quite different classes of persons, *kindred*, (either real or putative), who are always freemen of the tribe, and *dependents*, who are usually not freemen—servants, slaves, enslaved criminals, and their descendants.

The joint family seems to have existed at one time or another in all lands.* The ancient Greek *phratry*, Roman *gens*, Gaelic *clan*, Irish *sept*, and Anglo-Saxon *sib*, in their earliest forms, were apparently different names for the joint family. It was the predominant form of the family in the great Saracenic civilization which spread from Arabia across Northern Africa into Spain. Modified by Christian feudalism, it predominated in the medieval manorial family. In the United States, the ante-bellum Southern plantation was often the seat of what for all practical purposes was a joint family.

But the joint family still exists virtually unchanged in many parts of India, China, Burma, the East Indies, Asia Minor, and Northern Africa to which the influence of industrialism has not yet penetrated, and, if not in its original form with many of its original features, in

*According to Maine, the joint family and the self-governing village developed in every ancient society. This conclusion he based mainly upon studies of ancient Indo-European law and custom. cf., ANCIENT LAW, 1861, and EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM, 1883; Sir Henry J. S. Maine, 1822-1888.

the slavie Balkan *zadruga*; in Spain and Southern France, in Mexico and other Latin-American countries in which the ganancial system† still affects family life. Surviving families which retain some of its features may be found even in the United States—on Southern plantations, among the Pennsylvania Dutch, in the Southern Highlands, in the Ozark Mountains, and the census itself has recently taken some account of its persistence. But the ironical reason which led the Census Bureau to record the fact was the general assumption that such families were undesirable by-products of the depression of the 30's, to be eliminated as quickly as prosperity and public housing made it possible to modernize them. In 1940 there were actually 68,200 such households in the United States with two or more sub-families in addition to the main family, 1,603,620 with only one sub-family, and 2,858,560 with one or more lodgers.‡ Many of the lodgers lived with families already including sub-families. If families living and working on one farm but dwelling in separate households were included, as is common among Amish farmers and on most father-and-son partnership farms, the number would be larger, and if Southern plantations with their tenant families were included, the number would be still larger. This, of course, is still a very small portion of the total of 35,088,840 families enumerated. But even this vestigial survival of the pattern is in substance an act of unconscious homage to the economic and security value of the large family group.

I. MIS-SIZED FAMILIES

THE most obvious difference in the composition of the joint family and the modern family is that of size. The joint family—since it is by its nature an enduring multi-generational institution consisting of many sub-families—was necessarily a large family. The modern family—since it begins anew with the marriage of two persons and ends usually with their separation by death or divorce—is necessarily a very small family.

In 1940 the average family in the United States consisted of only 3.8 persons. In size, it has been declining steadily as the process of

†The ganancial system is a Spanish system of law in which the title and disposition of the property acquired during marriage or by the husband and wife is held in common. It is very similar to the French law governing community property. Similar bodies of law are found in many other nations.

‡Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Special report of the Sixteenth Census, FAMILIES, General Characteristics.

modernization has progressed. By decades beginning with 1890 the census records the decline as follows: 4.8; 4.6; 4.3; 4.2; 4.0; 3.8. But this represents the average for the nation as a whole. The modern family is really the urban family and as we modernize the rural family, the national average will come closer and closer to the urban ideal. The median size of urban families in all cities of over 2,500 was only 3.0 in 1940; it dropped nearly one-tenth in size in the ten years since 1930 when it was 3.26.

The obvious explanation for this is the decline in the birth-rate—in the number of children born per wife.* But an explanation not so obvious is the change in size caused by the general substitution of separate small families for joint and therefore large families. Though it is true that the primitive joint family was already rare a hundred years ago, the multi-generational family was not, and most families consisted of at least two sub-families. The figures on page 466 show that by 1940 only 4.6 of all the families in the United States consisted of two sub-families; and less than one-eighth of one per cent of three or more sub-families.

That the modern family is too small is obvious.

But if the modern family must be adjudged abnormal because *too small*, the ancient joint and united family—the ancient clan—must be adjudged abnormal because *too large*.

“TOO LARGE”

FOR the ancients, the modern antinomy between individual and family did not exist. The individual existed for the family, not the family for the individual. The family was not only a corporate entity, as I have tried to show, but the be-all and end-all of life. It was an entity to be dealt with not as a means to that other end which I believe to be more truly human—the end of individual self-realization and self-expression—but as a self-sufficient end in itself.

To this the humanist can make only one answer: the family—like any other institution—is a means. Not the family but living is the end. Individual life should not be organized primarily for the bene-

*The average number of children per wife in America, based upon 22 genealogical records, according to Edward Alsworth Ross, in his *PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY*, was as follows: Previous to 1700, 7.37; between 1700-1749, 6.83; between 1750-1799, 6.43; between 1800-1849, 4.94; between 1850-1869, 3.47; between 1870-1879, 2.77. In 1940, according to the census, it dropped to 1.6 for the nation as a whole, and for the urban population to 1.4.

fit of the family; *family life should be organized so that the individual may live as nearly like a normal human being as possible.*

I believe that there is only one answer to this because the principle that the individual exists for the family justifies the suppression and repression of the individual for the sake of the family. The *familist* then makes the same mistake which the *socialist* makes—he considers the *institution* more important than the *individual*. He duplicates the error of the socialist who sees no incongruity in sacrificing the liberties of the individual for the sake of state and nation.

This confusion between means and ends was the error inherent in the ancient joint family. It was so large; it seemed so essential to the good life; it loomed up as so much more important to sheer survival than the individual, that pressing the individual into a prescribed mold was accepted by everybody, and every variation from the mold considered reprehensible. Dominance by the institution and the subordination of the individual was taken for granted.

With patriarchal management of the large family, as was usual not only in ancient times but until quite recently, and with title to the family estate vested in a patriarch—as in the *paterfamilias* of ancient Roman law—the danger that this conception of the role of the family and of the individual would lead to tyrannical abuses, was enormous. Monstrosities of behavior, such as the right to sell the members of the family, (even wives, daughters, and sons), and such as the right to execute them, (much as the owner of domestic animals has the right to kill his cows and pigs), seemed to follow logically from the concept of the family as all-important and the individual as a mere means for its preservation.

The larger the family group, the more logical and the more essential seems this subordination of the individual. The smaller the family group, the clearer becomes the fact that the family exists for the individual, not the individual for the family. The abandonment of the older conception of sheer bigness in the composition of the family was undoubtedly a change toward more normal family organization.

BUT the movement from the abnormally large family has, in the modern family, moved to the other extreme. If the *too large* family is considered one species of family which is abnormal in size, then the *too small* family may be considered a second species abnormal

“TOO SMALL”

from the same standpoint. Of this second species, at least three distinct varieties are common today: (I) the solo-family, (II) the childless family, and (III) the family with too few children.

I. The first variety of this species of abnormal family—if indeed it can be called a family at all—is the *solo-family*; the household consisting of one person living alone. Such persons are considered by the census as families, and in the sense of maintaining a single home and operating as a single economic unit, properly so. According to the census of 1940, 10.1 per cent of all the families in the nation consisted of such solo-families. The proportion of solo-families is constantly rising as society becomes more and more industrial and urban; in the short period of ten years between 1930 and 1940, the proportion showed a staggering increase of over one-quarter, from 7.9 to 10.1 per cent. To get some idea of how far this is going, consider that in 1930, when the percentage for the whole nation was 7.9, the percentage of Manhattan Borough in New York City was 17.3 per cent—more than twice as great!

The individuals living these isolated lives develop many sorts of psychological, and even physiological, abnormalities which they are less likely to develop living in family groups. For one thing solo-family life is certain to lead to abnormalities of sexual life; if not to celibate suppression of sexual experience then to promiscuity, prostitution, and perversion. Institutionalization of solo-family life in apartment hotels, young men's and young women's associations, men's and women's residential clubs, and old peoples' homes, does not solve the problem of normalizing life; it is at best a mere expedient for supplying a substitute for some of the functions fulfilled by membership in a normal family group.

II. A second variety of family belonging to the species which I think of as too small, is the *childless family* which constitutes 25.7 per cent of all families in 1940. The proportion of such families in the total population is also showing sharp increases. In 1930 only 23.4 per cent of all families consisted of two persons. In ten years the increase was just about ten per cent.

Two-person families, as compared with one-person families, may succeed more or less in normalizing their sexual life, but without children they remain nonetheless abnormal—they do not, for one thing, fulfill the function of continuing the race; for another, the

women do not escape the physiological abnormalities which follow from childlessness, and both men and women do not escape the emotional abnormalities which follow from the same cause. Virtually all these postpone or refuse to fulfill the most important function of life.

III. A third variety of family too small to be normal consists of families with *too few children* to reproduce themselves and to fulfill the function of continuing the race.

If every girl-baby born were to grow up and live long enough to bear two children and her girl-babies were likewise to bear two children, *ad infinitum*, the minimum number of persons necessary to compose a family which fulfills its genetic function would be four—a mother, a father, and two children. But since many of them as a matter of fact die before they can bear two children—6,772 out of every 100,000 die before they reach their twenty-fifth year, most of them long before they are able to bear any children at all*—and since many of those who do survive do not bear any children at all, the minimum number of children needed to fulfill this function of the family must be between two and three. If in addition the fact that between one-third and one-half of all women born should bear no children at all because of hereditary abnormalities which should not be transmitted to future generations, or because of emotional or economic handicaps which unfit them for rearing children, those who should bear children must bear between three and five if the existing population is to be reproduced without further degeneration. To assume, therefore, that the minimum average of children per marriage should be three is conservative, and if this is assumed, every family with less than three children or composed of less than five persons is *prima facie* abnormal.

But according to the census of 1940 only 24.8 per cent of the families of America consisted of five persons or more; 75.2 per cent of all families were therefore too small. If the norm for optimum marriages is set at five children or a family of seven persons, 92.1 per cent of all families had too few children or were composed of too few persons. The number of families normal in this respect was not only a mere 7.9 per cent but in addition was decreasing sharply—in the ten years between 1930 and 1940 it decreased from 10.9 per cent—a decrease of almost one-third.

*Source: Life Tables, 1939-41; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U. S., 1944-45; p. 87.

Osborn admirably summarizes the facts which lead me to say that families with less than three children are *prima facie* abnormal simply because they do not fulfill the function of reproduction:

The present decline in the population . . . is the result of a decline in the proportion of families of more than four children, and an increase in families of one, two or three children. (He might have included the families with no children.—R. B.) Although at present rates of death and marriage in this country an average of about three children per surviving married couple would be sufficient for replacement, the others are limited in fertility to one or two children, and others, because of illness or for compelling economic or other reasons, will have few or no children. To bring the average up to three, and secure permanent replacement for any population group, a fairly large proportion, about 20 per cent, must have five or more children. In rural areas, such a proportion of large families is frequent. But in the cities, where the expense and the physical effort involved in the care of children are both very high, it is only among certain small and relatively well-off groups that a number even approaching 20 per cent of the married couples have a sufficient income to provide a secure living for so large a family without seriously impairing their standard of living. Evidently the expense of children is in proportion to the relative standard of living of each different group, and the expenses of those who send their children to college are greater than are the expenses of those who are content with high school alone. But at present in none of the larger city groups can 20 per cent of the couples rear five children or more at even the most moderate American standards.†

So much for this third variety of families which are too small. There are others but they have characteristics which make it better to classify them with mis-constituted rather than mis-sized families.

THREE species of *mis-constituted families* require brief consideration: (I) anachronistic families, (II) homologous families, (III) incomplete families.

II. MIS-CONSTITUTED FAMILIES

FIRST let us consider that species of mis-constituted family which I think of as *anachronistic* because the sheer chronological age of its members introduces inescapable abnormalities into life.

ANACHRONISTIC FAMILIES

I. One variety of this species consists of families composed of men and women who are *too old* to live normally in separate homes of their own. A family composed of a couple over 60 years of age, who have had no children or whose children have established entirely separate homes and lives of their own, is a social anachronism. To pay them an old-age pension or put them on public relief does not

† A EUGENICS PROGRAM FOR THE UNITED STATES, Frederick Osborn, American Eugenics Society, New York City, 1936; pp. 8-9.

normalize their lives. Neither does incarcerating them in an institution of some kind—let us say an apartment hotel if they are rich, or an old-folks home if they are poor. These are merely easy expedients for taking care of people too old to wait upon themselves or to earn enough money to support themselves.

Yet the proportion of such families is steadily increasing. In 1850 only about 4.0 per cent of the population consisted of persons over 60 years of age. By 1930 they more than doubled to 8.5 per cent.* In the ten years between 1930 and 1940 they increased by *nearly one-quarter* to 10.5 per cent.† Within about 50 years, by 2000, it is estimated that the proportion will have climbed up to 18.7 per cent.‡ *On this basis, the time will come when almost every other family will consist of a couple over 60 years of age.*

If life for such families is to be normalized, the present custom of having the rising generation immediately leave the home upon obtaining a job and marrying, would have to end. A modern form of the joint family would have to be developed. As the parent sub-family in such a joint family ages, they would retire either to an apartment in the original home or to a smaller separate house, as is so beautifully described in Knut Hamsun's *GROWTH OF THE SOIL*, leaving the younger generation to take the lead in the operations of the homestead.

II. A second variety of anachronistic families is composed of couples *too young*—couples still perhaps in their teens—which come into existence because a boy and girl, still too young to support themselves in a separate home or perhaps even leave school, have fallen in love and are anxious to satisfy their normal sexual cravings. There is nothing abnormal in the idea of such a couple marrying at almost any time after puberal changes are fully complete and they are physiologically, if not economically, mature. The situation for such couples is not normalized if they are forbidden to marry and are driven to resort to clandestine pre-marital sexual relations. It is not normalized if they resort to secret marriage and each stays in the parental home. Nor is it normalized by marriage and a futile attempt to set up a sep-

*"Our Rural People," in *AGRICULTURE IN MODERN LIFE*, by O. E. Baker, Ralph Borsodi, and M. L. Wilson, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1939; p. 140.

†Source: *STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES*, 1944-45; p. 25.

‡Estimated by Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, Scripps Foundation for Population Research; *Ibid.*, p. 27.

arate home with both of them prematurely trying to earn their living. To normalize life for such young couples, patri-local or matri-local marriage is called for in accordance with which one of the families of the couple would be most strengthened by the addition of either a young bride or groom.

III. A third variety of such anachronistic families is that consisting of couples of *widely different ages*—perhaps a man of 60 and a wife of 20; a wife of 40 and a husband of 25. Love, when it strikes into the hearts of two such anachronistic individuals, calls not for marriage but either for a liaison or for sublimation; it certainly furnishes no rational basis for the formation of a family. When it does result in marriage it represents either acceptance and devotion to the most absurd interpretation of the ideology of romantic love, or the substitution of impulse and obstinacy for human reason and foresight. The evidence indicates overwhelmingly that once such a situation has unfortunately developed, prompt divorce with all its pains may be necessary to avoid all its tragic potentialities. There is no other way than divorce and re-marriage with more appropriate mates to normalize such families because substantial disparities in age create more and more serious sexual strains and temptations toward extra-marital relations as one of the mates grows too old; because children are born at the wrong age so far as ability of one or the other parent to rear them is concerned; and because there may be financial difficulties when the husband is either too old or too young to support a family.

A HOMOLOGOUS FAMILIES SECOND species of mis-constituted families is that which I think of as *homologous*—as either (I) unisexual, or as (II) homosexual. These families are composed either of all females or all males. Both are obviously abnormal, yet their number is constantly increasing.

I. More usually these families are what I think of as *unisexual*—composed simply of like sexes and established mainly for purposes of economy; for the purpose of making it possible for the members to live more comfortably than they could alone. Such groups of individuals can afford to rent a whole apartment, whereas each living entirely alone could not enjoy the additional rooms and facilities possible with such group life. They can have a living-room, bathroom and kitchen to themselves. But such families cannot, of course, pro-

vide for normal sexual life, though they can make it possible—if they leave each individual free to entertain in their own room—for their members to have sexual relations without resort to the expense of hotels or of commercial prostitution.

II. But to an increasing extent what I think of as *homo-sexual families* are formed today as those of the same sex not only live together in one household for reasons of economy but for the purpose of cohabiting with a relatively permanent homosexual mate. The abnormality of this kind of family is too obvious for comment.

III. INCOMPLETE FAMILIES
WE come now to a quite different species of mis-constituted families—to groups which I think of as *incomplete families*. It is worthwhile considering five varieties of these families: (I) the adult family, (II) the one-generation family, (III) the two-generation family, (IV) the broken family, and (V) the dissociated family.

I. One variety of these incomplete families I think of as the *adult family*—the family composed of adults only. A number of unmarried individuals—perhaps brothers and sisters; perhaps a father or mother with unmarried sons or daughters—with no children in the group, are examples of such families. These families are obviously abnormal because, with no posterity to carry on the home and to succeed to the family estate, they are incomplete. Adoption of children would be one step in normalizing the composition of such families.

II. The *one-generation family* is an adult family composed of a married couple living alone. Such families are incomplete not only because they are childless but also because they are without ancestral members. Patri-local or matri-local marriage, in which the newly married couple becomes a sub-family rather than an independent family, is one way of avoiding this. To normalize the composition of one-generation families takes a long time. Only after grandchildren appear does mis-constitution begin to end.

III. The *two-generation family* composed of husband, wife and children is certainly less abnormal and incomplete than the one-generation or the adult family, but it is still mis-constituted. It has a complement of children, but none of aged persons. Such a family is abnormal because it has deprived itself of the conservative influence exercised by the aged and because it has shifted the task of caring for its own aged to some other institution.

A solo-family, (if a widowed, divorced or deserted individual lives all alone), or an adult family, (if it includes such an individual), or a two-generation family, (if it includes the children of a broken marriage), is in a sense a *broken family*. But strictly defined, the term broken family should be restricted to a father or a mother living with his or her still immature children. Such a family is not only abnormal because it is incomplete and mis-constituted but because it can make no normal provision for the sex-life of its adult member; because it does not provide its children with the disciplinary influence of two parents; and because a lone parent, no matter how loving, cannot properly provide for their emotional needs. In addition, economic handicaps often aggravate the other problems—the fact that there is only one breadwinner may mean poverty and deprivation, may mean inadequate housekeeping and home maintenance, and may mean a parent too tired and exhausted to function properly as a parent. The normalization of such a family calls for re-union with the parent's paternal or maternal family, and if the parent is not too old, re-marriage.

V. Finally we come to what I think of as the *dissociated family*—the family which, (though genetically, educationally and financially able to do so), has so to speak dissociated itself from the social burden of providing a good home and the opportunity for meaningful work for some of those who are unable to provide them for themselves. Families without such associate members and sub-families—without servants, lodgers, or tenants; without some modern equivalent for the *hired help* which really enjoyed family status on the old American homestead, or the *apprentices* who lived as members of their masters' families, or, if we go back far enough historically, those members of a family called *retainers*, *vassals*, *serfs*, or *slaves*—are incomplete and abnormal because they have dissociated themselves from what is in fact a form of hospitality essential to the well-being and normalization of society as long as some proportion of the population continues unable to establish and maintain an independent family life of its own.

The persistence throughout history and in every race and culture of this phenomenon—the inclusion within families of associate members and subfamilies—makes improbable the sentimental idea that it represents nothing more than the exploitation, through force and

cunning, of weaker individuals. Long ago Aristotle called attention to the fact that some persons were seemingly born to be slaves and others to be masters. Because of the brutality and inhumanity of organizing relations between these two types of individuals on the basis of slavery, and the irrationality of equating legalized slavery, serfdom, and vassalage with actual inferiority, it is easy to ignore the fact that there is ample scientific evidence for the differences in human beings upon which Aristotle based his rationalization of ancient Grecian slavery. The fact is that there are, and will probably always be, individuals who are either temporarily or permanently unable to establish and maintain themselves in independent families and at the same time live like normal human beings. They are unable to do so because (I) they are not yet ready to do so, or because (II) of accidental circumstances beyond their control, or because (III) they are genetically and emotionally unable or unwilling to exercise the initiative and to take the responsibility of doing so.

I. A boy or girl, or young man or woman, quite capable of developing normally, may find some form of associate membership with some other family than their "own" temporarily desirable because they are not yet able or ready to establish themselves independently. Such temporary membership may, of course, develop into permanent membership if, for instance, the individual marries into the family.

II. Accidental circumstances beyond the control of an individual may make associate membership either temporarily or permanently desirable. Individuals who are the victims of what might be called biological misfortune but who are in other respects normal—who have lost their husbands or wives by death; who have been crippled or who are chronically ill; children who have been orphaned—may prefer to join a family group, working for it or as lodger contributing to it, rather than live in isolation. Individuals who are the victims of economic as distinguished from biological misfortunes—who have lost their savings or property—who are perfectly normal except financially, may feel that associate relationship with an established, prosperous family—perhaps as a tenant farmer—is the wisest program to adopt. Then there are individuals who are the victims of what might be called educational misfortunes—who are otherwise normal but are either uneducated or educated "above" their own families—who may find transference to another family the solution of their problem of living.

III. Finally there are individuals who are genetically incapable of entirely taking care of themselves for whom associate membership in a normal family may be the only alternative to delinquency or degeneration. These victims of heredity may range all the way from high-grade morons capable of doing useful work if properly guided, to those who are in all other respects than initiative and desire for independence fully normal persons. Very low-grade morons, feeble-minded persons, and imbeciles who cannot work or whom it is dangerous to permit at large do not fall within this type of candidates for association in normal families; they need either to be institutionalized or mercifully disposed of by euthanasia.

At the moment we are not concerned primarily with the problems of these less fortunate members of society—whose existence should not be airily glossed over by a parrot-like subscription to the statement that all men are created equal—as with the fact of the mis-constitution of families with no associate members of any kind. In a society in which no family completes itself by absorbing a certain number of these dissociated individuals, all three of these types of persons would have to live either in isolation or be institutionalized. A normal family and productive home can absorb a certain number of such associate members with benefit to both. It would at one and the same time be furnishing them a good home and providing itself with additional hands and workers.

The problems, which normalization of dissociated families by completion with such associates creates, are economic, legal, and social. Economically the problem calls for much more than a purely money relationship between the family and its associate members. Lodgers and tenants must be more than sources of rent; servants must be more than mere hired hands; all the members of the group must be both in spirit and in fact cooperators with one another. This calls for legal definition of mutual rights and obligations—definition which can probably be most effectively achieved by family incorporation. And socially it calls for avoidance of arrogance on one hand and meniality on the other. It calls for the establishment of a status of reciprocal loyalty and hospitality.

IT IS fortunately not necessary to first establish a norm for the composition of the family with precise specifications as to the number, ages, sex, and types of children and adults to be included, in order to have a basis for the organization and normalization of families. If sufficient study is given to the problem, such a definitive norm may some day be developed. But for all practical purposes general specifications and approximate minima and maxima are all that is required. Such a norm, on the basis of the studies which I have been able to make, together with the assumptions upon which they are based, may be expressed as follows:

I. Assuming first of all that the function of continuing both race and family is to be fulfilled, then the minimum number of children

must be around three.* If this function is to be fulfilled eugenically—by having the better families bear and raise children in place of those unfitted to do so—then the minimum number may have to be raised as high as five.† The presumption here is that one child only—“heir,” either male or female—marries and carries on the family, the other two or three surviving children marrying into other families or establishing new families to replace the dysgenic families and individuals in the present population.

II. If now we assume that the needs of the aged as well as of the children and the present generation of adults, are to be provided for by the family as an entity, and that in addition primipara‡ takes place normally—between 17 and 22 for the mothers in each generation of the family—then at least three generations, and perhaps the survivors of four, have to be included in the family group. This means that in constitution the family must be at least three-generational and must include at least two sub-families—that of the present generation, and that of the grandparents of the children in the family. This would bring the number of persons in the group to three to five children and four to five adults.

III. If finally we assume that the family absorbs its proportion of relatives who are the victims of family “breaks” of some kind—the broken families of present conditions—and also employs or houses its share of individuals and sub-families who are either temporarily or permanently unable to live independently, then the family might on the average include at least two or three additional adults and one to three additional children.§ *This would bring the minimum number of persons in the normal family to three to eight children and eight to ten adults, and the minimum number of sub-families to four.* Such a family group in numbers, in emotional life, and in economic and financial resources would be strong enough to be able to fulfill all the functions of the family. Any group much smaller, would not.

So much for the minima. What about the maxima?

* cf., pp. 363-364. With present death rates during the time prior to the age at which women become capable of bearing children, the minimum would be 2.2.

† cf., pp. 365-368. If only one-third of the population is considered unfit to bear and rear children, the number would have to average over 2.9 per woman, (one-third more than 2.2), and if one-half is assumed to be dysgenic, the number would have to be 4.4, (double the minimum of 2.2).

‡ cf., p. 368 for a discussion of the age at which child bearing is normal.

§ cf., p. 365.

There are at least two ways of trying to establish maxima for composition. One would be to establish the point at which the family becomes *too large*—at which increases in numbers and in sub-families begin to interfere with the group's ability to fulfill properly all the functions for which the family exists; at which increases in size not only yield diminishing returns in terms of individual satisfaction but begin to frustrate the individuals in the group. Unfortunately we have no current data on large and joint families to use, while the cost of examining the only data which might be used—the data gathered by LePlay and his followers—has made it impossible for me to use this method. Fortunately there is ample data available with regard to the second method—establishing maxima in accordance with the ratio of abnormals to normals in the total population.*

For an actual family to guide itself with this data, it would have to be broken down by communities. The maximum number of children and absorption of abnormal and dysgenic individuals and sub-families by normal families would have to reflect the conditions in their own communities. Since normal family life is impossible in congested metropolitan centers, not even the minima is applicable to families in a community like New York City. The city family must either resign itself to disintegration, or decentralize itself—it must either accept annihilation or move into a rural or small community. On the other hand, in small communities the maxima would have to be determined by the available land and natural resources, and the extent to which the community's dysgenic population can be persuaded to practice contraception and the state is willing to impose sterilization upon its utterly irresponsible and degenerate members.

For the nation as a whole this ratio would make the maxima on the average from one-half to twice the minima. But this disregards two facts—that most of the abnormal and dysgenic population is already in the cities, and that the rural and small community population is already breeding at a much higher rate than the nation as a whole. In rural and small communities, therefore, there would be no such large numbers of abnormals and subnormals to be absorbed into normal family groups.

According to the census for 1940, 56.5 per cent of the population already lives in cities of 2,500 or larger. Some of these places, and

* cf., pp. 365-366. Footnotes on these two pages contain several sources of data.

the fringes of many cities, really fall into the category of small communities. Taking all factors into account, a rough correction for families in small communities would call for more than cutting the maxima in half—that is making the maxima range from one-quarter to one-half more than the minima.

IV. If we assume that in small communities the ratio of abnormal to normal individuals and families is from one-sixth to one-quarter of the population, *the maximum size of the normal family would be from 13 to 23 persons.*

There is no reason for assuming that such families would be too large and result in diminishing returns in personal satisfaction. And there are good reasons for assuming that they might greatly reduce the frustrations to which individuals are subjected in our atomized small modern family groups.

One point needs to be made to assure proper interpretation of the meaning of this norm even though it anticipates the discussion of the equipment of the normal family. This prescription for the composition of the family may seem to be a very large one, but if the family organizes its life normally, housing would not have to be provided to take care of every member and every sub-family at the same time. Absences and sabbaticals for education, for work, and for pleasure are as much norms of family life as is living on the homestead. Perhaps a quarter to a-third of the family would be absent at all times.

RECOMPOSITION

IN a normal population—in a community in which neither over-centralization nor over-decentralization of the population is creating problems of social pathology—the *recomposition* and replacement of members of families offsets all natural and inevitable *decomposition*.*

*The life-span of the really modern family is very short. If we assume that it begins at marriage and that it ends with divorce, desertion, or death, it probably does not on the average last more than five years. But even with the American rural family, which has not yet been completely modernized, the life-span is probably not much more than 25 years. The cycle revolves around the coming and growing up of children according to THE LIFE-CYCLE OF THE FARM FAMILY, University of Wisconsin Bulletin 141, by Kirkpatrick, Tough and Cowles. The cycle may be summarized as follows:

Pre-child family, couple under 25 years of age . . .	2.0 persons to family
Pre-school family, children under 6 years of age . . .	4.1 persons to family
Grade-school family, children 6 to 13 years of age . . .	5.1 persons to family
High school family, children 14 to 18 years of age . . .	5.1 persons to family
Post-school family, parents over 40 to 45 years of age . . .	2.0 persons to family

If the rate of decomposition exceeds the rate of recomposition, families disappear as rapidly as marriages create them. The normal link between the individual and mankind's past, (*his* genealogical ancestors), and its future, (*his* genealogical posterity), is broken, and the individual frantically tries to find a substitute link in mass-audiences, (such as the movies or the radio), and in mass-organizations, (such as labor unions, Rotary or women's clubs, coops, and political parties), both of which tend to exceed in size what I have called human magnitudes. A febrile restlessness and rootlessness infects every individual. Life is so fluid; so full of change and excitement, and tension and mobility are so great that the individual never really rests. Recreation does not revivify because recuperation never really take place. The individual never normally vegetates and ruminates. His nervous system is deprived of those periods of both relaxed contemplation and relaxed action essential to the maintenance of health and sanity. Neurosis becomes general and psychosis endemic, and both increase as they are increasing in proportion to the disintegration of the family and the congestion of population in the world.

If the rate of recomposition and replacement exceeds that of decomposition, *individual* pathology takes the form of more and more intense struggles for material wealth and opportunities for self-expression; *family* pathology takes the form of more and more intense rivalry generation after generation for control and inheritance among the increasing numbers of heirs in each family group; *social* pathology takes the form of widespread poverty as the total population begins to exceed the natural resources available for sustenance and opportunities to realize prescribed standards of living. The excess of births over deaths—the over-population which Malthus made the basis of his challenging thesis—eventually creates external as well as internal social diseases. Domestic social pathology generates international pathology. Nations composed of families in which composition exceeds decomposition eventually tend to become nations which have either to send out wave after wave of emigrants or wave after wave of invading armies.

Living like normal human beings calls ultimately for stabilization both of the size of the family and the population of the community.

If the number of individuals in a community are too few to utilize all its natural resources and develop the arts and sciences of living to

their highest and most satisfying degree, the rate of replacement of members by its normal families should, *for a time only*, exceed that of decomposition by death and emigration. If the community is already over-centralized and too congested, the rate of replacement, *for a time only*, should either be less than the rate of decomposition, or there should be no additions to the family at all until death and emigration again normalize the ratio of population to community natural resources. In either event, the ultimate goal is *stabilization* on the dynamic equilibrium which is life.

25
X

There are at least four distinct methods by which mankind has solved, as a matter of historic fact, the problem of maintaining the membership of the family. These solutions involve the admission of members, (I) by marriage, (II) by birth, (III) by adoption, (IV) by reinstatement and re-admittance, and (V) by hospitality.

I HAVE deliberately placed recomposition of the family group by marriage first, and recomposition by birth second, because the most important factor in the maintenance of the family as a permanent corporate entity is not birth but marriage.

I. MARRIAGE

More nonsense has been taught and has become a part of the folklore and still accepted ideas of mankind about the part birth plays in the continuation of the family than a scientific civilization ought to tolerate. Only if mankind had adopted a completely endogamic system of mating, and birth was wholly within not only the tribe and nation but within the immediate kin-group and probably the group within which mating is usually considered incestuous, would birth have represented the most important method of recomposition. The fact, however, is that mating has been and is almost universally exogamic. This means that half the permanent membership of the family consists of those who marry into the group, because the children, except for the heir, are not permanent but only temporary members of the group—most of them eventually leave it to marry or to establish families of their own. It may be exaggerating the matter to say that the whole elaborate ideology of kinship and of blood-descent is based upon romantic superstitions, but if so, the exaggeration is very slight. The fact of the matter is that in exogamic marriage, even with the most rigorous primogeniture, (forgetting all possibility of adultery),

the original blood is diluted by half in each generation so that *within five generations the members of the family can have only one-sixteenth of their so-called progenitor's blood in their veins and fifteen-sixteenths of the blood of those who joined the family generation by generation through marriage*. With exogamic marriage, it is not so much the blood as the habits and values, and the whole culture pattern, of the family which are transmitted to future generations.

Marriage—the *state* of a man and woman living together as husband and wife as distinguished from the wedding or *act* of being married—is the culmination of a process of *selection*, sometimes by the man and woman involved, as in courtship; sometimes by the two families involved, as in matchmaking; sometimes, in ancient and primitive societies, by capture and abduction of the woman, as in the famous “rape of the Sabine women.” In civilized societies the actual process of selection—which consists of courtship, of matchmaking, or of both—is usually followed by *betrothal* or engagement for a period of time, (sometimes beginning with the making of a marriage contract or settlement); then by a *wedding*, a *honeymoon*, and finally, settlement in a home into *married life*.

From the standpoint of family composition, it is the process of selection—and the methods which govern this process—which are important. Among the considerations which actually enter into selection, those which are most frequently involved are *love*, by which I mean romantic and passionate love; *compatibility*, or harmony of character; *progeny* and the satisfaction of desire for children or need of heirs; *support* by a husband; *service and housekeeping* by a wife; *wealth* of the husband or *dowry* of the wife; *family alliance*, often the main consideration with plutocratic and aristocratic families; and in many primitive societies, *profit* from the sale of the bride. These considerations are not mutually exclusive; actual selections usually reflect a combination of several of them.

It is difficult, and fortunately not necessary, to try to pick one of these and say that it alone is the norm to be observed. If some one were to be selected, the evidence is rather conclusive that what I am calling compatibility—particularly if compatibility is defined to include genetic, cultural, sexual, and even financial, harmony—is most likely to produce happiness and general satisfaction to all affected by the marriage. The evidence seems to me equally conclusive that se-

lection upon the basis of romantic love, which is the consideration dominant with us today, does not represent the norm. The fact that between a third and a half of all marriages today end in divorce, if not proof that match-making is a better method of selection than love-making, does at least indicate that the prevailing cult of romantic love is abnormal.

We are not, however, driven to the necessity of picking some one of these considerations. The norm is probably *selection upon the basis of all considerations except those which involve compulsion in any form*; the violation of the norm, *selection upon the basis of one only of them*—of one such as love or wealth without regard to any other—or *considerations involving compulsion in any form*. It is the whole person who marries, and in selecting a mate and incidentally a new member of the family, the whole background of both persons should be taken into account.

IT IS necessary to emphasize this fact because—very largely as a result of the influence exerted upon the modern pattern of behavior by the poets, novelists and dramatists who have exploited Goethe's idea of "elective affinities" and Havelock Ellis' idea of the affectional nature of sex—there is not only an explicit movement advocating marriage solely and simply for the satisfaction of sexuality but also great confusion between this kind of mating and marriage itself. Marriage for sexual companionship and complete marriage are two quite different things. Lindsey recognized the distinction upon which I am insisting when he called the first *companionate marriage** to distinguish it from what I think of as *normal marriage*—from marriage in which not only are children sought but consideration is given to all the other implications of the married state.

*cf., pp. 358-359. "There was an ancient custom in the British Isle known as 'handfasting,' which comes from the Anglo-Saxon word 'handfaestnung,' pledging one's hand, and was an Old English synonym for betrothal. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, from which I here quote by permission, handfasting was 'later a peculiar form of temporary marriage at one time common in Scotland, the only necessary ceremony being the verbal pledge of the couple while holding hands. The pair thus handfasted were, in accordance with Scotch law, entitled to live together for a year and a day. If then they so wished, the temporary marriage could be made permanent; if not, they could go their several ways without reproach, the child, if any, being supported by the party who objected to further cohabitation.' Presumably the Scotch, who I believe have never been noted as a licentious people, found that handfasting had its advantages, or they would not

HOMOGAMY vs. HETEROGAMY

IN marriage, and in the continuance of the family by marriage, one crucial problem is whether happiness is best assured by *homogamy* or *heterogamy*—by the selection by and for the marriageable members of the family of mates who are *similar* to, or *different* from, one another. This problem is most acute in heterogeneous cultures such as our own in which people of different races, religions, nationalities, and classes meet intimately enough so that sheer propinquity leads to love, mating, and marriage.

Not only have the instincts—or prejudices—of mankind condemned heterogamy but the common sense of nearly all peoples have condemned it when it means intermarriage between those as different from one another as white and black, or yellow and white. The position of the Catholic Church, in opposing marriage between Catholics and non-Catholics, while it may be dictated by a desire to protect its own interests, nevertheless is justified by convincing evidence of the unhappy experiences of those who marry and disregard strong differences between themselves and their respective families on matters of religion.

On the other hand, not only religious believers in the “brotherhood of man” but many scientific humanists who base their convictions upon anthropology and sociology, are advocates of heterogamy, and insist that opposition to intermarriage between persons of different races, and of markedly different cultures, is based upon prejudices which have no validity in either science or morals. The issue arises not only in connection with the organization of family life, but also that of economic, social, and political life. The question is, what is the norm which should guide human beings in dealing with the problem?



Anthropologists distinguish between *endogamy* and *exogamy*—between those solutions of the problem which prescribe that mar-

have practiced it. Presumably, too, the complicating factor in this method of trial marriage was the always possible child. The child was the fly in the ointment. But with a recognized system of Birth Control, and with a development of scientific contraception, sanctioned by law and public opinion, that would not have been so. It would then have been understood that handfasting was *not* a permit by society to have children; and the result would probably have been a system recognizing two kinds of marriage, much as I have described it above.”—THE REVOLT OF MODERN YOUTH, Ben B. Lindsey and Wainwright Evans, p. 181.

riage should be restricted to those who belong to the *same* tribe or nation, and those which prescribe that they should be restricted to *different* totems or genealogical lines. In these terms, no light is thrown on the problem; for marriage may be both endogamous and exogamous. Only if evidence is marshalled in terms of three distinct alternatives, is there any chance that a norm applicable to the problem can be formulated based upon fact rather than fancy. As we shall see, the wide prevalence of *both* endogamy and exogamy is in reality evidence that our primitive ancestors had already formulated approximations of the norm which should govern marriage. The three alternatives which must be considered may well be called (I) isogamy, (II) heterogamy or anisogamy, and (III) homogamy.

I. Similarity of the persons marrying, if pushed to its utmost extreme, calls for a form of marriage which I think of as *isogamy*.*

Marriage is a state and relationship between individuals in which *homo sapiens* ritualizes what is simply conjugation in other species of animals. Isogamy, which is the biological term for conjugation between not merely similar but identical gametes—between sex cells of the same kind—may be defined as a form of marriage between persons who are as nearly identical genetically as possible. Belief in the virtue of isogamy underlies the distinction between royal and common blood, the principle that royalty should only marry royalty, and the laws declaring that marriage between a monarch and one not of royal blood is morganatic. Isogamy underlies *Racism* and what has been glorified by the manner in which Spengler and after him the German National Socialists have used the word *blood*; it really is a prescription for consanguineous family composition. Such exaltation of the value of blood kinship if pushed to its uttermost limits logically assumes the validity of incestuous marriage. If isogamy is the answer to the problem, marriage between members of the same family including not only cousins but also brothers and sisters would be positively good. For with incestuous marriage, the blood would remain the same generation after generation, while with incestuous marriage prohibited, the blood in the family becomes fifteen-sixteenths that of other families within five generations.

There are practically no instances, however, of the incorporation of incestuous marriage in the general folkways of any people. On

*Isogamy is a biological term applied to conjugation between identical gametes.

the contrary, the instincts and customs of mankind nearly everywhere and in all ages have revolted at the mere idea. The case of the Pharaohs of Egypt furnishes an interesting exception to the rule—interesting because it shows how rarely any people have accepted a genuinely consanguineous concept of family even for their royal families. Yet there are no biological grounds for assuming that incestuous conjugation is necessarily evil, as livestock breeders well know. The instinctive opposition to incestuous marriage; the almost universal insistence upon exogamous marriage; the severe penalties prescribed by both folklaw and statutory law for incest, are based upon rationalizations which have not been established as valid scientifically. It is possible that this almost universal revulsion against incest and incestuous marriage is due to the fact that it represents a denial of the great ideal of the *brotherhood of man*. Exogamous and heterogamous marriage tends to make the statement that *every man is my brother*, a fact. It tends to intermingle the whole blood stream of humanity, and to make *homo sapiens* one species in fact if not in racial origin. Such intermingling—which always takes place when different peoples meet—is an indubitable fact of enormous importance. Intermingling of the blood of tribes, nations and races, takes place not only when custom proscribes it but even when the law forbids it. Even when marriage between races is interdicted by statute, as in the case of the laws against miscegenation in our Southern states, intermingling nevertheless takes place.

But it is much more probable that the root of the instinctive opposition to incest has its genesis in some obscure recognition of the virtues of evolution. There may be, from the standpoint of evolution, values in variation which would not be realized if the blood stream of mankind were stabilized and immobilized family by family. The very bifurcation of all the higher forms of animal life into two sexes* is indicative of the virtues of such variation, for in all asexual plants and animals† no variation of the “blood stream” takes place. In attempting to realize that good, the proscribing of incest seems natural and logical. *Isogamous marriage is therefore not the norm which should govern selection in marriage.*

II. The opposite of isogamy is neither endogamy nor exogamy but *heterogamy or anisogamy*. Since anisogamy is a biological term

* cf., “The Bifurcation of the Sexes,” pp. 327-337.

† cf., p. 328.

applied to conjugation between different gametes, heterogamy seems to me the more appropriate term to use to designate the relationship between human beings involving marriage between persons who are as different from each other as possible. Heterogamous marriage is neither endogamic nor exogamic. It is not endogamic because that prescribes that marriage should be restricted to those of the same tribe or nation, nor is it exogamic because that prescribes marriage between different genealogical blood streams without regard to whether they belong to the same or some other tribe.

Heterogamy is really the kind of marriage, or at least the doctrine dealing with marriage, advocated by the proponents of internationalism and inter-racialism—the doctrine which assumes that there are positive virtues in marriage between persons of different races, religions and nationalities. There may well be virtues in such marriages, if immediate consequences are disregarded; and if the unhappiness which they usually create, (if not for the couple, then for their relatives, children and friends), are also disregarded. There are, doubtless, instances in which the love of such a couple for one another is so exalted and their characters so self-sacrificing, as to make the problems which their marriage creates of no moment *to them*, but there is no question that in the overwhelming majority of instances the incompatibility between peoples of widely different races, religions, nationalities, cultures, and even means, is so great, that such unions must be adjudged abnormal and inhuman.

For super-normal individuals—for geniuses in love and mutual accommodation—this common sense rule may have no meaning. But if the differences which they disregard are too great, then such marriages should in most instances be deliberately kept childless. Such couples may adopt children, but they should not bear the mixtures which are all that they can generate. The lives of most half-breeds, for instance, do not warrant couples of two different races—no matter how great their love of one another—in disregarding the consequences of launching such human beings upon life. For most of them, life is one long series of humiliations and frustrations.

If all the norms are observed in marrying, and particularly if the importance of compatibility not only between the couple and their children on one side and their respective friends and relatives on the other, is recognized, then *heterogamy is abnormal, and mixed mar-*

riages and the absorption into the family of mates widely different from the family itself, unwise.

III. Nature itself seems to recognize that heterogamy violates the norm. While purely biological analogies are certainly not to be considered the most conclusive basis for formulating norms for human behavior, they do contain lessons which should not be disregarded. Conjugation between animals too widely different usually produces crosses which are less able to survive than either parent; sometimes it produces progeny which is infertile; often such mating itself is without issue. But even between animals of the same species, as in the case of *homo sapiens* himself, if the man and woman come from families or races with widely different characteristics, their union generally produces progeny less fitted to survive or less able to adjust itself to life than either parent and, as we shall see, parturition for mother and child may be fraught with great danger.

The overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that what I am calling *homogamy*—the marriage of individuals similar to each other in both heredity and environment—is *the norm to be observed in the selection of mates for the marriageable members of the family*. The more nearly husband and wife come from families of the same race, nationality, religion, and social class, the more likely is the marriage to be a success and the better will the new member fit into the family which he or she joins. The greater the differences between them, the greater is the danger of unhappiness and separation; the greater the probability that relations between the married couple and their respective friends and families will prove unhappy, and the greater the difficulties which life will present to the mixed progeny of their union.

Inter-racial, international, inter-religious, and inter-class marriages are abnormal and hazardous in proportion to the magnitude of the differences involved. There can be and have been many notable exceptions to this dictum of experience. But generally speaking, marked differences of either race and heredity, or of environment and background, violate the norm.



Even if the *hereditary background* is not a difference of race, as great as between white and black, but merely of two markedly different sub-racial strains as between the tall Scandinavian and the short Italian, or even of two differently *sized* individuals, the mixture of

the genes in their progeny often proves unhappy in the extreme—their children may be asymmetric both physically and physiologically; they may inherit a large body from one parent and small organs from another, or some of their limbs and organs may be large and some small. Parturition in such a marriage may prove dangerous both to the mother and her children if a small woman marries a large man, because her pelvic organs may be unable to accommodate the large infants to which she would give birth on the average, at least half the time.



Differences of *environmental background* yield more readily to adjustment than hereditary differences, but the difficulties which they create are nevertheless often insuperable. Differences of religion, if the husband or wife or either of their families, are deeply religious, create antagonisms about manners, places and times of worship, and about the religious educations of their children. Differences of nationality may cause friction not only about conflicting customs but about patriotic feeling and develop into tragic differences in time of war. Differences of class, while still easier of adjustment, are nevertheless undesirable because of the differences in their respective relatives and families. Only by a more or less complete break with his or her background by one of the couple, can this difficulty be overcome, and then there may be deep subconscious effects to trouble the one who has indulged in this form of repression.

Eventually the melting-pot* may produce a different—though not necessarily better—race of human beings, but the process is a painful one to those who are actually being smelted together. And there is no evidence to prove that an ideal of absolute *uniformity* in the human species would mean better human beings, a better world, or a better pattern of living than an ideal of infinite *variety*. The first calls for endangering and sacrificing the happiness of the living for the possible future felicity of the generations to come. The second is realistic; it accepts the fact of variety, and calls only for teaching people how to treat those who are different from themselves in color, language, religion, and culture.

*This expressive phrase was popularized by Israel Zangwill's drama "The Melting Pot."

BIRTH is probably second, and not first, in importance among the various means for the recomposition and maintenance of the family.

II. BIRTH

By birth, as we have seen, each sub-family in a normal family group will produce from three to eight children—the minimum number being determined by personal and family consideration, the maximum by the natural resources and population of the community in which the family lives.† But in spite of the fact that this seemingly adds a greater number of members than marriage, the actual addition of permanent members—as distinguished from child or temporary memberships—should be no greater.

In a normal family there may, or may not, be more than one sub-family in the current generation. If the homestead is a small one, there should be only one. But if it is large enough and furnishes work and place for more than one, there may be two or more each of which might give birth to anything from three to eight infants. Not all of these children will survive into maturity. But of those who do, all but one in each sub-family would normally leave the homestead, resigning, so to speak, from their “own” original family sooner or later to join some other, or to establish another family and, in any event, to live permanently on other homesteads. One alone would then remain permanently in the family to carry on the sub-family by marrying and bringing his or her mate into the group.

This is the norm for replacement by birth in all families in which the homestead and resources available to the group call for stabilization in numbers. Only if the community is in fact both under-populated and under-developed—only if it is over-decentralized—are more children than the minimum per sub-family called for, because such a community will have room for the children who will leave their original families to establish new families and homesteads of their own. The moment these unused natural resources begin to be used to the full extent to which the existing state of the arts and of technological development makes possible, then the birth rate should fall to the minimum so as to avoid over-centralization and the abnormal competition for land and jobs which create the social evils from which congested communities always suffer.

† cf., p. 367.

AS ordinarily understood today, *adoption* has reference only to the not uncommon practice of accepting—voluntarily and legally—a child of other parents than one's own.* But this restricted conception of the idea is part and parcel of an era in which the concept of family itself is losing significance. To the anthropologist studying other cultures than our own, adoptees may be adults and not only children, and the adopters not merely married couples but families, clans, and tribes. In a sense, the process of naturalization, by which a citizen's transfer of allegiance from one nation to another is accepted, is the modern equivalent of the ancient process of tribal adoption. But for the adoption of adults by a family, almost no trace is left in modern life. Yet there are just as good reasons why heir-less families, too old to bear children should adopt adult heirs, and grandparent-less families should adopt grandmothers or grandfathers, as there are for childless couples to adopt children. Grandparent-less homes are just as abnormal as childless homes.

III. ADOPTION

The justification of child-adoption is two-fold: it substitutes child-full homes for childless ones, and it provides homes for orphaned and illegitimate children.† Couples who cannot bear children, either because the husband or wife, or both, are sterile; or who should not bear them because of hereditary abnormalities like hemophilia; or who—perhaps because of the mother's health—have too few children, should adopt a full complement of children both to normalize their own lives and the lives of children in need of homes.

Reasons for adopting adults are just as valid. In the case of a young couple with insufficient savings or insufficient "hands" to establish a homestead, formation of a joint family may make it possible for two or more couples to achieve what neither might otherwise be

*The author of *ADOPTING A CHILD*, Frances Lockridge, (Greenberg, Publisher, New York, 1947), estimates 50,000 or more American families adopt children yearly.

†Orphanage and illegitimacy constitute perennial social problems. They confront us with the necessity of trying in some way to normalize life both for the orphaned and illegitimate child and for its unwed mother or widowed mother or father. Instead of stigmatizing illegitimacy as bastardy, the holiness of every normal child and childbirth should become recognized. With the present less inhumane attitude toward pre-marital sexuality, unless more and more homes are opened to illegitimately born children—and the attitude toward unwed mothers becomes more and more kindly—abortion is certain to increase. The acceptance of the idea of the normal family, and of the normalcy of adoption as one way of completing membership, would provide homes for both such mothers and children.

able to achieve alone. Such partnerships are in effect mutual adoptions of adult couples by a new and larger group.

In the case of an aged couple with an established homestead, (or an estate larger than they need for themselves, or a property too large for them to manage), adoption of adult heirs, or even a couple with children, gives reason for the continued maintenance of a home. It makes it certain that the home will have members who will take care of them in their extreme old age. At the same time it provides their adoptees with a home which they might not be able to provide for years—and perhaps never—for themselves. Full legal adoption is no doubt dangerous in an acquisitive society—in such a society as our own peopled with grossly mis-educated persons who have been systematically conditioned *to get without regard to what they give*. Unless both adoptees and adopters experience a complete and enduring transvaluation of values, associate membership rather than full adoption is the more flexible and therefore wiser solution of the problem.

BOTH *hostility* and *hospitality* are concepts which curiously enough have their roots in the same idea—the idea of *host*. And this is natural enough because both are in effect solutions of the same problem—the problem of the relationship of host-to-stranger. This problem is solved in one way, with hostility, if we assume that the family should dissociate itself from the problems of strangers; if we assume that those outside of the family circle should be treated as aliens and enemies. It is solved in quite the opposite fashion, with hospitality, if we assume that the homeless shall be treated not only as friends and guests but as potential kinsmen; if we assume that the family should not only be a group composed of those who are *kinsmen by birth, marriage, or adoption*, but also an association which includes *putative kinsmen*—men and women with whom the family has associated itself for mutual benefit but who are not admitted to full membership because they are by nature or by nurture ineradicably dependent, or because—if they have the necessary qualities fitting them for full membership—their association is still one of trial, and may prove temporary rather than permanent.

In organizing the family in terms only of the biological family, with no provision for the admission of isolated, dependent and familyless strangers into the charmed circle, the modern family is in effect

solving this problem with hostility. The modern family extends little hospitality even to relatives; it has no truck at all with strangers. If strangers are admitted into the home, they are admitted on a purely monetary basis. Certainly there is no provision for their really joining the group. That this commercialization of hospitality is inhuman and abnormal—quite without regard to whether the stranger pays money to the family or the family pays money to the stranger, cannot be doubted.

To employ servants—to bring strangers into the home solely in order to have them wait upon the members of the family—is inhumane because it reduces them to the status of menials. On the other hand, to furnish rooms to lodgers or meals to boarders solely in order to make money, is equally abnormal. While to exploit tenant farmers on land which the family has pre-empted, is downright predatory.

In this respect the feudal concept of the relationship of the family to those outside it, was much more human. Except for avowed enemies, hospitality was extended to all strangers and often, by enfeoffment, the opportunity to establish a permanent home. The journeyman went everywhere, and the masters in his craft were obliged to furnish him work, food and lodging for not less than a day and as long as seemed mutually desirable. The knight was welcome at the castle. And the poor could always become retainers of those who had estates and property. The institution of vassalage called for permanent reciprocal relationships of loyalty and obligation between the weaker and the stronger from serf to royalty.

As long as the world consists of individuals some of whom are strong enough or fortunate enough to be well established, and others who are homeseekers or job-seekers, some provision which humanizes the relationship of those who are relatively dependent to those who are independent, is essential to the normal organization of the family. The addition of relatively permanent associate or auxiliary members, seems to me a more human solution of this problem than the insularization of the family, its dissociation from all isolated individuals, and its shifting of the problem of providing a substitute for home life for them to the government. There are at least four distinct types of associate or auxiliary membership which have been tried by families: association (I) by ownership, (II) commercially, (III) by employment, and (IV) socially.

I. Till rather recently one common way of dealing with the problem was that of *ownership* of the weaker, or the more unfortunate, by those who were richer, stronger, or more fortunate. Slavery, serfdom, and bond-service were solutions which at their best, though nonetheless inhuman in nature, often brought the slaves into loving relationship with the families which owned them. But no matter how much tempered with an enlightened slave code, and even with manumission, the ineradicable element of legalized coercion remained in it to stamp it as definitely abnormal.

In spite of this there is still more to be said in defense of the institution than most people today are accustomed to hear. Family slavery and commercial slavery were two quite distinct things. The first often created ties of affection between the members of the family and individual slaves which it would seem that the very nature of the relation rendered impossible. The degree of care, both in health and sickness, which was lavished upon slaves was that lavished upon valuable domestic animals multiplied a hundred-fold. And the family security provided for aged and infirm slaves compares not unfavorably with many public schemes of old-age care. There is, of course, nothing parallel to this in the temporary and purely money-relations between a modern family and its servants; long before servants age, the modern family simply discharges them.

For commercial slavery, as practiced in the mines of Grecian and other ancient states; in the mines and forests and on the plantations in conquered colonies all over the world; on the absentee-owned cotton plantations of our own South, and in the concentration camps of Soviet Russia, there is not a vestige of justification in human terms. The compulsory degradation and exploitation of human beings in the alleged interests of society and the state, is always abnormal, Aristotle to the contrary notwithstanding.

II. Landlordism of some kind, with the family playing the part of landlord and strangers the part of tenants, is an essentially *commercial* solution of this problem. It is commercial because profit becomes the essence of the relationship between the family and the tenants to whom its lands, or houses, or apartments are rented, or between the family and the lodgers or boarders it takes into its home. At its worst, with the family mercilessly taking advantage of its pre-emption of

land, nothing good is to be said for this solution of the problem, but even at its best, when full value is given in shelter or board, little good is to be said. All normal human beings need to own homes and to belong to families. Landlordism ignores this. Not even the best managed apartment hotels can furnish an adequate substitute for home ownership and family life.

An essentially commercial relationship, dominated by the profit-motive, is an abnormal solution of the problem of relations between those as intimately and continuously related to one another as those who live in the same house or work the same land.

III. Using the term broadly, *employment* of servants, "hired men," and other *family*, as distinguished from *commercial*, workers, is justified both because most families can increase the efficiency and beauty with which they live by having more hands to share the work of the household and homestead, and because there will probably always be a considerable percentage of the population—of strangers to the family—composed of individuals who are inherently or circumstantially unable to establish and maintain independent establishments of their own. The material plane of living would be higher and life more secure and happy for such individuals if they worked for some family on terms mutually advantageous to both.

The present purely monetary relationship between all employers and employees—which solves this problem of family and farm service on the basis of day-labor—creates an essentially fugitive relationship between the two; it is so abnormal that it never lasts unless there is domination by the family and submission by its servants. It really tends to the dehumanization of both. The social disadvantages of migratory farm labor have been abundantly documented; but equally great social disadvantages are inherent in migratory house service. The moment a relationship between two human beings becomes intimate—intimate to a degree that can be called familial—a purely monetary resolution of it becomes inhuman and abnormal. The evidence indicates that *hospitality* on one hand and *loyalty* on the other, are essential to humanize and normalize relations between the family and its servants. The consideration paid for the service must be payment not only in money but in kind—the servant must feel that he is working in his own home and is an associate if not altogether a full member of the family. This includes consideration on the part of

the employer for both the material and the psychical needs of the servant—the provision of significant work up to the limit of the servant's potentialities; the provision of proper recreation, adequate rest and privacy, not excluding love, marriage and children—the provision, in sum, of opportunity to live as full and complete a life as is possible for each servant.

IV. This, of course, solves the problem *socially*—it socializes and normalizes the relationship by making them both in effect associates rather than just employer and employee. It differs from adoption only in degree. And it is not very different from the relationship of those relatives of the family whom circumstances—perhaps the death of the husband or wife—have brought more or less permanently into the family circle. Such relatives or friends of the family may work wholly within the home; they may work outside and contribute both money and work to the household, but they are associates rather than full members as long as there is still any degree of impermanence—or dependence—in the relationship. Once the relationship becomes permanent then, as used to happen with “maiden aunts” and “bachelor uncles,” they should be accepted as full members of the group—the family ceases to be host to a friend or relative; they become part and parcel of the corporate entity itself.

If the composition of the family is planned and not a mere matter of accident, the fact of acceptance into membership ought to be ritualized. Just as betrothal and wedding symbolizes acceptance of a member by marriage, and christening symbolizes acceptance by birth, so adoption and associate membership calls for some appropriate form of recognition—a form which should have not only emotional but legal content. Legalization, however, is really a matter which goes beyond the subject of the composition of the family; it brings us to consideration of the enormously important part which management plays in the organization of family life.



II. MANAGEMENT

SOME DAY posterity may look back and see something ironic in the fact that the principles of scientific management were first applied not to the organization of family life—not to the fundamental needs of mankind—but to the organization of the

money-making enterprises of business men. The facts, however, cannot be denied. There is a science of business management. There has been such a science ever since Frederick Winslow Taylor's pioneer work in the field over half a century ago. But there is as yet no such science for the management of living. We have great schools of business administration in our universities; we have no great schools of living connected with them. If, therefore, the problem of how to manage the family so that its members may live like normal human beings is to be solved, nothing better can be done than to begin with the principles which Taylor and his disciples have developed.



Broadly conceived, *management* is a generic term for the methods used in treating, directing and controlling the participants in projects and enterprises in order to achieve the purposes for which they are undertaken and organized. Authorities on business management usually discuss no more than three basic types of management because these three are those which lend themselves to use in business enterprises.* Actually, however, there are at least five basically different types of management among which it is possible to choose in selecting the particular type which best fits specific kinds of projects and enterprises. These five I think of as (I) authoritarian, (II) functional, (III) fraternal, (IV) educational, and (V) co-ordinal. If the family is to fulfill its functions, the right system or combination of these systems of management must be selected. Without going into detail in discussing each of them, it seems to me that there is ample evidence indicating that only the second of these—functional management—is applicable to family organization if the family is to fulfill all, and disregard none, of the eleven functions which are essential to its normality.

*These three are usually designated *line management*, which I am designating authoritarian management; *staff management*, which I am designating functional management; and *committee management*, which I am designating co-ordinal management. Generally speaking, in business administration the conception of management is *unilateral*—it is restricted to the consideration of the problems of the managers, whereas my conception of the problem of management is *reciprocal and omnilateral*; it involves consideration of the problem both from the standpoint of the management and of those managed.

The management must be *functional*, or cooperative, for two reasons: because the family is a group composed *not of equals* in needs and rights and powers and responsibilities, but of *unequals*, including individuals of two different sexes and of all ages, infants and adults, adolescents and seniors, children and aged persons. The authority for exercising management cannot therefore be uniformly assigned to all of them and must be expressly withheld from children altogether too young to assume such responsibilities. Neither are the tasks which need to be fulfilled uniform; they must be divided and almost departmentalized among the members. The second reason is that the family is a group both human and contractual in essential nature; it calls for voluntary and loving cooperation, for reciprocal treatment of those who manage and are managed, and not for compulsion or impersonality in its management.

The management cannot be *authoritarian* because that makes it impossible to fulfill the family's erotic and harmonic functions. Only to the extent to which paternal love tempers patriarchal authoritarianism is even approximate fulfillment of these functions possible. Neither can it be *fraternal*. The family is not a fraternity of competitors engaged in the production of a like commodity or service. Neither can it be *educational* because, while the family has educational functions, it is not a school; it still remains a microcosmic unit of humanity as a whole. Nor can it be managed *co-ordinally*, or federally; it is not composed of members all of whom are capable of delegating power over themselves to others.

TRADITIONALLY family management has been authoritarian. TRADITIONAL MANAGEMENT In the earliest Roman organization of the family, direction and control of the members by the *paterfamilias*—the method sanctioned by law and prescribed by custom—was management by absolute male autocracy. The management of the Christian family in England, as we find it described in the novels of Thackeray and Dickens, was little different from the management of the early Roman family.

For the most part, the variations from this scheme found in different nations and cultures were variations of degree and not of actual organization and management. Even in primitive cultures in which descent and inheritance was matrilineal, management was

still authoritarian with the authority vested in the eldest uncle of the wife instead of in the husband or the husband's father.

But when the whole traditional concept of family began to collapse in the industrialized nations of the world, male authoritarianism began to collapse with it. Feminism was the ideology which most directly challenged this concept of family management. But feminism was not only powerfully reinforced, it was in a sense a mere outgrowth of the indirect war waged upon the whole idea of family by industrialism and urbanism. Modern science, as it has been applied to life in the United States and in most of the nations of Europe, has affected corrosively almost every aspect of family life. In reducing the family to an institution with almost no other function than that of sexuality and procreation, it cleared the way for the feminist claim of equality and for its denial of male autocracy.

CERTAIN assumptions are implied in the FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT normalization of family life by the substitution of functional for traditional and prevailing methods of management.

I. First of all the family must be *named*—there must be recognition of the fact that a distinct corporate entity is being managed—the *Jones Family, Inc.*, for instance—and that the individuals who belong to the family have to be managed only insofar as their direction and control is necessary in order to enable the corporation* to fulfill its functions.† The family must be readily distinguishable from any member belonging to it, particularly from that member whose surname may be chosen for it, much as *Jones & Co., Inc.*, distinguishes a business corporation from the John Jones who is its principal organ-

*A corporation, in contemplation of the law, is an artificial person having an existence separate and distinct from that of the members who from time to time compose it; it has continuous succession, and, accordingly, no changes among the members occasioned by death, bankruptcy, retirement, admission of new members, or otherwise, affect the corporation's identity—it remains in law the same distinct person continuously existing until deliberately dissolved. The members are not the corporation; they have only that interest in it prescribed by the corporation's charter and by-laws. This concept is not a mere verbal fiction or legal abstraction; it has pragmatic reality, and is of the utmost practical importance. Thus, a corporation's debts are its own; the members are usually not and perhaps should not be liable for them. So also, a corporation's property is its own, and no one nor any number of individual members can appropriate, alienate, or convey title to any of it; its property therefore is not subject to seizure in payment of any of their individual debts.

†c.f., "The Functions of the Family," pp. 431-461.

izer and stockholder and who may also be one of its officers, one of its directors, and one of its executives. Part and parcel of this matter of a corporate family name is a corporate family seal or, as used to be the case in the days of heraldry, a family crest, escutcheon, coat-of-arms or armorial bearing.

II. Secondly, normal management assumes that the family has a permanent home or *address*—a family estate or homestead upon which and from which it operates—the legal equivalent of what is called a corporation's *principal office*. This used to be recognized in the custom of using place names as surnames—a man was known as *John of Sutherland*, or *van Rijn*, or *de La Salle*.

III. Thirdly, it assumes that the family has purposes substantially the same as the eleven functions and purposes already discussed.

IV. Fourthly, it assumes the perpetuity of the family—that its existence as an entity is not to be terminated by the death, divorce, resignation, or even expulsion of any of its members, and that it continues to function for those who remain or who succeed those who have ceased, for any reason, to belong to it.

V. Finally, it assumes the existence of an equivalent for the by-laws of corporations; of a body of rules or at least defined customs for the management of the family as an entity. By-laws, however, ordinarily only define the form of the relationship between the members and the officers and directors of corporations. They do not usually say anything at all about the form which the management and treatment of the employees or the patrons of corporations should take; that is usually left to the initiative and unilateral decisions of executives whose methods of managing are usually unwritten and take any form from the most absolute autocracy to the most self-abnegating public service.

In a family, however, since the members are both the employees and patrons of the group at one and the same time, a single body of rules or customs is called for which prescribe both the manner in which the *members* manage the family, and the family as an entity manages its *members* as “employees and patrons.”

BY-LAWS usually provide for (I) the election of officers and directors—for the equivalent of what in law today is considered the *head of the family*; for (II) meetings of the board of directors and of the

members—for what has almost no equivalence in modern family life but for which the nearest analogies are *conferences of the husband and wife*, (the directors of the family), and *dining-table counseling* by the entire membership of the family; (III) definitions of the duties of the officers and directors—for which the *legal powers and responsibilities* of the head of the family and of parents are virtual equivalents; (IV) the admission, resignation, suspension and expulsion of members—for which *composition* of the family as it has already been discussed is the equivalent; (V) the disbursement of the corporation's income and funds, and the distribution of dividends—for which modern custom and law prescribes the negation and antithesis of family action, *individual ownership of property and income*, which means in substance the substitution, for group disposition, of individual initiative both in expenditure and in bequest; and finally, (VI) the disposition of the corporation's assets in the event of its dissolution—for which analogies today are found in disposition of common property by *court decree in divorce*, by *dower right of the wife* and *statutory provision for the claims of the next of kin* in the event that individuals die intestate, and by *escheat to the state* in the event of death without heirs.

It is in these last two matters that the modern so-called family departs wholly from the concept of the family as a community or corporate entity. The change from group to individual ownership of the funds and property used by a family; from family income to individual wages and incomes; and from entail of the family estate or homestead to the right of individual alienation and bequest, is not a mere evolution—it is the substitution of a directly opposed concept of family and of the organization of social life. In the others, what survives in the modern world are traces of the traditional patriarchal and authoritarian method of family management.

How would functional management of the family deal with these problems? In two ways: (I) it would substitute *voluntary acceptance and acquiescence* for every trace of compulsion in direction and control, and (II) it would substitute *division of powers and responsibilities functionally*—in accordance with the nature and capacities of various members of the family—for the present ideal of equality.

Another way of saying this is that freedom and reciprocity would replace both traditional authority and modern individualism.

LEADERSHIP AND DISCIPLINE

IF entirely voluntary (though not necessarily spontaneous) action is substituted for patriarchal or parental compulsion, the necessity of furnishing direction and obtaining obedience must be recognized; the problems of leadership and of discipline should not be ignored; provision for both must be made, because both are essential if the family as a group is to operate efficiently. There can be no effective management of any group unless the equivalent of a "boss" is provided and the management is equipped with adequate means of disciplining any member of the group who fails to do what he is called upon to do.

I. LEADERSHIP

LEADERSHIP is the form which direction takes in functional management. The leader directs not *by exercising power* but *by exerting influence* over those whom he or she has to control or order about. Such leadership will almost without exception be accepted if it is reasonable and persuasive rather than arbitrary and dictatorial—children naturally accept the leadership of adults; usually all the members of the family accept the leadership of the wife and mother in the kitchen, as they accept that of the husband and father about the farmstead, shops or business of the family. But functional organization of the family calls for much more than this rudimentary division of direction and control.

First it calls for division of the authority exercised by the membership over the family as an entity in accordance with their ages—division between the very youngest children, the adolescents still in a state of novitiation, and the adults. While all should take part in family councils, the membership should be graded—there should be juvenile, junior, senior, and auxiliary classes with full legal membership reserved to those who become *homo legalis** after attaining their majority, or whenever "in-laws," servants, or other workers are accepted as full members of the family.

Two kinds of leadership are necessary—*corporate* and *operational*. Leadership must be provided for the family equivalent of corporate meetings of stockholders and directors of business corporations, and the family equivalent of the regular daily technical operations of the employees of business enterprises. With incorporated enterprises, the

*A person whose status as a citizen, or member of a community, is recognized in law. Aliens, slaves, incompetents, and minors, are not *homo legalis*.

first kind of leadership is provided by the corporation's *officers*—the president, vice-presidents, secretary, treasurer, and chairman of the board of directors; and the second kind, by its *managers* and *superintendents*. In very large corporations, the officers and the executives may be different persons; in small corporations they are usually one and the same.

Every family needs a presiding officer—a chairman or *moderator* for its meetings. It needs a secretary or *recorder* of certain important proceedings which should be written down and not trusted to memory—particularly those recording the status of its membership; and it needs a treasurer or *bursar* who handles its funds and financial affairs. These offices should not be assigned permanently to one person, much less assumed permanently by a patriarch or dowager, as is too often the case. Rotation of these offices is highly desirable.

In practice, the moderator, because of the poise and wisdom for which the office calls, should be one of the elders of the family. The office of the recorder, which calls merely for making entries into some minute or record book which will provide written legal records some of which used to be made, at one time, in the Family Bible, might well be rotated among the younger members of the family, while that of the bursar should be rotated among the members who have shown interest in the handling of funds, in bookkeeping, and in whose accuracy, conservative tendencies, justice and probity everyone has confidence. In middle class French families, experience has shown that wives and mothers make excellent custodians of family funds.

The operational leadership and superintendence of the various departments of the family—the kitchen, the laundry, the nursery and sickroom, the flower and kitchen garden, the business or profession which produces the cash income of the family, the work shops, and the farm—need to be divided among those best able to do the work and best qualified to furnish direction in each department and to lead and exert influence when work at certain hours daily or seasons yearly calls for more than one person. The members of a family are naturally as different as is the work which needs to be done. Just as there is naturally men's work, women's work, children's work, and old folks' work, so there is leadership which naturally belongs to the young and the old; to husbands, fathers, and grandfathers; to wives, mothers, and grandmothers. In the recreational undertakings of the

family, one of the older boys naturally furnishes the initiative and takes the leadership; in social affairs, one of the older girls. In the various productive departments and projects the father or mother. In most educational and spiritual matters, one of the family elders.

In actual fact, therefore, nature itself tends both to dictate the division of labor and also to choose those best fitted to lead in each department. Leaders are rarely chosen; they emerge; or they choose themselves. They should never be prevented from making their contribution to the group; all that the group should try to do is to give every member the opportunity to express himself in contributing the talents which are his. Circumstances in the very nature of things—like sex and age, strength and temperament, marriage and the responsibilities of fatherhood and motherhood—tend to furnish the equivalent of election of officers in corporations and of the appointment of managers and superintendents in business enterprises. The group has only to confirm, by the support it gives them if it does not do so formally and articulately, the managership which circumstances confer upon some of its members, and to choose or to confirm alternates when the natural department head is on a prolonged absence or is rendered unable, by illness or incapacity, to manage his or her regular departments.



What is called *staff management* by authorities on business administration, is simply one variety of what I have been calling functional management. What is called *cooperation* in the organization and management of producer and consumer cooperative enterprises, is another variety of the same species of management. Both are solutions of the operational problem which are alike in their fundamental characteristics. They firstly divide the enterprise into departments and then substitute for dictated or *authoritarian co-ordination*, (as in line or military management), *voluntary co-ordination* of those in charge of the departments. Functional management, both in the form of staff and of cooperative management, has proved a pragmatically effective method of directing and controlling business enterprises; in well-managed and happy families, careful analysis of the essential nature—as distinguished from the form—which management takes, shows that functional management is not only equally effective but

that it alone makes it possible to preserve the loving atmosphere without which family life becomes a hollow mockery.



But there are matters with which family management must deal which do not yield to more or less natural disposition as do questions of work and choice of managers. These arise usually in connection with (I) *family composition*—the admittance of members by marriage, by adoption, or by employment, tenancy, and hospitality on one hand, and the ending of membership by resignation, suspension, or expulsion on the other, and with (II) *family funds and property*; with either the acquisition of property for the family, or the distribution of family funds and settlement of property upon those members who marry into other families, or leave, or are expelled.

In the traditional family, with its authoritarian form of management, these matters are disposed of unilaterally by the decision of the head of the family. In the modern small family they either do not arise, (because funds and property are owned individually by the husband and wife and each is free to do as he wishes with his own), or they are disposed of by agreement between the two, much as is the case in ordinary business partnerships. But with functional management, decisions must be both multilateral and voluntary—all members of the family must not only have a voice in making decisions which concern them all, but none of them must be compelled to accept them.

If unanimity is not obtainable, and action cannot be postponed, *universal consent*, including the consent of those not in favor of a decision, can usually be obtained. In a group as intimately acquainted with one another as a family, the Quaker rule of *making no decision where there is strong opposition to it*, works quite well if the members have already been educated—as they should be—to the sense of responsibility which good Quakers display before expressing opposition or strong concern about any matter. By the time the minors attain majority and have full voice in the councils of the family, they should have learned how to discharge this responsibility. If, nevertheless, the opposition of any individual is so great that there is no way in which he can reconcile himself to a decision of the group, he must either suspend his membership and leave temporarily, resign permanently, or be expelled. The only way in which it is possible to

avoid giving each member the individual power of vetoing what the rest of the members or the leaders of any of the family's activities decide to do, and at the same time avoid frustration of the individual by the family or frustration of the family by an individual member, is *separation*. Such separation, as we shall see, calls for an equitable settlement of the financial interest which the individual has in the family's possessions. If instead of individual opposition, there is a split into two or more irreconcilable groups, then the situation may call not for mere separation but for complete *dissolution* of the family.

THE ultimate problem of management and crucial test of leadership is that of securing obedience and maintaining discipline. II. DISCIPLINE

If the manager and leader has the ability to influence all those who are involved in the group activity which he directs, the problem tends to disappear—disciplining becomes unnecessary; each individual does what he should do because each individual disciplines himself. But no matter how well the members of a family are educated to cooperate with one another and to accept leadership, the fact remains that there will be occasions when disputes will arise, and when differences of opinion—and of inclination as to what should be done and who should do it—will be apparently irreconcilable. Disobedience—the failure to follow orders or observe directives of the family as a whole—is in a sense simply a dispute between those who are being directed and those who give directions. It may be due to some *inadequacy in the manager*, in which case there must either be a change in the manager—he or she must learn how to manage more effectively—or a new manager must be selected. But it may also be due to the *inappropriateness of the method of management* used. If functional management is used, it must have an appropriate and adequate method of obtaining discipline.

Authoritarian management solves the problem of discipline very simply and directly. In present day business enterprises, irreconcilable disputes between the managers and those who work under them, call for the discharge of any individual who disregards the orders of his superiors. In the administration of governments, which is necessarily authoritarian when it comes to the enforcement of law, disputes by those who are ruled with those who rule, call for penal coercion. And in armies and navies and other military establish-

ments, which are even more plainly authoritarian in management, discipline is enforced and obedience secured not only by the use of compulsion but, in time of battle, by summary execution by officers of those who refuse to obey them.

The family cannot, without doing violence to the norm of voluntary association and action, use physical coercion in obtaining obedience, nor can it delegate to any leader or family head the power to "fire" any of its members. The question is, are there alternative methods of disciplining—more appropriate to family life and yet equally effective—which are functional rather than authoritarian—to which the family can turn? The evidence indicates that there are; that it is possible with *patience, ingenuity, firmness, and love* to persuade all properly educated members of the family to do what they should; that not even in the case of children is physical chastisement necessary, and that physical restraint need only be used with those who are sub-normal—with congenitally or environmentally conditioned problem and feeble-minded children, and adults who are imbecile and more or less psychopathic. In this respect, most savages are more humane and normal than so-called civilized peoples. Our habit of striking children is a form of brutality which savages regard with horror. "Spare the rod and spoil the child," is just as barbarous a rule as the old English law permitting a husband to beat his disobedient wife—provided the stick he used was not thicker than his thumb.

A quite different problem in disciplining arises in connection with disputes involving adults when the disputes have their source in incompatibilities of one kind or another. A good family manager will make allowances, in his assignment of tasks, for the peculiarities and particularly for the incompatibilities of individuals. If, nevertheless, irreconcilable differences and disputes between the leaders and members of the family who have reached the age of accountability, arise, the first court of resort should be *arbitration*. Very often an apparently irreconcilable difference can be reconciled by reference to an elder of the family, or to the family council, or finally to an outside presumably entirely impartial arbitrator. But if the incompatibility is too great, and arbitration produces no reconciliation of the disputants or fails in securing the obedience of those in full revolt; and if neither *ostracism and privacy, nor temporary exile or separation* can produce a change of heart, divorce or expulsion is called for.

THE problems of leadership and discipline are essentially problems of personality and character.* To a considerable extent they tend to solve themselves by the very nature of the relationships and daily association of the members of the family with one another.

But this is not the case with the problems of *composition* and of *possession*. These are essentially institutional in nature.† They are affected by an enormous body of both ancient and modern law. Whether dealt with between the individual and the family by contract or by status, they not only *are*, but properly *should be*, enforceable by law. Not only with us but in most cultures, people simply accept and adjust themselves to the status prescribed by custom and law. But when these prescriptions are illogical, and above all when they are violative of norms of human life, (as is the case with the customs and laws dealing with family composition and family possessions we use today), then status should be replaced by contracting‡ between the family and its members. Locke's concept of a *social compact* between the members of society, may be a highly abstract and even mythical construct of the imagination, but the concept of a *compact* between the members of a family is no abstraction—any family can make it a very tangible reality in the lives of its members. For instance, marriage contracts, such as are still used in France, Spain, Italy, and many other countries, are examples of compacts into which individuals and families enter which provide at one and the same time for family composition and possessions.



Family composition poses problems of family management in connection with the (I) *establishment* of an entirely new family; the (II) *admission*, (as by marriage or adoption), and *acceptance* of new mem-

*In saying that they are problems of personality and character, I am in effect saying that they are problems in education. And if the education is right-education, it will have equipped the individual members of the family with habits which teach them how to differ individual-to-individual and individual-to-group without paralyzing group action or frustrating the individuals involved.

†In saying that they are institutional in nature, I do not mean to imply that they are not also educational in nature. They are. But they involve education about the proper manner in which to implement group action as distinguished from individual action.

‡These contracts have to be formally executed if the family is unincorporated; if incorporated, they can be effectuated by action in accordance with the charter and by-laws.

bers, (as when children or junior members come of age or auxiliary members are accepted into full membership); the (III) *severance* of membership; and the (IV) *dissolution* of the family by the dispersion of its members and the division of its possessions among them. The weight of the evidence indicates that the norm in these matters is not traditional unilateral decision by a head of the family but action by the entire membership—*co-option*§ *in establishing a family, in admitting and accepting each new member, in expelling a member, and in deciding to dissolve the family altogether.*

I. In the United States, and in countries in which all traces of feudal family life have been eliminated, permanent families can only be established by contract or incorporation. In China and India, status still provides for family establishment, and in all countries in which any form of community family law¶ survives, as in Spain, the law provides what we have to provide by contract or incorporation.

It is true that "family" corporations can be, and many have been, established by very wealthy men for the purpose of making possible the transfer of their property to heirs to whom they wish to bequeath it without payment of inheritance taxes. There is no tax which is ethically less defensible or morally more contemptible than the one which is levied upon the estates of the dead—upon women and children, for instance, widowed and orphaned by the death of a husband and father. While it is true that avoidance* of inheritance taxation

§I am using the word *co-option* somewhat more broadly than the dictionary definition of *election of a fellow member by the members themselves*; as I see it, the corollary of election by co-option is expulsion and dissolution by co-option.

¶Formal legal provision for community of goods—for partnership or common ownership of the property of husbands and wives, sprang up in various parts of Europe during the Middle Ages, the nature and extent varying in different places. Sometimes the law covered the whole property of husband and wife, whether acquired before or after marriage; sometimes only the *conquests* of husband and wife, that is, the property acquired during their marriage; sometimes the *movables* acquired before the marriage as well as the *movable and immovable conquests*. English law at an early time rejected the idea, as did the law of Normandy. But it has been retained in various civil-law systems—Spanish, French, Roman Dutch, and even some States of the United States. In Spanish law it is called the *ganancial system*; in French law, the *dotal system*; and in the Roman Dutch law still used in South Africa, *gemeenschaap van goederen*.

*Lawyers make a nice distinction between tax *avoidance* and tax *evasion*. To do anything to avoid and to reduce the taxes which the government levies, is perfectly legal, and it is perfectly ethical for lawyers to help their clients to avoid and reduce them. This kind of casuistry always develops with sumptuary legislation and whenever taxes are levied not in proportion to the services rendered by government but arbitrarily in accordance with ability to pay and sheer ability of tax-collectors to collect.

and the criminally wasteful costs of settling estates, is one of the very great advantages of family incorporation, corporations organized only for this purpose are not corporate entities such as I have been trying to envision.

The family cannot be normalized by the creation of an *artificial person* distinct from each of the *natural persons* who organize it unless there is agreement and contracting with one another for its incorporation. For the establishment of such a *permanent* entity, as distinguished from the contracting of a marriage or the establishment of a household, calls for self-conscious repudiation of the existing *impermanent* "legal" or "natural" family, and also the substitution of *family property*† for *individual ownership* by the husband, wife, and each of the individual members of what should be owned by the family as a whole. Not only must the "charter" members agree to the composition and establishment of such a normal family unit, but they must also agree to transfer to it enough of the property which they already own in their individual names to properly equip it to fulfill its functions, and to the pooling of the wealth which they subsequently create and the property which they may acquire with its help or by their common activities.

The conventional scheme of family life which is thus repudiated is abnormal for two reasons: because of the colossal waste of the savings of individuals and families for which it is responsible in the settlement of estates upon the death of the individuals who have title to it, and because of the shortness of the life-span of the modern conventional family.‡ Only when this is explicitly rejected by the charter members of a family, is establishment normal.

II. In establishing a normal family, the compact into which the charter members of the group enter—even if composed only of a husband and wife—is a permanent or many-generational compact in contrast to the one-generational—or even shorter—contract of most marriages today. If the new entity thus created is to be permanent, *new members must be welcomed into the group* to complete it and to replace those who die or drop out; *recomposition* must take place at least at the same rate as *decomposition* takes place. The admis-

†The legal term is *community-property*, but I am taking the liberty of substituting *family-property* to avoid confusion with the concept of *government-property*.

‡ c.f., footnote on p. 490.

sion of new members, (as by marriage or adoption); their acceptance, (as when children or junior members come of age, or auxiliary members are first accepted, or later transferred in status to full membership), and their ceremonial and festive welcome, poses a problem in family management similar in purpose but different in form from that of family establishment.

The problem arises in its simplest form when children and junior members arrive at the age for promotion to higher classes of membership and to more mature rights and responsibilities. But it should not be disposed of mechanically; the young should not feel that full membership is something which comes to them automatically as a matter of birth and of coming of age. On the contrary, they should know that the whole membership has to formally approve their being raised to new legal status in the group, and that such approval and acceptance will not come until they have proved by the maturity of their behavior that they have earned it.

The problem of admission arises quite differently in the case of candidates for membership other than those born into the family. With marriage; with the adoption of children or older outsiders; with the hiring of helpers, renting of any part of the homestead, or extending its hospitality to isolated friends or widowed or orphaned "in-laws;" and with any change in the status of these auxiliary members, the personal inclinations of one or more members create the major problem in management. In contracting a marriage—which illustrates most sharply the issues involved—in which a bride or groom is to be brought into the family, the same problem in management arises if the member introduces the candidate, (if he or she falls in love), as if the candidate were proposed to the member by the initiative of the rest of the family, (if match-making rather than romantic love precipitates the issue). In either event, the evidence indicates that the norm must recognize that the satisfaction of individual feeling is essential but by itself not all-sufficient. The rest of the family, who, will necessarily have to associate with the proposed member, and with whom they must share the family property, must have an opportunity to accept him or her. And if, by chance, a candidate is rejected as unsuitable either for the member of the family who desires to marry the candidate or for the family as a whole, the candidate must either be given up or the member who desires to

marry him or her, resign from the family. No person, in other words, can be brought into the family unless the responsible members of the family as a whole consent to his or her acceptance. And the members of the group are not properly educated for normal living—for the exercise of the rights and responsibilities of family life—if they do not feel the impropriety of trying to force a candidate, willy-nilly, upon the group, or of prejudicially and obstinately vetoing a candidate important to one or more of the family.

III. Separation from membership—with full reciprocal and social observance of all the rights and responsibilities involved—presents problems in family management usually more difficult than those of admission. The separation of individuals from their families is not only a fact in life—it is a right essential to the inviolate preservation of free and voluntary gregation. Every member of such a group must have the right to resign; both the individual and the group must have the right to suspend membership; the group must have the right of expulsion.

We do not, it is true, ordinarily think of men and women who leave their families in terms of resignations, suspensions, and expulsions. Yet in actual life, every separation from a family must be one of the three. *Resignation* is the act of voluntary and permanent separation; *suspension*, a temporary separation which may be either voluntary or involuntary; *expulsion*, the permanent and involuntary severance of a member from the group.



What distinguishes *resignation* from *suspension* is its permanence, and from *expulsion*, its voluntary nature. Daughters of the family, for instance, relinquish rather than abandon their membership when they marry and move bodily with all their belongings to their husband's family. In a divorce by mutual agreement, the woman who returns to her original family in effect resigns her membership in the family which she joined at the time of her marriage.* In resignations from a family, the member who leaves surrenders his or her heritage or usufruct in the family property but has the right to take all his or her *paraphernalia* or private belongings, dowry, and fair share of

*In a contested divorce, on the other hand, the divorced member who is compelled to give up marriage, is in effect "expelled." In either event, the member who leaves permanently must be given all his or her dotal and other property.

what he or she has added to the family's wealth or contributed to it in work. The individual has, as we shall see, two claims upon the family's possessions—a right in common with all the other members to the usufruct of the homestead, and an individual right to a dotation. The first he surrenders if he resigns; the second he is entitled to claim upon separation for any reason whatever.

The group must, of course, accept his resignation. Managerial problems nevertheless arise with every resignation in fulfilling two norms—in connection with educating the members so that they do not idly resign for inadequate reasons, and in connection with providing for the transfer of their interest and payment of their dotation. The first is a problem in *composition*—of what is called personnel management in business; the second is a *possessional* problem which we shall have to consider separately and in more detail. The first is essentially a problem in emotional and educational management; the second, in economic or business management.

Suspension from the family may come either as a result of the initiative of the member involved, in which case it is voluntary; or it may come about at the insistence of the rest of the group, in which case it is compulsory. In the first instance it implements the freedom of the individual; in the second, the freedom of the group.

The suspension is *voluntary* if a member wishes to leave for an extended period, (perhaps to take a job so far away that it calls for setting up a relatively permanent home; perhaps to embark upon a professional career or to launch a business of which the family does not approve and the proceeds of which he therefore feels should be exclusively his own), without wishing to preclude the possibility of reclaiming his membership or of later re-union either because he or the family has changed minds about the matter and both are ready to accept the losses or share equitably in the proceeds of his project.

The suspension is *compulsory* if some sort of antagonism has developed between him and either another member or the rest of the group, and he is made to leave for an extensive period with the hope that time and distance may lead one or the other to a change of mind. The normal management of differences and disputes which have become acute and intolerable but not yet hopelessly irreconcilable, calls for (I) discussion and group exploration of each case; (II) decision to try suspension as a means to subsequent resolution

of the issue and reconciliation of the disputants, and (III) taking into account in the terms of suspension—in the financial arrangements, the length of time, the place of residence—the rights and responsibilities of the individual, the family, and society as a whole.



In suspension, love between individual and family has not yet entirely vanished; the hope of revival of mutual affection and loyalty has not yet died. Even when the suspension is compulsory and the family is insisting upon a temporary exile somewhat like the ancient Roman *relegatio** it is still essentially disciplinary. But with *expulsion* the family falls back upon its final resource in protecting itself against the recalcitrance, delinquency, or disloyalty of one of its members. In desperation, usually after many failures or because of the heinous nature of his or her offense, the individual is "cast out" and "cut off."

In a sense, expulsion is the familial equivalent of the medieval punishment called *outlawry* in the case of men and *waivery* in the case of women. Outlawry banished the individual from society; expulsion casts him out of his family. An outlaw was *civilliter mortuus*—he was, so far as society was concerned, dead.

Expulsion is, of course, nothing new. All that I am doing is naming a class of acts to sharply distinguish and define the managerial problem which they present. In practice, every time a son or daughter is disinherited; every time a divorce compels a man or woman to leave a home; every time a husband, whose wife has deserted him, advertises that "having left his bed and board" he is no longer responsible for her debts, we have more or less formal expulsion from the family.

The problem which expulsion creates is not only private; it is also social. The individual expelled—usually for defects of character which make it impossible to endure him in the home—is almost certain to prove a burden to society at large. The hopeless liar, wastrel, thief, drunkard, drug fiend, pervert cannot be disowned by his family with-

*In Roman law, *relegatio* was a mild form of the punishment called *deportatio*. The first was usually temporary; the second involved banishment for life. *Deportatio* was originally inflicted upon political criminals but was also a punishment for adultery, murder, poisoning, forgery, embezzlement, and sacrilege. It included loss of *civitas* and all civil rights, and confiscation of property. *Relegatio* banished the person from one specified district only, usually with permission to choose a residence elsewhere; it involved no loss of *civitas* or property.

out regard to the family's responsibility for his existence. In abandoning responsibility for him, the family shifts it to society. The question is, to what extent is such a shift justified, and what provision must the family make for him if, as I believe, it has major responsibility in the matter?

Three sharply contrasting assumptions need consideration: (I) the more or less *socialistic* assumption that the individual character—and specifically the delinquent character—is socially created. On this assumption society is responsible and the family is absolved of responsibility for its delinquent members. In its most extreme form this assumption absolves even the individual of accountability for his conduct. (II) The *individualistic* assumption which holds the individual wholly accountable and relieves both society and the family of responsibility. And (III) the *familistic* assumption, which was at one time universally prevalent and still is in most oriental and primitive cultures, which holds the family accountable for the behavior of its members. The weight of the evidence indicates that responsibility for character formation is three-fold. During childhood, the responsibility for shaping character is primarily the family's; during youth, the social environment exerts the predominant influence; during maturity, the individual reflects mostly his own developed personality.

With expulsion, the family confesses its complete inability to discipline one of its members. But this does not justify it in throwing such an individual penniless, so to speak, upon society at large. The old emphasis upon punishment, which seemingly justifies disinheritance, would mean that the rest of the family profited by a situation for which it was itself in part responsible. What the situation probably calls for is (I) formal public notice of disavowal, and (II) the setting up of some sort of trust for the individual out of what would ordinarily have been his dotation. A rough and ready approximation of this is what we find in the "remittance man"—the ne'er-do-well banished from his family in England to a distant colony but kept from being a public charge by regular remittances from home.



IV. Dissolution of the family by the deliberate action of the individuals and sub-families who compose it—not dissolution of a marriage by divorce or by death of the husband or wife, but dissolution of the corporate entity created when a normal family is established—

may seem a strange idea to us but not to the people of a familistic civilization like China's. Yet nothing is more essential to the proper organization of the family than the right of complete dissolution if free and voluntary association between the individuals and sub-families of which it is composed is always to be maintained. Chinese law and the Chinese concept of family provides the right, though resort to it is considered a blemish upon the characters of those who break up their homestead. Norah Waln tells the story of how Chu Lu-mai, of the Family of Chu, came to live with the Family of Lin:*

"Tall and graceful as the willow," according to Norah Waln, "with skin soft as the petals of the golden peony, brows arched like the butterfly's spread wings, and temples as the cicada, she is gentle of manner and speech, unselfish in daily consideration for others, skilled in the needle and the table lute, quick at hedged-in chess, and gifted in cookery." In addition, "the inheritance money for Chu Lu-mai's living, dowry, and wedding celebration was sufficient to provide her more than any daughter of Lin who has married in my time. Yet the House of Lin did not propose marriage with either son to her."

Why? Why was not this prize among possible brides promptly betrothed to one of the marriageable sons of the Lin Family? Norah Waln answers the question by quoting a remark of Wei-Sung, the Elder of the Family of Lin:

"She is a charming, lovable girl, but she is of the House of Chu, and the House of Chu has dissolved twice in three hundred years."



Dissolution of a family differs from separation of an individual or sub-family from a family. With separation, the original group continues and those who leave do not draw from the family property more than their endowments, "conquests," or what they brought with them when they joined the family. But with dissolution the original group not only ceases to live together but all its property is distributed among the members. Dissolution presents to family management the problem of distributing the family possessions—real estate, farm equipment, household furnishings, family businesses, stocks, bonds, and money. It raises the whole question of property rights, a question which we dispose of today by implementing in every possible

*THE HOUSE OF EXILE, Norah Waln; Little, Brown and Co., 1933; pp. 111-112.

way the idea of individual ownership. In considering norms applicable to the rights of members in the family property, we shall at the same time be establishing norms applicable to this aspect of dissolution. The norm applicable to the human aspect of dissolution is similar to that applicable to compulsory severance—to divorce or to expulsion. Even without the evidence furnished by familistic civilizations, our own experience with divorce and with the settlement of the estates of the dead indicates very clearly that *dissolution of a family is normal only when the differences among its members are so deep seated and irreconcilable that continuance of association creates greater evils than complete discontinuance.*



One point in connection with composition needs emphasis. If the the family is to be normalized, membership must be made voluntary and every vestige of compulsion in membership abandoned. Though the normal family is a corporate entity, it is not a microcosmic political state. To the degree in which membership in it is compulsory, the same abnormality is introduced into its composition which exists in nations like Soviet Russia which deny to their citizens freedom to change their allegiance from one sovereignty to another. Every member of the family should be free to leave it and to transfer his membership to another. *This norm applies not only to adults but also to children.* The parents are not the proprietors of their children, custom and law to the contrary notwithstanding. Parents are *guardians*, children *wards*—wards who should be made to understand that they are free to leave their parents and to attach themselves to any other family which will have them. Not force but love must hold them. But this ideal, which is only realized in certain primitive cultures, requires the development of a pattern of living in which children are not only desired for their own sakes but in which children are economic assets, not burdens. There would then be many families to welcome a child running away from unloving parents or an unlovely home, and on the other hand, every family would in the very nature of things strive to make itself so attractive that it would hold its own.

The principle has universal application. Every member of the family, old and young, married or single, must be held not by force but by love. And every member must be free to end his membership,

(even when that involves obtaining a divorce), provided only that his obligations—to his children, if any, and to the rest of the family—are fulfilled by the terms of the separation settlement.

COMPOSITION creates problems in management *periodically* only. **PROPERTY AND INCOME** Members join or members leave a family not daily or weekly but only at intervals often many years apart. But the distribution of the family's income and property—the money which its members earn and the funds, goods and estate which constitute their possessions—creates a *continuous* problem in family management. Distributing its acquisitions among the members as they need them and whenever they are entitled to any of them, is a daily—and almost hourly—problem. It is a problem with which the group has to deal literally with every meal served even though it takes acute forms only in connection with the weekly pay-envelope and in death and divorce. The question which confronts us is whether education in this matter, (the matter of the laws and customs we have been taught to accept with regard to income and property), are normal or abnormal; whether they are in accord with what is human in mankind or whether they represent distortions which man has inflicted upon himself in order to industrialize, urbanize, socialize, and atomize living.

I. By income I mean not only *money income* but also *income in the form of the goods and services which families supply to their members*. That we tend to think of income only in terms of money—of wages, salaries, profits, interest, dividends—is due to the mis-education to which we have been subjected by all the institutions of our industrialized civilization. Right-education calls for re-education in this matter. The room and furniture assigned to each member of the family; the clothes furnished to those too young to buy their own; the meals which the members eat at home; the produce of the fields, orchards and gardens, and the milk, eggs, chickens and other foods produced on the homestead and supplied to each sub-family in the group, all represent real income to those who receive and consume them even though not “paid” to them as is the money which they may happen to “earn.” The fact that the distribution of this real income among the members of the family is nearly always according to need and that it does not present issues as trying as that of the distri-

bution of money earned, only makes it more important to make the members of the group conscious of its reality.

The norm for management in this matter is *distribution according to need* rather than *according to merit, work, or earnings*; distribution not equally but in accordance with differences in age and sex, in health and strength, in taste and talent. The needs of children and of adults, of married and single members, of a mere female and of a mother, of manual and professional workers, are different. In a properly managed family, each member would receive in money and in furnishings and facilities whatever each might need in order to develop his or her utmost potentialities and, incidentally, contribute maximally to the well-being and happiness of the entire group.



What each individual and sub-family receives regularly out of the total family income should not therefore be strictly proportional to what each may have contributed in work or brought into the family in current money earnings. But neither should it be proportional to their mere inclinations. *It should be proportional to their true needs.* And need, as here used, means not merely what is essential to sheer animal survival but to life as a normal human being in the circle in society to which the family belongs. This would, of course, include everything which they need because of urgency and emergency but not everything which they may wish, fancy, desire, or want. A member of the family may want diamond tiaras and Paris gowns; may want a steam yacht and the privilege of gambling at the races—or at Monte Carlo; may want not merely to study art or music but to do it in Rome or Paris; *but these are really wants not needs.* On the other hand, useful and beautiful clothes and furniture; efficient transportation; wholesome and enjoyable recreation; and education to the limit of the capacities and genius of the individual—even if that calls for residence in Paris—are legitimate needs, and should be provided *as far as the means of the group permit.*



A schematic tabulation of the weekly distribution of a family's cash income in accordance with these principles, will make their application clearer than any amount of discussion alone:

	NON-CASH EARNERS		CASH EARNERS		
	VERY YOUNG CHILD	HOUSE- WIFE	BOY CASH EARNER	ADULT WAGE EARNER	LARGE MONEY MAKER
Allowances to Each Member:					
For purely personal desires	\$.50	\$5.00	\$ 2.50	\$ 5.00	\$ 5.00
For working expenses			1.00	5.00	15.00
For social contributions	.50	5.00	2.50	5.00	40.00
To the Family:					
For maintenance, etc.			\$ 4.00	\$15.00	\$ 15.00
To family surplus				20.00	125.00
Weekly Cash Income:	None	None	\$10.00	\$50.00	\$200.00

In this table a *very young child* and a *housewife*, whose time is entirely given to homemaking and child-care, are used as typical of the *non-cash earners* in the family, and a *boy*, earning perhaps \$10 weekly in his first job; an *adult wage or salary earner*, bringing home \$50 weekly; and another *adult in business or practicing a profession*, earning \$200 a week, are selected as illustrative of family cash-earners. Proper management calls for the distribution of all cash earnings with regard to both personal and family needs and with consideration for both present and future members of the group. To disregard the common interest and to spend one's income without regard to future generations, as modern man increasingly tends to do, is to behave sub-humanly and abnormally.

The norm assumed here calls for three kinds of allowances to each member: (I) an allowance for purely personal spending—for ice cream, movies, tobacco, cosmetics, drinking, fixed with regard to the social and cultural circle to which the family belongs—in this case assumed to be 50 cents for children, \$2.50 for older boys and girls, and uniformly \$5.00 for adults regardless of their work or cash incomes; (II) an allowance for the actual expenses which each person incurs in holding down his job or carrying on his work—for car-fares, luncheons, work-clothing, tools, etc., and finally, (III) an allowance for contributions to public welfare—for such things as religious, charitable, political, and other institutional contributions and activities of his own choice, and for his further education and cultivation—for books, music, instruments, lectures, concerts, tools and apparatus. This last allowance, even without taking into account the natural desire to increase the family's means of providing more liberally for all its members, would furnish a more normal and humane incentive to increase individual earning power than the incentive upon which we rely today—sheer competition for “success” in accumulating money and in Veblen's expressive language, competition in “conspicuous consumption.”* The spending of this allowance by the individual, while it should be left entirely to the individual, else it would cease to be individual, should not however, as is the accepted practice today, be a matter of individual caprice. Every individual should be taught that human beings are more than bundles of personal desire; that they are members of society, and that among the keenest satisfactions which they can realize in life is self-expression in contributing to social welfare. It is to this that the individual should devote his surplus income rather than to “conspicuous waste”—to the support of movements and institutions in which he believes rather than to having “two chickens in the pot and

* c.f., Thorstein Veblen's THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS.

two cars in the garage."* If spent only upon himself or his own immediate household, it would tend to engender false pride in himself and in his wife and children, and envy in members of the group with smaller incomes. And if it created differential planes of living too great for the group, it would make inevitable the family's dissolution. Proper use of individual surplus earnings calls for expenditure upon the artistic, scientific, religious, charitable, and community and political interests of the individual; for homestead improvements which redound to the benefit of the whole group; for further education in craft and profession and cultivation of skill and good taste; and finally for bequest by the individual of what he may have saved not exclusively to his own wife and children but to the family itself or the community as a whole.

Finally the table assumes that every member of the family must make two contributions to his family either in work, as in the case of homemakers, or in cash in the case of those who earn money: (I) a "payment" as nearly as possible of the full cost of their "board and room"—of maintenance and the other functions furnished them, and (II) a contribution to the family surplus of what in the quaint language of medieval law were called their "conquests."† In the table it is assumed that the cost of maintenance for an adult is \$15, and that the *conquests* of each individual vary with what is earned or produced by him over and above payment for maintenance and allowance for personal needs. If the whole of the individual's earnings were claimed by the family, domination of the individual by the family develops. The feminist revolt against retention and control of money and property by husbands and fathers—as heads of the family—was a revolt against this abnormality. Furthermore, individual initiative and incentive to increase production and earnings would be chilled, as is the case in most old-fashioned Chinese families; it would certainly lessen the tendency to enterprise and progress which has developed in our highly competitive and non-familistic civilization. On the other hand, if each individual were to retain all his earnings, the difference in planes of living which would develop, would introduce a corrosive and destructive element into the group's life.



II. A distribution of family wealth, as distinguished from what we have been discussing up to this time—the regular distribution of the family's current income—still takes place in connection with certain climacteric family events in most Oriental and primitive cultures. And such a distribution of possessions specifically accumulated for the purpose should take place from time to time in every normal family both as (I) *endowments*‡ to its members and (II) *contributions* to

* This was the phrase which former President Herbert Hoover made famous in an address extolling American prosperity and the American way of life.

† c.f., the footnote on this subject on p. 510.

‡ The oldest meaning of *endow* is to furnish with a dower. Today it has come to mean to furnish with money or its equivalent as a permanent fund for support. There is no substantial difference between the dictionary definition of *endowment*, (*that which is bestowed or settled on a person or institution for support*), and the sense in which I am here using the word. The novelty lies only in refusing to restrict the concept to the endowment of institutions like hospitals and univer-

institutions and for activities in which every member believes. Whenever a member embarks on an independent career or venture entirely on his own; when a son or daughter is married; whenever a member resigns or is suspended and is to be absent for a long period of time; and whenever a member is divorced or expelled, he or she should be given the endowment to which each is entitled as a matter of right.* And whenever the family as a whole unanimously† agrees upon making a contribution to a charitable, political, educational, religious or other social movement or activity, a payment from this fund should be made.

The family's possessions which are thus distributed should not, of course, include either any part of the homestead or any of the equipment or funds essential to the fulfillment of its ordinary functions; the distribution should be made only from possessions over and above the unalienable "capital" of the group; from possessions saved and set aside for the purpose from (I) the surplus produce of the homestead or surplus products of its members; from (II) their outside *conquests*—from surplus cash earnings or profits of those working outside the home; from (III) the dowries which those who marry into the family bring with them; and from (IV) any funds or property turned over to the family by any relative or outsider joining the group. This reserve is therefore really a trust fund, the usufruct of which all enjoy but of which the family is merely the administrator.

sities, and my insistence upon the abnormality of both the extreme individualistic doctrine dealing with parental and family endowment of children, (which in effect is that human beings should be launched upon the world naked like animals—dowerless—with no start in the form of capital and home equipment), and the socialistic doctrine, (which shifts the problem of providing means for their support from the parents and the family to the state).

* The family as a whole has no right to deny this endowment to any member; each has moral and should have legal claim to it; for one reason, because the family surplus consists of wealth which he has helped to earn or to create, and for another, because in many instances it includes property which was originally his and which he entrusted to the family perhaps when first joining it. Good management by the group of this matter calls only for just determination of what is the correct amount to which the member is entitled, and how it is to be paid to him.

† Unanimity is essential to justice in this matter; it would constitute a violation of free and voluntary association if contributions were made *from the family surplus* to any institution for any purpose to which a member has conscientious objections—if funds in which he had an interest were donated, for instance, to a political party or to a religion in which he did not believe. Donations which individual members, or part only of the family, desire to make, should be made from their personal allowances for social contributions.

In the discussion which follows, it is important to bear in mind that two kinds of endowments are involved: (I) the *family endowment*—the homestead and other unalienable capital—set aside for the maintenance of the group, and (II) *individual endowments* bestowed upon the members for their support or contributed to institutions all wish to support.



What is the norm by which management of the family should be guided in making contributions from its surplus funds? As in so many of the questions which have arisen in the course of this study, I have unfortunately been unable to give adequate time to the evidence bearing upon this one. But tradition—as in the age-old doctrine of *tithing*‡—calls for ten per cent. That *some* contribution is normal, and the failure to make any at all, abnormal and inhuman, is perfectly obvious; no man and no family can live entirely to itself, and therefore none should be indifferent to the needs of the rest of society. Contributions for social purposes are recognitions of this principle. In the absence of scientific determination of what is normal, falling back upon the traditional ten per cent furnishes a better rule to observe than no rule at all.



The evidence indicates that the norm with regard to endowment should reverse the emphasis of the norm applicable to the distribution of current income among the resident members of the group; the norm is probably *endowment in accordance with justice* rather than *in accordance with need*. Every climacteric severance calls for a dotation of an equitable share of the family surplus; for the return of what the individual has contributed over and above the value of what was received in maintenance or otherwise; and for what he or she may have brought to the family in joining it.

If the individual who leaves is irresponsible, then the distribution may be made in installments or periodic remittances, or the whole

‡ Tithing, in British usage, calls for the contribution of a tenth part of the increase arising from the profits of land, stock, or personal industry, paid in kind or money, to the church for religious, charitable, or other public uses. The payment of tithes for such purposes was practiced by the Hebrews and other races in the remotest antiquity.

transferred to an independent trustee. But no matter what the character of the member or how bitter the circumstances leading to the separation, the family can only discharge its responsibilities to society by providing, as far as its means permit, a start in life for any member it formally turns loose by figuratively washing its hands of him.



There is now no concept which reflects expressly what I think of as the *right of endowment*—the right of the members of families to receive an endowment at a family severance such as marriage and divorce, and the obligation of families to transfer some of their property to them, without “consideration,” on such climacteric occasions. The nearest equivalent to this concept is found in *birthright**—a concept, however, which is restricted to possessions to which persons are entitled by birth and which does not, therefore, take into account the fact that those who are members of families by marriage or adoption are entitled and should possess rights essentially the same. Yet novel as the doctrine of endowment seems, it has been practiced by families from time immemorial. The obligation to make endowments and the right entitling individuals to them has always been one of the most important of human rights ever since the institution of private property was established. Among the various forms which they have taken are *property settlements, dower, dower rights, primogenitures, entails, and bequests.*

I. All *settlements of property* upon relations or for their benefit, are endowments. The *property settlements* made with children at the time they attain their legal majority; *marriage settlements* made, sometimes ante-nuptially and sometimes post-nuptially; and *divorce settlements*, are endowments made by families on special occasions.

II. The *dot* is a dotation made by the parents of a daughter upon the occasion of her marriage. It involves the transfer of property to

**Birthright*, insofar as it deals with familistic rights rather than aristocratic privileges, may be defined as the right of individuals to maintenance and to inheritance as a consequence of birth. These birthrights are generally governed by laws concerning (I) legitimacy and illegitimacy; (II) primogeniture or seniority of birth; (III) sex, (the rights of males being usually given priority over those of females); and (IV) rank or social station. The mere enumeration of these classes of laws, all of which assume the sole validity of the legal or natural family, is in effect an enumeration of the absurdities and inequities into which the implementation of both traditional and prevailing concepts of family has led mankind. Not birth but membership should be the basis of these rights.

the newly married couple with the reservation that it is to belong to the wife in the event of separation or of her husband's death. There is, however, no good reason for restricting marriage endowments to brides only. Both bride and groom should receive endowments from their families as both now receive wedding gifts from their relatives and friends. In practice no actual transfer of property by the groom's natal family is necessary if the marriage is patri-local, or by the bride's if it is matri-local. Only if the newly married couple establish or join an entirely new family unit is transfer of the endowments from both natal families necessary. Obviously if endowment were a universal accompaniment of marriage, every married couple would start life with a degree of security almost unknown today.

III. The exercise by a widow of what are called *dower rights*, upon the occasion of her husband's death, involves what is in effect endowment from whatever estate he may have left for his dependents. In common law, the dower right of the widow is one-third of the estate. This fixed percentage is the law's arbitrary way of recognizing the fact that wives are a factor both in the accumulation and the conservation of what the law considers "his" property partly because traditionally he is supposed to be the head of the family, partly because he is usually the principal money-earner. Dower rights, however, cannot be satisfied without division of the entire estate. This liquidation of estates in every generation, though highly profitable to surrogates, lawyers, real state men, and auctioneers, is, as we shall see, one of the most idiotically wasteful consequences of modern man's belief that progress requires repudiation of every institution which seems the least bit feudal. If a man's widow does not remarry but remains a member of his family, exercise of her dower right becomes superfluous; if she remarries or if she returns to her own natal family, then return of the dot she may have brought into the family at the time of her marriage plus her share of the family's surplus and the family's *conquests* and acquisitions during her membership in it, would represent a more equitable settlement of her rights than the arbitrary one-third which the law now prescribes.

IV. Both *primogeniture* and *entail* I think of as discriminatory endowments. *Primogeniture* discriminates in favor of the eldest son against all the other children; the eldest son alone inherits—and receives upon the death of his father—the family estate as his endow-

ment; the rest, only such "gifts" or endowments as the father settles upon them while still alive. *Entail* carries the idea of primogeniture one step further. It settles descent upon the heir specified so that neither the donee nor any subsequent heir can alienate or bequeath it, as for instance in entailing a manor to "A," "A's eldest son," and "each subsequent eldest son," *ad infinitum*. Primogeniture and entail are really aristocratic institutions, devised for the purpose of avoiding the dispersion of the estates of noble families. But the problem with which they deal is really familistic rather than aristocratic. Similar patrilineal customs prevailed in other levels of feudal society and still prevail in surviving familistic cultures. Not merely the manors of the nobility but the homesteads of peasants are bequeathed—and entailed—to eldest sons. Endowment of every member of the family from the family surplus, with the estate or "capital" of the whole group in effect entailed to the family as a whole, seems to me a much less arbitrary, and more humane and just—and therefore normal—solution of this problem.

The existing scheme of individual, as distinguished from family, ownership was adopted in this country to abolish entail and primogeniture—mainly in order to disperse wealth and particularly wealth in the form of large landed estates, but also in order to free the individual from thralldom to his family. In practice it has, as we shall see, created a monumental legal racket, and shifted individual bondage from the family to the state, substituting what is called *social security* for what might be called *familial security*. When the new dependence reaches its full flower, as it does in Socialistic and Communistic states—in what Belloc called *the servile state**—mankind will discover that all ownership has been concentrated in the state and every individual reduced to a state of serfdom.

V. Finally there are those forms of endowment which represent the custom as practiced today—endowments which might be called *bequests*, using the term in its oldest and broadest meaning with reference not only to the transference of property by will or testament but also to gifts or transfers in which delivery and title is passed at once. Endowments of this kind represent the implementation of the idea of individual, as distinguished from family, ownership of land and property. In America, in order to guard against the possi-

* c.f., Hillaire Belloc's *THE SERVILE STATE* and F. A. Hayek's *ROAD TO SERFDOM*.

bility of feudal concentration of land ownership, all our institutions have aimed at division and sub-division of family estates in each generation. As a result in most states we have not only subjected our homesteads—that part of the family property which I have called its “capital”—to a process of attrition and erosion generation by generation but we have succeeded in pulverizing and atomizing the family itself in the course of our progress.

The prevailing conception of the right of bequest is based upon two assumptions: the right of (I) *absolute personal ownership* of not only personal paraphernalia‡ but all other kinds of property—money and securities, goods and commodities, special privileges, real estate—and on the right of (II) *absolute personal disposition, including disposition by will or testament after the individual has died*. In this customary sense neither assumption is valid. Tested pragmatically, the doctrine of absolute personal ownership of land, for instance, has justified individual owners in exhausting the fertility of “their” soil or cutting all the timber in “their” forests, converting the produce into money, and spending the money in any way they wish. It justifies disregard of the fact that land is by its nature a trust inherited by each generation to be conserved and improved and enriched for posterity, and refusal to distinguish between property of which the individual is only entitled to enjoy the usufruct and that which he can consume and destroy. While the consequences of the doctrine that the individual can dispose of and bequeath all kinds of property at will—by whim and to favorites—tends not only to the malformation of the personality of the absolute individual owner but also to that of his relatives and intimates; they are tempted to cadge his favor in order to receive gifts from him or to be remembered in his will.

‡ In its original meaning *paraphernalia* referred to property other than dowries, marriage settlements, etc., which in Roman law and subsequently at common law, remained under the control of a married woman; did not pass under her husband's control during his life; and under the administration of his estate upon his decease before her. But in the sense in which I am using it, it refers not only to the prevailing concept of personal belongings such as dress and jewelry, but to many other things of the same essential character acquired by both men and women and which are intimately and personally theirs, as distinguished from both trusts and fungibles, which never acquire such characteristics. There is overwhelming evidence of the propriety of absolute personal ownership and bequest of not only dress and jewelry but books, musical instruments, manuscripts, paintings and other objects of art, personal as distinct from household furniture, personal shop tools and house utensils, pet animals like horses and dogs, etc. Savings out of personal allowances undoubtedly acquire similar attributes.

Only with regard to property like individual paraphernalia is the right of absolute personal bequest—if the property is not too great or too valuable—free of this malignancy.



In spite of the intensity with which modern man has been taught that progress requires the substitution of money-making and money-saving for home production and family ownership, it is a curious fact that, in the management of their incomes and property, an enormous number of modern husbands and wives approximate *corporate management* by resorting to what amounts to *partnership management*. Even among entirely urbanized native white Americans, there is a tendency in families in which both the husband and wife are employed to *joint* contribution to the family budget, *joint* savings and bank accounts, and *joint* title to the home. Upon marrying, many modern couples establish what amounts to a partnership—at least for the duration of their marriage—until divorce or the death of one of the two, results in the disappearance of what we still insist so mistakenly in calling a family rather than a marriage. The tendency toward normal management of income and property re-asserts itself in spite of the temptations and prescriptions of the institutions of our monetary and atomized civilization. Every tradition of old world joint family life may have vanished, (traces of which are still to be found in the immigrant families of America), but an approximation to it nevertheless emerges.

But partnership represents only a partial solution of the problem. It does not provide for endowment of the next generation, perhaps because the conditioning of our urban people is so largely one-generational. Modern urban folkways do not prescribe dotes nor do they call for the equipment of sons and daughters with starts in their married life; modern newlyweds get their start in married life by going into debt—by buying the furnishings of the home they rent from a department store on the installment plan. Neither do urban folkways prescribe home ownership; the really modern family does not therefore have to make any provision for succession to the family estate; there is no homestead to be transmitted to the rising generation.

Partnership is enormously superior to individual management and ownership by either husbands or by husbands and wives separately.

But at its best it still provides only for a relatively temporary alliance for the duration of marriage or the life of the husband or wife.



But among farming families, among home and business-owning middle class suburban families, and among wealthy families, the process of transferring property from one generation to the next is one of the most serious problems with which such families have to deal. Like death and taxes it cannot be evaded, obviously enough because it is a problem caused by death and aggravated by taxation.

The life-span of the average modern family is very short.* If we assume that it begins at marriage and ends with death or divorce, the problem of transferring the property owned by it and providing for the various claimants to it, usually presents itself several times rather than once in a lifetime. The frequency with which the problem presents itself in modern life is also increased by the mobility of the population. The more frequently the family moves its home, the more frequently its property—if any—is sold. The American family is not only migratory by reason of industrialization; it has a long tradition of migration to profit from the rise in the land values of its homes and farms. Farm property, as we have seen, changes hands on an average every fifteen years. And if it does not shift because the family has decided "to go further West," or to a place where pastures seem greener and opportunities greater, its ownership is virtually certain to be shifted by a death every 25 to 30 years.

Ownership of the homestead corporately by the family, instead of individually by husbands and wives, completely eliminates this problem. The wastes, legal and other financial costs, and heartbreaks and emotional strains of dissolving the family and breaking up the homestead are avoided. When father dies, the hurt is not intensified by sale and division of the family estate. The shorter the life-span of the family and the more frequent the movement of the family seat, the greater is the damage which the liquidation and monetization of homesteads inflicts upon the members of the group both emotionally and economically.

* C. J. Galpin, FARM TENANCY, University of Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 44; 1919.

One of the more inhuman consequences of the substitution of the idea of *monetary investment* for that of *homestead* in farming, is revealed by Galpin's study of the occupancy of 500 typically American mid-western farms during a period of ten years.† Almost 50% of the transfers of title during this period were rented farms occupied by tenants *who were relatives of the sellers*. Over 30% were sales of farms *by fathers to sons*. A more ghoulisn custom cannot well be imagined. Monetization of the farm by sale to a son not only means that the older generation profits, (through the rise in land values), at the expense of the rising generation but that fathers in effect profit from exploiting sons by retiring to the county seat, and if possible, by moving to Florida or Southern California. Every dictate of humanity cries aloud for a pattern of living in which transfer of family property is reduced to a minimum and is not made, as at present, an occasion for a commercial transaction patterned after the model furnished by the worst aspects of dog-eat-dog competitive society.

An excellent statement of the problem of providing for farm ownership succession was made in an article by John F. Timmons this past year.* Unfortunately—good as is his statement of the problem and his description of the various ways in which succession is actually effected in America—he made no clear recommendations as to what might be done to eliminate the evils involved.

All too frequently the death of the owner (of a farm) is followed by the disintegration of the farm as a going unit of production. The farm is sold to settle an estate, or the land is divided among heirs into uneconomic units, or the heir who buys out the others must mortgage the farm excessively, or life interests of various kinds arise to plague the continuity and stability of the ownership and operation of the farm.

Breaking up the farm as a going concern at the death of the owner is probably the most serious of these problems. All farm communities bear scars of sales made to settle estates. These dispersion sales destroy the going-concern value of prosperous, well-organized farms by scattering to the four winds the machinery, herds, and other forms of capital. The new operator must repeat the costly and inefficient process of re-assembling the necessary productive factors into a balanced farm organization. . . . Generally speaking, farm transfers within families should transfer economic farm organizations from one generation to the next with a minimum of problems. During this process the essential unity of the farm as a going concern should not be seriously disturbed. Ownership by the member of the younger generation should be obtained early in life while his enthusiasm is high

† c.f., footnote on the life-span of the modern family on p. 480.

* From a reprint of an article in the "Land Policy Review," Winter, 1946, in "Land and Home," Des Moines, Iowa, December, 1947.

and his physical vigor is strong. When owner-operatorship must be temporarily delayed and tenancy must be accepted as an intermediate stage, the conditions surrounding the tenancy should be as favorable as practicable to the welfare of the owner, to the security and living conditions of the tenant, and to the productivity of the farm. In the process of transfer, the younger generation of farmers should benefit from the experience and judgment of the old, yet the older generation should be fully protected during their declining years.

Perhaps the most important single objective of farm transfers within the family relates to the security of the parents. This is recognized by state laws of descent as well as in most wills drawn by or for farmers. According to state laws a widow may not be deprived of her dower interests in her deceased husband's lands. Most farm wills or other farm transfer arrangements provide for the parents' income and security during old age—together or as a survivor. Yet almost every farm community can furnish examples of parents who have impoverished themselves to give their children a start in farming. To the degree that their security is achieved, much mental as well as physical suffering by the parents may be avoided, and they can enjoy the independence they have earned and deserve.

Equitable treatment of the children is the second major objective in farm transfers within families. But unfortunately the concept of equality, so deeply ingrained in American culture, is frequently substituted for the principle of equitability. As a result, the children or other heirs are not rewarded in proportion to their contributions to the welfare of the farm and parents. Moreover, equality of division—not equitability—guides our laws of descent. Even farm owners are reluctant to will or otherwise transfer property to their children on any basis except equal division for fear of creating ill will or jealousy among the heirs.

Mr. Timmons does not discuss the searing financial burden which the present system of succession by bequest imposes upon farm families, nor does he make any reference to the manner in which it is impoverishing the rural districts and enriching the cities of the nation. Farmers usually have three or four children. One son only tends to remain on the farm, and, when old enough, enters into either a tenancy or partnership arrangement with his father; the rest leave the farm and make their homes in cities. At the father's death, if this son desires to continue to operate the farm, he has to buy out not only his brothers and sisters but also the dower rights of his mother. Almost invariably the farm is then burdened with a heavy mortgage which calls for payments of both principal and interest for many years. The aggregate interest payments thus sent to the city may fully equal the aggregate principal, thus doubling the amount of wealth which has to be exported to the city. Furthermore, as farm land rises in value, the tribute levied by each succeeding generation of city heirs becomes greater.

If we assume that land values only double in the course of a century, then the existing system of allodial land tenure and of succession

by bequest, has been transferring the value of all our farm property to the city four or five times a century.

This draft of rural wealth by migrants from farms to cities, even after allowing for all possible back currents, was of the magnitude of *two to two-and-a-half billion dollars per year between 1920 and 1930, and about two-and-two-thirds to three-and-three-quarter billion dollars yearly between 1930 and 1940*, according to O. E. Baker. In a period of thirty years—the span of one generation—this transfer of wealth from the country to the city is equal almost to the total value of all the farm property in the nation. Every generation of farmers, in other words, has to ship the total capital value of its farm property in the form of produce to cities merely to settle farm estates, and nothing has to be shipped to the country in return for this. No wonder cities grow and prosper while the country becomes poorer and poorer!



Baker calls attention to the significant part which the maintenance of the integrity of the family can play in avoiding rural impoverishment:†

In 1934 I attended a conference of agricultural economists in Germany, and for a week before and a week after the conference the German hosts arranged for a few members of the conference to visit about 100 German farms, mostly "Bauern" or peasant farms. My idea of the European peasant and his farm was greatly changed by this visit. I found the farmer, or "Bauer," a man proud of his ancestors, proud to be a farmer, and one who generally possessed a sense of superiority over city people. Although in many instances the house was built by the farmer's father or grandfather or great-grandfather, it was built of brick, had a tile roof, the hall and kitchen floor were generally also of tile, and nearly every house had electric light. The typical bauer farm is 40 to 100 acres in size, but it produces as much as a 100- to 200-acre farm in most of the United States. The barns are generally much better built than in our country, and frequently the floor that is over the stable and under the hay mow is made of steel I-beams with brick arches.

At each farm the visitors were provided with a page or two of mimeographed information about the farm. Most of the mimeographed sheet told of the acreage of the crops, yield per acre, fertilizer used, crop rotations, number of horses, total cattle, milk cows, swine, chicken, etc., but always at the top of the page for those farms which could claim the honor, and many of them could, was a statement somewhat as follows: "This farm has been in the family 200 years." Some farms had been in the family for 400 years, some 500 years. One farm had been in the family since the eleventh century. As we considered what had happened during these centuries, wars, economic crises, periods of inflation and deflation,

† pp. 167-169, *AGRICULTURE IN MODERN LIFE*, O. E. Baker, Ralph Borsodi, and M. L. Wilson; Harper & Brothers, 1939.

political revolutions, the thought came to us, How long ago would this family have lost its wealth had it been invested in anything else than land?

This concept of the farm as the hereditary home of the family has profound consequences. We saw practically no soil erosion in Germany, except in the vineyards on the steep slopes of the Rhine Valley. This absence of erosion is partly owing to the cool summer climate, with few torrential rains, partly to the crops grown, but partly also, and perhaps primarily, to the conviction that the land is the foundation of the family, the heritage from the past to be handed on to the next generation undiminished in fertility, and, if possible, with its productivity increased. One could sense among the German farmers the feeling that a man who lets his land erode away was not only dishonoring his ancestors but also depriving his sons of their proper heritage. The German farmer is keeping faith with the past and with the future. He is conserving both the natural and the human resources. He has a philosophy of life which one wishes were more common in the United States today. . . .

There will not be, I fear, widespread and permanent improvement in the utilization of farm land in the United States until more farmers pass the farm on to their sons. It has been difficult enough in the past for a young man to climb the ladder from hired man to tenant to owner of a farm, and it may be more difficult in the future

The German farmer, when old age draws nigh, does not retire to the county seat, as many farmers in our corn and dairy belts did before the depression, and build a house that represents the savings of a lifetime, renting the farm to a tenant. Instead the "Vater" and "Mutter" retire to a portion of the farm house, which is usually much larger and better built than most farmhouses in our Corn Belt, and a partnership contract is entered into with the son, who, with his family, occupies the remainder of the house. Sometimes a new house is built for the old folks or for the son. This son, who later inherits the farm, does not spend most of his life, nor does his wife, digging and delving and saving to pay off the mortgage on the farm; but in much of Germany he starts without debt, in a house that is usually built of brick, with a tile roof, and his savings are in turn used to improve the farm and educate the children. The money that the German farmer makes in good times is mostly plowed back into the land, so to speak; a new house or barn is built, or a piece of land drained, or better stock bought. *Each generation climbs from the shoulders of the preceding generation, and wealth and culture accumulate, instead of being dissipated by migration to the cities.*



III. EQUIPMENT

IF THE family is to justify its continuance; if it is to fulfill the functions which make necessary its reformation and normalization, then it must possess all the equipment necessary to enable it to do so. A family living in a city apartment—no matter how modern—which possesses not much more in the way of equipment than some clothing; not much more in the way of housefurnishings than the things needed to open cans

and bottles and to heat and serve their contents; nothing more in the way of furniture than a radio and the pieces needed for living rooms and bed rooms; and nothing more in the way of machinery than an automobile, is not equipped to fulfill the purposes which justify its existence. Not even the substitution of a typical suburban home for a city apartment, normalizes the equipment of such a family. The modern family, no matter how completely equipped, is equipped only to live in accordance with the fashions of the moment, which means *that it is equipped only to consume things and to do those things which the masses of people must do if the industrial machine upon which it depends for its income is to be kept running.*

Our concern, however, is not with industrialism but with living; our concern is not with the things which people should buy in order that our industries prosper, but *the equipment which they should possess in order that they may live like normal human beings.*

INTANGIBLE VS. TANGIBLE EQUIPMENT

IT IS necessary to make clear that in confining this discussion to tangible physical equipment, I am not underestimating the importance of intangible family equipment such as a family name, a family code and tradition, family love, and family managerial "know-how." With one exception, most of these intangibles have already been considered; here I propose to try at least to refer to the most important physical facilities without which the intangibles become sterile and meaningless. The one exception to which I have referred is the family's equipment for communal and social life—its citizenship in the community and its membership in social clubs, (Y's, fraternities, women's clubs, sport clubs, etc.), churches, political parties, labor unions, business and professional clubs, musical, dramatic and literary societies, and museums, libraries, and schools. Since this "equipment" is identical with the equipment of communities with the institutions necessary to normal social life, it will be discussed in connection with that of the normal community.

THE FACT that most families today are being taught, and most of them are already equipped, with things which no normal family should possess, makes it necessary to begin consideration of what they *should possess* with consideration of what they *should not*—with the consideration of *divestment* rather than *equipment*. The English language, unfortunately, has no precise antonym for equipment. Ruskin ran into substantially the same difficulty, and solved it by distinguishing between *illth* and *wealth*.

Though there are many of these divestments, two only—leases and debts—must be mentioned.

Leases. Using the word *lease* broadly—with reference to every contract into which people enter for the renting of a dwelling of any kind—the renting of a room, with or without board; an apartment; a farm; a house, (city, suburban, or country)—*no family can function normally and equip itself for normal living if it is handicapped with a leased home.* For the minority of individuals and of members of families who are *dependents* either by temperament and conditioning or by hereditary taint, renting from—and so associating themselves with—a normal family may be the most humane solution for their unfortunate condition. For normal individuals and families, temporary rental of a home while trying to climb up the ladder to independent ownership, is one thing, but as a permanent solution of the problem of maintaining a home, it is anomalous and abnormal. The emphasis here is upon the leasing of a home, not the leasing of land in a community or state with a rational system of land tenure.

Debts. Credit and debt are different names which we apply to the same thing. *Credit* is simply the name we give to *that which a lender extends to a borrower*; and *debt* the name we give to *that with which a borrower encumbers—or equips—himself in promising to return or pay for what he has borrowed.* When we consider lending and borrowing from the standpoint of lenders; when we consider the conditions under which it becomes profitable for stores to extend credit to their customers, banks to make loans, or investors to buy bonds and lend their savings to corporations or to the government, we are considering the subject of credit. *When we consider the same thing* from the standpoint of borrowers—from the standpoint of a customer of a store who is purchasing furniture for his

home on the installment plan; an automobile buyer planning to pay for it "on time;" a family contemplating the purchase of a home or farm and encumbering it with a purchase-money mortgage; or of a farmer who is planning to buy more land, to put in a large cash crop of corn, or to feed a lot of hogs in order to make money, we are considering the propriety of going into debt.

Debt is a powerful and almost magical instrument for profit and for the realization of dreams in the hands of those who know how to use it; a dangerous and destructive force for those who do not. Capitalism, which was the ideology of the founders and builders of these United States, is essentially an ideology of property; Finance Capitalism, with which it has been replaced without the leaders and teachers of America having taught the people to distinguish between the two, is an ideology of infinite debt. As a result, debt has been more used—and abused—in the United States than anywhere else in the world. Most of what is today taught about debt in our homes, in our schools, and by the advertising and salesmanship of retailers, of manufacturers, of contractors and real estate men, of financiers and investment bankers, is completely false. Millions of American families therefore accept as normal the fact that they are hopelessly enmeshed in the toils of what is called *consumer credit*§ and equally large numbers of American homes accept the burden of mortgages—and principal and interest payments—which they may spend their whole lives trying to pay off.†

§ At the end of 1947, *consumer credit*—including that for furniture, household appliances, jewelry and all other merchandise sold by department stores, mail order houses, and other kinds of stores; for automobiles; and for repairs and modernization of houses by retailers, automobile finance companies, commercial banks, small loan companies, industrial banks and loan companies, credit unions, and other finance companies, was \$13,368,000,000. This is an average of about \$382 per family. But if the millions of debt-free families which have not yet succumbed to the lure of *consumer credit* were excluded, the burden on the others might well average twice as much. This, of course, does not include mortgages on homes and farms, and other kinds of debts and divestments. Source: "Federal Reserve Bulletin," February, 1948; p. 228.

† It should not be forgotten that owned homes in the United States include both those owned free and clear, and those mortgaged, in which family security is often illusory, in which *interest* takes the place of *rent* and a *usurious institution* plays the part of the *landlord*. And mortgaging is taught not only as proper as a means of acquiring a home—which is certainly necessary and justifiable in order to normalize a proletarianized society in which most people are born propertyless and endowmentless—but for other unjustifiable reasons. Mortgaging is being encouraged to help real estate speculators sub-divide land and sell building lots;

There is a legitimate place for debt in the operations—and the equipment—of the family *prior to the time it accumulates the surplus with which every family should be equipped*. That place is in financing (I) the acquisition of a homestead, (II) investments in labor-saving (and money-making) tools, machinery and supplies, and (III) providing for those needs which credit unions call *provident*.^{*} Once, however, the family has normalized itself by saving and accumulating its surplus, *the family should also normalize its equipment by divesting itself of all debts*. With regard to this, note should be taken of the fact that it does exclude the taking of risks, risk in life and in carrying out or conducting any project or enterprise being natural and inescapable. But it does exclude speculation because speculation, as I use the term, refers only to undertakings which are neither productive nor provident and which violate, as we shall see, rule two with regard to going into debt—*they are never reasonably certain to make it possible to repay any debt contracted for them*. Families ought not to speculate at all. If an individual does, he ought

to stimulate the building industry; to help manufacturers of the latest and most modern kinds of home luxuries even when it involves sacrificing the enjoyment of security to the enjoyment of the latest in gadgetry.

If we take all owned homes, both rural and urban, approximately 45.3% were mortgaged in 1940; 54.7% were owned free and clear. This is not a perfect showing, but there is something to be grateful for in the fact that over half the families in the United States still pay no tribute either in the form of rent or usury. This means that *approximately 56.4% of all families have leases and pay rent; 19.7% have mortgages and pay interest, and only 23.9% have neither form of divestment*. The showing is much worse with urban families and much better with rural families, than in the average for both. In this respect, as in so many others, the modern urban family is the farthest away from independence and the normal. Source: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1944-45; p. 922.

^{*} The concept of *provident*, as developed in the credit union movement, goes far beyond that of *productive*. A debt contracted for productive purposes is a debt the proceeds of which are used not only to produce something useful but also to produce a margin of value above its cost sufficient to enable the borrower to repay principal and pay interest charges. *Provident*, on the other hand, is interpreted to mean a loan for almost any purpose of real benefit to the borrower—as Bergengren puts it, the loan “must not help a man to do himself what will ultimately be an injury.” To quote him further, (p. 153, CUNA EMERGES, Roy F. Bergengren, Credit Union National Association, Madison, Wisc., 1939), “If the thing an applicant (for a loan) wants is a good thing for him to buy and if his other obligations, his job and his prospects for holding on to it warrant going into debt for this thing, in about 99 cases out of 100, the cash price of the thing plus the cost of the credit union credit will be substantially less than the ultimate installment price of the same thing.” Then he adds this significant statement: “It is the credit union’s job to make cash buyers of things out of its members.” He ought to have added, that it is also its job to help free them from the necessity of even going into debt to the credit union.

to speculate, as he ought to gamble, not with borrowed money but with his own, and then only with money which he can cheerfully afford to lose.

If we consider a *productive or provident purpose* to be rule one with regard to debts, then there are at least four more which experience indicates all families should observe. The second is, *the family must be reasonably certain that it can repay the debt, and pay any interest called for, when it becomes due*. Most non-productive debts and all debts contracted improvidently—by families without any savings or staggering under installments—violate this rule. If a family nevertheless has a real need but is not able, or reasonably certain, that it will be able to pay a debt contracted for it when the debt becomes due, then it should not seek a loan; what it should seek is a gift; what it needs is not credit but charity. The third rule is, *the period for which its debts should run should never exceed the life of the undertakings—or the productive life of the things—for which the debts are contracted*. The fourth is, *the day of the week, month, or season of the year fixed for payment of interest and principal on debts should be those when it is most likely the family will be able to meet them*. The fifth and last is, *long-term debts, (or debts contracted for something like a house or automobile which depreciates in value), should always provide for installment payments, and always at a rate more rapid than the rate of depreciation*.

IF now we turn to the equipment which the family should possess to enable its members to live individually and as a group like normal human beings, the evidence indicates that it should include:*

EQUIPMENT

A shrine and sanctuary. The sanctuary may be *outdoors*—a sylvan spot, an elegiac grove, or *indoors*—a chapel; the shrine, anything from a hearth-side to a nook containing a crucifix, the tablets of the family's ancestors, a funerary urn, a madonna, or some similarly evocative object of art—perhaps nothing more than a beautiful vase regularly filled with flowers. But to fulfill its purposes it must be possible

* The items listed are not numbered because numbering them would tend to suggest an order of importance. The brain is not a more important part of the equipment of the body than the heart; both are equally essential to normal life. The eyes—if we must choose among organs of the body—may be more important than the limbs, but both are essential if the individual is to be whole and to live in a truly normal manner.

for family groups to gather about it at weddings, funerals, christenings; it must be a place of retreat; it must be visible, or at least tangible enough to serve as a reminder of the eternal and ultimate values in life, and if not embodied in a sacred icon of some sort, it must do for the group what icons do. It must, therefore, successfully symbolize what the family and its members are indebted to in their ancestry and what they owe to posterity. For the religious family, it will be, of course, evocative of worship and prayer; for the non-religious, of thanksgiving, of consolation, of right endeavor, of recognition, if not of articulate expression, of the wonder of life.†

Fields, woods, and gardens. In order to surround itself with growing things, the equipment of every family must include fields, woods, and gardens. For woods, it may have to turn to local parks or state forests, and for pastures to cooperation with neighbors, but gardens every family can and should possess—not only, however, a kitchen garden with some fruit trees but also a flower garden, a grassy sward, and at least a clump of shade trees.

Animals. Just as every family must surround itself with growing things, so it must equip itself with living things. In its broadest sense the norm calling for association with *living things* includes human beings—human beings of all ages. But in the specific sense of equipment, it means livestock and pets—chickens and ducks, cows and goats, sheep, swine, horses, rabbits, dogs, cats, etc. The justification, in the case of livestock, is most obviously economic. But animal husbandry and the care of pet animals is also essential—like association with children and the aged—to the normal emotional development of personality. Love for instance, cannot be properly instilled unless it is lavished upon both humans and animals. In addition, animals also furnish a natural method of introducing children to the meaning of sex and to the phenomena of birth and death. In sum, the family must equip itself with a variety of animals if it is to fulfill its educational functions properly.

Wells and waters. The evidence indicates that in most regions of the nation, the most economical way in which the family can supply

† Some of these items of equipment should be for the use of the group as a whole—as for instance swimming pools or picnic and playgrounds; in the case of others—kitchens, for instance—one is needed for each household; still others—like beloved objects of art and, of course, treasured books—should be a part of every individual's room.

itself with water is with an individually owned well and modern pumping system.[§] But every family should not only have an adequate water supply; every homestead should be located on either a stream, lake, or sea shore, or, if none of these are available in an otherwise desirable region, create its own fish pond, swimming pool, or at the very least, its own tiny lily pool.

Music and musical instruments. A family without a collection of music and without musical instruments of more than one kind—perhaps even an instrument for every member of the family—is a family which tends to eliminate song, dance and rhythm from its daily life. Yet nothing is more necessary to normal living. The radio and phonograph should, no doubt, be a part of the equipment of the family, but these furnish only vicarious music, and good taste in choosing what to listen to on them can best be cultivated by musical self-expression in song, on instruments, and with dancing and drama.

Games. The family should be well equipped with games—both for parlor and outdoor play—with chess and checker sets, with cards and with pool and billiard tables, with croquet sets, swimming pools, swings and hammocks, fishing tackle, guns, canoes and boats, skates and skis.

Books. Every family should have the books essential to a minimal library—a good dictionary and encyclopedia, the plays of Shakespeare, and other classics. It should subscribe to certain magazines—magazines on current events, on country and farm life, on the arts and crafts. And these books and magazines should include poetry and fiction so as to realize not only the cultural but also the recreational possibilities of literature and contemporary writing and journalism.

Objects of art. As homes increasingly strip themselves of paintings and statuary and of the objects of art produced not only by artists but also by weavers, potters, woodcarvers and other craftsmen, and replace them with factory-made products, appreciation of the arts and crafts becomes more and more pretentious and affected, and less and less genuine. Only great national works of art belong in mu-

[§] Table 5, Research Bulletin No. 3, School of Living, Suffern, N. Y. At a time when the total cost of maintaining and operating a private water supply system consisting of a well and automatic electric pump, was \$34.89 per family per year, the cost in cities of 30,000 to 50,000 was \$85.10; in cities of 50,000 to 100,000, \$66.99; in cities of 100,000 to 300,000 \$66.45; in cities of 300,000 to 500,000, \$83.36; in cities of over 500,000, \$95.32.

seums; mostly art should exert its influence daily in the home itself.

Shops and studios. The corollary of equipment with objects of art is equipment with the shops and studios in which members of the family themselves create beautiful—and useful—things. Taste cannot be divorced from skill without becoming sterile and decadent. Drawing and painting equipment, looms and sewing machines, kilns and potters' wheels, woodworking and metal-working shops, leather working tools, cameras and dark rooms, are essential if the members of a family are to develop their artistic and creative potentialities. It is difficult to say at what point studios become shops, and shops studios. The kitchen is undoubtedly both shop and studio; so are probably most work shops; the laundry and the barn, shops and nothing more.

Machinery and tools. There are two kinds of machinery and tools: (I) domestic, and (II) commercial.* The first consists of machinery and tools used in the home *to produce what the family itself consumes*; the second, tools and machinery used in shops and factories *to produce goods and services for sale*. A kitchen mixer, used by a housewife to mix a batch of dough, is a *domestic machine*; the giant mixer used in a commercial bakery, a *commercial machine*. Generation after generation the family has been stripping itself of domestic machinery—the use of which long antedated the power age—as it has gradually transformed the home from an institution for *both* production and consumption into an instrument existing *solely* for the purpose of consumption. In spite of the fact that it represents a flat contradiction of what is today taught about the efficiency of the division of labor, of the factory system, and of mass-production, small-scale domestic machinery enables the average man and woman to earn more per hour in home production than commercial machinery makes it possible for them to earn in commercial or industrial employment.†

* A full discussion of the great significance of this distinction will be found in the author's book, *THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1929. cf., Chapter II, "Machines," pp. 7-17, and Chapter XVII, "The Factors in the Quest of Comfort," pp. 366-376.

† The subject is discussed briefly in Chapter VII, Part II, "Industrialization: The Centralization of Production," pp. 204-220. The following Research Bulletins of the School of Living, contain detailed and conclusive evidence bearing on this question in certain specific industries: No. 4, "How to Economize on Laundry;" No. 5, "A Manual on Baking at Home;" No. 6, "A Manual on Milling at Home;"

But even if it were not justifiable in strictly economic terms, as the evidence clearly establishes, the average family should still equip itself with sewing machines, agricultural implements, washing and ironing machines, tractors, kitchen mixers, flour mills, dehydrators, refrigerators, shop tools and machinery including power saws, drills, etc., because this equipment is essential to assure the freedom and independence of its members, to secure them against unemployment, (by furnishing them opportunities for self-employment in the home), and to make possible participation in productive and creative work.

It is true that the modern home has not stripped itself of *all* kinds of domestic machinery. For there are not one but two kinds of domestic machinery: (I) *productive and creative*, and (II) *recreational and recuperative*. It is the first kind of which the modern home has almost completely stripped itself. Modern families increasingly equip themselves with the latest models of the second kind. Few modern homes contain churns, which are *productive domestic machines*; most modern families own automobiles which—as used by most of them—are *domestic recreational machines*. Most machines of this kind—like the phonograph and the radio—are really mechanical toys; they hardly deserve the dignity conferred upon them by calling them machines. The fully equipped home will not only have its complement of recreational equipment; it will also have a full complement of productive and creative tools and machines.

Storage facilities. Nothing is more essential to the independence and self-sufficiency of the family than adequate and efficient storage facilities—refrigerators and freezers to furnish *cold storage*; root cellars to furnish *cool storage*, and to furnish *dry storage*, pantries and closets in the house, storage space in the work shops, and bins, cribs, and barns outside. Good storage facilities are time and labor savers—they eliminate frequent shopping; they are food-savers—they avoid wastage and spoilage; they are health-savers—they prevent contamination; they are money-savers—they make it possible to buy in larger quantities. But they have positive virtues which should not be overlooked—the full and over-flowing pantry makes hospitality a

No. 10, "A Manual on Home Canning and Preserving," No. 12, "A Manual on Butter, Cheese, and Ice Cream Manufacture." See also the discussion of this subject in THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION; Chapter III, "Efficiency," pp. 18-49; and Chapter XIV, "Food, Clothing, and Shelter," pp. 296-309.

pleasure rather than a burden; the well-stocked larder and barn and the full coal bin secures the family against hunger and cold; the production and processing of the food to be stored creates opportunities for home employment.

Current supplies. Storage is meaningless without supplies to store in them. But in saying that every family should be well equipped with current supplies, the concept of *supplies* should not be restricted to food. The advantages which have been enumerated as growing out of the possession of ample storage can only be realized to the fullest extent if, in addition to food-stuffs, every family has ample supplies of fuel—wood, charcoal, coal, oil; of textiles—domestics and linens, bedding, fabrics, and clothing; of odds and ends of repairs and spare parts for the water, lighting, heating, plumbing, and transportation systems upon which the family relies—fuses, bulbs, etc., nuts and screws, nails and other hardware items, and even a few boards and sticks of timber.

A family surplus or reserve. Old fashioned thrift† may be out of date today, but an enormous number of individuals and families still save money, deposit it in banks, invest it in life insurance, and speculate with it in the securities which they have been taught to substitute for the building up of tangible and real estates. But this saving is almost exclusively for protection against the proverbial rainy day or to buy something upon which advertising and salesmanship has persuaded people to set their heart's desire. Yet every family should not only possess a reserve for contingencies, it should accumulate a surplus for family—as distinct from individual—contributions to charity and to social causes, and for the endowments which it should make to its members on climacteric occasions in their lives.

But this surplus should not consist exclusively of money. As far as possible, it should be invested in working capital—in supplies, livestock, house, farm and shop equipment—the usufruct of which the whole family can enjoy and the care of which creates “jobs” which free the members from the hazard of unemployment. Part of this surplus should, undoubtedly consist of money deposits in savings

† *Thrift* originally referred to thriving—to a condition produced by good husbandry and efficient management and not the exercise of mere frugality. The honey bee became the symbol of thrift not only because it saved but even more because of the efficiency and industry with which it worked.

banks or invested in credit unions and other co-operative societies organized and controlled by those who patronize them or, until the community organizes them, in mortgages, bonds, and "gilt edge" securities. And part of it should be invested in life insurance.

Life insurance, however, should merely supplement the fund itself. In a sense, life insurance is nothing but a modern substitute for the real estate which used to secure the dependents of a person against the hazard of his death.* The most economical form in which to provide this supplement is with group insurance covering every member of the family. Until the family has accumulated a substantial surplus, the amount of life insurance carried should be large enough to take care of all the usual contingencies created by death—particularly the contingency created by the meanest of all forms of modern taxation: *inheritance taxation*; thereafter the amount carried can be reduced to no more than may be needed to take care of the actual expenses of death. In addition, as long as a purchase-money mortgage† remains upon the homestead which a newly organized family has acquired, it should carry mortgage or reducing term insurance upon the lives of its breadwinners and important workers. When the surplus becomes large enough, the family can almost entirely eliminate this drain upon its income and, so to speak, carry its own insurance.

Transportation. Efficient facilities for transportation—of goods and commodities as well as persons—are essential if the family is not to revert to a relatively spartan and uncivilized plane of living. If its members are to *participate in social and civic activities*—go to political meetings and take part in elections; attend festivals, holiday celebrations, parties and dances, and weddings, birthdays and funerals—which call together people often living considerable distances apart; if they are to have ready *access to institutions* like schools, hospitals, libraries, churches, and theatres, all of which ought to be centrally located; if they are to *obtain goods* from grocery, drygoods, drug, hardware, jewelry, and other stores, and *services* from produce markets, banks, physicians, lawyers, dentists, and printers, who must

* In addition to the group insurance which should cover each individual for the benefit of this family fund, each member of the family with special responsibilities should carry individual term insurance sufficient to take care of them.

† A *purchase-money mortgage* is a mortgage placed by a buyer upon the real estate purchased by him as a part of his payment for it.

necessarily serve many people, then they must have faster and more efficient means of transportation than their own legs.

There are two distinct types of transportation which they can use. One is that furnished by busses, street cars, and railroads, which I think of as *mass-transportation*; the other is that furnished by horses, carriages and wagons, automobiles and trucks, which I think of as *individual transportation*. The objection to sole reliance upon the first, and the argument justifying individual and family ownership of such equipment as an automobile, grows out of the fact that mass-transportation requires the home to be established close to bus-lines, railroads, and main streets and highways; it virtually precludes living in areas and on roads which cannot furnish sufficient traffic to support them; it compels dwelling in densely populated areas where land values are high and where the disadvantages of congestion make themselves felt. If the family is to live on the land and yet avoid isolation, it must own its own means of transport. For the countryman, the automobile—or some equivalent to it—is essential to normal living. For the city dweller, it is merely an expensive means of escaping from urban boredom—temporarily—and then of being carried back to it.

Dwellings. The evidence indicates that every normally organized family is properly equipped only if it possesses *dwellings* rather than, as is the case with the modern family, a *dwelling*. A normally composed family must provide for each of its sub-families—for the households of younger and older generations and both full and associate members. It must equip itself with more than one house if it is to avoid reverting to the primitive pattern of living we find in those cultures in which joint families prevail and in which a whole clan lives in one "long house." Some provision, it is true, is made even in the long house for the privacy of each sub-group, but if adequate provision is to be made in the architecture of our dwellings for the fullest development of personality, our folkways and standard of living must call for dwellings which provide fully for both group life and for privacy.

Our architects, who ought to furnish leadership in this matter, do not even recognize the existence of the problem. Modern architects grapple with the construction of dwellings only when retained by the rich—who can afford to employ them to build *mansions* rather

than dwellings—or in connection with the construction of those monstrosities of metropolitan life, *multiple-dwellings*, in which strange and unrelated families are housed, either for the sake of the private profit of contractors, landlords and real estate speculators, or to concentrate in one area the large numbers of hands and workers needed by centralized industry and big or socialized business. With an irresponsibility which violates the essence of the idea of *profession*, architects today ignore the fact that while the construction of the buildings in which people live reflects prevailing ideals it also, because of the permanence of “sticks and stones,” predetermines the pattern of living of future generations. It may be true that the pantry-less apartment reflects the habits and desires of families who buy the food they eat daily in packages, cans, and bottles; but once a city is composed of such dwellings it becomes impossible for any family to buy in bulk or to store what it may want to grow or to can and process itself.

The genius of familistic civilizations such as Hindu and Chinese, Moorish and Spanish, Mexican and Latin-American, is reflected in their solution of this problem, in the *family compound*, in which each sub-family in the group has its separate dwelling-place, and yet all are united. The genius of our industrial civilization—with its atomization of individual and family life—is reflected not only in the *apartment house*; in the multiple residential building, but also in its acceptance of what follows, the idea of the rented home and of families unequipped with permanent dwellings of any kind.

Land. It is perfectly obvious that it is impossible for any family to equip itself with most of these essentials of normal living without possession of an adequate area of land. It is true that in a city apartment a family may have a number of potted plants, or even a few window boxes. If these—and public parks—are accepted as adequate fulfillment of the specification of equipment with fields, forests and gardens, then land may not be necessary to provide association with *growing things*. But how the landless family is to equip itself for animal husbandry—to provide association with *living things*—I do not know, particularly when most cities, even very small ones, prohibit the possession of cows, chickens, pigs and other livestock for allegedly hygienic reasons. A normal family which already possesses a properly equipped homestead may also have a city apartment to be used during “the season” and when any of its members have to

stay overnight in the city, but such an apartment is really nothing but a convenient dormitory; it should not be confounded with the family's home.

While land is essential, the range within which the area may vary is very great. The Chinese and Japanese, for instance, with their intensive agriculture and miniature gardens, have shown that very small areas and compounds make it possible to fulfill all the requirements for land. If cities are to be planned so as to provide the minimum amount of land needed for each family, some such concept as Frank Lloyd Wright's "Broadacre City"* will have to take the place of the ideas upon which modern architects and city planners have been concentrating.

Area is, however, affected not only by the degree to which acculturation trains people in the intensive use of land, but also by the characteristics of the regions in which people establish their homes. In grazing, forest and mountain regions, the area will naturally have to be larger than in fertile valleys, where richness of soil makes small areas equal to much larger areas of less fertile land; or than on the shores of the sea, where the sea itself provides a species of common "land" for the "cultivation" of all families. Minimum rather than maximum area is the genuinely human norm, and intensive rather than extensive cultivation. The savings and profits of the family must not therefore be used—as they are with modern farm families—to add to the area of land it owns and to increase its income by giant farming or by renting land to the landless, but instead used to increase the fertility of the land and improve it with better housing, livestock, orchards, etc.; and into raising its plane of living by equipping itself not only with better facilities for production but also with better facilities for the cultivation of the arts and amenities of civilized life.

WHAT this discussion of the equipment of the family has incidentally done, has been to dispose of a most important question—the question of the residential norm.

People in industrialized America reside (I) in large, congested, *metropolitan communities*—cities of which New York is the arche-

* ARCHITECTURE AND MODERN LIFE, Baker Brownell and Frank Lloyd Wright, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1937.

type; (II) in small *urban and suburban communities* with populations as low as 2,500—provided that, no matter how small, they are urban and not rural in their values; (III) in villages or *rural communities*—by far the oldest and still in most parts of the world the place of residence of the bulk of people—which we will assume in this country to mean all small towns which are definitely rural, (though not exclusively agricultural), in their characteristics; and (IV) on *isolated farms*,* a place of residence distinctively American and produced mainly by the virtually free distribution of 160-acre homesteads during our period of expansion westward. That people do live, and can live, in all these kinds of places is obvious. The human animal is the most adaptable of all species of animals. It can live almost anywhere after a fashion. The real question, however, is not *where they live*, nor even whether they can live everywhere; the real question is, *Where should they live?*



Even when modern science—and modern essentially scientific education—finishes its consideration of the physical universe, the globe, the continents, the oceans and rivers, the climate and soil, the forests, the minerals, the animals; and begins to consider man, the communities in which he dwells, the nations, states and cities he has organized, and the arts, cultures and civilizations he has developed, it is still mainly descriptive. What is worse, it identifies objectivity with description, and subjectivity with normation. Until the social sciences cease imitating the physical sciences and become truly normative, no amount of what we call education will dispose of the real problems with which human beings are confronted. And study not only of general sociology but rural and urban sociology

* "The farm home in America has three decided peculiarities; it is in sight of or close to the field work and chores of the farmer; it is separated by considerable distances from the homes of other families; its neighbors, however near or far away they may be, are also farmers. Although a farm home may have two neighbor homes lying within the distance of one mile, the likelihood is that the greater number of neighbors live at least three miles away, out of sight and hearing. This situation approaches a condition of solitary living . . . The key to understanding such a life is that the life is all one's own. On the other hand, whatever loss comes from having nothing added to life from the soul of another person, that loss must be accepted with the advantage . . . The townsman lives not his own life in his own way, but he lives the life of others; while the American farm family, more or less, it must be confessed, lives its own kind of life."—RURAL SOCIAL PROBLEMS, Charles J. Galpin, 1924; p. 15.

will continue to produce confusion and frustration and leave to the advertising and salesmanship of modern industry the task of prescribing the way in which modern man should live.

But if so much of the equipment which the family must have to fulfill its functions; to make it possible for its members to live satisfyingly, can only be possessed in a rural rather than an urban place of residence, then we have not only an unequivocal but also an objective answer to the question of city *versus* country life. To leave the answer to this question to the accident of birth in either the country or the city is to dispose of the problem animalistically; to leave it merely to what the individual happens to like, is to assume that it is rational to answer it subjectively. Approaching the problem, as I have tried to approach it by analyzing it both from the standpoint of the *fractional individual* and of his *familial whole*, the residential norm emerges clearly and irrefutably. *Man, no matter how often he has tried to urbanize himself, can only live like a normal human being in an essentially rural place of residence.* The penalty for disregarding this norm is mass-frustration, cultural decadence, and race suicide.



The more truly men and women today are the children of our urban and industrial ideology, the more certain are they to challenge the assumption that only within the frame of reference of family life is to be found the answer to the question of how life should be organized; almost all of them will insist that the answer must be formulated within the framework of society and the state.

But there is a crass fact which even the most truly modern individual cannot deny. It is the perfectly obvious fact that every individual owes the sheer fact of existence to his parents.* Without their cohabitation he would not even have been conceived and without their care and support, at least during the long period of helpless infancy and childhood, he would not have survived long enough to discover whether life was a blessing or a curse.

* Only orphaned individuals, raised in institutions, furnish an exception to this observation, and these, considered as a class, furnish the exceptions which prove the rule.

If existence is a boon, then manifestly there is a great obligation owing by the individual to those who have conferred it upon him. If, however, existence is not a boon; if Schopenhauer is right in saying that life is not worth living; if birth is nothing more than a blind reaction and unfortunate consequence of parental sexual drives; if most children really come into existence unwanted by those who conceive them, (something which does not take place as frequently as modern cynicism suggests), then of course no obligation is created. The individual, if life is in reality a curse, has the right, simply because he was born, to a life-long grudge against those callous enough to have plunged him into it. But if both begettors and begotten are the victims of what Schopenhauer called *the Will*, neither have parents any obligations to their children. They are as truly victims of their own instinctual drives as are the individuals they beget. And no obligation on their part exists which is not discharged if society and the state is organized so as to provide what families at one time were expected to provide—and still largely provide—for those whom they are driven inexorably to beget.

As Schopenhauer sees it, life is not a gift;† it is merely a yielding on the part of the parents to the basic principle of the universe—*the Will*. This *will-to-be* ushers the individual into a world of ceaseless striving and battle in which different forms of *the Will*—human, animal, insect, and plant—compete with one another; a world in which “the little fishes are devoured by larger ones;” an evil world and not a good world, and as he puts it, “the worst of all possible worlds.” The individual is ushered into a world in which life is not worth living because of constant cravings which are never satisfied but merely issue into new and more urgent and painful desires, and so on, *ad nauseum*. What is worse, the individual is launched upon a sea in which he is eventually certain to be shipwrecked and in which he will thereafter have to struggle to save his weary body only in the end to be engulfed at last.

The life of most men is but a continuous struggle for existence—a struggle which they are bound to lose at last. Every breath we draw is a protest against

† Schopenhauer quotes approvingly from Calderon's "Life a Dream,"
For the greatest crime of man
Is that he was ever born.

the death which is constantly threatening us, and against which we are battling every second. But Death must conquer after all, for we are his by birth, and he simply plays a little while longer before devouring it. We, however, take great pains to prolong our lives as far as we can, just as we blow soap bubbles as long and as large as we can, though we know with absolute certainty that they must break at last.

And again:

The life of the great majority of men is a weary yearning and torture, a dreamy tottering through the four ages to death, accompanied by a succession of trivial thoughts. It is like a clock work that is wound up and goes without knowing why; and every time a man is conceived and born, the clock of human life is wound up anew, in order to grind out the same old hackneyed tune which it has played so many countless times before, measure for measure, beat for beat, with insignificant variations.‡



But if this apparently hopeless struggle to live and to avoid death which oppressed Schopenhauer, inspired Buddha, and challenged Confucius, is hopeless only because individuals are taught to vindicate it in terms of their own egos instead of primarily in terms of a properly organized family; if its pains can be justified by creative and productive contributions to those whom the individual loves; if it is possible for the individual to learn how to avoid premature death and how to accept death after living a full life-span as a fitting end to a well-spent life; if individuals may be made to see that life should be thrillingly and joyously risked, and death itself gallantly embraced in circumstances which justify supreme sacrifices for causes which are dearer than life, then existence is not necessarily "weary yearning and torture," (even though it is that for countless numbers of mis-educated human beings and those mistakenly begotten by them). *If the struggle for survival may be transformed into a struggle which satisfies—if the pains of endeavor become the pleasures of achievement—then every*

‡ THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA, Arthur Schopenhauer, 1819; the quotations are from Book Four, "The World as Will."

properly conceived, properly educated, and properly endowed individual owes an enormous debt to his begettors.



It is my conviction that there is literally overwhelming evidence indicating that of all the purposes which have justified individuals both in living and in dying—the *love of truth, the love of justice, the love of beauty, the love of country, the love of God*—none is more capable of vindicating the individual in his ceaseless struggle to live than *love of family*.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART III.

THE NORMAL COMMUNITY

SECTION I.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNITY

The more economists have tampered with economic conditions, the worse they have become; the more political scientists have reformed governments, the more governments are in need of reform; the more sociologists have tampered with the family, the more the family has disintegrated... Only after a reconstruction from top to bottom will sociology and the social sciences be real sciences, independent, subservient to no other values.—Pitirim A. Sorokin, "The Crisis of Our Age."

NO individual, I think it has been made clear, can live like a normal human being unless living includes for him membership in a relatively normal family. Bachelorhood, and even modern marriage-and-divorce, no matter how much morals and social organization adjust themselves to the atomization of the population, furnishes no real solution of the individual's associational problem. I propose now to make equally clear that it is impossible for the members of a relatively normal family to live entirely normal lives if the group insists upon living in an abnormal community—if the family cannot succeed in persuading enough families in the community in which it lives to normalize its community. Such a situation calls either for normalization or emigration. True, a few exceptional

families may be able to normalize life for their members to a very great extent in spite of abnormalities in community and society. But a truly satisfactory way of life is very nearly impossible unless the social environment in which people live is also normal. Nobody and no family can afford to ignore social and political problems. The government, the church, the labor union, and political movements—to mention only a few community institutions—have each their own way of forcing themselves upon the attention of everybody.

The problem of normal living, therefore, is not solved until in addition to teaching the individual how to normalize his own, and his family's life, people in general are taught, community by community,* how to normalize society. Unless the normalization of life is to be restricted to a small minority of people living in a small minority of communities who happen to be ingenious and fortunate enough to be able to completely insulate themselves against the abnormalities existing in the world at large, the process of normalization must be expanded until it includes not only the local community, not only what is called society, but humanity in its entirety.†

What those interested in the possibility of the humanization of the world in which we find ourselves must ask themselves is something like this:

“Why is it that modern man in spite of the wonders of science, of the machine age, and of the modern city, has failed to create a social environment which furnishes him a genuinely

*I say *community by community* deliberately, because it seems to me more practical to start reform and re-organization community by community than with the nation as a whole, hoping that somehow or other normalization will percolate down to each local community.

† We may try to dismiss world problems and the problems of humanity in its entirety, as things for which life is too short to concern ourselves. But the rest of the world, at least so far as wars, revolutions, and financial catastrophes are concerned, does not dismiss us. Somehow or other no matter where we go nor how hard we try to be indifferent about the concerns of the world, humanity has a way of concerning itself in our affairs.

satisfactory way of life? Why, in spite of his Progress, does he find himself confronted with the tragedies of war, the horrors of revolution, and the miseries of financial depressions and poverty amidst abounding wealth?

“Why—in the words of the quotation from Sorokin with which I began this chapter—why is it, in spite of the extent to which economists have tampered with production, political scientists with government, and sociologists with society, that frustration is still the lot of man? Why—to be specific and name great names; why is it that in spite of the extent to which modern man has followed the teachings of the disciples of Adam Smith and Karl Marx; of Machiavelli and Locke and Montesquieu; of Comte and Spencer and Ward, and a host of modern urban and rural sociologists, has he not only failed to create a wholesome environment for himself—why does he not even know what kind of society will furnish it to him?”

THE prevailing manner in which the teachers of modern man approach this question is to concentrate upon the relations of individuals in society. We have endeavored to solve the problem, which Niebuhr wittily posed as that of “Moral Man and Immoral Society,” by exploring the sociological concept of society. It is my belief that we have thus far failed—and will continue to fail to solve it—because of the insufficiency and invalidity of the sociological concept.

The individual man or woman is a *fraction*. He is not made, and cannot become, a normal *whole* as an azoic member of society, nor by giving him a social security number and making him legally entitled to all the possible rewards of a cog in the modern industrial machine; least of all by making him *homo legalis*—a citizen with perhaps the right to vote for the public officials of a modern national state. He remains, in spite of all present-day efforts to organize life in terms of individual units in a great social organism, first of all a fraction of the family. And in addition, he remains a fraction of that corporate entity which I think of as the community, *an entity composed of some sort of primary and face-to-face organized group*

operating in the same neighborhood as himself. He remains finally a fraction of that much larger entity which it is usual to refer to as society but which should be more correctly designated humanity. If this is true, then the sociological concept of society is an utterly inadequate basis for dealing in any realistic manner with social problems. It creates new problems without solving old ones. It assumes, in effect, that the problem of creating a decent social environment can be solved in terms of the relationship of man to society. It grossly over-simplifies the actual problem which the true scientist must take into account. And it renders what the leaders of modern man teach about how to organize society positively harmful.

COMMUNITY vs. SOCIETY
THE essential distinction between what I am calling community and what social scientists—sociologists, political scientists, and economists—call society, is a difference in magnitude. Relative to his local community, the individual is a fraction of *a group of people* living on *an area of land* both of which are still *concrete and comprehensible* to him. But relative to larger social entities—to a great metropolitan city; or to a state, nation or empire; or to the whole world—the individual becomes a fraction of an entity which embraces so large a population, so many different classes and organizations, and which covers so much territory, that his relationship to it *can only be expressed in abstractions and dealt with by centralization.* Abstraction and centralization are unnecessary in the relationships of the individual and his family because of the intimacy created by a common domicile. They are minimized by sheer propinquity in those groups or social units which I am calling communities. But both are unavoidable in conditioning the individual for modern life and in organizing modern society. Anonymity and absenteeism (which are inescapable accompaniments of increases in distances and in population), impersonalize the entity of which the individual is asked to consider himself a member, and make centralization and compulsion necessary if “society” is to function at all.

The difference in the sheer number of people involved in the operations of a *family and neighborhood economy*, and a *national or political economy*, is so great that economists find it almost impossible to make political economy comprehensible because of the abstractions to which they have to resort in discussing it. For instance,

the actual distribution of goods and services among the members of a family and people living in the same small community, is concrete and personal; it is unnecessary to resort to bewildering abstractions to understand what takes place, or establish complex institutions in order to be able to operate. But when we turn from distribution as it presents itself in a local community and as it operates in a great political and monetary economy such as the United States, we have to turn from problems which are readily comprehensible by almost everybody, to the operations of price systems, money systems, wage systems, and property systems which are incomprehensible not only to the average business man but even to economists themselves. No matter what aspect of the relationships of individuals to so-called society is the subject of study—commercial, industrial, political, criminal, charitable, medical—we are driven to resort to abstractions of such a high order as to make the social sciences well-nigh incomprehensible. And no matter what we try to do in dealing with these social problems nationally, we are driven to resort to centralization to such a degree as to impersonalize and dehumanize most of our lives and institutions.

There is only one way to avoid floundering in a morass of sociological and political abstractions, and that is to see that most of the problems with which sociology deals are either the problems of local communities or those of humanity in its entirety. Most of them are not created by the vague abstraction called society but by the failure to teach mankind the proper composition, management, and equipment of local communities. Or they are problems created by the existence of societies—or rather nations—none of which ought ever to have been organized at all.

There are, it is true, problems which are not local. There are problems which are truly *regional* and others which are truly *global*. But if our local communities on one hand and our states, nations, and empires on the other, were both normalized, the first by ending their over-decentralization, and the second by eliminating their over-centralization, the only problems which could not be solved family by family and community by community would be specifically regional problems, (like those of the conservation of soil, water, and forests), and specifically global problems, (like those of navigation in the air and on the high seas).

HUMANITY vs. SOCIETY

WHEN we turn to the distinction between *humanity* and *society*, we find that the entity which sociologists call society is not too large but too small. As a result, the problems of humanity as a whole float around the peripheries and in the interstices of competing social sciences. No wonder right-education and proper organization of humanity gets nowhere as mankind, taught to organize itself into conflicting nations and societies, wages sub-human warfare upon its own species. It is to the everlasting credit of religion, however short in falls in the practice of its ideals, that it has continued to teach a gospel framed not in terms of particular societies but of the brotherhood of man. It is a pity that philosophy, a victim of the modern cult of specialization, has fallen from its high estate and permitted itself to degenerate into just another scholarly specialty.

Society—an entity which is implemented today only by the entities called nations—is a unit too small to deal with matters like free trade, access to oil and other mineral resources, and the use of the seas and air, in which the people of the whole globe have common, unalienable rights. Nations become monstrosities which do more harm than good when they assert sovereignty over such matters and exercise authority in fields which properly fall within the jurisdiction of agencies which should represent the whole globe. As we shall see in dealing with the subject of the composition of the community, *nations, societies, or regions*, like *provinces and counties*, must have strictly limited jurisdictions if they remain normal. At this moment it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that there is overwhelming evidence indicating that these all-too-real nations, rationalized by an all-too-unreal concept of society, are usurping functions which belong, on one hand to the local community, the county, and the state, and on the other to the whole globe.

The vagueness of the concept *society* to which I am calling attention, and the advisability of substituting the concepts of *community* and *humanity* for it, cannot be better established than by quoting a typical sociologists' definition of society—in this instance the definition used by Franklin H. Giddings:

We may conceive of society as any plural number of sentient creatures more or less continuously subjected to common stimuli, to differing stimuli, and to inter-stimulation, and responding thereto in like behavior, concerted activity or

co-operation, as well as in unlike or competitive activity; and becoming, therefore, with developing intelligence, coherent through a dominating consciousness of kind while always sufficiently conscious of difference to insure a measure of individual liberty.

The result of dealing with problems which the nations of the modern world face in these sociological terms has been, it seems to me, futile and sterile. Schooled to approach gregational and political problems in a manner so unrealistic, it is no wonder that the teachers and leaders of modern man have minimized, (when they have not entirely disregarded), what is the most important factor involved—that of the relationship of the civic entities he has organized and amidst which he lives, to the earth.


ECONOMISTS, it is true, take the earth into account THE EARTH in their analysis of the process of production. Production, most of them agree, involves the organization of *land*, labor, capital, and enterprise. But neither they nor other social scientists, even when they acknowledge that there is a land problem, make clear its enormous import. Social scientists and most social reformers simply ignore the fact that people and land are Siamese twins. They overlook the fact that they are actually inseparable. The error, and the correct approach to the social problem, can be made clear by means of the diagram on the opposite page.

Social science today generally assumes that the problems with which it has to deal consist of inter-relations between the individual and society as shown by the arrows in the upper part of the diagram. What is thus overlooked is the fact that these relations do not, and cannot, take place in a place called society. They are of necessity relations among people who can only live on the earth, as is shown by the diagram as a whole.

Human relations are therefore not only social; they are also territorial. Only from the land can human beings obtain what is necessary to individual survival; only from the land can groups of human beings obtain what is necessary to group survival. Territorial relations are therefore just as primal as social relations—they are of the essence of the problem of community and humanity.

What is it that gives rise to this dual relationship, upon the importance of which I am insisting?

Every human being must have access to the solid earth not only because he is a land animal, rather than a bird or fish, but because from the earth he must obtain the food he consumes as well the raw materials, both organic and mineral, which he uses to build the



structures in which he lives and to fashion the other goods—tools, machines, furnishings and other artefacts—he manufactures for his use and enjoyment. He is dependent first for the necessities of life and then for the goods and services which enable him to live like a civilized being, upon access to the soil, to the waters of the earth, and to the minerals to be found in its bowels. His relation to the earth is

primary even when it is not direct as it is with farmers and miners.

It remains primary even when he substitutes indirect for direct relationships to it. When he abandons the direct relationship represented by actual cultivation of the soil and goes into business or gets a job and permits himself to become dependent upon money, he may think that he has emancipated himself from dependence upon the earth, but he is mistaken. The penalty he pays for the mistake is the state we call *insecurity*. Modern man, who has substituted almost total dependence upon money for dependence upon the direct harvesting of the fruits of the earth, is not only insecure; he fails to obtain what is the just due of his labor or enterprise in almost exact proportion to the degree to which he permits his relationship to the land to become indirect. If he cannot at all times turn to the land as an alternative to accepting what he can obtain in cash for his labor or produce, he is vulnerable to exploitation. He begins to feel insecure no matter how much better money enables him to live. He becomes, relative to the source of his money-income, dependent and servile; he ceases to be a free and independent human being.

That primitive man had to have direct access to land is obvious—hunting and food-gathering required it. But that modern man, living in progressive communities like New York and supporting himself entirely by money-making, has a land problem is not so obvious. Yet no occupation, no form of wealth, no organization of his economic and political institutions, satisfies his real needs which does not provide adequately and properly for his relationship to the earth. All progress which introduces any abnormalities into this relationship are so violative of normal living as to give a kind of unreal, and insane, quality to life. That some adequate system of land tenure is necessary for the farmer, those who are teaching and leading modern man will concede, but that such a system is equally vital to the cityman, does not occur to them.

The problem is really that of *land tenure*—of individual tenure to parcels of land within the community, and of community, or national, tenure of the territory bounded by community and nation. If individuals could live, like Robinson Crusoe, in isolation on particular portions of the earth, and if communities and nations as well were so far apart from one another that for all practical purposes each could preempt as much as each desired to bound and enclose,

the problem of land tenure for man and the communities he organizes would be as simple as that of Robinson Crusoe on his island. There would be no land *problem*; there might be no social problem either—the social problem might shrink so greatly in magnitude as to cease being a problem. But mankind, instead of spreading itself out over the earth so thinly that each individual has as much land for his exclusive possession as he might desire, has settled in particular regions, cities, villages and neighborhoods leaving others relatively unsettled. Community life being essential to the security of his existence, to the continuation of the race, to his sanity and development as a human being, he settles in communities and cities often at astonishingly high densities to each square mile of area.*

THE variations in the densities of the population of nations in 1938 were as follows:

DENSITY AND TENURE

Australia	2.2	Italy	344.3
Canada	2.9	Germany	363.4
Mexico	21.4	Japan	374.9
United States	41.3	Britain	486.1
Spain	116.6	Netherlands	625.5
China	118.9	Belgium	688.0
France	197.1	Egypt (inhabited area)	1,044.5

The situation within particular sections of each nation varies as greatly as it does between different nations. In the United States in 1944, when the density for the entire nation was 44.2 per square mile, the density in Rhode Island was 674.2; in Ohio, 168.0; and in Nevada, 1.0. If densities by cities are considered, the variations become staggering; the density with which people have been persuaded to crowd into New York City is 23,178.7 per square mile.

It is impossible to reflect upon the meaning of these variations without raising a question as to whether there is not some optimum density—some normal ratio of population to area—which might be developed as a basis for planning the composition of communities; for dealing with birth and birth-control, and immigration and emigration between nations, between communities, and between city and country. The evidence suggests that the norm would be that density which results in (I) the most efficient use, cultivation, and

* c.f., Chapter VII, Part VII, "Urbanization: The Centralization of Population," pp. 266-271.

conservation of its natural resources, including all forms of land—agricultural land, forests, mineral land, site land, and the waters of the area; in (II) maximizing the health of the population; in (III) the development of the highest plane of living the existing state of science makes possible; in (IV) permitting men and women to express their personalities most fully amid the widest diffusion and the greatest enjoyment of art and craft. All but the last of these specifications can be expressed statistically, and even the last can be expressed in statistics which are indicative, if not actual measurements, of conditions.†

MOST of the desirable plots of land and all the desirable regions of the earth, (and much of the earth which should never have been touched by the plow), is already pre-empted both beyond the point at which each individual can have as much land as he desires, and beyond that at which each nation can have all the territory over which it desires to exercise sovereignty. Many individuals in the same nation therefore want the same parcel of land; they keep bidding up its price so that all who own no land and all succeeding generations find it more and more difficult to purchase land. And many different nations want the same regions and territories, and fight war after war, as in the famous cases of Poland, Bohemia, and Alsace-Lorraine, in order to exercise dominion over them. It is because of pre-emption that the political and social and economic problem of tenure in land and dominion over territory has arisen—economic, because it involves the relationship of each individual to the earth; social, because it involves the relationship of individuals to one another; and political, because it involves the relationship of each government to all the other governments on the earth.

But observe what is the essence of the problem. It is not, as the high density of population in some nations and cities suggests, that there is not enough land at least for the existing population. There is plenty of land available in practically every region of the globe for everybody. The essence of the problem arises because of the fact *that the land has been pre-empted*; that limited numbers of individuals or families in the total population of a region or locality

† c.f., pp. 319-326.

"own" all the desired or desirable land and so make it impossible for the landless to have access to land without paying some one of the pre-emptors the highest price which competition for his land enables him to demand. In a witty reference to the origin of civil society, Rousseau described the inequity and immorality of pre-emption in the following ironic words:

The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying, *This is mine*, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the founder of civil society.

That pre-emption, or private property in land, is utterly wrong, is obvious. As Henry George pointed out, it is a sort of conspiracy entered into by each generation in turn for the purpose of exploiting future generations:

Has the first comer to a banquet the right to turn back all the chairs and claim that none of the other guests shall partake of the food provided, except he make terms with him?

The pity of it is that millions of individuals and families buy land—usually with money which represents hard-earned savings—and do so utterly unconscious of the fact that they are joining in a maleficent system which creates masses of landless people and then exploits them generation after generation.

Liberty Hyde Bailey expressed the ethics of the matter in his classic essay entitled *THE HOLY EARTH*:

The best kind of community interest attaches to the proper use and partition of the earth, a communism that is disassociated from propaganda and programs. The freedom of the earth is not the freedom of license; there is always the thought of the others that are dependent upon it. It is the freedom of utilization for needs and natural desires, without regard to one's place among one's fellows, or even to one's condition of degradation or state of sinfulness. All men are the same when they come back to the meadows, to the hills, and to the deep woods: *He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust . . .* We have not yet escaped the idea that vested rights—and particularly personal realty—are inviolable. Certainly these rights must be protected by law, otherwise there can be no stability and regularity in affairs; but there is no inalienable right in the ownership of the surface of the earth. Readjustments must come, and even now they are coming slowly, and here and there in the interest of the neighbour, and in the end there will be no private monopoly of public or natural resources.

The lesson of the growing abounding earth is of liberality for all, and never exploitation or very exclusive opportunities for the few. Even if the weaker anywhere perish in the contest for food, they are nevertheless given the opportunity to contest on terms equal to their abilities; and at all events, we come,

in the human sphere, to the domination of sweet reason rather than to competition in sheer force. When, by means of reasonable education, this simple relation is understood by mankind and begins to express itself spontaneously, we shall find our voluminous complex of laws to regulate selfishness gradually disappearing and passing into limbo.

AFTER long study of the agriculture potentialities of America, LAND—AND TO SPARE Alvin Johnson came to the conclusion that from five to 40 acres of land is all that an American family needs in order to support itself comfortably exclusively from the cultivation of land. On the soils classed as excellent in the South Atlantic states, he says: "Any man could make his living on five acres of this land, a good man on ten, a Napoleon on twenty." On the soils classed as medium in the Middle West, he says: "Any man would have made a living on forty acres or less." He is not speaking of cultivated land alone but of the total area of the farms including plowable pasture, poorer pasture, woodland and what in American statistics is called "other land," including swampland, rocky land, and land covered by water. That his estimates are adequate is confirmed by the fact that share-croppers on Southern plantations average no more than 20 acres, and yet have been able at least to keep their families alive in spite of the fact that they are forced not only to turn over half their crops as rental but to devote themselves mainly to the raising of a single cash crop.

European authorities generally agree that five hectares, or 12.5 acres, of crop land and plowable pasture, is sufficient to support a family in independent middle-class existence. This is about the area which one family can cultivate without employing help. The limits are supposed to vary between five and 25 acres in accordance with the soil and location relative to markets. Five acres are ample where the soil is good and close to markets in Western Europe; 25 acres where the soil is poor and location unfavorable as in Scandinavia and Russia. The average area per farm in Japan is much less than the average in Europe; in Japan it averages 2.5 acres per family. Yet about half of the Japanese peasants are tenants who have to turn over as high as 70% of their harvest to their landlords. The situation is similar in China. A Chinese farmer who owns 30 Mu, or five acres, is considered rich.

Franz Oppenheimer, after a careful analysis of the soil studies made by the National Resources Committee, came to the conclusion

that 41,000,000 families, or over 200,000,000 persons, could support themselves by farming on only one-third of the total farm land in the United States.‡ Each one of these families could have an average of 16 acres of land classified as excellent, good or fair by the Committee and excluding any land classified as poor.

It is true that virtually all the land has already been pre-empted; that the boundaries of the land already owned preclude those who have no land from obtaining access to land without paying tribute to the existing pre-emptors. But the problem which this presents is merely one of ceasing to permit the holding of land for speculation and of abolishing exploitive landlordism; of establishing a system of land tenure which enables every farmer to obtain ownership of a farm and also makes land available for subsistence-homesteads to non-farmers—a system which would furnish them an alternative to dependence upon others at wages or on salaries they consider too low. Various entirely adequate solutions of this problem have been developed. Henry George's solution is probably the simplest; it has only the disadvantage of requiring something like a political revolution in order to be put into operation. The farmers of Denmark have shown that cooperation can be used immediately to effect a partial solution of the problem and to create a public opinion in which George's radical solution becomes politically practicable.

At present, under the existing system of speculative tenure, so-called farms of over 10,000 acres each pre-empt one-ninth of all the farm land in the United States; farms of over 1,000 acres each pre-empt 28% of the land; farms of 500 acres or more, 39%. Farmers who own less than 50 acres—that is the farmers who on an average own enough land to support their families but not enough for large-scale commercial farming—own less than 5.76% of all the land. What is even worse, the educational, financial, and governmental institutions of the nation seem to be engaged in a sort of unwritten con-

‡ The distribution of farm ownership in the United States was as follows:

Farms of 10,000 acres or over	represented 11.3% of all land owned;
Farms of 1,000 acres or over	represented 27.9% of all land owned;
Farms of 500 acres or over	represented 38.9% of all land owned;
Farms of 100 acres or over	represented 74.0% of all land owned;
Farms of 50 acres or over	represented 94.2% of all land owned.

From "Wages and Trade Unions," by Franz Oppenheimer, "The American Journal of Economics and Sociology," October 1941, Vol. I, No. I, pp. 45-77.

spiracy to make it easy for the best farm land to be acquired by those who already have large farms, and to restrict those able to retain ownership of small farms to the poorest farm land in the nation.

As the sizes of farms increase, the number of persons needed in rural communities constantly decrease. With modern mechanized giant farms, no one actually needs to live in the country. For maximum efficiency, the farm workers should be migrants, only present at certain seasons, while the farm owners and managers, living in the nearest cities, should commute to work and abandon country life except during the seasons for plowing, cultivating, and harvesting. But assuming that each farm unit were to be occupied by at least one family, with five persons to a family the number of persons per square mile who would live in the country would be approximately:

SIZE OF FARM IN ACRES	FARMS PER SQUARE MILE	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE
16	40.	200.
50	13.	80.
160	4.	20.
500	1.28	7.
1,000	0.48	2.5

If all the existing families in the United States, which average only four persons per family, were to acquire one homestead of an average of 16 acres each, this would make the density of the population average only 160 persons to each square mile. That they could support themselves handsomely on these homesteads, *if they were taught how to do so*, is unquestioned by those who have studied what the Danes have done with their countryside.

The areas of land needed to support people using different techniques of production, vary enormously. Primitive food-gatherers like the Andamese islanders need 16 square miles to support between 40 and 50 persons; the Arctic Americans who support themselves by hunting and fishing need 70 to 200 square miles to support a similar number. Pastoral nomads can support two to five persons per square mile. Intensive agriculture on the European pattern makes it possible to readily support 1,000 persons per square mile. The Japanese, using the Asiatic type of intensive agriculture, support a family on 2.5 acres, and usually support in part the family of a landlord with the rent they pay. How does such an ideal density as is here suggested for the resettlement of the United States compare with these

figures? If we take the above estimates as indicative of the minimum and maximum need for areas of land, we get some such picture as:

	PERSONS WHO CAN BE SUPPORTED ON ONE SQUARE MILE
Arctic fishers and hunters	0.4
Andamese food gatherers	3.0
Pastoral nomads	3.5
Proposed self-supporting homesteads	160.0
European intensive agriculture	1,000.0
Japanese intensive agriculture	1,824.0*

Such a resettlement would not, therefore, require any undue crowding of the population upon the existing rural areas of the nation *even if the whole population now living in all the towns and cities of the United States were to abandon them*—even if every man, woman and child moved “back to the land,” a contingency which not even the most extreme agrarian and decentralist has ever in his wildest dreams envisaged.

The 1940 population of the United States consists of 131,669,275 persons of all ages, and the continental area of 2,977,128 square miles of land of all kinds. If there was such a resettlement of the whole population upon four-person-to-a-family, 16-acre homesteads, only 822,932 square miles of land would be required for this purpose and nearly three times as much land—2,154,196 square miles—would remain entirely unoccupied.¶ If all the land were sub-divided among these 32,917,319 families, *each would have a 58-acre homestead.*



The problem of tenure in land and dominion over territory is very old. It came into existence the moment mankind emerged from the stage of primitive appropriation—from the moment men began to change from finders of food—from fishermen, hunters and herders, into tillers of the soil and dwellers in villages and cities. It still remains, unfortunately, the most important single problem of mankind. There is not the slightest hope of permanent peace and of any general humanization of living until it is dealt with correctly.

* This is on the basis of 228 farms per square mile of agricultural land; six persons per family; allowance of only 25% of crops paid for rent. This allowance makes it possible to assume that each farm could support eight persons on the same plane of living as the farm family.

¶ One acre covers 43,560 square feet; one square mile, 640 acres.

No matter how much the real nature of the problem may be obscured by the more obvious and dramatic indirect forms in which it puts in its appearance—by individual competition for wealth, by rivalry between capital and labor, by class struggles, by wars and revolutions—it still remains the underlying problem of society. It will always, of course, exist to some degree as long as human nature and human institutions are not perfect. To provide proper, just, adequate, and peaceful methods of dealing with this great problem—methods human rather than predatory in nature—is the major challenge which life on the earth presents to the organizing ability of man. If our social reformers and our specialists in the social sciences want really to contribute to the solution of the crisis which confronts civilization, they cannot afford to belittle this problem; they cannot ignore it until what they think are more pressing questions are dealt with. There is no more immediate problem. They must deal with this problem and recognize that nothing which nations may enact or do with regard to their own and world problems will make a human way of living possible if the method of dealing with tenure in land and dominion over territory is left as it is at present.

In dealing with it there are two basic postulates which they will have to accept—postulates which assume that there is a difference in nature between *commonwealth* and *private wealth*, and a difference of rationality and arbitrariness between *community* and *nation*.

WEALTH, used in its broadest sense with reference to any *thing* whatsoever which can be both possessed and used, is of at least two kinds, *private* and *public*. It is properly treated as *private property* when it comes into existence—and insofar as the thing comes into existence—as a result of the labor of one or more specific individuals; it is properly treated as *public* or *common property*, when it does not—when it comes into existence without human effort or as a by-product of the activity of the whole community. A house, no matter how many craftsmen may be employed in building it, since it can only come into existence as a result of the savings and expenditures of individual human beings, is in its essential nature *private property*. The land upon which it is built, is *commonwealth*, firstly because the land itself was not created by anybody, and, secondly, because the value of land comes into existence only as a by-product of the pres-

ence and activities of the population. By the same token, improvements of any kind whatsoever—even improvements in the soil such as come from manuring and cultivating—are private property.*

There are, of course, other things than land and natural resources which may be owned by a whole population—public buildings like a school-house, for instance. But such things can be sold, and frequently are, by communities to individuals *without depriving every member of the community including those not yet born, of that to which each has an unalienable right*. The land and natural resources of the community cannot, however, be properly sold or alienated as can the school building. Parcels of land may be properly leased to individuals—the community may give them secure and even perpetual possession without violating this principle *if they are required to pay into the common treasury regularly full value for the use of that part of the commonwealth which has been assigned to them*.

Unfortunately—obsessed with the idea of *society*, an idea which requires for its realization establishment of *national* governments—present day social science overlooks the fact that the problem both of tenure and of dominion over land is insoluble in terms of national organization of lands and peoples. Just as history evidences the fact that *Feudalism* and *dynastic war* are inseparable, so history furnishes overwhelming evidence of the fact that *Nationalism*† and *imperialistic war*—wars for dominion over territories and peoples—are inescapable. The time has surely come to recognize the truth and for the teachers of mankind to stop teaching patriotic devotion to one nation on one side of a boundary line, and to another nation on the other side. True humanization of life cannot be realized, and rev-

* Those who think that there is any practical difficulty in distinguishing between *improvements* and *land values*, should study the rather extensive literature on the appraisal of real estate, both urban and farm. The fact is that not only tax assessors but hard-headed bankers, real estate dealers, and business men do distinguish between them, and millions of dollars are exchanged yearly upon distinctions between them. Typical manuals dealing with the subject are BOECKH'S *MANUAL OF APPRAISALS*, E. H. Boeckh, Rough Notes Co., Indianapolis, Ind., 1934; *THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF URBAN LAND VALUATION*, An Exposition of the Somers Unit System, Walter W. Pollock and Karl W. H. Scholz, Manufacturers Appraisal Co., Philadelphia, 1926.

† A sharp distinction should be drawn between *political or governmental* Nationalism, which is here referred to, and *cultural* Nationalism, as Grundtvig used the term in Denmark. Love of one's native culture is one thing; devotion to the public officials who happen to control a nation's government, is something entirely different.

olutions, international wars, and periodic collapses of civilization will not end, until we begin to substitute the ideal of community and humanity for society and nation, and to implement tenure and dominion in terms of (I) the globe, (II) the region, and (III) the locality. Only as we begin to organize the earth in terms of these three population units, and to discard economic and political nationalism and all the exploitive devices—such as protective tariffs—which go with them, will true normalization of politics begin.

COMMUNITY vs. NATION
WHENEVER dominion over any part of the globe—over any part of what is ultimately the commonwealth of the whole of mankind—is pre-empted by a gregation‡ of people, a *congregation of people or population unit* comes into existence. By what amounts to common consent not only among social reformers and mere laymen but also professional social scientists, it is taken for granted that the population unit through which the idea of sovereignty and the lawful use of force and coercion is to be implemented and exercised, must be the nation. But this almost universal assumption today is arbitrary to the point of irrationality. The arbitrariness may be illustrated by the fact that national units as different as the Republic of Andorra, (area 191 square miles and population, 5,231), and metropolitan France, (area 212,659 square miles and population, 42,014,594), are treated as though they were units identical in essential nature and different only in size.

To substitute a rationally conceived population unit for this arbitrary national unit, it is not necessary to turn to the realm of pure imagination. There are two kinds of objective realities—land and people—which can be taken into account for the purpose of establishing what is the natural and normal unit to use in organizing populations. Indisputable facts about both solve the problem.

When the facts about land are examined, the unit which becomes basic is *the whole globe*—nothing less, as we shall see. When the facts about people are examined, the unit which becomes basic is *the local*

‡ I am using these terms in a specific and strictly technical sense as I use them in my study of the gregational problem in *EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY*, the second volume of this work. *Aggregation* I use with reference to a mere crowd; *gregation* with reference to any temporarily or informally organized group; and *congregation* with reference to permanently and fully organized groups.

community. All other population units are the products either of mere historical accident or of sheer political expediency. Mainly they have come into existence for the purpose of either implementing conquests or of rationalizing the aims and protecting the vested interests of government officials.

The truth is that the population units popularly called *nations* and technically *states*, which as matters of historic fact *originated*, (as Oppenheimer has shown[§]), for purposes of conquest or for the purpose of governing territories conquered, are abnormal entities. To whatever extent nations or national units of population are used for the purpose of discharging functions which local communities should fulfill, usurpation takes place. The penalty which mankind pays for this error is found in the social morbidity of nations—a morbidity which does not exclude those nations endowed with the blessings of modern science; in the class struggles, social revolutions, and civil and international wars of nations which modern progress, instead of abating, has intensified to such a degree that now, with the airplane and the atomic bomb, their rivalry threatens the very existence of mankind.

It is high time that in dealing with these diseases of our nationalized world we clearly define the elements involved in the organization of population units and see clearly the real nature of that fundamental congregation of people, the local community.

A COMMUNITY is a corporate entity—an artificial person—even though by very nature an unincorporated one. Not its charter, (if it has one), but the activities in common of people and institutions in one locality creates the community. And even when a community is incorporated as provided by law and statute as a town, village or city, the community may include either more or fewer people and cover more or less territory than the incorporated municipality. Its boundaries and its membership may extend beyond the limits prescribed by its charter. On the other hand, it may be smaller than the municipality, or the municipality may in reality be an agglomeration of distinct communities. Metropolises like New York and London and Paris are really such agglomerations of communities.

§ c.f., THE STATE, FRANZ OPPENHEIMER; HUEBSCH, New York, 1922.

Whenever and wherever you find a population unit which has (I) a name; which has both (II) members and (III) an area of land; which has (IV) both a center and its commuting region; which has (V) a common body of laws and conventions or ways in which people are supposed both to behave and not to behave; which has (VI) leaders; which has (VII) institutions which implement common and group purposes, and which has (VIII) definite functions which it tries to fulfill, you have what I call a *community*. If a community is organized so that it has all these things and does all these things; if it is neither too large nor too small in population and area; and if it fulfills all the functions which it should, *and does not take on or appropriate functions which it should not*, it is a *normal community*. Most of our population units, unfortunately, are not normal. Most of our smaller units—neighborhoods, towns, villages, parishes, boroughs, wards, cities; and most of our larger units—counties, metropolitan regions, states, provinces, nations, empires—are *abnormal*.



I. A community must have a *name*—a symbol which makes it possible to apprehend its existence, to think about it, to feel about it, and to act about it. We have today so far lost the sense of the wonders of the universe in which we live that we no longer feel the enormous significance which man at one time attached to names. Yet in endowing names with a sense of the sacred and the occult, primitive and ancient man was more nearly in accord with reality than we are today when we have not merely secularized them but have lost all realization of the enormous importance of the function which naming things, persons, and places fulfills.

II. A community must have *members*. Not just residents but persons who both feel that they are members and feel that they owe fealty to it. By the same token, communities have non-members consisting not only of sojourners from other communities but often of natives whose loyalties and characteristic irresponsibilities exclude them from true membership. The tangible expression of real membership is (I) establishment and maintenance in the community of the family homestead, and (II) investment of individual and family savings in the community. Membership calls for property owner-

ship not merely of *movable private wealth* like furniture and automobiles, machinery and stocks of goods, money and securities, but *immovable improvements in the commonwealth* of the community. There are many communities in which individuals with no real stake in the community are endowed with formal membership—they are given the vote, for instance—but if these persons are homesteadless with no property other than movables; if they have no permanent roots in the community, they are not members no matter how long they live in it and no matter how many of the legal attributes of membership may be conferred upon them.

III. It must have *land* and it must have boundaries which define the commonwealth and the area over which it is sovereign. And it must have sufficient land to make itself relatively independent and self-sufficient. If it has no such sufficiency of area, or if county, state or national officials control its land—if it has no real local autonomy—it is not a complete but an imperfect fraction of a real community.

IV. It must be composed not only of a *center* but also of its *commuting region*. It must have a center for its institutions and a place to which people come and in which they meet to transact their business and social affairs. But the center alone can never be a normal community. When separated from its hinterland, the center tends to organize itself predatorily. Just as a population scattered about a countryside with no center and no institutions cannot be a normal community, so a city or village incorporated apart from its commuting region is abnormal.

V. It must have a *body of customs* which are commonly accepted and observed in addition to any creeds or codes in which particular congregations in the community may believe. These customs in common will consist not only of the statutory and positive law enforceable by governmental coercion, but also of all sorts of conventions ranging from mere *rules of etiquette* to *mores* governing the behavior of individuals and the relations of individuals of different races, religions and classes with one another.

VI. It must have *leaders* since it will indubitably consist mainly of *followers*. It cannot act as an entity unless it has an equivalent for the financiers, directors, officers, executives, and foremen who organize and manage business corporations. These leaders do not consist of the public officials of the community only. Mayors, gover-

nors, and presidents are usually leaders, it is true, but very often they "reign but do not rule;" they are titular leaders rather than leaders in fact. The actual leaders of the community usually include political bosses; party leaders; leading bankers, manufacturers and other business men; leading writers and newspaper publishers; leading preachers, lawyers, teachers and other professional men; leading club women, farmers, union leaders, and rich men or plutocrats. The men and women who really make the community a living entity are those persons, official and unofficial, whose influence or whose powers are such that they in fact initiate and direct the activities of the members of the community and the institutions essential to group and common action.

VII. It must have *all the institutions*—not only governmental and political but educational, economic, recreational—which will enable it to fulfill all the functions of a community. The more nearly normal a community is, the fewer of these institutions will be governmental and coercive in nature—the less will taxation have to be used in order to force people to support them, and the less will reliance have to be placed upon law and the use of policemen and soldiers to ensure their proper operation. The more nearly perfect the community becomes, the greater will be the extent to which its gregational needs will be supplied by non-profit corporations—by voluntary social action—and by the individual initiative and enterprise of its citizens.

VIII. Finally, it must fulfill *all the group functions* necessary to enable its people to live like genuinely civilized human beings. As we shall see, there are at least seven of these functions which cannot be adequately fulfilled by individual action alone. Needless to say, as a result of the general neglect of our local communities, and concentration upon education for city and business life, most of the communities of America do not fulfill all these functions, and until they are normalized, the people of our rural regions and small towns will have to either migrate from them or commute to cities in order to find what they need and what is missing in their own communities.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART III. THE NORMAL COMMUNITY

SECTION II.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY

There can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his rationation from the definitions, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan."

AS we have seen there are at least thirteen major problems of living* with which the teachers and leaders of mankind must deal if men and women are to be persuaded to live like normal human beings. And every one of these problems has to be, and is now dealt with both (I) *gregationally*—through group-action or what is variously called social, public, institutional, civic, political, and governmental action, and (II) *personally*—through direct individual and family action. Gregational action in some fields of action may be slight, and in others very large; the desirability of dealing gregationally with some of them very great and with others most undesirable; the form in which gregation is organized and the institutions through which the whole community and community groups act may vary, *but to some extent and in some form every human being has to*

* c.f., pp. 29-37.

join with his fellows in dealing with common problems if he behaves like a human being. Hedonists, Egotists, Anarchists, and Individualists tend to ignore this fact; Altruists, Progressives, and Socialists of all sorts, tend to magnify and glorify it beyond all reason. The evidence, as I have tried to show, indicates that while both methods of action are essential and action in certain fields necessarily gregational, *the norm is to rely upon personal action as much as possible and to resort to group action only when personal action cannot fulfill some function which is essential to civilized existence.*

The evidence indicates that no community is complete or normal unless it fulfills seven definite gregational functions:

I. The *police*—or defensive and martial—function, which is more usually thought of as political and civic; as legal and official; as legislative, judicial and executive;

II. The *inspirational* function, which is usually thought of as religious, cultural, educational, and philosophical;

III. The *economic* function;

IV. The *social* function;

V. The *recreational and recuperational* function;

VI. The *public health* function; and

VII. The *affiliational* function.

I propose to try to substitute precision for the prevailing vagueness in the definition of the functions of communities and population units of various kinds. Glittering generalities like "promote the general welfare" mean anything, everything and, in the final analysis, nothing. Resort to the simple, scientific expedient of classifying every possible *variety* of gregational activity into distinct *species* of group activities in accordance with the characteristics which they have in common, and the species which thus emerge into two distinct *genera*, makes precision possible. And this in turn makes it possible

to establish norms concerning (I) functions which are properly social and those which are properly private; (II) functions which are properly compulsory and those which are properly voluntary in nature, and (III) functions which are properly local and those which can only be fulfilled by regional and world institutions.

I. SOCIAL vs. PRIVATE FUNCTIONS
THE norms for dealing with the three problems which develop as a result of distinguishing clearly between gregational and individual action, may be summarized as follows:

As between social or public action on one hand, and private individual or family action on the other, *no function should be socially or governmentally implemented if it can be fulfilled equally well by private action.*

If the determining majority of the individuals and families in a community consists of abnormal and mis-educated persons without sufficient initiative to do what they should, social institutions should not be organized to take over what should be done privately unless right-education and re-education individual by individual and family by family is impossible. We need schools, for instance, not to fulfill the character-building function of the home but only to teach those subjects which either cannot be taught at all or taught as well in the home as they can in classes and school-rooms. If we disregard this norm, we may build schools until they tower above every other institution in the community, and we will still not be able to create a properly educated population.

II. VOLUNTARY vs. COMPULSORY FUNCTIONS
AS between gregational action which is voluntary and that which is compulsory, the norm is: *No gregational function should be implemented by compulsion—by recourse to government—if any voluntary institution can be established by which it might be fulfilled.*

Our public school system furnishes an interesting illustration of the violation of this norm. We compel people—by law and with sheriffs, policemen and truant officers—to pay taxes to support them; we compel them to send their children to them; we compel the young to attend them, and we accept and approve this because, having been

mis-educated about the true functions of government, we create a government institution to educate the future citizens of the nation without making any inquiry as to whether there may not be some more appropriate voluntary way of dealing with the problem. The impropriety of utilizing the police power for the purpose of educating children is so obvious that it is only by hiding the truth from ourselves by every possible euphemism that we can tolerate such a perversion.

FINALLY as between gregational functions which call for implementation by the local community and those which call for assignment to larger population units—counties, states, nations, and the world as a whole—the evidence indicates conclusively that the norm must be something like this: *No function is properly assigned to a larger population unit if it can possibly be fulfilled by a smaller one.* Here again the school may be used to illustrate the point involved. In spite of the century long drive toward the centralization of education, to an extraordinary extent the administration of our schools remains in local school districts. Every step in the centralization of the system, however, whether on the township level, the state level, or the federal level, leads to the standardization of values, methods and curriculum. Yet differences from community to community and region to region are so great, that standardization on one pattern ought to be recognized as a manifest absurdity. Nevertheless, to the degree in which we have centralized schools, we have imposed by fiat standards appropriate for urban and industrial conditions upon all schools, even those in rural districts. The error grows out of the fact that the ideal of Community, and of local and regional variation and autonomy, is abandoned and replaced by that of Nationalism, national authority, and national uniformity.

The validity of these norms becomes apparent if the nature of the seven species of functions which classification of group activities reveals, is carefully considered.

IF persons are to be protected against injury and property against misappropriation in any form, provision of some sort by the community as a whole must be made for the fulfillment of what I think

I. THE POLICE FUNCTION

of as the *police function*. The maintenance of peace and the prevention of war call for group, not individual, action. Mankind's experience shows that, no matter how law-abiding and peaceful the people in a community may be, they must make some provision for dealing with occasional anti-social or criminal behavior on the part of some of their members, as well as provision for the contingency of aggression, invasion and conquest by other tribes and nations. Anarchism is a goal; it is unrealistic to assume that the abolition of all government will be automatically followed by the spontaneous disappearance of crime and war and the development of populations and nations every one of which would be law-abiding and peaceful. Some sort of government must be established and some force used to enable it to fulfill its functions even though the anarchist is right in calling attention to the fact that government itself is too largely a manufacturer of the very criminality it is supposed to eliminate.

The various functions which fall into this category constitute not only a distinct *species* but also a whole *genera* of their own. Law and legislation, adjudication and penalization, assignment of land and conservation of natural resources, taxation and the administration of the public revenue, and quarantining against epidemics, different as they are, have in common the fact that they require the exercise of the police power; that they have to be administered by public officials through an organization which has to be essentially coercive in nature. All the other six species fall into a second *genera* because all have in common the fact that they can be fulfilled without resort to legal coercion.

That policing—including laws, courts, officers and public revenues and whatever else may be incidental or necessary in order to assure that it is done efficiently and justly—is a function to be performed by local communities is still an accepted doctrine. But that all policing, including that kind which involves the use of military forces and establishments, is primarily a responsibility of the local community—and not of national governments—may seem a somewhat novel doctrine. Yet the evidence is overwhelming that the only way in which abuse by governments of the coercion essential to the fulfillment of the police function can be minimized, is by delegating it to the government of the local community. Only if the local community jealously defends its *general* and *primary* authority is it safe

for *limited* and *specific* powers to be federally delegated to governments of larger territorial and population units. Certain kinds of policing, such as that having to do with the protection of forests and streams and other natural resources, obviously call for the delegation by *the local community* of specific powers to regional and national authorities, and other kinds of policing, such as that essential to the maintenance of international peace, equally obviously call for the delegation, again by *the local community*, of military powers to a world authority.

II. THE INSPIRATIONAL FUNCTION

THE evidence furnished by man's earliest history seems to indicate that the purpose for which man first gathered in cities and communities was worship. The first community was neither a fort nor a market; it was a temple. *Homo sapiens* evidently formed communities firstly for what I think of as *inspiration*—to supply himself with *vision*; with *courage* in dealing with the trying and often startling events with which he was from time to time confronted, and with *stimulus* for the actions which he had to perform daily and seasonally. I think the evidence today indicates that this still remains the most important service which community life renders mankind.

A community which furnishes its members no inspiration; which is without its normal complement of schools and churches, libraries and museums, theatres, concert halls and auditoriums, is a community crippled in its most essential function. Inspiration, however, is not a mere matter of institution and organization. In the final analysis all that institutions and organizations can do is to furnish their members occasions for meeting together. If these meetings are to really inspire those who attend them, the community must not only be equipped with an adequate quota of dramatic, musical, literary, artistic, scientific, philosophical, educational, and religious organizations—it must include in its membership inspiring musicians, dancers, dramatists, writers and artists, teachers and scientists, orators and preachers, poets and seers. No community is complete if it does not include men and women who can put spirit into what would otherwise be spiritless—and uninspiring—institutions.

To the extent to which the community tries to fulfill these functions with institutions which are compulsory and not voluntary,

participation in them is formal, routine, and uninspiring. In addition, compulsory adhesion; compulsory support; and compulsory attendance violates the rights and liberties of those individuals who have other ideas or tastes than those which the community thus attempts to impose and enforce upon everybody. A community without churches, schools, and cultural and professional societies, is an abnormal community. But so is a community which attempts to supply the need for inspiration with state churches, state schools, and state cultural organizations. To be truly normal, the community must not only have an adequate variety of inspirational institutions but must explicitly avoid reliance upon coercion to supply them.

III. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION

NO matter how completely a people may recognize the rights of private property and no matter how great their devotion to free enterprise, that does not lessen by a particle the fact that there are economic functions which must not be left to individual action but dealt with by the community as a whole. The perhaps fatal flaw in the kind of Capitalism we have in fact implemented is refusal to recognize that enterprise can neither be truly free, nor just, nor efficient if the community as a whole fails to properly fulfill its economic functions—a flaw corresponding in its nature to the flaw of Communism in ignoring the fact that no amount of economic functioning by the state can ever provide an adequate or proper substitute for the economic activities which individuals should carry on privately at their own risk, on their own initiative, and for their own needs and benefit. *To the community as a whole, public economic responsibilities; and to the individual, private economic responsibilities*, is the norm which the evidence indicates must be observed if mankind is to provide for its economic wants normally.

Among these economic functions which must be dealt with gregationally, first and foremost is that of providing a decent system of land tenure—a system which will provide every family, every enterprise, and every community a share in the earth, (the basic *commonwealth* of all mankind), on terms which make possible their prosperity, security and liberty. No system of land tenure properly fulfills this function unless it provides mutually fair means for (I) the apportionment of lots and parcels of land to the individual members

of communities, for (II) the division of the globe, area by area, among the communities, states and nations of the whole world, and for (III) access and use of the air, the seas, and the mineral resources of the earth by all the peoples of the world. Until people everywhere are taught, community by community, how to adopt a system of land tenure which makes pre-emption and monopolization of land and territory impossible, universal peace will remain an iridescent dream and war between nation and nation and between rich and poor continue.

Second to this fundamental economic function is gregational organization to facilitate trade—in providing (I) a decent money system, (II) a decent price and marketing system, (III) a decent labor or wage system, (IV) a decent property system, and (V) an adequate highway and harbor system. With access to land, everybody has equal opportunity to obtain the basic necessities of living directly by their own efforts; without group provision for exchange, they cannot provide for the acquisition of the things and services which each individual or family cannot efficiently provide by personal action. If this function is to be fulfilled, markets must be organized in every community, (and not merely in distant centers); commodities graded and weights and measures standardized; money issued and retired, and credit and banking institutions provided; laws governing contracts and property enacted and enforced; and travel and port facilities provided.

We have been taught to believe that all these facilities call not only for standardization but for centralization and nationalization. But to whatever extent the local community surrenders its autonomy over them, it loses its liberty and independence. The community which abolishes its own public markets, which relinquishes control over the issuance and retirement of money, the extension of credit, and the savings it accumulates in banks and in insurance, tends to become a sort of colonial dependency from which tribute flows to distant cities and is extracted from those to whom it rightfully belongs by the absentee managers of activities which should be locally controlled from beginning to end. Standardization of many of these activities on a national and even a world level is not only quite desirable but entirely practicable, but centralization is unnecessary in order to achieve standardization. If the benefits of stan-

standardization must wait here and there until education and the losses caused by refusing to cooperate, persuades backward and recalcitrant localities to voluntarily cooperate, it is better to wait than to resort either to the devious compulsions which Finance Capitalism knows so well how to employ, or to outright national coercion and regimentation. Even with the imperfect and unstable systems for facilitating exchange with which the nations of the Western world replaced feudal economic systems since the Industrial Revolution, hunger and famine—compared with the long past of mankind—have been virtually abolished, and the masses of mankind lifted to a plane of living which the nobility and royalty of the past would have in many respects envied.

Finally there is the function of providing social services and public utilities which are of necessity gregational—police protection, fire protection; water, gas and electric service; telephone and telegraphic services; postal service; railway and street car service, etc. In the United States some of these activities are carried on by government and others by corporations which have been granted franchises under which they operate subject to more or less political regulation. To an increasing extent these services and utilities are being taken over by the governments of municipalities, states and nations—even in nations like the United States which are still Capitalistic rather than Socialistic in their economic ideology.

It should be noted that in this discussion of economic functions calling for community action, no function calling for the creation of "jobs" by government action has been included. Under the leadership of Henry A. Wallace, successively Secretary of Agriculture, Vice-President, and Secretary of Commerce in the "New Deal" but really Social Democratic administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, an insistent demand that the Federal government guarantee "full employment" has developed.* In fact, in all industrialized nations not yet totalized economically by Socialists and Communists, there is similar insistence upon the proposition that it is a function of the government to furnish everybody a job. But there is no valid evidence that it is the function of the community as a whole to furnish every single individual—old and young, male and female, bachelor

and mother—employment by other human beings. If the community fulfills its proper economic functions; if it provides normal access to land and grants no special privileges or monopolies to a favored class, the people will be provided with the opportunity for self-employment in businesses or on homesteads of their own if they either do not choose or cannot find employment with others. The ultimate recourse of access to land could then be relied upon to assure equality of bargaining powers between workers and employers.

THE variety of community groups and activities which fulfill the community's social function is very large. The essence of the function which I think of as social is *furnishing to individuals the opportunity to enjoy the satisfactions which human beings obtain from sheer association with one another*. To some extent, of course, the function is fulfilled by the mere meetings of two or more individuals anywhere in the community—on its streets, in its stores, in its homes. But many of the keenest satisfactions of association can only be obtained through regular meetings and social affairs of some kind.

To some extent the social function is fulfilled in the course of the community's fulfillment of other functions. The community's churches, schools, offices, stores and markets, shops and factories, may have been established for other purposes, but they nevertheless furnish the satisfactions of association. This likewise is true in communities which have labor unions; political clubs, movements and parties; chambers of commerce, farm bureaus and co-ops; and dramatic, musical, literary, artistic and scientific societies. It is often difficult to determine which of the community's institutions are essentially social since so many of them contribute to the fulfillment of the social function. Only by determining whether the purpose is primarily sociability—as in the case of luncheon clubs, fraternal lodges, country clubs, saloons and road houses—is classification of institutions as devoted to the social function possible.

True it is that even our smallest and most neglected communities contain some institutions which provide the satisfactions of association. But the tastes and skills of individuals—as well as their notions of morality and propriety—differ. Churches and schools are found in nearly all communities, but churches often forbid card-playing and even dancing, while schools concentrate upon the so-

cial needs of the young. A wide variety and considerable number of institutions which create opportunities for association are therefore necessary if the community is to fulfill its social function.

A community without clubs for those of each age group—for 'teen agers and for older boys and girls; without men's and women's clubs; without places for dining and drinking, and for balls and parties, is obviously an abnormal community. It is not equipped to fulfill that social need which the home and the family can at best only partially fulfill. A community which does not provide a sufficiency of distinctively social institutions is a community from which people either migrate permanently, or from which they commute to other towns and even distant cities which do contain them, and which prospers out of the business of providing socially starved "visitors" commercialized forms of sociability. Communities which ignore their social function tend to decay; their populations become progressively smaller, and less and less able to fulfill their other functions in part because they are constantly losing their best educated, most artistic, most sport and fun-loving, most enterprising and ambitious members, and in part because the smallness of their populations makes them unable to support group activities of any kind.

CV. RECREATION AND RECUPERATION
CERTAIN forms of recreation and recuperation can only be enjoyed if the members of the community provide themselves with them by group action. Personal action in the home and by the family can be relied upon to satisfy most human needs for recreation, but clubs and leagues are necessary for baseball, football and other sports in which teams must be organized; competitive, cooperative or public initiative and enterprise must be relied upon to supply theatres, eating and drinking places, bowling alleys, poolrooms, and other forms of entertainment; and government to provide the land and maintain forests and lakes, camp-grounds and playgrounds,

No community is normal unless it has a community forest or natural retreat, and no region normal unless regional action has been taken to set aside the area of land necessary not only for the conservation of soil and water but also recreation and recuperation. True, in communities which are normal to the extent of being predominantly rural, there is no such desperate need for parks as sub-

stitute for forests as is the case in congested cities; but plow land, pasture land, and woodlots, kindlier as they are to the human body and spirit, do not entirely take the place of the deep forest.

Unless every community acts to provide itself with these essentials for the fulfillment of its recreational and recuperational function, it runs the risk both of stunting the development of its own people; of alienating all those determined to enjoy their share of play—even if it means removal to cities in which they can obtain it.

VI. THE PUBLIC HEALTH FUNCTION

IT is true that the problem of maintaining health is primarily a problem in personal habits and patterns of living. The function falls mainly, so to speak, within the jurisdiction of the individual and the family. But certain aspects of the problem cannot be dealt with by private action. Mostly these have to do, not so much with maintaining health, as with sickness—with the treatment of both mental and physical disease and the protection of the public against diseases against which individuals can do little. The term *public health* is therefore a misnomer; the community function is really that of protecting the public against disease and individuals against mis-treatment when diseased. It is, therefore, a community function to deal with epidemics and infectious diseases, by quarantine and otherwise; to make certain that water supply and sewage disposal systems are hygienic; to isolate and confine persons dangerous to themselves and to the health and safety of the public; to regulate the use of dangerous drugs and poisons and methods of medical treatment which involve danger to life and health; to provide the community with various treatments of disease—medical, surgical and natural; and of course to make certain that the community has hospitals and sanatoria for the treatment of those who cannot be properly taken care of in their own homes. Finally, certain social problems not ordinarily thought of in connection with health—eugenic sterilization, euthanasia, even the charity and relief which prevents hunger—really involve the community and call for community action.

Insofar as the protection of the public health cannot be assured except by resort to the police power—as in the establishment of a quarantine—the function falls within the area of government. But an enormous part of what today has been surrendered to government in dealing with health can be dealt with far less expensively and op-

pressively by voluntary community action. We have already resorted to the police power in giving a monopoly to the medical profession, and the trend in most nations is toward the socialization of the whole of medicine. That this is an abuse of the public health function, is a matter beyond reasonable dispute by those who recognize that the community exists for the individual, not the individual for the community.

HUMAN BEINGS, by very nature of the fact that they are gregarious and not solitary animals, are not intended to live in isolated communities; they cannot live like normal human beings in a world of insular, azygous communities each organized in a posture of hostility toward every other community. On the contrary, the weight of the evidence with regard to man's nature and the nature of the physical world in which he finds himself indicates that normal living, individually and in groups, requires affiliation with the rest of mankind. The history of mankind is one long demonstration of the validity of this norm. Every organized group in the community, and of course the community itself, finds that affiliation with similar congregations renders it not only easier to fulfill the purposes for which the group exists but makes it easier for each individual in the group to live like a normal human being. The community and the community's institutions are abnormal if they do not fulfill what I think of as their affiliational function.

The problem of which affiliation is the solution, presents itself typically in the case of labor unions. A local labor union may be absolutely independent, or it may affiliate or join some city, state or nationwide organization of unions more or less similar to itself. It may affiliate federally or co-ordinally on terms which involve not much more than a contribution by means of a per capita tax to the central organization; the receipt of the right to have delegates represent it; and the reservation that it may on some prescribed basis withdraw its affiliation. On the other hand, the local union may, (as is the case in affiliation with International Unions of the kind which belong to the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations), subordinate itself to its International, surrender real control of its local affairs, accept the

absolute authority of the International over its local funds, contracts, officers, and give up all right of withdrawal or secession. It is a curious contradiction in the organization of the labor union movement that whereas the principle of affiliation in the case of locals and Internationals is authoritarian, in the case of affiliation between the Internationals and the AFL and the CIO, the principle is federal or co-ordinal.

Overwhelming evidence exists to establish the fact that no community institution—labor union, woman's club, bar or medical society, church, charitable association, political party—is truly normal unless it is affiliated with others dealing with its own problems but on a larger scale. And the evidence indicates that the community as a whole is abnormal unless it is affiliated firstly with central authorities representing its own locality and region and, finally, with an authority representing the world of which each community cannot avoid being a part. Historically this affiliation has usually been effected compulsorily by national or imperial conquest; affiliation has been so to speak, imposed upon the local community or smaller political entity *from the top down*; only occasionally has it been effected federally and voluntarily *from the bottom up* without surrendering local autonomy and destroying community sovereignty.

The evidence is clear and conclusive: unless the community itself is taught to take the initiative in fulfilling its affiliational function, it will sooner or later have affiliation imposed upon it, *willy nilly*.

FUNCTION VS. ORGANIZATION

THE definition of functions which call for gregational implementation presents problems for solution which are essentially jurisdictional in nature. Given a function which calls for fulfillment by some either large or small congregation, the question, *To which of the infinite number of existing and possible group entities shall the function be assigned*, naturally arises. Shall it be to the family, or to some other *voluntary* small and local group—a church, a labor union, a co-op or corporation, or a club; or to a large state or national denomination, a congress of unions, a holding company, a federation of

clubs? Or to some *compulsory*, government entity such as a municipality, a county, a state, a nation, a world authority?

If, as I believe, the evidence indicates that ultimate sovereignty should always remain in the face-to-face local group, then what should be the relationship of local organizations and local communities to the larger entities with which they should affiliate and to which they should delegate specific responsibilities and powers which as locals they are too small to fulfill? It is not sufficient, therefore, to consider the gregational problem from the standpoint of local institutions and local communities only. Norms must be established both for the composition, management and equipment of local communities, and for much larger groups and political units to which certain functions must be assigned if a genuinely humane social order is ever to prevail in the world.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART III. THE NORMAL COMMUNITY

SECTION III.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY

PAR. I. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY

SUB-PAR. I. TOWN VERSUS CITY

The commune is society's primary organic cell.—The Dictionary of Political Economy.

ANTHROPOLOGISTS, sociologists, and historians are almost a unit in their conviction upon this point: the primary and basic population group is that group which I shall call the *town* to distinguish it from the vague and more inclusive concept of *community*. To review the evidence which has led to this almost universal conclusion is therefore superfluous; any standard text upon the subject is sufficient to resolve the doubts of those unfamiliar with the question.*



As far back as we go in the history and pre-history of mankind, everywhere in the world, the town has been found. It is not a peculiarity of one race, religion or nation.

In the English-speaking world it has been variously called a town, a township, a parish, a manor, a borough, a village, a community.

In France, Italy and Switzerland, it has been called a *commune*.

In Germany, a *tun* and *markgenossenschaft*.

* The classic study of the question is, of course, *VILLAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST*, (1871), by Sir Henry Maine.

In Spanish-speaking countries, a *pueblo*; in Mexico, an *ejido*.
 In Czarist Russia, a *mir*.
 In Denmark, a *by* and *sogn*.
 In the Balkans, *ino koshtina*.
 In China, *hsiang* when rural, and *chen* when urban.
 And if we turn to the ancient world, in Rome, a *vill*.

IN AMERICA the population unit which comes nearest to this basic unit is the *township*. THE AMERICAN TOWNSHIP Alexis de Touqueville called attention to this fact in his DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA—in 1835, before the rise of big cities made it easy to overlook the significance of this particular type of community. His account touches upon so many of the reasons which make the township humanly normal, that, lengthy as it is, it is worth quotation in full:

The village or township is the only association which is so perfectly natural that wherever a number of men are collected it seems to constitute itself. The town, or tithing, as the smallest division of the community, must necessarily exist in all nations, whatever their laws and customs may be; if man makes monarchies and establishes republics, the first association of mankind seems constituted by the hand of God. But although the existence of the township is coeval with that of man, its liberties are not the less rarely respected and easily destroyed. . . . Local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty. The transient passions and the interests of an hour, or the chance of circumstances, may have created the external forms of independence, but the despotic tendency which has been repelled will, sooner or later, inevitably reappear on the surface . . . The American attaches himself to his home as the mountaineer clings to his hills, because the characteristic features of his country are there more distinctly marked than elsewhere. The existence of the townships of New England is in general a happy one. Their government is suited to their tastes, and chosen by themselves. In the midst of the profound peace and general comfort which reign in America the commotions of municipal discord are infrequent. The conduct of local business is easy. The political education of the people has long been complete; say rather that it was complete when the people first set foot upon the soil. In New England no tradition exists of a distinction of ranks; no portion of the community is tempted to oppress the remainder; and the abuses which may injure isolated individuals are forgotten in the general contentment which prevails. If the government is defective, (and it would no doubt be easy to point out its deficiencies), the fact that it really emanates from those it governs, and that it acts, either well or ill, casts the protecting spell of a parental pride over its faults . . . The native of New England is attached to his township because it is independent and free; his

cooperation in its affairs ensures his attachment to its interest; the well-being it affords him secures his affection; and its welfare is the aim of his ambition and of his future exertions; he takes part in every occurrence in the place; he practices the art of government in the small sphere within his reach; he accustoms himself to those forms which can alone ensure the steady progress of liberty; he imbibes their spirit; he acquires a taste for order, comprehends the union or the balance of powers, and collects clear practical notions on the nature of his duties and the extent of his rights.

The first settlements in New England, out of which the townships which de Touqueville described evolved, were settlements by organized groups rather than individuals and unrelated families, and the land upon which the group settled was administered as a community enterprise for considerable periods of time. The original title to the land in Massachusetts Bay was vested in a joint-stock Company of that name. The Company later transferred titles to each individual township. When the townships made allotments to individuals, they not only restricted the owners' rights of alienation but also retained a large part of the land for the common use of all the members of the township. In dealing with the origin of their own title to Massachusetts, however, the Massachusetts Bay Company was characteristically humorless—the fact that their title to the land originated in the seizure by force and the appropriation by fraud of land originally used for the common benefit of all by the Indians, was simply ignored.

THE composition of the original New England township is much older than New England; it is even older than the English nation itself; its antecedents lie in northern Germany among those teutonic tribes from the union of which the English people sprang.

THE GERMANIC MARK

The *Mark* was a village community, (*Genossenschaft*). As found among the Germanic tribes, each *Mark* was a virtually self-sufficient group of households composed of families of substantially equal wealth. The community came before the individual; the idea of kinship and brotherhood was strongly emphasized; community problems were dealt with very democratically. The *Genossenschaften* recognized several different kinds of landed property of which the four most important were (I) dwelling places, (II) gardens, (III) arable land, and (IV) waste land. With regard to dwelling places and gardens, as might be expected, a large degree of what we would today

call private property was recognized, but the arable fields, with their changing strips in fields set aside alternately to lie fallow, were assigned periodically to each family by the community, while the waste land, or *commons*, was used by all families in the community and no part of it even temporarily apportioned to any one family.*

LIKE its prototype, the Germanic mark, the old English town was surrounded by a hedge or fence—a *tun*. Suffixes like “ton,” (for *tun*), and “wick” “ham” or “stead,” added to a clan name such as “Hamp,”

THE ENGLISH TOWN

* There is rather conclusive evidence that communal possession of the *arable* land was a mistake. Not until the enclosure movement began and private possession of farm land developed was there any real progress in agriculture. With communal farming, group inertia and group resistance to changes in the traditional methods of cultivation was so great that the crops harvested were never large enough to eliminate hunger nor to avoid the famines which decimated whole regions every few years. E. Parmalee Prentice, in his *HUNGER AND HISTORY*, (Harper & Brothers, 1939), marshalls evidence which establishes the normality of individual farming and private possession of arable land. In the traditional, communal method of farming the “land was generally cultivated on the plan of a triennial rotation—the first year wheat or rye; the second year barley, oats, beans or peas; the third year, fallow. There were no fences, (outside the villages), but the land in each part of the rotation was divided into strips, long and narrow, often marked by rough balks of unploughed land, so that every member of the community could know what land was his, and so arranged that every one had a third of his holding in each part of the rotation. In the use of their land, all owners, from the lord of the manor down, were compelled to follow the same system—to plough, sew and reap, at the same time. Roots, clover and artificial grasses . . . subsequently revolutionized farming. Flax, hemp and other crops could have been raised to advantage as has since been done. More important still would have been the cultivation of potatoes, but no change could be made and no new crops introduced into an open-field farm unless the whole body of farmers agreed to alter the field customs, and this agreement never came.” (p. 32).

“(Oliver) Goldsmith . . . could not look far enough ahead to see the stimulus which private ownership would give to ambition and initiative, nor the large number of people who could be supported by enclosed fields which, when used as commons, produced little. A poet and a dramatist failed to understand the value, to his country and to the world, of the historic work in which Robert Blakewell was at that very time engaged, and which stirred up, as Dr. Anderson said, in 1799, ‘a species of furor in the breeding line that hath, perhaps no parallel in history, unless it be the tulip-mania which, about two hundred years ago, prevailed in Holland.’ It was a great achievement for a working farmer to teach the world what could be done to improve cattle and sheep and it is his work with cattle that suggested to Amos Cruikshank, the Colling brothers and others, the improvement of British beef animals of which Mr. James Sinclair says that it has made it possible ‘materially to raise the standard of living of the toiling millions.’ In the end, *the abolition of commons was a contributing cause for all the progress that the nineteenth century brought.*” (Ibid., p. 47).

Prentice’s evidence bears on *common ownership of farms*; it does not really furnish any evidence against *community ownership of pasture land, forest land, and mineral land*. The italics in the quotation from Prentice are mine.—R. B.

produced town names like Hampton and Hampstead. Common ownership of the land, but not common cultivation, prevailed. Land use was regulated by the *tun-moot* or town-meeting. Each family had its dwelling place and plot of ground, and ownership of this plot carried with it the right to cultivate portions of the arable land as well as the right of pasturage in the undivided commons or "waste." The government was thoroughly democratic. In the town-meeting, all the freemen assembled to enact town or *by-laws*, (from the Danish *by*, which means *town*), adjust disputes, and try petty offenders. The chief officers of the community were elected at the town meeting—the *gerefa* or head-man, the *bydel* or messenger, and the *tithing-man*. The town was the autonomous unit of representation in the assemblies of the *hundred*, (a number of towns) and the *shire*, (which comprised a number of *hundreds*). The *shires* later became known as *counties*. During the Norman period, the town became known as a *manor*; at a still later period, the manor began to be called a *parish*. Between 1580 and 1640, the terms *town* and *parish* were interchangeable. The *vestry-meeting* in the parish corresponded to the *tun-moot* of Saxon days; it elected the same kinds of officers only it called them *church wardens* and *vestry-clerks*.



When transplanted to New England, the settlers in America returned to the use of the older term *town*; the wardens became *select-men*; the vestry-clerks, *town-clerks*. But functions and organization were unchanged. The land and the territory which the community governed included not only the area within the stockades usually erected to protect the people and the dwellings from the Indians—the part of the town we call a village—but also the outlying agricultural areas. As in England and in the original Germanic mark, ownership of a house-lot carried with it the right to cultivate outlying fields assigned by the town-meeting to each family and the right to pasturage in the undivided commons. The government was a pure democracy, the residents coming together not only to deal with the limited range of subjects with which the modern town-meeting deals but with maintenance of highways, care of the poor, support of the school, assessment and collection of taxes, organization of the local militia, election of a representative to the colonial assembly, and

above all, apportionment of the use of land. It was, in fact, a miniature state exercising sovereignty over the population and territory within its boundaries.

IT IS only in primitive village communities that it is still possible to see the forces in operation which originally led to the establishment of the American township. In these simple communities—both nomadic and agricultural—the relationship of the individual and of the community to the land can be observed free from the sophisms with which civilized society obscures it. In them the idea of *commonwealth* in land—an idea which the legalization of private pre-emption of land and the idea of superseding the local community by the national state have combined to destroy in the modern world—is still a living fact. There are still many such communities in the world today—in Indonesia, for instance—and millions of human beings still live contentedly in them.

What fundamental reason has led to the world-wide development of these communities? What is the ultimate purpose fulfilled by these organizations in which the life of the individual is almost blended into that of the community and in which the relationship of the members of the community to one another has something of the intimacy of family life? According to a former governor of Dutch East Java, it is *to live harmoniously*:

Harmony with God and nature, harmony with one's fellow men, harmony within oneself, that is the all-important aim, far more than the material gains of success. Though only a few are Christians, the truth of the biblical words "For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" inspires their life. The Indonesian communities—usually the village, in some parts of the archipelago a large unit—are essentially harmonious. There is a balance between the sovereignty of public opinion and on the other hand respect for the elected headman and his village officials, and the guidance of the village elders, who are unpaid justices of peace solving quarrels and small contentions, restoring harmony in the homes and in the village with no other aims than a spotless life, wisdom and recognition by public opinion. And there is a balance, too, between the right of the individual on his land and the right of the community. Nowhere except in cities, *where the community has lost its life and character*, is its right on the land wholly absent.*

* "Stars of the Plough," by Charles O. van der Plas; in "Land and Home," March, 1943, page 2. The italics are mine.—R. B.

Concretely and practically, these village communities exist, as civic entities, mainly for the purpose of regulating the possession of the land upon which the members of the community, (and for that matter people everywhere in the world), depend for their existence. In the Indonesian village the land is still recognized as the ultimate natural resource which provides every individual—even when a city-dweller—with the means of existence and livelihood.† To insure that this natural resource—this *commonwealth* of everybody's—shall neither be pre-empted by a few nor held for speculation by absentee owners, and to prevent disastrous quarrels about the boundaries of each parcel of land, the community itself is organized as a body politic. The community functions through what is for all practical purposes a super town-meeting. In our own town-meetings this sovereign power of the local community is no longer exercised; land is no longer considered nature's gift to man to enable him to survive, to furnish him employment, to provide him with security, and to develop his character. Custom and law treat it as an object of speculation; the fortunate "original" possessors of land and their heirs are given the privilege of profiting at the expense of those who are without land; the present generation of land owners are given a pre-

† Upon this point, Elphinstone says: "The rights of the landholders (in ancient village communities) are theirs collectively and, though they almost always have more or less perfect partition of them, they never have an entire partition. A landholder, for instance, can sell or mortgage his rights; but he must first have the consent of the Village, and the purchaser steps exactly into his place and takes up all his obligations. If a family becomes extinct, its share (of the village land) returns to the common stock."—Mountstuart Elphinstone, *HISTORY OF INDIA*, I-126.

Driberg, in his essay, "The Savage as He Really Is," says: "A clear distinction is made between the soil and the enjoyment of its products. The former is the possession of the clan or of the tribe; the latter belongs to the individual farming the land. Ownership gives no rights of property in the soil, and only the use of the soil can be transmitted to an heir. The same principle holds good among pastoral tribes; for though they do not cultivate the soil, the tribal lands are divided into clan pasturages, the grazing rights of which are strictly preserved. In no case can land be sold or alienated by gift, exchange or any other form of transfer."—cf. Adam Savage, *THE PROFESSOR'S HOTSPOTCH*, 1934, p. 68.

The essential problem of *what is commonwealth* and *what is not*, is that of deciding concerning each type of goods *what is mine*, (including myself), *what is another person's*, (including his own self); and *what is everybody's*, (what belongs to the community to which all belong). *Mine* may mean *my family's* and *another's* may mean *another family's* with regard to property like the family homestead which is familial (rather than individual) in nature. On this basis, it is wrong not only to take but to injure or destroy what is not one's own—what is either another's or what is everybody's.

emptive right to the natural resources essential to the life of every generation. All the surviving American town-meeting has left of the full sovereignty exercised by the first New England communities and by the remaining primitive agricultural communities of the world, is local police, taxing and spending power. That is something, but little in comparison with what it has lost.

LAND TENURE varies in the Indonesian communities which have not yet lost this key to the solution of the social problem. In some villages the land is re-divided each year at the annual town-meeting into a sufficient number of lots to furnish every member of the community an equal opportunity to obtain a livelihood. In others, the canker of landlordism has put in its appearance, and the land can be sold to any person who is accepted as a member of the community even though the buyer is already a landowner. But in most of them, no issue for community action about the possession of land ever arises unless a landholder dies without leaving heirs, or the land is abandoned by a villager who has left the community. In case of death intestate, the community steps in and assigns the land to one of the villagers in need of land, perhaps a newly married couple. In case of abandonment, instead of the absentee owner being permitted to extract a profit from its rent or resale, the sovereign right of the community to its commonwealth is asserted and the land is assigned to a landless family.

In most villages, the meeting at which land problems are settled is the most important event of the year. In Java this meeting is poetically called the *kumpulan udar gelung*—the meeting for the straightening out of tangled hair. On the morning of the meeting, offerings are placed upon the village sacred place—perhaps the grave of the mythical founder of the village, of some saint or wise man—or a venerated spring, forest or great tree. The women of the village, much as in our own New England townships, finish the cooking they have been doing for days in preparation for a feast. Sweets, cakes of sticky rice, biscuits, curried rice, vegetables, salted fish, and sometimes chicken or goat, are brought to the festival center.

In the village hall, mats are spread out and the village headman and officials gather. All the men of the village, and women if they

have a cause to plead, assemble and squat down on the mats contentedly chatting until the proceedings begin. The village officials come in and are seated at one side, facing the rest. The elders, and religious leaders, sit in front of the others. A small offering of fruit and cakes is placed in the center. Incense perfumes the hall, and a prayer is said beseeching Allah, all the spirits which animate the land, the mountains and the rivers, the demi-goddess of the harvest and the spirits of the founders, to bless the community and its works. After routine reports, the great question of the succession and distribution of land which is not being used begins.

Wongo has died recently and his son, Karto, is an absentee. It is believed that he works in the city, and therefore, in the opinion of the elders, he cannot inherit the land. A friend of Karto pleads his case. Let the land be assigned to Karto, and he, Kromo, will work it and will faithfully accomplish all the duties incumbent upon the ownership of the land. Karto's forbears have all been good members of the community. Is it quite fair that Karto should be ousted and the land ceded to a stranger? A quiet and dignified discussion begins and it is decided that Karto's full cousin, a promising boy, who has already taken over Wongo's duties to the village, will inherit the land.

So one after another the cases are disposed of, until the problem of land apportionment for the coming year has been resolved.

We may learn from these simply organized communities essential principles which we have ignored in developing the urban civilization of which we are so proud. But no matter how normal the traditional organization of these agrarian communities may be for them in their state of development, that does not mean that the solution of our social problems requires an exact duplication of their institutions. The question which has to be asked is what sort of organization and what sort of institutions are essential to the normalization of our own communities in terms of our own cultural development. I believe that it is possible to take the high technology which we have developed into account and still retain the essentials of normal community life. This is what Henry George did in suggesting the single tax on land values as a means of re-asserting the community's right in the commonwealth of its people. This is what Frank Lloyd Wright has done in his concept of "Broadacres City" as a basis of community planning. And this is the challenge to the leaders of the cooperative movement, and the educators of the community, who between them have the opportunity for not only re-establishing the community's

right to land apportionment but implementing it immediately without waiting until the whole of a state or nation has been converted to the principles of Henry George.

NOTHING has more often lead to war than conflicts over boundary lines. Nothing is more arbitrary than the areas of the population units, from townships to nations, which people have been taught to accept as natural and desirable. Yet nothing would do more to eliminate the wastes, injustices and conflicts which flow from mis-education upon this matter than the substitution of the idea that *the size of a community should reflect a principle rooted in the normal needs of the population*, for the idea of *accepting existing arbitrary areas and boundary lines* which political considerations and historical accidents have fastened upon each one of them. In spite of the fact that there is such a norm, we ignore it and continue to teach people that not reason but history and politics should be determinants of the composition of communities and states.

In size, studies of specific prototypes of our rural communities—the Germanic *mark* and the English *town, manor and parish*—show that they ranged in area between 900 and 3,000 acres, and in population from as few as twelve to 60 families, to as many as 300 to 500. (In the case of Grozhartan, a not unusual mark, the population consisted of 370 families and about 1,600 persons). Our own New England townships were usually composed of larger areas; most of them cover an area ranging between 20 and 30 square miles. In most of our Western states, the areas and boundaries were pre-fixed by Act of Congress in arbitrary blocks of 36 square miles. These sizes reflect not reason but historical accidents, the land hunger of lords and barons, the parochial needs of the church, or the arbitrary planning of state and national politicians and surveyors.



The distinctly modern approach to the definition of the real community, (as distinct from political entities), is through the concept of *trading area*. All villages and cities draw trade from various directions and varying distances; the area within the bounds fixed by these points define not only a trading area but also the natural community

area. Trading areas, however, are never precise squares of land, as in the case of most of America's townships. The boundaries of most of our townships are as arbitrary as their areas because they tend to disregard not only the pattern of behavior of which trading and shopping is typical but also topography and natural resources. Only the fact that tariffs are not levied at their boundaries minimizes the evil consequences of this mistaken approach to the composition of the community.

When communities are defined in terms of trading areas, they are almost invariably very irregular in outline. There are valid explanations for the indentations in their outlines. Sharp and long projections usually indicate prosperous, narrow valleys; good automobile roads; trolleys or bus lines. Deep indentations, on the other hand, indicate mountainous, forest or other sparsely populated areas. One study of trading in rural communities shows that farm families will travel distances ranging between 4.9 miles for groceries to 12.9 miles in purchasing women's clothing.* Sixty per cent of them buy groceries in villages of under 1,000 population; only eight per cent buy women's clothing in such small centers. Lumber and farm implements are other items which they buy in such small centers.

The concept of the community as a trading area, however, represents an approach to the problem which over-emphasizes the interest of the storekeepers and residents of the village; under-emphasizes that of those in the area outside of it upon whom the village is nevertheless dependent for patrons and for its *raison d'etre*, and tends to separate the whole population of the community into two separate groups. It seemingly justifies the tendency to incorporate villages and make them separate entities from the township as a whole. Some broader approach to the definition of the area and population composing the whole community is needed if existing communities are to be normalized.

SUCH an approach is furnished by the concept of *commutation*—COMMUTATION AREAS—using the word broadly with reference to the behavior of human beings in every region of the world and in every kind of culture back

* SALES MANAGERS' HANDBOOK, J. C. Aspley, Dartnell Corporation, 1940; p. 197.

to the most primitive, and not merely with regard to traveling back and forth on railroad commutation tickets.

Commutation in this sense in modern communities is for the most part occasioned by the fact that each community has (I) *a center*—sometimes called “the town,” sometimes referred to as “down-town,” and (II) *an outlying region* in which most of its inhabitants dwell. Between the outlying regions and the center practically all the inhabitants commute for some purpose or other more or less regularly—sometimes daily, sometimes weekly, sometimes monthly, sometimes even less frequently seasonally, annually, biennially, and to vote in Presidential years, quadriennially. The men commute daily to their work, the women to shop, the children to go to school. On Sundays most families commute to church. Once a month the members of most clubs, lodges, labor unions, and other associations commute to meetings or to luncheons, dinners, dances and other social affairs. Everybody commutes less regularly to the bank, to the theatre, to dine and wine out, to attend political or other mass-meetings, to vote, to go to court, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

The most distant points from which any considerable number of people commute creates a perimeter around the community which I believe in every case the true and proper boundary of the real community, (as distinguished from the conventional concept of the identity of municipality and community). This perimeter is naturally irregular in outline; in the very nature of the behavior pattern which creates it, it cannot be a perfect square. *The land within this natural boundary constitutes the community's actual area; the people living within it, the community's true population.**

It is true that in nearly all instances some few families living in the periphery of *Easton* may be commuters to the center of the adjoining community of *Weston*, and *vice versa*. But the points at which this cross-commutation takes place—at which approximately equal numbers of the people living near the boundary of the two communities pass each other—outlines the actual boundary between them.

* The concept of *metropolitan districts*, as used in the Census, is for all practical purposes the concept of the actual community as here defined. The metropolitan district of New York, for instance, disregards the corporate divisions of cities and counties, the mile-wide Hudson River and even wider bay between Manhattan and Staten Island; it disregards the boundary between two states.

CITIES, in spite of the fact that they are so often cancerous, may be normal entities. They can and do render services which small towns, no matter how perfect, cannot render—services which are unquestionably essential if mankind is to live normally *on the plane of living which modern technology makes possible*. The issue between town and city is really an issue only between the *normal town* and the *abnormal city*.



The most obvious difference between town and city is a difference of size. The town is a small center; the city a large one. But there is not only a difference of degree; there is also a difference in nature. *The normal community is a unity; center and outlying regions are not separated*. The township's political, economic, social and cultural activities and institutions do not distinguish between those who dwell in the township center and those who dwell outside. On the other hand, *a city is a community which has been separated from the region upon which it is dependent for its sustenance*.

The moment a village separates itself from the township of which it is really a part, we are confronted not merely with an *incorporated village*; we are confronted with the *city-in-embryo*. Out of such incorporated villages, all our cities have developed. It is not exaggerating the facts very much to say that virtually all the incorporated villages of America aspire—or at one time aspired—to be cities. If they do not grow into cities, the hopes of the business and political leaders of the movement for their incorporation are not realized.

Incorporation, however, does not stop with mere dismemberment of the township as a whole and normal community; it is the first step too often in a cancerous growth which begins by absorbing the rest of the township and then begins to absorb as many adjoining towns as possible. This cancerous process ceases to be "incorporation of the city"; it becomes "incorporation *in* the city."

In practice, the granting of charters of incorporation to villages and cities is the granting of a species of license for the development of a parasitic prosperity at the expense of the communities or regions from which they have been separated. The city is the parasite; the country upon which it depends for its prosperity, the host. One of

the privileges conferred by incorporation is exemption from township taxation: the city not only ceases to contribute to the support of the township—the larger its area, the less taxable area is left to the township from which to draw revenue. As cities grow larger, the privileges conferred upon them are increased. There are in most states different kinds of charters with different kinds of privileges for cities of first, second, and third class size.

The net result of this is the creation in every city, small and large, of vested interests in the exploitation of the population outside the city. Cities and city people become dependent upon the stream of profits which retail stores, wholesale markets, terminals, theatres, hotels, banks, and other similar institutions extract from outsiders. The taxes collected directly from these businesses, and indirectly through the rise in land values for which they are responsible, makes possible the support of a growing variety of municipal services and growing army of municipal functionaries and job-holders. What is more, these privileges, by creating an artificial prosperity in the city, and an artificial depression in the rural areas outside of them, tend to draw more and more of the rural population into the city. The cities grow and flourish; the rural regions wither from depopulation.

The city, then, is not merely a large town. The moment it is thus separated from the whole region of which it is really an organ, it becomes an entity which has the same relationship to the normal social organism that cancers have to the normal human body.

It is, of course, an exaggeration to say that cities are purely parasitic. In spite of the overwhelming evidence establishing the cancerous character of the modern city, it is absurd to assume that an invention so distinctively human, which has so persistently developed in all manners of nations, serves no legitimate needs. The history of cities makes it clear, however abnormal may be their tendency to unlimited growth, that they did come into existence to serve real needs—needs which human beings found it impossible to satisfy in small village communities. To satisfy these needs, ancient man began the building of cities. To satisfy needs which are still essential if modern man is to live normally, some population centers larger than the normal rural township center are undoubtedly necessary.

The question is, what are these needs?

I. CITADEL
IN the ancient world, the city was first and foremost a *citadel*. The city was the place of refuge into which the people of a whole country moved when attacked by invaders. And even when the citadel became separated from the town, as it did in early feudal history, and became the castle which the nobility used to protect itself, it was still, in case of invasion, the place to which people of the fief retired for safety and defense.

Of the various purposes which led the confederated clans of ancient Greece to establish cities, protection was only one, as Woodrow Wilson makes clear:

The city of Homer's day . . . was generally a citadel upon a hilltop to which the confederated families living in the country round about it resorted in times of actual or threatened invasion. It contained the temples of the gods and was the seat of common worship. In it was the marketplace, also, in which the trade of the countryside centered. It saw the festivals, the sacrifices, the councils, the armed musterings of the people. But it did not see their daily life. That was not lived in common, but apart in clans.

II. TEMPLE
THE fact that men probably gathered in congregations first for defense against the forces of nature and for the propitiation of the spirits which controlled the elements, was not forgotten when they began to build cities. In countless instances the *temple* remained the heart of the city. Holy cities like Benares, Jerusalem, Mecca and Rome are simply more famous temples than the rest. In England, the term city was for centuries reserved for cathedral towns—for intowns which were Episcopal sees. As Blackstone puts it:

A city is a town incorporated which is or has been the see of a bishop; and though the bishopric has been dissolved, as at Westminster, it yet remaineth a city.

III. MARKETPLACE
BY the fifteenth century, the burghers of English towns, which in Saxon days had been governed by town-meetings, began to secure from the crown, either by purchase or pledge of an annual contribution, charters which separated town and countryside. The granting of municipal charters, which was then the prerogative of the crown, is with us the prerogative of the state. The political and administrative organizations which these charters created, replaced

government by town-meeting, freed the burghers and their guilds from the exactions of the feudal nobility, and also licensed them to develop and control the trade of their city in their own interest and without regard to that of the countrymen whom they were thus enabled to reduce to the status of visitors and mere customers.

After the Commercial Revolution, the city may still have been a bishopric and center of worship for pilgrims, but with the decline of religion, it was less a temple and more a *market-place*. For a time it may still have furnished protection against invaders but with the coming of modern methods of warfare, city walls ceased to furnish any useful purpose, and the city—as citadel—became entirely obsolete. What the city became was a permanent, as contrasted to a periodic, market-place.

IV. UNIVERSITY
WITH the revival of learning during the Renaissance, many cities became *universities* and scientific and intellectual centers for whole regions. The country may still be the incubator of creative genius but the city, with its schools, libraries and museums, has become the place to which talented individuals resort to complete their educations and to master their professions.

V. CAPITOL
THE decline of Feudalism and the rise of Nationalism enabled at least one city in every nation and one in every state or province to fulfill a new function, that of *capitol* and seat of government. With Feudalism, the seat of government moved about; wherever king or duke took up his residence, there was the capitol. Nationalism changed all that. Paris, for instance, instead of being merely one of the cities of France which from time to time served as the capitol of the kingdom, became the permanent capitol of the nation.

VI. TERMINAL
EVEN before the coming of the railroad, when shipping was still the most important means of transportation, rivers and harbors made some cities *terminals* above all else. But with the coming of the railroad, inland and not only port cities became terminals to which people from small communities had to resort in order to take advantage of speedy travel by express through trains.

VII. WAREHOUSE
AS terminal, however, the city became not only a center for passenger travel but also for the storage of goods. It became a *warehouse* in which wholesalers stored merchandise, sometimes manufactured in other cities and sometimes imported from foreign parts. The city, which had been a retail market, now became even more important as a wholesale market.

VIII. FACTORY
THEN, with the coming of the Industrial Revolution, the city became, in addition, a *factory*—the place where all sorts of goods which may or may not have justified factory and mass-production, was manufactured.

IX. BANK
WHETHER it is as *factory* or as *bank*, (financial center and stock exchange), that the city fulfills modern needs most completely, it is hard to say. Certainly with the shift from independent Capitalistic organization of enterprise to “big business” and Finance Capitalism, the city has become as much a financial as an industrial, commercial and transportation center.

X. HEADQUARTERS
BUT the city is now not only a seat for the governments of states and nations—it is a *headquarters*, the seat from which all sorts of enterprises, (commercial, industrial, financial), and all sorts of associations, movements and parties, (trade, labor, scientific, religious, professional, cultural, artistic, political, charitable, fraternal), are directed. That cities as big as New York are needed to house these organizations is not true. Some of them have their headquarters in relatively small cities. But national and international conventions need large halls; they need big hotels, restaurants and places of entertainment for their delegates, and small communities cannot provide these—without themselves ceasing to be small.

XI. SPECTACLE
FINALLY the city has become a *spectacle*—it provides monumental and magnificent architecture, (public buildings, terminals, office buildings, cathedrals, hotels, stores, palatial residences, museums, and libraries), avenues and boulevards, botanical and zoological gardens,

planetariums, concert halls, opera houses, sport arenas, and similar spectacular institutions which cease to be spectacular unless large enough to be impressive.



What now are the real needs which cities alone can fulfill—the functions which must be fulfilled for really civilized living and which cannot be fulfilled by small communities no matter how near normal?

Obviously the city is no longer needed to provide protection. Long before the coming of the airplane, the bomber and the atomic bomb, it ceased to be a citadel or fortress. The city today is utterly unsuitable as armory and munitions warehouse; it cannot furnish the open space needed for the training and encampments of armies.

Nor is it any longer needed as a temple. There is something downright sardonic in thinking of the modern city as "the Holy City." The people today, if they worship at all, can find almost everything they may desire—except the famous preachers who occupy city pulpits—in the churches of relatively small communities. Only a few historic cities, (like Rome), sacred to specific denominations, are still places of pilgrimage for the devout.

For most of the things which people buy at retail, large cities are not needed. Only a few very unusual classes of merchandise, like scientific instruments, which only a few consumers ever buy, or imported and exotic luxuries which consumers buy only very rarely, cannot be profitably carried in stock in the stores which every normal community can support. And if decentralization were pushed to its optimum point, with city populations made smaller, and small community populations correspondingly larger, every community would have enough trade to support stores with varied enough stocks of merchandise to be a satisfactory retail market-place.

Nor are cities as big as monstrosities like New York and London needed to fulfill needs which are genuine requirements of civilized living. A relatively small city like ancient Athens satisfied man's hunger for magnificence much better than can a metropolis like Chicago. Universities in relatively small cities like medieval Oxford produced minds and personalities just as subtle and cultured as does modern London. The evidence does indicate that regional centers—

normal cities—are needed; it does not indicate that there is the slightest excuse for metropolis and megalopolis.

Nor finally is the city necessarily the best place for the location of factories. In spite of the fact that most modern cities are manufacturing centers, the weight of the evidence indicates that as locations for factories, cities have become less efficient and profitable than small towns. City factories may some day be as obsolete as city walls. This question was discussed under the topic of "Industrialization—the Centralization of Production,"* in Part II of this book, but it is so important in connection with the question of the validity of the modern city that certain aspects of it warrant more detailed exploration.



Factories, as I tried to establish in a previous work,† are of two kinds—essential and non-essential. Perhaps two-thirds of all the

* cf., pp. 204-220.

† cf., THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION, Harper & Bros., New York, 1929; pp. 78-128.

"The factory's products are of three kinds.

"The first are products, of which copper wire is one example, which can best be made, or made most economically, by the factory. They are *desirable products* because they are essential to the maintenance of our present standard of well-being.

"The second are products, of which a can of tomatoes furnishes a good example, which are just as desirable as the first, but which differ from the first because they can be made just as well, and often more economically, outside the factory.

"The third are *undesirable products*, of which patent medicines are typical, which are undesirable because they are not essential and may actually interfere with the maintenance of a high standard of living. They are products which it would be better not to make at all.

"Since the first kind of products, often not only factory-made but factory-begotten, so to speak, are essential to the maintenance of our present standard of living, it follows that the factories making them are *essential factories*. Ugly though all factories may be, and ugly though the factories making these products are, society will have to tolerate them because they furnish products which really add to mankind's comfort.

"But products of the second kind—products equally as necessary to material well-being as the first kind—we can provide for ourselves by other methods than that of factory production. The products of this kind are essential, but the factories making them are not.

"There are therefore two kinds of factories:

"*Essential factories* making desirable products which can best be made by the factory.

"*Non-essential factories* manufacturing either the desirable products which can be made just as well or even better outside of the factory, or the undesirable products which it would be wisest not to make at all."—pp. 78-79.

factories of which modern man is so proud are non-essential. If decentralization of production were pushed to its optimum point, no location for these non-essential factories would be needed at all. The goods now manufactured in them would be produced either in the home, family by family, or in relatively small shops in each community for local and nearby sale. What then we are concerned with are only those factories, like plants for the assembly of automobiles, which must produce on a mass-basis for nation wide distribution in order to produce desirable goods at a low cost.

The argument for the centralization of manufacturing in large cities is usually two-fold: (I) the city furnishes an ample (and at one time cheap) supply of labor, and (II) it furnishes an economical location from the standpoint either of obtaining raw materials or of shipping and marketing its finished products.

I. That the city does furnish an ample supply of labor is true. That at one time it furnished a cheap and readily exploitable labor supply, is also true. But that it furnishes such a supply today, is not true. It used to furnish cheap labor because city life deprived the laborer of the natural alternative to employment by others—it made it impossible for him and the members of his family to produce a living for themselves on their own homestead; it forced him not only to work for others but to accept whatever wages they were willing to offer him. On the other hand, because of the high land values and other wastes of city life, costs of living in the city are always high. The city worker used to be ground down between the upper millstone of low wages and the nether millstone of high rents, high food prices, high expenses of all sorts. But labor unionism and government interventionism have changed all that. Today the city labor supply is not cheaper than labor in small communities—it is both higher in cost and lower in efficiency. If decentralization ever really gets under way, the surplus of labor which now piles up in cities will disappear at the same time that an ample supply will become available in the small communities of the country.

II. As to the location of factories, what they gain by locating near the sources of their raw materials, they tend to lose by being far away from the consumers of their products and *vice versa*. If they locate in cities which are the centers of great populations, or which have

differential advantages as points from which to ship and distribute goods, they tend to lose by being far away from the sources of raw materials. For the most part, cities vie with one another in obtaining differential freight rates which favor themselves at the expense not only of other cities but small communities generally for the purpose of attracting factories, raising the total pay-rolls disbursed in them, and increasing their populations. If our freight rate structure were a just and rational one; if it were based upon uniform terminal charges, (without regard to long or short hauls), and upon a per-ton, per-mile basis for distance shipped; if, instead of our present system of favoring certain cities, (like Pittsburg), and certain regions, (like the Northeast), and saddling the bulk of the cost of operating the railroads upon agriculture and mining, few factories would find it advantageous to locate in large cities. But for the intervention of this governmentally fostered system of rebates and drawbacks* to favor cities and industrialized sections and to handicap small communities and rural regions, (and subsidize manufacturers at the expense of farmers and other producers of raw materials), decentralization of industry would be the natural tendency and few factories would locate in big cities or in the over-industrialized sections of the nation. The evidence points to the conclusion that cities are suitable, from the standpoint of efficiency, only for light manufacturing or manufacturing for local consumption, and that heavy manufacturing and manufacturing for the national and export market should be spread out among as many small communities as possible—among those especially favored by nature with the particular raw materials which various kinds of factories use. Flour milling for the national and export market, for instance, instead of being concentrated in giant mills in a few cities like Minneapolis, would take place in hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of wheat raising communities.

The advantage, again in terms of efficiency, of shifting the factory from the city to the small community would be that costs of living for

* A *rebate* is a part of the published freight rate of a railroad or steamship company which is returned, usually secretly, by the carrier to favored shippers for the purpose of inducing them to use that line to the exclusion of competing carriers. *Drawback* was a term sometimes used to describe an even more unfair system of rebating used by American railroads. These were payments to a favored shipper of a percentage of the freight received by the railroad from all the shipper's competitors. It is doubtful whether any other form of unfair com-

the workers would be lower; land values, and therefore rents, would be lower than in congested cities; seasonal work in factories would be fitted into seasonal work on the land; producers of raw materials would not be burdened with the costs of long hauls nor deductions to basing points; taxes would be lower and taxation for social security would be rendered practically superfluous because the family and the homestead would again protect the individual when unemployed and in sickness and old age; the workers would have a natural alternative to full dependence upon wages and jobs; and all these advantages would more than offset the single valid advantage of locating the factory in congested metropolitan regions which can absorb a large part of each factory's production. And, if the truth about centralization vs. decentralization were taught, and decentralization permitted to take its natural course—instead of being artificially impeded by the vested interests which profit from centralization—there would be no such congested metropolitan regions, so that the last advantage of centralizing industry would tend to disappear. The facts of the matter are that it is a species of social crime to locate factories in cities when they might better be located in small communities in what are now almost exclusively rural regions.

HOWEVER, the evidence indicates that even if all the superfluous activities of cities were eliminated, there would still remain services necessary and desirable which only cities can fulfill. The question is, how large would cities have to be in order to be able to fulfill them? I can venture only a very tentative answer to this question on the basis of the researches I have been able to make. Study of cities in terms of functions which small communities cannot fulfill, seems to establish the validity of cities of two kinds and perhaps two different sizes: (I) provincial, intra-national, or, as I think of them, *regional cities and centers*—cities which can fulfill the needs of regions larger than most of our counties but smaller than most of our states, and (II) international or *world cities and centers*—cities not necessarily

petition contributed more to the creation of monopolies than this system which enabled favored shippers—like Carnegie Steel or the Standard Oil Company—to destroy their competitors. The reference I am making is to what is analogous to drawbacks—undercharging shippers in cities and industrial regions with the profits from overcharges on freight from small communities and agricultural regions.

larger or more densely populated than regional cities but organized to fulfill the need for free-ports and for international and inter-continental traffic and relationships of all kinds. *All the functions which small communities cannot provide and for which these two kinds of cities are needed can, however, be provided by cities much smaller than those of which we are so proud today.* No metropolis with a population in the millions is needed to provide them. It is very probable that every need of a high culture with a high standard of living could be provided with cities of around 25,000 population and without any cities of over 100,000.

For it should be remembered that if industry and agriculture, and ownership, control, education and government were decentralized, the need for centralized activities and institutions would be so greatly reduced—and so many of our existing centralized enterprises entirely eliminated—that the population need no longer be centralized. We would still need wholesale markets; we would still need transportation and financial centers, and centers for government, higher education, headquarters and spectacles, but they would not have to be so large and they would not require such an array of workers to man them, nor an army of unnecessary workers to wait on the necessary workers in them.

The aim of those concerned with the design of cities ought not to be the discovery of how large—and inhuman—cities might be made, but how small and human. If that aim were pursued by city planners, and the truth about normal living taught by our teachers, city centers might become little different from small towns in terms of density of population, and the bulk of those who worked in them live on rurban homesteads distinguishable from the farmsteads farther out only by their smaller acreages, instead of in the towering sixteen-story housing developments with which the City Planning Commission of New York is planning to maintain (and perhaps increase) the population of Manhattan.

There is, unfortunately, no recognition among professional city planners of the importance of determining the optimum size for cities. What is just as unfortunate, economists, sociologists and political scientists also ignore the question. In all their approaches to the problems of urban civilization, the norm they take for granted is

limitless growth. That real estate men, mortgage bankers, contractors and builders, local politicians, big storekeepers, hotel men, saloon keepers, brothel keepers and gamblers, should encourage the limitless growth of cities is something to be expected; but that teachers and leaders of the people should accept this as normal is typical of the mis-education of modern man.

I have said this modern city is cancerous. I think the analogy an almost perfect one. A cancer is a growth developing in an otherwise normal organ or tissue. Its principal characteristic is its tendency toward limitless growth. It keeps on growing, following some degenerate principle peculiar to itself, without regard to the health of its host, and, unless checked, eventually destroys not only its host but itself. The principal characteristic of the modern city is limitless growth. Sheer increase in population and of area is considered healthy by not only the ordinary residents of cities but unfortunately by social scientists who ought to know better. All the functions the modern city fulfills are subsidiary to the ideal of sheer growth.

There is only one right way to deal with this cancer. That is to transform the tumorous growth into a useful organism. *The modern city must be reduced in size until it draws no more wealth—and no more population—from the region it serves than is necessary to fulfill the functions which alone justify its existence.* Its normalization and humanization requires decentralization. And the first step in the realization of this revolution in our concept of city design and city planning—of city composition—is the development of a leadership which sees the city not in terms of the city as the unit of design but of city and region—of the whole entity for which the city itself ought to be a convenient central service station and nothing more.

I HAVE said that the city is dependent upon the country. Perhaps CITY AND COUNTRY it would be more correct to say that if our cities were normalized—if metropolis and megalopolis were decentralized—the interdependence of city and country would be recognized. But this interdependence would relate solely to the enjoyment by everybody—by both the rural and urban population—of certain good things in life, (like great museums and adequate reference libraries), which it would be impossible to maintain in every town and township in the

nation. Relatively, of course, it is still the rural and not the urban population which is most independent. The country can survive without the city; the city cannot without the country. It is easy to establish the fact that the centers we call towns and cities, (even when nothing more than a village of shops and stores with perhaps a factory or two), are dependent economically for existence upon the country.

From the country must come daily the food they consume. In very few cities is there more than a few days' supply of food; if food did not come in continuously the people of the city would quickly find themselves reduced to starvation. Some foodstuffs, like cereals, lend themselves readily to storage, but others, like fresh fluid milk, cannot be stored for more than a matter of hours.

The city is even more dependent upon the country for water than for food; it cannot rely upon local wells; it must bring water in continuously through aqueducts from sources of supply draining territory often hundreds of miles in extent. New York, for instance, goes two hundred miles for one source alone of the water it must have.

Usually, too, it is dependent upon the country for its fuel and for the raw materials it uses in its factories; very few cities are actually built over mines, and none can grow the wool and cotton and other agricultural crops which their mills and factories convert into finished goods.

The bigger the city, the larger the region upon which it becomes dependent for its existence—for people to consume its products, to patronize its enterprises, and to tax (directly and indirectly) to support its political machinery. The bigger the city, of course, the greater the number of shops and stores which can depend wholly upon the patronage of the people living within its own confines, but no matter how big, taking the city as a whole, it cannot be sustained by its own population. One of New York's largest sources of income is that furnished by its hotels, restaurants and theatrical enterprises; unless there are *hundreds of thousands* of visitors in the city continuously, they could not be supported. What is true of its commercial and amusement enterprises, is likewise true of its manufactures. It may be automobiles; it may be clothing; it may be banking and insurance; it may be higher education; it may be governing a state or nation. Unless the territory tributary to it supports it, it would

soon cease to be a city. *City people cannot wholly live merely by exchanging the pressing of their pants for the washing of their clothes.*

Finally, the city is dependent upon the country round about it for its very population. The most obvious fact in the history of cities is that city people sooner or later become infertile; unless there is a constant stream of young immigrants from the fertile country into the city, all our modern cities would in a few generations become Necropolis—the city of the dead.

SUB. PAR. II. REGION VERSUS NATION

The American system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital idea of which is, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs only by the central authority.—Thomas M. Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations."

BETWEEN the composition of *localities*, with which we have just dealt, and *the world as a whole*, which we have yet to consider, there is the composition of *regions*—of entities each larger than a locality and of course smaller than the whole earth.

But if the concept of region and the consideration of the organization and composition of regional entities is not to be confused with the vague abstraction *society*, region must be used not *only* with reference to the organization of society; it must be used not *only* with reference to civic entities like counties, states and nations, nor *only* with reference to continent, nation, state, or county-wide social, business, religious, and cultural organizations and associations; it must be used with reference to the composition of *any and all organized entities, or congregations as I think of them, the members of which spread over any area larger than a locality or smaller than the whole world.* Region, then, is essentially geographic, and the composition of regions is the consideration of how to define and delimit congregations which transcend the local community but do not include the people of the whole globe. *To grasp the concept of region, is to realize the tragic absurdity of the concept of nation.* This error, which has plunged the modern world into war after war and which is now undermining what we still have left of freedom and natural rights, is the acceptance of Nationalism and the teaching of patriotic devotion to the essentially irrational entities called nations.

TO SEE why Regionalism* really solves problems which Nationalism* not only has failed but by its very nature cannot solve properly, it is sufficient to consider the problem of the assignment of two crucial and related public functions among various alternative local, regional or national, and international or global entities:

I. *Partition of the earth* through the division of territory and allotment of land, and

II. *Enforcement of law*—the protection of persons against violence and their property and possessions, (including land), against theft or misappropriation.

Both of these are functions which are in fact being fulfilled, which always have been fulfilled, and which, on the basis of the experience and whole history of mankind, will probably always have to be fulfilled by an organized government of some kind.

The simplest disposition of the problem presented by public functions of this kind is *assignment to the nation*—transfer (through centralization), to the national government of the powers which smaller units of government may have previously exercised with regard to them. This is the solution to which Communist Russia, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and all other despotic and totalitarian governments naturally resort. This is the solution of all those who believe, with Thomas Hobbes, *in the necessity for strong government because of the innate bestiality of mankind*. And this is the solution to which we, in nominally free America, are gradually turning as we lose our faith in the responsibility of the individual, transform the Republic bequeathed to us into an apparently paternal Welfare State, and transfer power from our states and local communities to what Tawney expressively called *the omnicompetent state*.

PROPER solution of the problem of furnishing access to the earth is not, however, simple. I. PARTITION OF THE EARTH—such as that of centering sovereignty exclusively in the nation—is *ipso facto* wrong.

* Nationalism is self-contradictory; it ceases being national if not *authoritarian* in its operational method. On the other hand, what I think of as Regionalism—administration of *specified and limited* functions by *delegated and federated* authorities—is *functional* in organization and method.

Partition calls for implementation both in accordance with *the nature of land*, and with *the wishes of populations*. The problem is firstly two-fold—*division* of whole regions of the earth among populations larger than those of mere communities, and *allotment* of small parcels or plots among individuals, families and other “persons,” natural and artificial. Territorial division obviously calls for implementation by some entity larger than the local community. Unilateral determination of boundaries in effect equates might with right. To some extent this problem has been disposed of rationally and humanly in the United States by delegating the power to determine the boundaries of cities, towns and counties to the state. But the problem will never be completely resolved as long as not only the United States but all nations, in accordance with the doctrine of national sovereignty, each claim the inviolability of the territory of which they are, in the truthful terminology of the law, “well-seized.” Plainly, *territorial division of the earth among its various populations calls for delegation to a global and not national, authority.*

By the same token—by the same line of reasoning—allotment of small plots of land calls for implementation not by the state or nation, nor by private real estate sub-dividers, but by the local community. Patents to land should issue from the local community, not from the nation. Jurisdiction over land and territory from the standpoint of people calls not for centralization in a national authority but decentralization among local, regional and global authorities.

In dividing the function between these various kinds of authorities, the various kinds of land must also be taken into consideration. Allotment of *sites* calls for assignment to a different authority from that of control over *mountain forests, watersheds and rivers*; assignment of control over *ports and harbors* from that over *the high seas, the air, and the minerals of the earth*. The first kind of land calls for the jurisdiction of a local authority; the second and third, for special regional authorities; the last, for a global authority. Jurisdiction of no kind of land, however, calls for assignment to a national government. The delegation of such control to our national government is responsible for writing some of the most disgraceful pages of American history. Witness, the despoliation of the American Indians through our breaching of virtually every treaty, no matter

how solemn, into which the nation entered with them; the repeated seizure of territory from Mexico, (to which, however, the Mexican nation itself had no better title than seizure and conquest), and the destruction of the Republic of Deseret by an American army and the transfer of its government from the Mormons to territorial Governors appointed by Washington.

THE proper solution of the problem of enforcement of law is no more simple than that of partition of the earth. There is not a vestige of worth while evidence indicating that the apparently simple process of centralizing police and military power in national governments is the way to reduce either intra-national crime or international war. There is *prima facie* evidence of its failure to maintain order within nations *in the rising amount of crime and volume of law-making, (judicial, legislative and administrative)*, and of failure to maintain peace between nations *in the continuance of war and the increase of militarism*. On the contrary, the facts suggest that the enforcement of law calls not for national retention and concentration but delegation and distribution of police and military power among a multiplicity of authorities—local, regional, and global.

The clue to the solution of the problem is furnished by the curious fact that in order to obtain any efficiency whatever in the exercise of police power, specialization—and decentralization—of policing has had to be resorted to. I am not now referring to the fact that we still have village constables and county sheriffs, remnants of the day before the efficiency of patrolling was discovered—when the enforcement of law may have been over-decentralized—but to municipal police forces, township police, state troopers and rangers, the national Secret Service and F. B. I., all of which have been organized since the trend toward centralization in Washington set in. The full extent to which we have resorted to this multiple solution of the problem is scarcely realized. Our customs service has *customs guards*; our school authorities, *truant officers*; penal authorities, *parole officers*; port authorities, *port policemen*; the army, *military police*; the forest service, *forest rangers*; conservation departments, *fish and game wardens*; fire departments, *fire marshals*. The trouble is not with our practice so much as with our failure to grasp the significance

II. ENFORCEMENT OF LAW

of the norm or principle which underlies it. The way to properly solve the problem is not nationalization but de-nationalization—*delegation of police and military power to specific authorities each of which has concurrent,* not discrete, jurisdiction*—authorities which are organized not to compete for power but to cooperate in all matters with one another.



But these functions, important though they be, are only two of the various public and gregational functions already discussed for which provision must be made if society is to be normalized.

I. If any of them are not being fulfilled, or not being adequately fulfilled, then it becomes necessary *to assign them* to an existing authority or voluntary entity if an appropriate one is already in existence. (In a community which is without a particular stock of merchandise, [goods for which people must therefore travel or send to other places], the community's function as a retail marketplace may often be most readily fulfilled if some existing store can be persuaded to add that particular class of merchandise to its stocks).

II. Or if any of these necessary functions are not being fulfilled by the authorities or congregations organized for the purpose of fulfilling them, (as is at present the case with the maintenance of international peace by the United Nations), then it becomes necessary *to reorganize them*.

III. Or if any of these functions have been assigned to, or assumed by, the wrong kind of organization, (as is the case in our continuing to entrust the allotment of land to private owners or real estate subdividers), then it becomes necessary *to transfer them* from the wrong organization to the right one. (In the case of the earth's mineral resources, from the nations within whose territory they happen to be found, to a global authority organized for the purpose of providing fairly for access to them by all the people of the earth.†)

* *Concurrent* in the legal sense of *each taking cognizance and having authority over the same subject matter* as distinguished from *having one authority, (like a national government), exercise exclusive and supreme authority over not only this matter but all matters whatsoever.*

† Transference of functions from large civic entities—like the nation—to smaller ones—such as regional authorities—is really a form of decentralization. But normalization may also call for centralization of functions—transferring functions

IV. Or, if no entity exists which can appropriately fulfill any of them, (as in the case of most communities, to furnish vision and inspiration, adult education and leadership), then it becomes necessary *to organize entirely new institutions*, (such as I have been calling Schools of Living), to fulfill them.

It is in the field of transferring functions from nations, to which so many of them have been mis-assigned, to what I think of as regional authorities, that exploration is most badly needed today.



In this whole matter of composition and of the assignment and re-assignment of public functions, a general principle established by biologists as a result of their studies of living creatures of every imaginable kind, seems to me an excellent one to follow. Organisms, they say, possess their present organs and characteristics by virtue of the efficiency with which each attribute serves to meet the conditions laid down for survival by its environment. If this principle is used as a basis for dealing with the problem of composition, it furnishes a norm which might be stated as follows: *public functions should be assigned to that specific congregation or authority which has either already given evidence of its ability to meet efficiently the necessities laid down by man's environment for his survival, or, if no existing organization furnishes such evidence, to some new organization composed for the purpose of providing for survival most efficiently not from the standpoint of the organization but from the standpoint of the individual—for the purpose of enabling all the individuals involved to live like normal human beings.*

Stated somewhat differently, this means that in approaching the question of the composition of public entities, it is not the entity which should be considered supreme, (as we have come to consider

now being left to units as small even as the individual, to larger ones. The control of building sites is a function which should be centralized in the local community, (as it is partially in zoning); the conservation of the soil, on the other hand, is not a community but a regional function and should be centralized in the entire region involved. The control of mineral land should be even further centralized; it is a function which cannot be properly assigned even to a nation; it is a global function and the control of all the mineral wealth of the world should be centralized in the hands of a global authority which acts not in the interest of individuals or corporations, of states and even whole nations, but of the whole of humanity, living and yet to live.

supreme not only the nation but the very idea of nationality), but provision for normal living. *Nationalism having demonstrated its inability to fulfill the norm of composition, the time has come "to alter or abolish it"*—to act upon the basic human right which was so eloquently expressed in Jefferson's famous words in the American Declaration of Independence:

. . . whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, (life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness), it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

It is certainly true that many thoughtful Americans believe that public problems can be most efficiently taken care of if the supreme power—the function of law-making—were centralized in the nation at Washington, and there were therefore no diversity of laws with regard, for instance, to marriage and divorce; if, in other words, the whole field of law consisted of one uniform code and there were no multiplicities of laws and law-enforcing bodies—municipal, state, and national. The argument for such centralization at the national level is two-fold: (I) human, and (II) administrative. It is believed that nationalization alone can (I) eliminate injustices inflicted both upon individuals and the public as a whole by conflicting laws and administrations, and (II) eliminate wasteful duplication of effort at the various existing and often conflicting levels of political organization. But if this kind of efficiency results in reducing the extent to which the people of local communities and distant regions utilize their own powers and faculties in dealing with their own personal, local and regional problems; if it results in the substitution of one uniform culture pattern for an infinite diversity of languages, arts and forms of living—and as a result people become less normal, self-sufficient and independent personalities—it is really pseudo-efficiency; it is merely another instance of the mis-education about means and ends from which we are suffering in our nationalized and over-centralized world today. Equally invalid is the argument about the virtues of centralization at the national level in terms of human values because that argument is based upon the assumption of the necessity for state and statutory usurpation of the power to make law.

ON THE MAKING OF LAW

THAT law-making is one of the most important of all gregational and public functions is perfectly true. But that we need states or nations in order to make law, is false. Real law, that law which is sometimes called *natural law* and sometimes *the moral law*, is never made; it is discovered. This is the kind of law which I think of as *normal law*—the body of law necessary to enable human beings to treat one another humanly; the law of which statutory and government-made law is not even a pale simulacrum; of which written law is often a veritable caricature. An immense body of such normal law has already been discovered, and the existing body is sufficient for all practical purposes, imperfect though it may yet be, and despite the fact that much remains yet to be learned before it is as perfect as it may some day be made if the legal profession ever discovers its true vocation.

We do, it is true, need legislative bodies to deal with matters which have characteristics similar to those displayed by traffic regulations—to enact rules, for instance, which prescribe the side on which automobiles shall pass one another—but these rules themselves must conform to natural and moral law, or they become arbitrary and often tyrannical denials of natural rights like life, liberty and property. An adequate really separate judicial authority is all that is needed, (as our courts of equity, which are guided by “equitable” and not statutory law, demonstrate), in order to deal with charges of civil and criminal disregard of the law. And such a judicial authority should have the authority to declare any statute or regulation of any other authority invalid if in the opinion of the courts they are in conflict with natural, moral, or normal law.

Sovereignty therefore does not have to rise above the local community level. We do not need sovereign and supreme states or nations—only regional authorities with specific functions and limited powers. The nation, which has acquired its present supremacy because of its exercise of both the police and of military power, would either “wither away” or shrink to that of a mere regional police force, if the maintenance of international law, and with it military power, were transferred to a world authority—to the authority where it properly, and normally, belongs.

PAR. I. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY

SUB. PAR. III. WORLD VERSUS EMPIRE

Meditate often upon the connection of these things and upon the mutual relation that they have one unto another. For all are, after a sort, folded and involved one within another and by these means all agree well together.—Marcus Aurelius.

PLATO'S conception of the political problem was: *how could a community of 5,040 citizens—at most forty or fifty thousand people if women, children and slaves were included—survive in a hostile world?** The answer to Plato's question is furnished by the history of mankind: *it cannot.* Nothing which any one community or nation can do—no walls, (no matter how thick and high); no armies, no ships, no planes, no bombs; not even growth to empire or hegemony over most of the world—can enable it to survive. The world is the graveyard of communities, nations, empires; its history, the annals of their wars and their ultimate extermination. The problem cannot be solved unilaterally by anything which any one community, nation

* That the problem is real, (and the world a "hostile" one, if not by nature then by the manner in which the tribes of man have been taught to treat one another), is shown by Bliokh, who estimates that in the past 2,500 years, the world has enjoyed *peace* one year in twelve and *war* the other eleven. (Ivan S. Bliokh, *THE FUTURE OF WAR*, translated by R. C. Long, Ginn & Co., Boston, 1902). Quincy Wright, in his *A STUDY OF WAR*, (University of Chicago Press, 1942), covering the years 1480-1941, lists the number of wars in which various nations have taken part, as follows:

Great Britain	78 wars	Italy	25 wars
France	71 wars	Holland	23 wars
Spain	64 wars	Germany	23 wars
Russia	61 wars	Denmark	20 wars
Austria	52 wars	United States	13 wars
Turkey	43 wars	China	11 wars
Sweden	26 wars	Japan	9 wars

Wright credits the United States with 13 wars in 150 years, but the War department records show 110 wars fought against the Indians alone.

or empire may do, no matter how big, how civilized, how powerful. It cannot even be solved by any kind of re-organization of the whole world, (even by a perfected United Nations†), so long as men continue to believe and continue to be taught to think of themselves as Hellenes and Athenians, and the rest of the world as aliens and Barbarians—as Americans are taught to think themselves superior nationally to Britons, Germans, Frenchmen, Italians, Spaniards; as whites, superior to yellows, browns and blacks; as Christians, superior to Jews, Mahommedans, Buddhists; as Northerners, superior to Southerners; and *vice versa*. It is high time that we recognize this fact and begin to seek the solution not, where Plato sought it, in the constitutions of nations, but in the re-education of mankind.

There is only one way in which the problem of peace and survival can be solved. *Men must be taught to think not about the problem as that of the survival of their particular state or nation but as that of the maintenance of peace and creation of harmony in humanity as a whole.* For the truth about the matter is not that the world is hostile but only that tribal groups like states and nations are. The grand goal of humane politics should be not the protection of the community but the abolition of hostility. And hostility will remain as long as mis-education about the partition of the earth continues. *Men must be taught the full significance of the fact that the Earth is a unity.* In partitioning it—as partition it we must if human beings are to realize (family by family and community by community) their utmost potentialities as persons—not one single bit of its area, no matter how small nor how isolated, can be properly left exclusively to the unilateral sovereignty of any one state or nation. For the truth is that every single human being—black and white, civilized and savage, native and alien—cannot avoid belonging to humanity, the population unit which includes in its membership every responsible individual on earth. An entity as important as that cannot

† The United Nations is only the latest of a great number of efforts at world, or international, organization of peace. It is only necessary to recall the League of Nations, (1920); the Hague Conference and Peace Convention, (1907); the Hague Conference and Court of Arbitration, (1899); and to go far back, the "Grand Design" of Henry IV, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Amphictyonic Councils of Ancient Greece, (all of which were in some degree efforts at international organization of peace), to recognize that there is a fundamental deficiency in approaches to the problem mainly from the standpoint of organization.

be ignored in the organization and composition of even the smallest of local communities.‡

It is true the members of this grand political entity differ greatly from one another both racially and culturally, and that some groups of its membership are so isolated that they have little commerce with fellow members. Yet they are in some degree, however minute, nevertheless related to one another even if only by virtue of the fact that sooner or later they meet individuals belonging to other groups and then find themselves confronted by the problem of how world law—international law if you wish—requires them to treat each other.

This all inclusive body politic, I think of as the *World*.

Physically, the members of this unit are all occupants of *one planet*; biologically, they all belong to *one human species*; legally, they are tenants for life and trustees of so much of the *whole earth* as they happen to possess; politically, they cannot therefore avoid being citizens of *one World*.

‡ Theologians will not be content with an analysis represented mainly by this study of the triangular relationship of (a) *man*, (b) *humanity*, and (c) *earth*. They will insist that the normalization of the individual and family, and of the community, the region, and the world, is not enough. They will insist that a genuinely complete approach to the problem of living like normal human beings must be either a study of the dichotomy, (a) *man*, (b) *God*, or the trichotomy, (a) *man*, (b) *society*, (c) *cosmos*. I am personally avoiding concerning myself too much with this aspect of the problem for reasons which will be discussed at length in the section devoted to the teleological problem in EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY. But I believe there is ample justification for concentrating upon the non-theological—upon the *natural world*, to use the language of theology—mainly because theologians of no two different religions or denominations agree upon the manner in which to validate what they affirm to be the ultimate truth. Some of them validate what they teach upon the revelations of Jesus; others upon those of Mahommed; still others upon those of Buddha, and so on. Even those who agree in basing them upon the revelations of Jesus, disagree as to whether it should be based upon Jesus according to Aquinas or Jesus according to Luther, and so on, *ad infinitum*, among all the different interpreters and denominations of the followers of Jesus. All that I can conclude from my study is that there is, indeed, objective evidence of the fact that man desires, and also needs, an adequate answer to the problem of his relationship to the cosmos to entirely normalize his life.

But even though it be true that complete normalization is impossible without consideration of the cosmic, it does not seem to me that the right answer to the problem of the relationship of (a) *man*, (b) *humanity*, (c) *earth*, (c.f., p. 561), can possibly conflict with the right answer to the problem of the relationship of (a) *man* to the (b) *cosmic*. No matter how we approach the problem of living—whether from the standpoint of physics or of biology, of sociology or of politics, or any other point of beginning whatsoever—the answer to the problem must always be the same. Normal living here on earth cannot possibly be inconsistent with right living no matter what form life may ultimately take.

FROM time immemorial two alternative methods of solving Plato's I. EMPIRE problem—really the problem of maintaining peace and creating harmony in the world as a whole—have been tried: (I) *empire*, and (II) *coalition*. Thus far both have failed, empire because all empires have naturally assumed that it is possible to achieve world unity and to maintain world peace by unilateral coercion, and coalition because, (right as it may be in conception), all leagues of nations have been so enamored of the nobility of their purposes, that they have ignored the fact that nothing works properly—even the most perfectly designed machine or organization—in the absence of right-education and proper training of both the leaders who operate it and of the people operated upon.

The term empire is loosely used to designate almost any state of large size. But as here used, it means a world state—a state which, however short it falls of world empire, is ideologically thought of as being both universal and perpetual. The word itself is of Latin derivation. But the conception antedates Rome; it was not only Assyrian, Persian and Macedonian; it was also Indian and Chinese; in fact, the idea of imperial unity under a “King of Kings,” is found everywhere as soon as men emerge from savagery into barbarism—in ancient Mexico as truly as in the ancient semitic world. The idea of universality and perpetuity—of world dominion and imperial survival—is found in Alexander the Great. As one historian puts it:

In his later years, Alexander formed the notion of an Empire, both European and Asiatic, in which the Asiatics should not be dominated by the European invaders, but Europeans and Asiatics alike should be ruled on an equality by a monarch, indifferent to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, and looked upon as their own king by Persians as well as Macedonians.

Alexander probably began the business of rationalizing empire, justifying himself by the contemporary Cynic philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. The obscene business of justifying world-unification by fire and sword has been continued by the apologists for imperialism from that beginning. The wisest of the Roman Emperors rationalized it in terms of the Stoic philosophy of Humanitarianism; the Popes, (with their Holy Roman Empire), in terms of Christianity—as did

also the "Defenders of the Faith;"¶ the Caliphs in terms of Mahomeddanism; Napoleon—at first—in terms of Republicanism; the long line of British imperialists, in terms of Progress and the "white man's burden;" and at this very moment, Stalin and the propagandists of Soviet Russian imperialism, are justifying their policy of ruthless infiltration, revolution and conquest in terms of Marxism.

The Roman Empire probably still remains the most representative example of the attempt to achieve world-unity and world-peace unilaterally—and of justifying imperialism with rationalizations such as "law" and "peace." But great as the empire the Romans thus created undoubtedly was, and much as has been made of the *Pax Romana*, the Empire failed miserably in maintaining peace and in providing for its own survival. The history of every subsequent attempt at world organization through empire is a history not of world-peace and world-harmony but of internal revolt and external war. The evidence of failure is so conclusive that the marvel is that any faith in the idea can persist at all. Yet persist it does—as witness the antics of the apologists for Soviet Russia's policy of expansion.

THE history of even the most ambitious attempts at solving the problem by resort to coalition—using the term very broadly—has been as unhappy as the history of resort to world-empire. In one sense, more unhappy. For coalition is the method which the problem calls for, as seers and idealists have long pre-vised, and its failure to produce peace and harmony has always given both tough-minded "practical" men and tender-minded patriots, an excuse for resorting to chauvinism and militarism as a means of defense against the hostility of the rest of the world; of trying to assure the security and prosperity of their own country by a policy *vis-a-vis* the rest of the world which, even if it does not realize complete hegemony, will at least make it possible to maintain, between wars, some sort of balance of power.

Coalition, as I am using the term, is being used with reference to all leagues and confederations of states and nations, even when mis-

¶ In 1815, for instance, the Vatican still believed so completely in the idea of empire that it protested to the Congress of Vienna against the failure of the Powers to restore the Holy Roman Empire as the "center of political unity."

designated as unions, *in which the members retain their identity and independence*. The history of all these coalitions—from the ancient Greek Amphictyones down to the late lamented League of Nations—is a history of heartbreaking failure. Already, as these lines are being written, there are indications that the United Nations—the latest and most ambitious attempt at world-coalition—will simply add one more to the long list of recorded failures in the past.

It is easy to explain these failures, now after the event, in terms of mal-organization—of the improper composition and constitution of the coalition—though this does not alter the fact that right-organization, in the absence of right-education of both the leaders and masses of mankind, is not enough to assure success. No world-coalition will ever succeed, no matter how perfectly organized, until the organizers of the coalition not only assign to it proper functions and surrender to it the power it will need in order to fulfill them, but also provide for their own and the public's re-education.

What the problem of peace calls for is a genuine *federation* as distinguished from a mere *coalition*, with the word *federation* being used to designate an authority with limited and specific functions and power adequately to fulfill them. It calls not for a *world-government* but for a federally organized *world-authority*, using the word *government* with reference to an authority which exercises general powers in all political fields whatsoever, and authority with regard to a government which exercises power only for the purpose of fulfilling its limited and precisely defined functions.



What are the specific functions now being usurped by nations which they must surrender to a world authority if peace is to be maintained and harmony achieved? There are probably not more than three of them: (I) *the partitioning of the Earth among states and nations*. (The boundaries of states and the exercise of dominion can not be left to the arbitrament of internecine war or of power politics). (II) *The maintenance of freedom of the seas, of the air, and of access to the mineral resources of the Earth*. (The nations, one by one, should no longer be permitted to infringe rights which belong to those of humanity as a whole, and to monopolize mineral resources essential to the well-being of every people without regard to nation-

ality, race or religion). And (III) *the enforcement of universal law*. It would take whole chapters to discuss the evidence and outline the reasoning which vindicates these propositions. Most of that discussion must therefore be postponed until EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY and EDUCATION AND IMPLEMENTATION are published.

BUT something must be said of *universal law*, of which *international law*, as it was developing before the first World War shattered it to bits, is only a very faint simulacrum. What is this law, jurisdiction over which must be assigned to a World Authority?

International law is a general term for the law governing the relations and intercourse of states with one another. It deals therefore primarily with the enforcement of treaties, the settlement of controversies, and the conduct of wars between nations. But the very first great theorists of the subject saw that much more was involved than merely the problem of mitigating and humanizing the controversies and conflicts of nations. To some extent Grotius in his *De jure belli et pacis*,* but even more clearly Pufendorf in his *De jure naturæ et gentium*,† (as the very title of his book indicates), based international law on *the law of nature*. Pufendorf assumed that it must re-

* *De jure belli et pacis*, by the great Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, (1583-1645), goes much farther into the discussion of the fundamental principles of law than its title suggests. Indeed, the *jus belli*—laws of war—was a very small part of his comprehensive scheme. His was the first attempt to obtain a principle of right, and a basis for society and government, outside of the church or the Bible. The law of nature is unalterable, he maintained; it would be valid even if there were no God; God Himself cannot alter it any more than He can alter a mathematical axiom; it has its source in the nature of man as a social being. In spite of the imperfect development of these fundamental propositions in his book, he is generally accorded the honor of being the founder of the modern sciences of the law of nature and of nations.

† Samuel Pufendorf, (1632-1694), the German jurist, began his major life work by devising a system of "universal" law and in 1661 published the fruits of his early reflections on the subject under the title *Elementa jurisprudentiæ universalis, libri duo*. In 1625, in his *De jure naturæ et gentium*, he sought to complete the work of Grotius. In opposition to Hobbes, he maintained that the state of nature is not one of war but of peace. But this peace is feeble and insecure, and if something else does not come to its aid it can do very little for the preservation of mankind. Government and law should therefore aim at the maintenance of peace. State action and public law derive their validity from conformity to natural law. Pufendorf defended the idea that *international law* was really *universal law*—that it was not restricted to Christendom but constituted a common bond between all nations because all nations form part of humanity.

flect ethical principles applicable to all peoples without regard to particular creeds or standards of morals.

Strictly objective observation of the mores and folkways of peoples of all cultures, both civilized and primitive, indicate that there are ethical principles—natural, or rather normal, laws, as I think of them—which are binding upon everybody without regard to statutes or constitutions, or nationality, race, or religion. But universal law is not the whole body of that law. It is only one specific part of it. *Universal law is that part of the whole body of normal law which, by its very nature, is outside the jurisdiction of the family, the community, and the nation.* For it is a code prescribing not what individuals but what states or nations may not do. Its maintenance, therefore, manifestly calls for enforcement by an authority over and above those who are subject to it. In the words of Jefferson, universal law assumes the existence of “unalienable rights” not only of individuals but of peoples and whole populations. Upon this assumption it proscribes violations of these rights by states or nations even when they are seemingly sanctioned by constitutions or statutory enactments.

War, for instance, is a violation of the unalienable right of people to freedom from organized, wholesale violence.

Tariffs, to furnish another instance, violate the unalienable right to freedom of trade both of the populations of the nations which impose them and of the population of the rest of the world.

The censorship or prevention of any class of individuals or kinds of groups from speaking, publishing, meeting or worshipping as they wish, is a violation of the unalienable right of peoples to free speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and religious freedom.

Violations of these basic ethical principles, when perpetrated by individuals or groups—religious groups, for instance—fall within the jurisdiction of states. But when they are perpetrated by the state itself, as they are, (under the doctrine of national sovereignty), by almost every nation in the world today, the fact that governments claim a sovereign right to declare war, to fix a tariff on goods imported, or to regulate where people may go, what they may read, what they may say or publish, does not alter by a particle the fact

that universal law—binding upon everybody and every government—is being violated.

It is this fact which calls for general recognition of jurisdiction by a world authority over what I have been calling universal law. This is not the place for any extended discussion of the whole body of that law. But some sections of it—which seem to me essential if normalization of the local community is not to be hindered by the prevailing tendency to extend, rather than to curtail, national sovereignty—need to be mentioned if only illustratively and suggestively.

There is, I believe, overwhelming evidence in the history of mankind that:

No nation has the right to wage war.*† (Nations have, of course, the right to defend themselves, but with the establishment of an adequate world police force, defensive war would be as profoundly changed as was the right of self-defense by the establishment of local police forces).

No nation has the right to censor or suppress speech, communications or publications; to interfere with peaceful and orderly assemblages, organizations or religions; or to impose any particular form of belief or activity—economic, social, political, religious or irreligious—upon people. (Every ordinance or decree, whether enacted by a tiny local community or ordered by an empire like Russia, which interferes with these civil rights, violates universal law and is, *ipso facto*, immoral and invalid. The “Iron Curtain,” to use Winston Churchill’s term, which Soviet Russia has dropped upon its borders, is a violation of universal law.

* The term nation is here used not only with regard to any kind of governmental unit—municipal, provincial, national, or imperial—but also with regard to political parties or religious organizations which wage war, both those which are intra-national, (as was the case with the Southern Democratic or Confederate party in the American Civil War), and those which are international in scope, (as is the case with the Communist Party in China, in Greece, and in other countries at this time, and as was the case with the Roman Catholic Church in the various religious wars and crusades which it sponsored in its long history).

† I am here referring not only to what is defined in law as *public (or international) war*, but also as *civil war*—to any kind of armed conflict in which nations take part which is not genuinely defensive in character, or which is not necessary to the enforcement of world law. The provision of the United States Constitution, (Art. I, sec. 8, §11), which states that Congress shall have the power “to declare war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water,” assigns to the nation’s government powers which, while in accord with the ideology of Nationalism, violate universal law.

No nation has the right to levy tariffs or place obstructions of any kind upon trade.‡

No nation has the right to prohibit or interfere with the movement, travel, or migration of its citizens, or the movements of alien travelers or sojourners in its territory, or to levy tolls upon or interfere in any manner with the use of the air or the high seas, genuine (and not pseudo) quarantines alone excepted.§

No nation has the right to exercise dominion over any part of its territory or any of its existing sub-divisions, no matter how long subject to it, against the abiding desire of a determining majority¶ of the members and permanent inhabitants of that part of its domain. (Not only does imperialism and colonialism violate universal law; any denial by a nation of self-determination or of independence to any of its sub-divisions, violates the law. Allegiance must be won by nations, not commanded).*

No nation has the right to maintain armies, navies, air forces, armories, fortresses, naval bases, and armaments of a combatant character except for defensive purposes, nor to maintain military establishments† of any kind the moment a properly organized and

‡ The implication here is trade in ordinary articles of commerce. There is no conflict then with the perfectly reasonable right of communities and nations to regulate traffic in narcotics, poisons, explosives, and similar articles, or to entirely prohibit and suppress traffic in women and in slaves.

§ A sojourner is a temporary resident as distinguished from a native, citizen, or permanent member of a community. Every nation, like every association, has the right normally, as the students of parliamentary law long ago recognized, to be the judge of the qualifications of its own members. The right of travel and of sojourning is universal, but permanent membership and residence is a privilege over the extension of which communities should have complete control.

¶ Experience plainly shows that a mere majority is insufficient to establish the abiding desires of a population. With determination by a mere majority, a change in the point of view of a small number of persons in the whole population is sufficient to call for a shift of allegiance; mere majorities are too apt to represent the transient, rather than enduring, will of the people. The evidence indicates that not less than a two-thirds majority of the whole membership—not merely of the voting members—should be required in plebiscites on allegiance.

* The American Revolution was a war fought to vindicate the universal right of self-determination; the American Civil war, on the other hand, was a war which violated the right of the Southern States to independence. The Southern argument on secession and state rights was, in terms of universal law, unassailable; it is too bad that it had to be asserted in defense of another violation of universal law, the law which interdicts slavery.

† Local police forces, and state rangers and national gendarmeries, no larger than needed to maintain law and order, are not military establishments.

adequately equipped world authority and world police force is established, or to interfere with such a world police force when engaged in patrolling any nation's domain in order to enforce disarmament. (From this it follows that every nation, big and little, has the right to protection from aggression, and threats of aggression, by an adequately armed world authority).

No nation, no government or ruler, and no "owner" of land has the right to monopolize any of the mineral resources of the earth.* (If it were universally recognized that ultimate title to mineral resources, regardless of national location, really rests in the world as a whole, the internecine rivalry of the powers of the earth for their possession or control would end; if mine operators and mining companies had to pay royalties equal to the economic rent of their mines to a world authority, [instead of retaining them, paying them to land-owners, or to the governments of the nations in which they are located], there would be neither private nor "public" appropriation of unearned natural resources; if free trade was universally practiced, there would be no tariffs to prevent the people of "have not" nations from obtaining minerals at the same price as those in "have" nations; if the economic rent of these resources of the earth were payable to a world authority this great gift of nature to all of mankind would be used, not to create speculators and millionaires, but for the benefit of everybody in the world, and at the same time the world would have an adequate and independent revenue, [which nature has seemingly created for that express purpose], sufficient for all the ordinary expenses of a world authority as well as for the maintenance of the military establishment needed to enforce disarmament and, for the first time in history, to really establish "peace on earth").

* Minerals fall roughly into three groups: *metals*, (iron, copper, tin, etc.), *non-metals*, (nitrates, salt, sulphur, etc.), and *fuels*, (coal, petroleum, natural gas).

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART III. THE NORMAL COMMUNITY

SECTION III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY

PARAGRAPH I CONTINUED

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY: *Membership*

There can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his rationation from the definitions, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan."

IF I have dwelt at length upon the composition of the community from the standpoint of size—from the *quantitative* standpoint—it is not because composition from the *qualitative* standpoint is less important but simply because modern man's devotion to *bigness*, (his identification of magnitude with Progress), and his faith in the centralization of population and government, requires it. If less space is devoted to the qualitative aspects of community composition, that should not be interpreted as in any way depreciating the importance of the organization and planning of communities in terms of (I) membership, of (II) homogeneity or heterogeneity, and of (III) classes and occupations. For normal living for the individual becomes difficult in almost precise proportion to the degree in which the population of the community in which he lives is controlled by (I) irresponsibles, composed of (II) irreconcilables, or (III) lacking in representatives of the classes and occupations necessary to the fulfillment of all the community's functions.

Just as no community can make life entirely normal for its people in an abnormally organized world, so no family can make life entirely normal for its members in an abnormally constituted community.

The normalization of individual and family life calls for the normalization of the community's population.

FROM many standpoints, but particularly from the standpoint of the community's management, the populations of communities may be said to be composed of two kinds of people—of natives, citizens or *members*, and of sojourning aliens or *non-members*. I. MEMBERSHIP

Native and stranger; citizen and alien; member or non-member, are not merely descriptive terms describing status; they are really designations of individuals with, and those without, responsibility and power in the communities in which they find themselves. But while often used interchangeably and synonymously, there are distinct states to which these terms are applicable. *Native and stranger* are terms which may be used with regard to either a status created by *birth* or by *length of residence*. One may describe a person born in a community, or long resident there, as a native; a person born elsewhere, or in the community for only a short period of time, as a stranger or mere sojourner. Mere nativity, however, cannot be equated with responsibility. Children, criminals, and the insane may all be natives; that does not make them responsible members of the community. *Citizen and alien*, on the other hand, are terms which are properly applicable only to the legal or political status of individuals. Citizenship is a matter of birth or of naturalization; alienship, quite without regard to the length of an individual's residence in a community, the state of an individual who has retained his citizenship in the community from which he originally came. But citizenship does not mean, any more than nativity, responsibility. Law recognizes this fact in restricting the suffrage to those above certain ages; or to males only; or to tax-payers only, and in denying it to all citizens considered incompetent to exercise power.

But *membership* and *non-membership*, as I use the terms, are applicable to a status which is neither one of birth, nor length of residence, nor arbitrary legal formulation. To assume, as we do, that membership in a local town, city or state, is an automatic preroga-

tive of citizenship in the nation, is nonsense. It violates the norm of local autonomy. Membership in a community has its roots in something inherent in and necessary to the existence of normal communities. Custom, legislation, and the religious and social philosophies which people believe and accept, can deny it as it is denied by both Marxism and our own kind of Individualism. Or law, folkways and ideology can recognize it and implement what the evidence indicates is essential to the normal organization of community life.

Membership is a term properly applicable to, and a status properly conferable only on, those individuals in a community who have accepted responsibility for all the community's vital activities.

Membership in the community, however, is not, as we modern victims of an over-atomistic ideology think, composed of individuals; *it is composed of families.* The really responsible unit, the existence of which we must recognize in the organization of our communities, must be the family; it cannot be the fractional being we call an individual.

But the membership of the community is not composed of all the families which reside in it; nor even of those born there; nor those who have resided there long enough to cease being sojourners. *It is composed only of those families which both live there and have a permanent stake in the community's commonwealth—which have not only made their homes in the community but also own a homestead in it.* All the other families and individuals in the community are non-members. Land-ownership is essential to the creation of that distinct status which I am designating community membership. Individuals, as individuals, cannot acquire it, neither can families, no matter how wealthy or how well educated; no matter how long they may have resided in the nation, or even if born in the community of generations long resident there; nor how completely they may be accepted, in law, as citizens. These are so different from the resident land-owning families as to constitute a distinct species of population, not strangers or sojourners; not aliens, but *resident, native, citizen non-members.*

The evidence that communities which disregard this fact in their organization are abnormal, is overwhelming. Communities composed mainly of what I call non-members are not merely abnormal; they

are subnormal. Communities composed mainly of propertyless tenants of farms or of city homes, or of propertyless salary and wage-workers—mine-workers, factory-workers, office workers—are almost invariably communities in which dependence, delinquency, degeneracy, and decadence follow as effect follows cause. Goldschmidt's study of Dinuba, (a California community composed mainly of small farm-owners), and of Arvin, California, (a community composed mainly of migratory farm workers),* furnishes a classic demonstration of the evils which develop when land—the community's commonwealth—is absentee-owned. All the evidence indicates that in the composition of communities the norm of membership must be observed: *the determining majority of the population must consist of families which live in the community, which own land in it, and which earn their livings in it.* The population must consist mainly

* In 1944 the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the U. S. Dept. of Agr. published a study by Walter R. Goldschmidt, professor of anthropology and sociology in the Univ. of Calif., at Los Angeles, of two communities of similar size in the San Joaquin Valley. The population of one, Dinuba in Tulare County, was composed predominantly of the owners of small, family-sized farms. The population of the other, Arvin in Kent County, was composed mainly of more or less migratory farm workers employed by the owners of large farms operated on a factory-like technique. The following table from this study shows how just this one difference in the character of community membership results in the creation of two totally different kinds of communities, one certainly more human if not completely normal, and the other subnormal even in terms of the average rural community of America today:

	Dinuba	Arvin
Population	7,770	6,500
Average Farm — Acres	57	497
Production	\$2,540,000	\$2,460,000
Banks	2	0
Newspapers	2	1
Businesses	141	62
Grammar Schools	4	1
High Schools	1	0
Service Clubs	5	2
Fraternal Clubs	7	0
Veteran's Associations	2	0
Churches	14	7
Housing	Modest	Very Poor
Juvenile Delinquency	Slight	Fairly Serious

In presenting the Goldschmidt study to the Senate in 1947, its Agricultural Committee drew this conclusion: "The evidence conclusively proves that the traditional American small farm operated by the resident farm family makes for a more wholesome all-around life. Such a setting supports a city whose community welfare standards are incomparably higher."

of families formally admitted or accepted into membership by the community as a corporate entity—by a process akin to that of naturalization—on the basis of qualifications which not only seemingly establish their responsibility, (as is the case with such qualifications as birth, masculinity, age, wealth, or payment of taxes), but which in fact establish their competence and right to the franchise and to participation in the community's management. Most of our large cities, which violate this norm because they are composed mainly of non-members—of natives who are disqualified from membership by irresponsibility or incompetence, (by youth or senility, by adult infantilism, by poverty and pauperage, by ignorance, insanity, and criminality), and of visitors, travelers, alien sojourners, and native residents who are tenants, boarders and hotel residents instead of home owners—are manifestly abnormal.

The mere statement of these facts makes it plain that no community can afford to leave the matter of its composition and membership unplanned, to mere chance—to the cupidity, for instance, of real estate developers and land speculators. The prevailing assumption that communities are helpless in this matter, and that they should leave everybody free to buy into the community, is mistaken. Zoning is evidence of the fact that much can be done to control the use of the community's land; restrictive land covenants, that much can be done without resort to law. The present method of conferring membership arbitrarily and irrationally upon any individual who can afford to buy land, or who resides in the community thirty days, or even six months, (and meets the test of our election laws), is destructive and not promotive of wholesome community life.

II. HOMOGENEITY vs. HETEROGENEITY

THE people of a community may be so like one another in their heredity, their customs, their conventions, their values, as to make it notable for the amity of its atmosphere—for the sodality, harmony, and sympathy and mutual friendliness of the individuals of which it is composed. Or these essentials of humane life may be absent because its population consists of too many irreconcilables—of so many different kinds of individuals and groups as to make misunderstanding, dislike and discord almost certain, and to make the community

notable for the mutual hostility and antagonism of the people of which it is composed.

Which is to say that communities—like nations—may be either *homogeneous* or *heterogeneous* in composition.

But while most communities in the world become either one or the other unconsciously, our own American communities—notably our big cities; notably our smaller mining, textile and other manufacturing towns—may be said, partly because of our devotion to town booming and partly because of our original policy of unrestricted immigration, to have been made deliberately heterogeneous in composition. And there have been experiments, most of them unhappy failures, in which idealists deliberately established communities composed of people conspicuously different from one another in the belief that heterogeneity could be disregarded because irreconcilability was not in reality a fact.



Most of the communities in a nation like Denmark are homogeneous. In most of them the whole population is Danish both genealogically and by language and culture. Even in those cities in which considerable numbers of foreigners are found, the percentage is not large enough to affect the essential homogeneity of the community. But in the United States most of our communities are heterogeneous; their populations include large numbers of people so different in race, nationality, religion, and political and social beliefs as to make the similarities between them—such as the ability to speak some sort of English—relatively unimportant. There are, however, notable exceptions which deserve study. There are, for instance, a sufficient number of towns in the New England states, in the Pennsylvania Dutch region, among the Hopi and Navajo Indians, like the town of New Glarus, Wisconsin, to make it possible to determine whether homogeneity or heterogeneity is the norm.*

New Glarus is composed almost exclusively of descendants of emigrants from the Canton of Glarus, Switzerland. The population is composed of individuals of the same race, (in this instance *white*);

* For a popular description of this community, see "The National Geographic Magazine," Vol. XCI, No. 6, June 1947; "Deep in the Heart of Swissconsin," by William H. Nicholas and J. Baylor Roberts.

of the same national ancestry, (in this instance *Swiss*); of the same religion, (in this instance *Protestant*); of the same or at least similar political faiths, (in this instance, *Republican or Democratic*); of the same socio-economic status, (in this instance farmers and store-keepers, craftsmen and professional men serving one another, with no individual and no distinct group very much richer than the remainder, and with all equally free to join the clubs and to take part in the social life of the community). New Glarus is therefore a homogeneous community.

The population of a heterogeneous community, on the other hand, is composed of individuals who are different as to race, national ancestry, religion, fundamental political faiths, and socio-economic status. Such a community might be composed of whites, negroes, and even mongolians; of individuals of English, Irish, Polish, Italian and Japanese ancestry; of Methodists, Baptists, Episcopalians, and Roman and Greek Catholics, Jews and even a few militant atheists; of not only Republicans and Democrats but also Socialists, Communists and even Fascists; of distinct rich, middle-class, and poor families, (the rich, a handful of families retaining their residences in the community but able to leave it whenever they wish; the middle-class, business and professional men, most most of them college trained; the poor, usually factory workers and unskilled laborers, living "on the other side of the tracks," or "down in the slums," and each class with its distinct social life and distinct type of clubs—country club, Rotary luncheon clubs, labor unions, etc., membership in which is mutually exclusive).

There is overwhelming evidence that social tensions between individuals and groups, (feelings of envy, dislike, and hatred, sometimes flaring into personal and occasionally into mob violence); that social problems, (crime, prostitution, alcoholism, insanity, desertion, venereal disease, suicide); and that frustration and unhappiness is greater in heterogeneous than in homogeneous communities, (in spite of the existence of greater opportunities of all kinds—opportunities for money-making, for amusement, for art and learning, above all for novelty and excitement). In old homogeneous communities nothing *seems* to happen; in heterogeneous communities, everything and anything.

In particular respects, therefore, heterogeneous communities may provide advantages which are denied to the individual or the group in homogeneous communities—it is easier to establish new industries, found new movements, organize new institutions in them; and they furnish greater opportunities for individuals to become wealthy, to enter upon new occupations, to change their political or religious faiths, to alter their standard of living, (upwards but also downwards), and to develop capacities and talents, (not always desirable), which otherwise might lie dormant. But in spite of this, the evidence indicates that life in homogeneous communities is more pleasant and furnishes greater satisfactions to normal human beings.

Facts, of course, are stubborn things. Deplore this fact as much as we may from the standpoint of the brotherhood of man, rational human beings should nevertheless accept it, and in considering the growth of their communities, and specifically membership in it, (as in the sale, or rather transfer, of land), take into account what is good for the community now and not in some idyllic future when all men, without regard to race or creed, are brothers. Right now there are in every community enterprises and institutions which call for common action. And as in families, the people cannot avoid association in small communities; only in large cities is isolation possible. Homogeneity makes cooperation and association upon a human and humane level much easier.

The problem of humanizing many of our communities is the problem of homogenizing or, in the truest sense of the word, unifying them—of imbuing them with fraternity and solidarity. Implementing this calls for at least two organized community movements and activities: (I) *selection and elimination* under the leadership of what amounts to a community membership committee, and (II) *education and evangelization* by the community's inspirational institutions—its schools, churches, and literary, artistic and scientific bodies.

I. By *selection* I mean, on the one hand, organized attraction of desirable immigrants, (not from foreign countries so much as from other, perhaps over-sized, communities), and on the other, organized encouragement—by creating a proper climate of public opinion—of the bearing of full complements of children by the desirable families of the community. By *elimination* I mean, on the one hand,

organized help in encouraging the emigration of desirable but locally incompatible individuals and families from the community to communities in which they would actually be happier, and on the other, gradual elimination of the hopelessly unfit by discouraging their rearing of progeny—by community provision of facilities for contraception and sterilization.

II. By *education and evangelization* I mean the inculcation of a common teleological ideology—a common body of ideas about the ultimate purpose to which life should be devoted. Acceptance of a common faith, of common values, of common goals makes possible the welding together of the people of a community even when there are great original differences in the individuals of which it is composed. Any idea which the determining majority may be persuaded to make their goal in life—such as “the brotherhood of man;” such as “liberty” or “democracy”—may be made the basis for welding the membership of a heterogeneous community together. A common religion, (as the case of Mormonism, for instance, proves), is such a welder of diverse peoples. Marxism, in Russia, proves that an economic idea is also such a welder. Unfortunately, goals which are abnormal and inhuman—the goal of Fascism and National Socialism, for instance—can also be used for this purpose, though the more inhuman and abnormal, the less can persuasion be relied upon, and the more must actual and potential force, be used in holding people together.*

Both these methods of community homogenization—the first because it requires people to tear up their roots and establish themselves in a new community, and the second because it requires them to abandon life-long habits of belief and behavior and to acquire new ideas and habits—are hard upon individuals who differ from the determining majority of the members of a community. To whatever extent the community is homogeneous in its original composition, and subsequently maintains its homogeneity by restricting its selection of members to compatibles, this hardship is minimized.

* It is a rather unpleasant possibility that no positive idea, no matter how humane both in doctrine and leadership, can succeed in homogenizing a people quickly unless it is accompanied by a common hatred. Not love of liberty but hatred of monarchy and aristocracy was probably what really unified people in the French Revolution.

III. CLASSES AND OCCUPATIONS
 TO justify its existence and to fulfill its functions, a community cannot be composed mainly of people who practice only one vocation, (even though it be a vocation as important as farming), nor can it be, for the same reason, composed exclusively of one class of people, (even though that class consists of common people*—the people about whom Abraham Lincoln remarked, perhaps whimsically, "God must have loved them—he created so many of them.")

If a community is to justify its existence, merit the love and the devotion of its members, and make them cheerfully willing to sacrifice time and money for its support and development, it needs the leadership of a genuine *elite*; it needs, in the literal meaning of the term, (as Ralph Waldo Emerson used the word), a *nobility*.† It needs what I have called *quality-minded* people to lead and inspire it; it needs *quantity-minded* people to administer its enterprises and institutions; and it needs *common people* if its work is to be done.

And it must have, if it is to supply the goods, the services, and the educations which people need to enable them to live like normal human beings, in accordance with the highest standards of human culture, its due share of representatives both of each of the various trades and of each of the various professions.



Though the subject of the various classes which are needed to normalize a community needs much more consideration than it is given by the leaders and teachers of modern man—obsessed as they unfortunately are by the shibboleths of democracy and equality—I

* I have called the masses of common people today—the visionless mass-men whom industrialization has spawned—perhaps unkindly but nonetheless factually, *herd-minded*. c.f., Chapter X in the author's THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION.

† It needs an elite or nobility composed of individuals who are *quality-minded*; who are eminent for the superiority of their minds and characters; who are of commanding moral worth and excellence, in contradistinction to an aristocracy, plutocracy or bureaucracy composed of individuals who are *quantity-minded*; of a class which rules and exercises power in the community not because it is composed of the best individuals in the community, (presumably "best" because superior in birth, wealth and intellect), but because it is composed of those who are strongest, most ruthless, or most cunning and politic. c.f., Chapter X, "John Doe, Average Man: The Herd-Minded Type," pp. 223-229; Chapter XI, "The Quantity-Minded Type," pp. 230-240, and Chapter XII, "The Quality-Minded Type," pp. 241-261, of THIS UGLY CIVILIZATION.

can only very briefly outline an approach to the subject here. I have already discussed the matter at length in a previous book.† Sheer limitations of space make it necessary for me to content myself with calling attention to the fact that no community can be normal; none can be as desirable a place in which to live as it might and should be, unless it contains a class of individuals notable for their vision and aspirations, and a class tough-minded enough to realize dreams and to make actualities out of their own and the community's ambitions. These are characteristics found not in common but in uncommon individuals. If the masses of men and women were properly led and taught, they would not envy the superiority of any individual or class, but recognize what their presence contributes to the life and improvement of the community as a whole. And if the members of the elite were in their turn properly educated, they would discover that there is greater satisfaction to be obtained—in the long run—out of using their talents to serve than to exploit, and they would at the same time recognize how little they could do to realize their ambitions and to make life enjoyable for themselves without the labor and the cooperation of the common people of the community. The norm for class composition is not uniformity but diversity.



That the community needs representatives of all the important vocations is so obvious as to make detailed discussion of this norm unnecessary. Without shops and stores of all kinds, it forces people either to go without or to spend their money in other communities. It builds up and enriches the cities near to it at the same time that it impoverishes itself and deprives its own people of varied opportunities to earn money. Without a doctor and dentist and at least one representative of each profession, people tend either to deprive themselves of help which they ought to employ or they postpone doing so until they can go to a nearby city to obtain it. Every day that a community is without its quota of these occupations, it becomes progressively more abnormal and progressively less desirable as a place in which to live.

† THIS UCLY CIVILIZATION, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1933.

It must not be forgotten that people have artistic and spiritual as well as material needs, and that the occupations needed to make normal living possible for the members of a community call for a quota of teachers, poets, musicians, dancers, dramatists, painters, sculptors and architects. If these occupations were represented by those who were, so to speak, part-time workers at their professions, instead of men and women trying to make their livings wholly out of earning money out of them, (as they are taught to do today*), and who make themselves financially independent on homesteads, every community could support its share of them, and talented individuals raised by the community would not be driven out of it by the barrenness of its artistic and social life, and by the fact that only big cities furnish them any opportunity to realize their aspirations.

IN the composition of communities we may, sub-humanly, leave the matter of recruiting and maintaining the population to mere chance—to what is in effect *natural selection*—or we may, like human beings, turn to *planned selection*. Planning does not, of course, imply any abolition of what is natural; it is just as natural for human beings to plan what they do as it is natural for animals not to do so; the failure of human beings to use their knowledge and capacity for forethought to plan what they do as individuals and in groups is simply for them to behave like animals rather than like normal human beings.

Almost without exception all the tribes and nations of mankind, (though not too many modern local communities), have exercised some sort of control in this matter. During its long period of unrestricted immigration, the United States seemingly furnished an exception to this rule.‡ That exception ended when the quota law became effective operative July 1, 1929. But even when the nation was still inviting people without regard to race, nationality, religion and physical condition to settle in the United States, it set up various qualifications and restrictions with regard to admission into full citizenship. It excluded Indians from citizenship altogether. Only

* There is a discussion of *vocation*, (pp. 93-98), in the first part of this book.

‡ The situation as to most regions in process of colonization during the past two centuries has been similar.

those immigrants could be naturalized who had lived here various minimal periods of time. Only those whose knowledge of our constitution, and whose renunciation of subjection to their natal land and declaration of allegiance to the United States, satisfied our courts, could become citizens. These conditions were at least a recognition of the principle of planned selection, though often not much more.

Tribal selection has, of course, disappeared with the coming of civilization, but to this day local communities and neighborhoods in the United States, even though they have virtually no legal powers of exclusion, do in many instances exercise a species of planned selection even though it is often merely expressive of their prejudices, as in the case of restrictive covenants directed against Negroes and Jews. That we are beginning to realize the abnormality of abandoning all local autonomy in this matter is evidenced by the widespread development of the zoning movement.

Much of what has already been said on this subject in connection with the composition of families applies also to the composition of communities. There is overwhelming evidence that planless composition results in disintegration, and that unrestricted admission of people into communities makes for delinquency and degeneracy and for mal-administration and political corruption in the management of cities and communities. The facts point to a norm long recognized in parliamentary law, *every community must be the judge of the qualifications of its own members*, (within the framework, of course, of those freedoms—those universal laws†—which no community or nation has any right to violate).



There are at least five distinct methods which deserve consideration in the implementation of this norm — in the substitution of homogenization and harmonization for our present method of leaving the recruiting and maintenance of our communities to landlords, land speculators, real estate sub-dividers and to boosters organized in chambers of commerce. It is high time that we recognized the absurdity of accepting the idea that the only concern which the

† For a definition of universal law and an outline of the freedoms which no nation or community has the right to curtail, see pp. 631-635.

people of a community should have in this matter should be that of sheer enlargement of its population—the unlimited increase in the number of customers for stores, of workers on payrolls, of buyers of houses and lots.

These five methods are (I) *generation* by eugenic breeding, (II) *necrosis* by contraception, sterilization and euthanasia, (III) *immigration* by invitation, (IV) *emigration and expulsion*, and (V) *harmonization* through re-education. All five of these methods are to some extent, almost unconsciously, used, but all of them can be much more effectively used deliberately to control the composition, replace the losses, and (by recruiting on one hand and decentralization on the other), to normalize the population of communities.

I. *Generation*. The most obvious method of maintaining the population of the community is generation. But generation, if it means the mere reproduction of the existing population—births without regard to the character of the parents; without regard to their blood-streams and families—is an animal-like and not human solution of the problem. Normalization of the population of the community calls for eugenic breeding. It calls for systematic eugenic education. It calls for teaching men and women, desirable both because of their antecedents and their present status, that the greatest satisfaction in life for them lies in the normal completion of their lives with fatherhood and motherhood; and for teaching the undesirable members of the community—the paupers and dependents, the hemophiliacs and other bearers of hereditary handicaps, the criminals, the prostitutes and perverts, and the irresponsible pursuers of pleasure, (even from good families)—that greater happiness in life for them actually lies in contraception than in burdening themselves with childbirth and supporting children.

II. *Necrosis*. Death, while not a means of recruiting the population, is a fact which can be used to affect selectively the future composition of the community. Sterilization not only means the prevention of undesirable additions to the population, it also means the gradual elimination—by death; by what I call necrosis—of existing undesirable individuals and families. Voluntary contraception and even sterilization can be taught; it can be induced in those intelligent and conscientious enough to recognize the pain for themselves and the unhappiness for their children, if they have hereditary defects which they cannot avoid transmitting to them. For those who cannot be taught this—the moronic and the psychotic—compulsory sterilization is called for. Re-education of the leaders and the people generally is needed in all communities in which sterilization is still considered abhorrent or immoral. And, in the case of the growing proportion of feeble-minded and other undesirable elements in the population requiring institutionalization, euthanasia is called for rather than the hopeless heartache and burden of supporting them and of prolonging their unhappy lives.

III. *Immigration*. As it is today, immigration and emigration is a matter of not much more than individual caprice little influenced by considerations of community well-being. Individuals and families leave one community and move into another because they are tired of the community in which they happen to find

themselves; because they think they will be happier in some other community or part of the nation; or find a better job, home, farm, or opportunity to make money and gratify their ambitions. Rural youth and the youth of our small communities migrate to big cities partly because that is the thing for them to do today but also because the whole of the school system teaches them to do so. But if a community either needs more population in order to be able to fulfill its functions, or needs certain classes of people—races, religions, national cultures—to replace discordant and inharmonious elements being removed by emigration and eliminated by death, then it should deliberately invite possible immigrants from other communities by calling their attention to the existing attractions it has to offer, and by providing inducements for them to join it. This, of course, applies doubly to professions or occupations which the community lacks. It must, if it is to survive as a desirable place in which to live, take the initiative in either persuading those in the desired occupations to become members of the community by doing whatever may be necessary to make the community attractive to them; or it must persuade some of those already in the community to prepare themselves for such occupations—it must, perhaps, subsidize the education of one of its own members for dentistry, for architecture, for the furniture business, or for any other profession or trade which it requires but which is now missing.

IV. *Emigration and expulsion* is, like necrosis, a negative means of selection. As it is today, those who leave their home communities, particularly the smaller ones, are often those who would make the most desirable members of them—the most ambitious and best educated young men and women they have raised. In a normal community, the exact opposite of this should take place. Every effort should obviously be made to make the community and its future so attractive as to hold these desirable members. On the other hand, there must be an equally well organized effort to persuade undesirable members to migrate. (Undesirable, as I am here using the term, refers not only to those who are socially and morally undesirable but also to otherwise perfectly desirable individuals and families with characteristics, however, which make them discordant and incongruous). Persuasion may involve nothing more than making them realize that they would be happier in a community of people more like themselves, but it should include, since they might own property in the community, organized provision for “buying them out” by a foundation which subsequently sells the properties to desired members, or for helping them to move and to establish themselves equally well elsewhere. Expulsion, in contrast, should be the last resort in dealing with this problem. In the absence of statutory provision for local autonomy and control of membership, communities are still by no means helpless since means of expulsion actually used, (usually without recognition of their nature), include refusal of employment, (or of patronage if in business or practicing a profession), and social ostracism.

V. *Harmonization*. Finally there is selection through what I think of as harmonizing the discordant through re-education. Unless an individual or family cannot be re-educated at all—unless attempting to make the “melting pot” theory work will take too long or involve greater unhappiness than emigration—the method of solving the problem which should be tried first is that of conversion; of transformation intellectually, socially, morally. The discordant may be re-educated; they may be persuaded to accept the mores and practice the folkways of the community, and so cease being heterogeneous elements in the popu-

lation. Idealists—and, of course, revolutionists—will object that it may be the majority and not the minority which needs changing and re-education. That may not be as often true as those with iconoclastic temperaments think. But since it is true in many instances, it calls not for behavior which provokes resentment but for two quite different things: (I) recognition by idealists of the fact that the work of re-educating a community requires not hostility and contempt on the part of the “teacher” but competence in a difficult task, and (II) recognition by the community itself of the need for constant re-evaluation and re-education. It calls, in other words, for a School of Living in the community, and for idealists who are not only possessed by new ideas but who have equipped themselves for teaching and leadership.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART III. THE NORMAL COMMUNITY

SECTION III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY

PARAGRAPH II.

MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY

There can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his rationation from the definitions, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan.”

IN considering the management of the community, nothing is more important than to distinguish clearly between (I) *the management of the community as a whole*, and (II) *the management of the various institutions which are essential to it if it is to fulfill the functions which justify its existence.*

I. By the management of the community as a whole I mean the leadership and harmonization of all the group and public activities of the people of a community.

II. By the management of the community's institutions, on the other hand, I mean the direction of the community's various enterprises and organizations—the administration of its government; its hospitals, welfare and charitable institutions; its churches; its busi-

ness enterprises; its labor unions; its schools; its bar, medical and other professional associations; its businessmen's and farmers' organizations; its social clubs of all kinds.

Distinguishing between these two kinds of community managements is of particular importance at this time for two reasons: because of the prevalent tendency to assume that it is government which does and should manage the community, and because Industrialism and Interventionism are both combining to centralize the control of all of our institutions not only in local or state governments, but in the government of the nation as a whole. As a matter of fact, I am going to try to sharpen the distinction upon which I am insisting by designating the normally informal management of the community as a whole, the *leadership of the community*, and by restricting my use of the term *management* to that of the direction and administration of the community's various separate organizations and enterprises.

EVERY community, like every other organized aggregation of people, is composed of leaders and followers—of individuals who are willing to take the responsibility for initiating and directing group and public action, and of individuals who accept or acquiesce in their leadership.*

I. LEADERSHIP

And every community, as we shall see, is a complex of groups and organizations ranging in size from mere households to the congeries of public services called the government. The more normal a community, the less is it a total unity. What has come to be called totalitarianism—what used to be called monarchy and tyranny—is

* Most of mankind undoubtedly consists of followers—of individuals who either because of limited capabilities or because of temperament and inclination cannot or do not choose to lead. True, in many instances an individual who is a follower in some fields and in some organizations is a leader in others—a business leader may be a follower in politics, a political leader a follower in matters of religion, a religious leader a follower in matters of business—but it is also true that many of the characteristics which we find in most leaders—initiative, articulateness, responsibility, willingness to take risks—lead them to assert themselves in almost every group and organization in which they find themselves. Perhaps in a perfect world—in which all sub-normals were eliminated—every individual, (excepting only the very young and those old enough to have retired), would both lead and follow, leading where he or she had an inclination to lead or a special contribution to make, and following in all the other group activities of the community. But as it is today and will be in the indefinite future, the fact is that most of the population consists of followers and only a minority of leaders.

not merely one variety of community organization; it is really a perversion of what should be. The more nearly total the organization of the community—the more nearly what should be only one of its institutions becomes the community itself, the more abnormal is its organization.

If the management of the community as a whole is taken into account, the crucial question upon which those interested in its well-being and normalization should concentrate should not be, *What institution should dominate the community?* (business, religion, government), and therefore *Who should rule the community?* but instead *Who should be the community's leaders?* and *What institution should furnish the community leadership?*

If the problem is attacked in the first form, the tendency will be to accept things as they are; to accept the idea that government should dominate and public officials rule. While if it is considered in the second, choice will have to be exercised between what is and what should be—between government and between the one institution which the lessons of history and the available evidence indicates should furnish the community its leaders and through which they should inspire and harmonize—but not rule—the community. If either the wrong institution is chosen for this purpose, or the domination of the wrong institution continued and accepted, as is the case in most communities today—and money and business, or government and politics dominates and manages the community as a whole—nothing can prevent social life and the community itself from becoming abnormal. It is not exaggerating the facts to say that today we are moving in most of our communities from a condition in which businessmen and money dominate every public, social and economic activity, to a condition in which politicians and government dominate them. The first—business—tends to make capital the instrumentality of community management; the second—government—tends to make law and coercion the method of management.

The question is, which is the right method of furnishing the community as a whole with leadership? Which of the five basic methods of management does the experience of mankind establish as normal?

A right answer—and right choice among the only available alter-

native methods—will dispose not only of the problem of community leadership, but also make it possible to dispose of the problem of properly managing the particular institutions of which communities are composed. A wrong answer will make it impossible to solve either problem—will simply result in rationalizing errors.

THE evidence, it seems to me, indicates rather clearly that the community as a whole cannot be properly managed *militarily*. MILITARY LEADERSHIP Sparta tried it, and produced a community infinitely lower than that of civilian-managed Athens. Rome tried it and the experiment ended in one of the most colossal failures of all time. More recently Mussolini and his Black Shirts tried it in Fascist Italy; Hitler in Nazi Germany and in each of the countries he conquered; Japan tried it in its Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere, and Stalin and his Cominform are trying it in each of the nations hiding behind the Iron Curtain. We too, with Britain and France, are trying it in conquered Germany. The evidence indicates rather conclusively that military management of nations and of the communities of which they are composed results in the brutalization and not humanization of communities.

EQUALLY clear seems the evidence that the community should not be led *clerically*. CLERICAL LEADERSHIP Geneva, under Calvinism, tried it; medieval Europe, under Catholicism, tried it; so did our own Puritan New England. The all-pervading bigotry culminating in the burning of Servetus in Geneva; the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the religious wars of Protestant and Catholic Europe; the witchcraft mania, the persecution of Quakers and dissenters like Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams in New England, all evidence the fact that clericalism and clerical leadership and domination of the community is not the answer to the problem. Communities cannot be properly managed theologically for the simple reason that each church by the very nature of the basis upon which it claims authority must be the final arbiter of social life and public action.. Each is in possession of absolute truth, and whichever one succeeds in leading does violence to its own revelation if it permits dissent in matters of religion. Yet the

right of dissent is essential if the community is not to deny its members what is theirs by unalienable universal and natural law.

BUSINESS LEADERSHIP
THE evidence of history since the Commercial and the Industrial Revolutions—and the evidence with which this book is filled—equally clearly establish the fact that the community as a whole cannot be properly led or managed *commercially or industrially*. The sordid history of our American cities* in which apparently respectable and progressive financiers and captains of industry actually ruled, (in spite of the fact that politicians exercised the reigns of power), and the sordid rural villages and ugly factory towns with which the nation is dotted, are evidences of the fact that leadership of communities by and for business is not the answer to the problem.

GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP
FINALLY the evidence seems equally conclusive that the community as a whole cannot be properly led *politically and bureaucratically*. Communist Russia, of course, furnishes the example *par excellence* in our own time of the error of government leadership. But history is replete with illustrations of this error—the later Roman Empire; the German Reich created by Bismarck; our own New Deal with its staggering centralized bureaucratic substitute for state rights, local autonomy, and individual freedom and responsibility. Government leadership of the community, no matter how unpalatable the fact may seem to idealists who have limitless faith in what they call democratic government, is by its very nature coercive. In the final analysis, politicians and bureaucrats do not stop, as the leadership of the community should, with persuasion; they always resort to the enforcement of law.

EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP
OF the five alternate methods of management only one—educational management—is appropriate for the leadership of the community as a whole. The norm is: *the community's leading institution should be a school, (a School of Living in small, local communities;*

* Lincoln Steffens made a vivid report dealing with this which was published in magazines under the general title of "The Shame of the Cities."

a University in all regional centers); its leaders, the community's real elite, (its teachers in the inclusive sense in which I define them in the first part of this work†); the method of leadership by this educated minority, persuasion.‡ The other four methods of management—the authoritarian, the fraternal, the functional, the co-ordinal—are unsuitable for the community as a whole; they are suitable only for particular organizations and enterprises; they are methods which are, by their nature, (as countless experiences with them demonstrate), unsuitable for the task of inspiring and harmonizing the social and public activities of the whole community.

II. MANAGEMENT

LET us now turn from the problem of community leadership to that of the management of the separate organizations and enterprises, including government, which are needed in every community; let us turn from what is in effect the *ideation* of the community—from evaluating, envisioning, and planning it—to the *implementation* of the ideas which the leaders of the community persuade its people to accept and the ideals to which they lead the community to aspire.

COMPETITIVE BUSINESS

THE first norm which the experience of mankind clearly supports, if the universal law of freedom is to be observed; if what used to be referred to as the *natural rights of man* are not to be infringed, is that *unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, every business enterprise in the community ought to be privately owned and personally operated by its owner or owners.* The stores, from mere gasoline stations to department stores; the shops and factories; the mines and farms; the taxis and trucks; the ocean liners and ships; the restaurants and theatres, should be in competition with each

† Those whom I have in mind when I speak of teachers and leaders are described in Chapter II; their functions in Chapter III; their form of organization in Chapter XII, and the call of the times to them in Chapter XIII.

‡ It is unfortunately necessary to reserve adequate discussion of the distinction between educational and other methods of management for the second volume in this study, EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY. Here all I can do is to point out that the essential distinction lies in the fact that in managing, or rather, in leading educationally, only persuasion and prestige can be used to inspire and integrate the community's activities; that the method explicitly excludes domination of the community either through the exercise of political power, the use of wealth, or playing upon the superstitious fears of people.

other; and in the cases of enterprises catering to a region or to the whole nation, with those of other communities. But their competition should be *fraternal* and not, as is generally assumed, *predatory*. The rules governing the free market in which every trade and industry should compete should provide for open bidding in order to equalize the competitors and to deprive "big business" of its present advantages both in buying and selling. Indeed, with a rational system of land tenure, an honest money system, and cooperative credit and banking, "big business" and the overly-rich businessman would tend to disappear because every one would have access to natural resources on equal terms and every capable and trustworthy entrepreneur would be able to obtain all the credit he needs. The rich and the predatory would be deprived of the monopolies, special privileges and differential advantages which they now enjoy and which alone create the great disparities and concentrations of wealth which exist today.

Trusts, cartels, holding companies, chains of stores and factories could not survive if this norm was implemented, community by community. The private corporation—the privileged *artificial person* in competition with *natural persons*—is a monstrous abnormality; the laws which legalize their existence are simply sanctified violations of the rights of individual human beings. Corporations are really needed only for the operation of public utilities — of enterprises which by their very nature should not be privately owned. With the private corporation abolished, business enterprises would tend to grow only to their optimum magnitude; they could not expand as they have fantastically beyond the point of maximum efficiency.

THIS norm applies to all small-scale and all those large-scale enterprises which require initiative, originality, or personalized service. The evidence as to certain highly routinized business enterprises, (insurance companies, for instance); all public utilities or enterprises which operate on franchises, (power companies, telephone companies, railroads); and certain essential public services, (banks, organized produce and other markets), indicates clearly that they should be cooperatively owned and managed as a service for those who use them and not for the private profit of those who control some corporation. The norm is, *every business enterprise which is public in*

its essential nature should be neither privately nor governmentally owned; it should be functionally managed and cooperatively owned by those who patronize it.

THE norm as to the management of the community's non-profit enterprises—its churches, charities, schools, hospitals, libraries, museums and other cultural institutions; social clubs, trade associations and labor unions; its bar, medical and other professional associations, is self-evident: *ownership and operation as a social service by membership associations or foundations.* This is in fact the situation to a great extent today. The subject does not have to be labored; only its implications must be made clear. The evidence indicates that whenever and wherever the norm is violated, there is a tendency toward tyranny or inefficiency; often to both. When the church, for instance, is "established" and government supported, or *vice versa*, the government is clerically controlled, the penalty for the violation of the norm is curtailment of religious freedom. When schools are politically operated, as is the case with our public school system, bureaucracy permeates them from top to bottom. The best schools are never public schools; the best teachers are frustrated by the handicap of unavoidable politics. And when what should be social enterprises, are privately controlled and operated for the profit of those who control them, (as is the case with some labor unions and charities), they afford endless opportunities for racketeering at the worst and exploitation at the best.

AT this point something must be said about the contribution which the implementation of the community's affiliational function would make to the solution of our economic, social and political problems. We have become so used to thinking that centralization offers the only way of managing anything efficiently, that we have made virtually no effort to explore the possibilities of affiliation on the community level—the possibilities of cooperation and true federation of local units nationally and even internationally. For instance, the international postal service is not a Post Office Department such as we have in Washington at all. It is nothing more than an agreement

SOCIAL SERVICES

AFFILIATION

among autonomous national post offices to cooperate in exchanging mail. There is no reason why the same technique might not be used to decentralize and localize the management of all sorts of centrally controlled social services and public utilities. Why should a politician in Washington appoint local postmasters? Bank presidents, whose job is much more important, are appointed locally by a board of directors representing the stockholders of banks. Why shouldn't postmasters be appointed by a board representing the patrons of post offices? Two additional very different illustrations must suffice to establish my point.

The operating unit of a railroad is never a gigantic railroad corporation, nor nationalized railroad system; it is a division—often less than a hundred miles in length. While the evidence unquestionably establishes that the combination of these divisions into systems thousands of miles in length has led to an agglomeration of profits, (particularly from stock speculation wherever railroads are privately owned), and to the creation of gigantic tax-eating bureaucracies, (where they are governmentally owned), there is no real evidence indicating that this has led to any net reduction in the cost of railroad service. On the contrary, there is ample evidence indicating that great economies could be effected if the railroads were broken down into local and regional units which affiliated with one another. Such affiliation exists today in the transshipment of freight; the same thing would hold true if the units of organization were much smaller.

Another illustration of what I have in mind is furnished by our centralized money and banking system. Our Federal Reserve Board is not federal at all; it is not a genuine affiliation of autonomous banks, as are clearing houses, for instance; it is an agency which enables the Treasury Department in Washington to regiment all the banks of the nation and to use their resources not as the banks each believe theirs should be used, but as the government decides they should be forced to use them. The same perversion of affiliation is to be found in all sorts of other institutions—institutions as different as labor unions and medical associations. Most local unions are completely dominated by their International Unions; most local and even state, medical associations, by the American Medical Association.

THERE remains the management of the government—^{GOVERNMENT}of those community services, like the protection of persons and property, which justify resort to coercion. Here the evidence clearly points to the three norms: (I) *authoritarian administration regardless of the size of the population unit being governed*; (II) *democratic election in all small and local communities*, and (III) *federal or republican organization in all larger population units—counties and provinces, regions and nations, continental areas and the world as a whole*. The justification for these suggestions is to be found, firstly, in the evidence indicating that governments never fulfill their functions effectively—functions which call for the *enforcement* of law—unless they have full authority to act, and, secondly, in the evidence of the impracticability of democracy in large population units and of representative government in small ones.

One final norm which all history supports must be touched upon: *Nothing in the community must be assigned to the management of government, (to management by legal coercion), which can possibly be assigned to any other institution; which can possibly be managed equally effectively by volunteers, with volunteered funds, and by voluntary action*. The implications of this are far-reaching.

FOR instance, there is the fact that there are probably only three ^{REVENUE}sources of revenue which the leaders of the community and managers of its public, social and commercial activities can use: (I) *taxes*—revenue obtained by compulsion; (II) *donations*—revenue contributed voluntarily, and (III) *sales*—revenue created by trading, (using the term *trade* broadly, with reference to the sale of goods—goods produced by agriculture and industry—but also the sale of labor and services). The first, taxes, (which in any normal community would consist almost wholly of ground rents), would support the government; the second, donations, would support all of the community's non-profit organizations and enterprises; the third, sales, all of its business and most of its professional activities. The indisputable fact about taxes—that people are *compelled* to pay them—constitutes just one important piece of evidence justifying the decentralization of all government and the reduction of its activities to a minimum.

Today not only democracy, not only republicanism, but the very idea of liberty, of which both are implementations, is being everywhere challenged. Beginning with the Age of Revolution, the world began to labor under the impression that progress called for more and more liberty and less and less government. Russian Communism, and the neo-Communism of Fascism and National Socialism, has changed all that. We can no longer assume that liberty is an idea the validity of which no intelligent person denies. The ideal of liberty must again be vindicated. Not only the fanatic revolutionists who accept Russian totalitarianism but countless well-informed and well-meaning men and women have abandoned their faith in liberty and are turning to Statism as their hope of social well-being. The reason for this, it seems to me, is that in the implementation of the ideal, modern man has disregarded all the evidence of history, and all the evidence of current events, about the true basis upon which government should be organized.

Modern man has disregarded the fact that there is really only one unit upon which the civic relations of mankind can be properly organized. That ultimate unit is not the voter voting as an individual, but the voter as a member of a community—as the representative of a family which owns a homestead and has a stake in the community's commonwealth. For the community is not a mere aggregation of individuals; it is an organization the members of which consist of those families which not only concern themselves with its affairs at election time but which accept responsibility for its management at all times.

Vaguely we recognize this in our method of representation; we have taken the land of the nation and divided it into township, assembly, congressional, and senatorial districts, and we send from each of these geographic areas a representative to act in the public interest. But we have disregarded this when we come to the matter of voting. The individual is taught to represent nobody but himself. In a desperate effort to represent something more than his own material self-interest, he joins something—a movement, pressure group, political party of some kind. He tries to sublimate the selfishness he has been taught in some artificial entity, which never really satisfies his instinctual drive to express himself like a normal human being. But the

normal group for him to represent is the family in which he completes himself, and the community in which his family lives.

If this is true, there is need of a profound transformation of our conception of what constitutes membership in the community. The land must be divided so that every family is not only able to be self-sufficient, but also so that it can never be used for purposes of speculation. One of the principal tasks of leadership in the community should be to ensure the equity of division and the proper use of the land within its borders; it should cease embarking upon an endless series of meliorative measures for which need would disappear if land was properly distributed. The norm is, *the vote should never be conferred upon an individual until he or she marries and becomes a full-fledged member of a family with a stake in the land*. His or her vote should represent in the councils of the community, a family and a homestead. The individual instead of finding, as at present, every institution in civilization—including its educational institutions—so organized as to discourage him from establishing a family, from having children, from acquiring independence, would find the exact reverse the case—he would find that accepting responsibility and discharging his functions as a mature individual would mean final acceptance as a man and citizen.*

* It is worth noting that the social stability of the communities of agrarian and pre-industrial China—their democratic base in spite of their apparently inconsistent feudal superstructure—is very largely due to their familial political organization; ten households make a neighborhood; ten neighborhoods a village; ten villages a community; an aggregation of counties a province, etc. etc.

CHAPTER X. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NORMAL LIVING

PART III. THE NORMAL COMMUNITY

SECTION III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY

PARAGRAPH III.

INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY

There can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his rationation from the definitions, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan."

NO COMMUNITY is entirely normal unless it is equipped with *all*—and not merely some—of the institutions necessary to fulfill the needs which from the beginning led the human race to invent them. A community without all of them is as abnormal as a human being without all the organs of a whole person—it is crippled and handicapped as is a human being without eyes or ears, or hands or feet, or any other of the organs or parts of his body. Such communities are mis-called *communities*; they do not and cannot furnish their members the facilities which give significance to their conception. In such so-called communities people may dwell, or shop, or work, but they do not find provision for equally important essentials of good living. As to these missing needs of living, they are the victims of frustrations almost directly proportioned to the incompleteness of the community's equipment. The norm for the equipment of the community therefore is: *all the institutions essential to the fulfillment of the community's functions.*

NEIGHBORHOODS
AN enormous number of what we call communities are simply *neighborhoods*. Most suburban communities are *neighborhoods*. Many residential sections of big cities, which were before their incorporation into a metropolis relatively normal communities, are today mere *neighborhoods*. Real estate sub-dividers do not usually build communities; they build *neighborhoods*. In all such *neighborhoods* people dwell near each other; that is all. There is, between residing in a *neighborhood* and living in a community, a world of difference—a difference of the same order as that between listening at home to the radio performance called the Town Meeting of the Air, and participating in a New England Town Meeting. For most of the needs which communities should supply, the dwellers in mere *neighborhoods* have to go to the nearest city and patronize the purveyors of commercial substitutes for community life.

SHOPPING POINTS
NEITHER are the innumerable hamlets and villages equipped with a gas station, a grocery store, perhaps also a post office or church, communities. Even if the storekeepers live in the village, as is usually the case, that does not make them communities; they still remain mere shopping points. The sharper the separation between the people of the village and the rural population patronizing them, the more abnormal is the so-called community. Shops and stores represent only one of the institutions with which every normal community ought to be equipped.

MILL TOWNS
OF ALL so-called communities, none are more depressing than many of the towns which spring up around mills, mines, lumber camps, and fishing points. The trouble with them is that the town "equipment" which enables the people to earn their living, is permitted to become, in effect, the whole town. Such towns are almost invariably ugly as sin; often they have a transient appearance—the stores and homes may not be much more than temporary shacks; there is so much missing from them that the marvel is how people can endure them at all.

DIVESTMENT
BEFORE enumerating the institutions with which evidence indicates every community should be equipped, note must be made of

the fact that in many communities divestment may be as important as equipment. To normalize communities it may be necessary in some cases to equip them with institutions which they lack; in others, to divest them of things which they should not have. Most social reformers never get beyond concerning themselves with divestment; they are concerned with eliminating some one institution to which they are opposed rather than the normalization of the community as a whole. They assume that if some one existing institution in the community, (which they believe evil), were eliminated, all social evils would disappear. Prohibitionists, for instance, would divest communities of saloons and bars; purists and moralists, of bawdy houses and gambling dens. But divestment by itself is never enough. The Abolitionists succeeded in eliminating slavery—but evil though that institution was, they did not succeed in normalizing society. I too am a believer in a divestment—in divesting our communities of the mania for bigness. The communities of the nation most in need of this divestment are our cities. They need, first of all, to be divested of their surplus populations; then of their surplus factories, banks, stores, hotels, apartment houses, skyscrapers, subways, two and three-deck streets and highways; finally of their innumerable government bureaus and hordes of public functionaries—in fact, all the fantastic things and institutions which become necessary to provide for crowds.

WHAT now are the institutions with which every community ought to be equipped—institutions of which there are only a few in the abnormal communities which I have described? By institutions I mean in almost every instance a combination of five things: (I) *ideas* about something which needs doing; (II) *tangible things and natural resources* which can be used to implement the ideas—land, buildings, machinery, tools, livestock, supplies, commodities, stocks of merchandise; (III) *techniques* for using the equipment and producing and distributing the goods, or furnishing the services, for which the idea calls; technically and professionally trained *personnel*; and (IV) *organizations* which plan, finance, own, and operate community institutions. *Schools* may be cited as typical of such institutions.

Every community must have a *full* complement of schools; without schools for dealing with *both* adult and juvenile problems, a commu-

nity is obviously incapable of fulfilling its inspirational functions.*

No matter how much individual families in such a community may try to fill the void created by the absence, let us say, of a School of Living, not even the richest and most highly cultivated families can render life in it entirely normal for themselves. In such a community these are the families which ought to take the initiative and furnish the leadership in establishing such a School not only to furnish stimulation to its own members but to make certain that it is provided for all those who are poorer in spiritual, and perhaps also in material, resources than themselves.

That reading books and periodicals is an inspirational and educational activity for which fairly adequate provision can be made family by family, is perfectly true. The family may be able to buy plenty of good books; it may be able to subscribe to magazines and newspapers. But no amount of reading is a substitute for hearing an inspiring speaker, or for conversation and discussion with a group of thoughtful, cultivated and concerned persons; just as reading Shakespeare and Sheridan is no adequate substitute for seeing dramas and comedies acted, much less for actually taking part in acting itself. To profit fully from one's own education, it is essential that there be a substantial number of people in the community in which one lives who are equally well educated—that all the children of the community, and not merely one's own, shall be prepared and inspired to live like civilized human beings, and that the determining majority of the adults of the community shall be taught and led to deal with the problems of the community, the region, and the world in the light of the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of mankind. A community which is not equipped to implement its inspirational needs properly, must inevitably become parochial, drab, and static; it cannot be relied upon to deal in a civilized manner with the social, economic and political problems which human beings cannot afford to ignore.

The families of no community can afford to abdicate responsibility for the organization and operation of its schools. The equipment of the community with a full complement of schools calls for local initiative — for voluntary leadership and voluntary cooperation — for

* c.f., Chapters III and IV, pp. 27-111, in which I discuss the distinction between adult and juvenile education, and particularly the diagram on p. 66.


local enthusiasm and support, and not merely for professional, bureaucratic, political, and absentee state or national control. Normalization of the community is impossible with bigness and centralization. Centralization results in the standardization of the inspirational as of every other community function. It results in the substitution of official propaganda for what should be individually felt; in the organization of schools not in accordance with local and regional traditions and topographic, climatic, and social conditions, but in accordance with national and even cosmopolitan concepts of culture. It leads everywhere to the acceptance of a single, rootless culture in contrast with the creation of a multiplicity and diversity of indigenous cultures. We have tried to educate the American people in tax-supported schools; we have tried to create a rightly-educated population by compelling parents, under penalty of the law, to send their children to public schools organized from the top down. We are discovering that the public school system—from primary school to state university—has not lived up to its promise.*

The time has come to cease thinking of schools as institutions which the state and the nation should control. The time has come to lead people to think of them as one of the many institutions with which every community must be equipped *by the community itself* if the communities in which we live—and living itself—is ever to be normalized and humanized.

In order to vivify what would otherwise be a mere list of institutions, I have asked Shirley Miles to diagram a community equipped with them. The diagrams, however, are not pure abstractions; they are based upon a study of an actual township—Jefferson Township, in Montgomery County, Ohio.

The list is necessarily suggestive rather than definitive. I think it fairly complete, at least with regard to the most important institu-

* It is perfectly true that the community and nation have a vital need of insuring some minimum of education in the population. It is true that the state has full warrant, in order to assure itself of a population capable at least of fulfilling the requirements of good citizenship, for the use of the taxing power for this purpose. But all this could be done without implementing the idea through a state school system. The simple expedient of substituting scholarships and grants-in-aid for the present system of public ownership and political direction of schools, would eliminate most of the distressing evils with which every student of American education is familiar.



DIAGRAMMIC suggestion for the "equipment" of a normal community. The diagram is based upon a study of Jefferson Township, in Montgomery County, Ohio, in which "Milestead," the homestead of Shirley Miles, the artist, is located.





DIAGRAM of some of the elements entering into the equipment of the center of the Township opposite. For a more complete list, see pp. 670-673.

- | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. School of Living | 12. Post Office, Bus Terminal |
| 2. Library and Museum | 13. Town Hall |
| 3. Common and High School | 14. Men's Club |
| 4. Vocational School | 15. Women's Club |
| 5. Auditorium | 16. Young Men's Club |
| 6-7. Churches | 17. Young Women's Club |
| 8. Hotel | 18. Subsistence Homesteads |
| 9. Bank | 19. Family Farmsteads |
| 10. Market-place | 20. Common Pasture |
| 11. Shops and Factories | 21. Town Forest and Forest Belt |

tions. But research really adequate to the importance of the problem would probably reveal institutions which I have overlooked; it would also have to distinguish between institutions which should be located in every community and those which can only be located in cities and regional or national centers. A really complete study would provide us with a check-list of the institutions essential to local communities, to marketing cities, to regions and continental areas, and to the world as a whole.

Sheer limitations of time have made it impossible for me to enumerate in each instance the *idea*, (such as that of education); the *tangible equipment*, (let us say a school building); the *technique*, (the method of management and instruction); the *personnel*, (the teachers); and the sponsoring *organization*, (perhaps a school board).

I. INSPIRATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

School of Living—a university in extension; led by a full-time, professionally trained Dean and a panel of specialists or experienced masters in each profession and craft; sponsored by a Fellowship of men and women concerned with the normalization of living. (1) *

Common Schools, (preferably one in each neighborhood), and a *high school*, (preferably a folk school); staffed with professional teachers; managed by the faculty; sponsored by a local membership association. (3)

Vocational Schools, preferably sponsored by organizations composed of men and women in the various vocations for which the young are preparing themselves. (4)

Library and Museum; an institution *preservative* of all the arts and sciences. (2)

Auditorium, with halls for lectures, meetings and conferences, and facilities for drama, concerts, dancing, broadcasting, etc. (5)

Churches; priests, pastors, rabbis; congregations. (6-7)

Newspapers; preferably more than one so as to give expression to more than one interpretation of events.

Literary, musical, dramatic, historic, scientific societies, etc., each of which would sponsor community activities in its own field.

Art Commission; (planning, zoning, appearance of both public and other structures, monuments, roads, parks, etc.)

* These numbers refer to the numbers on the diagram on page 669.

II. GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

Town Hall; town meeting; public officials; police force; court, lawyers, and laws and ordinances. (13)

Jail; preferably a mere house of detention.

Armory; militia.

Fire Department; preferably a volunteer fire company.

Highway Department; paved roads, sidewalks in town center.

Sanitation Department; garbage and sewage disposal system, preferably using a compost "factory" for waste disposal.

III. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Hotels, (8); motor courts—rest houses for visitors and travellers.

Restaurants; bars, ice cream parlors, road houses.

Social Clubs; luncheon clubs, country clubs, fraternal lodges, women's, young women's, children's, men's, young men's. (14-15-16-17)

Public Comfort Stations.

IV. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

ENTERPRISES PREFERABLY IMPLEMENTED COMPETITIVELY

Factories, (11); preferably for the finishing of the raw materials which are produced in the community on its farms and in its forests, mines and quarries, fisheries—creameries, canneries, abattoirs, etc.

Handcrafts; contractors and builders; carpentry and other wood-working shops; machine shops, smithys, and other metal-working shops; tailors, weavers, upholsterers, decorators; bakers, etc., etc.

Retail Stores.

ENTERPRISES PREFERABLY IMPLEMENTED COOPERATIVELY

Land; business sites; home sites, (preferably subsistence home steads [18] for those mainly employed in business, industry and the professions); farm sites, (preferably family-sized [19]); grazing sites, (preferably cooperatively managed [20]); forest sites, for soil and water conservation, timber, fuel (21); park, camp, playground sites; mine and quarry sites; river, lake, ocean, harbor sites. The allocation, use and conservation of the community's land and natural resources might be assigned to a land authority and planning board which would fulfill functions now left to land-owners and speculators, real estate dealers, sub-dividers, boards of assessors, zoning boards, forestry de-

partments, conservation departments, irrigation districts, and specifically in certain areas to the U. S. Reclamation Service, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Port of New York Authority, etc.

Banks; commercial, building and loan, consumer credit unions, depositors' checking, savings, bank-of-issue, (money). (9)

Public Utilities; water supply, (for the town center only); gas; electricity, street cars, bus lines.

Post Office, (12); telephone, telegraph, cable, radio companies.

Depots; railroad station, bus terminal, airport, harbor—wharfs, etc.

Produce and Farmers' Market—both wholesale and retail.

Fair Grounds; sheds, stables, tracks, etc., with seasonal fairs and regular market days sponsored by farmers' associations.

Public Storage; elevators, locker plants, etc.

Insurance; life, fire, health, accident, liability, etc.

Guilds; trade and manufacturers' associations; labor unions; farmers' associations, professional associations.

Arbitration Association.

Community Chest; for supporting charities and welfare agencies.

V. RECREATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Theatres and Concert Halls; theatrical companies, movies; "little theatres," amateur theatricals; operatic companies; orchestral, band, choral concerts; sponsored by drama and musical associations.

Play grounds; camp sites, picnic grounds; swimming, skating, boating, wading facilities; athletic fields, tennis courts, baseball grounds, golf courses, coasting, skiing and toboggan slides; parks, band stands, outdoor auditorium and theatre.

Festivals and Holidays; pageants, processions, fairs, folk dancing, folk singing.

Retreats; mountain, forest, seashore.

VI. HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

Health Center; health examination board; ante-natal, post-natal, birth control, sex instruction, marriage advisory, mothers', infant-welfare clinics; nursery school; immunization clinic, quarantine board; sanitation and hygienic inspection service; sponsored by a public health administration. (15)

Hospital; rehabilitation clinic and service; trained nurses, midwives, physicians, dentists, oculists, etc., sponsored by local medical and hospital association. (15)

Sanitariums; neurotic; tubercular, etc.; delinquent; degenerate, (perverted): dependent, (poor).

Asylums; orphaned, old, feeble-minded, insane, crippled, blind, etc.

Cemeteries; mortuaries; crematoriums.

VII. AFFILIATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Memberships in Clearing Houses and Central Banks by the community's banks, credit unions, building and loan associations, etc.

Memberships in Organized Central Markets by local elevators, cotton warehouses, cooperatives, brokers, etc., dealing in produce, grain, petroleum, coal, timber and other commodities.

Delegates from local fraternities, trade and professional associations, unions, political parties, etc., to state and national conventions.

Legislative Representatives; councilmen, county board members, assemblymen or legislators; congressmen and senators.



This study of community has necessarily been an incomplete discussion of an enormously important subject. But if it persuades a saving remnant of the teachers and leaders of modern man to seriously concern themselves with something other than city life, it has not been written in vain.

Maybe each great region of the earth needs one giant city—one giant cesspool which glitters phosphorescently—to attract the decadents of the region and then, in a few generations, annihilate them. Maybe the city is needed to make evolution work. But if this is so, then Normal Living is impossible. For these great boils upon the body politic—these centers of corruption and decay—are certain, unless history lies, to ultimately infect the whole population and, by giving it a false ideal to which to aspire, make it despise the ideal of living in normal communities like normal human beings.

PART IV
EDUCATION AND LIVING



RE-EDUCATION



*. . . . the history of mankind
might be described by a cynic as
a series of splendid expeditions
towards no goal at all, led by men
who have all the gifts of leader-
ship except a sense of direction,
and every endowment for achiev-
ing their ends except the know-
ledge of ends worth achieving.
—Sir Richard Livingstone, in
“Education for a World Adrift.”*

RE-EDUCATION: *The Normalization of Man*

There can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.—Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan."

IF modern man is living abnormally; if he is mistaken in the purposes toward which he shapes his life, the real problem of those who are responsible for education is the problem of re-educating modern man; of first determining the proper ends and purposes to which human beings should devote their lives; secondly of instilling in them the desire to devote their lives to this newly defined objective; thirdly of supplying them with knowledge of how it is possible to achieve it, and finally of leading them to act in accordance with it.

It is the argument of this book that the true objective to which human beings should devote their lives is *living like normal human beings*. If Normal Living is substituted for Progress as the aim and goal of modern man, then the primary effort of the teachers of mankind ought to be the solution of the problems which living normally presents to individual men and women. The challenge which this represents is specifically a challenge to adult education because the problem of normalizing living

is really a problem only to men and women old enough to act. It cannot be solved by educating children. A certain minimum of adult experience in life is necessary to understand what is involved, and a certain minimum of adult power to do anything about it.



It is not necessary to repeat in any detail what has been said concerning this missing aspect of the education of modern man. But a brief summary may prove helpful in laying a foundation for the argument which concludes this book.

EVERY adult has two kinds of problems—ADULT PROBLEMS one personal and individual, and the other public, social and gregational. Educating human beings to deal with them in a rational manner requires the utilization of all the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of mankind in helping them to make the proper choices between alternative ideologies of living and alternative methods of implementing them. Most of the instruction received by men and women today does not in any way reflect this knowledge and wisdom—it reflects the ideas formulated by advertising men in order to promote the interests of industry. The formal instruction given by educational institutions is almost entirely in terms of the needs of special producer-interests and not of society as a whole; instruction in terms of the needs of consumers and of the common welfare tends to be sacrificed to the needs of vested interests of all sorts; if the specialized instruction given is integrated at all, it is integrated in terms of the nations' industrial expansion; it is not integrated in terms of human beings and their welfare.

Formal instruction in the choosing of ideologies and of their implementation, was virtually impossible prior to the rise of science. The average man and woman inherited his or her choices. All the problems of living were disposed of in accordance with family and folk traditions. Tradition, however, as a guide has ceased to function in modern, scientific life; fashion has taken its place—fashions which are for the most part imposed upon modern man by advertising, salesmanship, publicity, propaganda. The actual influence which shapes

the way in which modern man acts and behaves—the way in which he lives—is not right-instruction in the solution of individual and gregational problems; it is mal-education; it is mis-education not only in church and school but in newspapers, movies, broadcasting; it consists almost exclusively of ideas which favor business interests, or political parties and personalities. Both these interests tend to over-emphasize the interdependence of individuals; they tend to minimize the possibilities of individual action and self-help, and to encourage reliance upon large-scale enterprise and mass-action politically. They ignore not only the possible extent to which individuals and families might be taught to solve their own problems by directly exercising initiative, but also the extent to which their public problems might be solved through voluntary group and cooperative action. They create a “climate of public opinion” in which the only practical solution of any problem at all seems resort to political action, to new statutes, to the use of the state’s power of legal compulsion and coercion. Since these problems of the individual, personal and social, are not juvenile but adult problems, they are really problems in adult education.

BUT CONVENTIONAL ADULT EDUCATION most adult education today is not true adult education. It is almost exclusively delayed instruction of adults in subjects in which they should have received instruction during their childhood. What is not delayed instruction is for the most part intellectual entertainment—the presentation of unintegrated and arresting information, or instruction in the appreciation of arts which the average individual is not supposed to practice because he cannot practice them skillfully enough to make a living out of them.

TRUE TRUE ADULT EDUCATION ADULT EDUCATION must consist of a comprehensive program which aims at furnishing the responsible adult, (as distinguished from the pre-accountable juvenile), an adequate basis for (I) choosing among alternative ideologies those which are valid postulates of action; for (II) choosing the specific social, political and economic institutions which need to be established, reformed or abolished in order to implement ideas calling for group and public action; for (III) choosing means of implementing ideas which call for per-

sonal action, and for (IV) choosing leaders who are educators rather than power-seekers. True adult education should equip the people with principles which will help them to solve both their personal and public problems.

But above all, true adult education must direct itself to personality and character-building. It must motivate the individual as well as inform him. The cultivation of the character of the individual man and woman is an essential pre-requisite to normal living, to the right use and cultivation by mankind of the Holy Earth, to the organization of normal families and the creation of normal communities. For even if the people, by some miracle, could be transplanted into a Utopia equipped with a set of perfect social, economic and political institutions, conditions would not be Utopian because it is impossible to make such mere mechanisms work properly unless those who have to operate them have both the desire and the practical knowledge of how to make them work properly. That it is possible to solve these problems through education, and to transform the whole manner in which people live, is proved by the great Scandinavian revival which grew out of the education of young "adults" in the Danish Folk Schools. That it can be done more effectively, and in a shorter period of time, I believe an adequate analysis of the educational potentialities of modern advertising, salesmanship and publicity will establish. Re-education of the *mature* adult—without at all neglecting the education of the young—will do in a matter of years, what it took nearly two generations of educating *young* adults to do through the Danish Folk School system, and what will never be done so long as education is confined to childhood only.

Since adults, however, are already educated by the time they become adult—mis-educated, unfortunately, for the most part—what this calls for is really *re-education*.

FINALLY, in order to furnish this re-education, and to give to those I call teachers an instrument through which to exercise leadership, a new kind of university—which I have called a School of Living—is needed in every community, an institution which is a sort of graduate school for adults and which brings, through its affiliation with

SCHOOLS OF LIVING

Universities, all the existing special and technical knowledge of mankind into each community. These Schools of Living—and not banks, factories, nor municipal, state and national governments, and not even churches—should become the central and most influential institution in each of the communities of the nation. And the educated minority, and not financiers, industrialists or public officials, must furnish the leadership in society now being usurped by businessmen, and in process of being usurped in the rising socialized world by politicians and bureaucrats.

IN the education of men and women, it is a temptation to say that the first years of life count for more than all the rest of life put together. Of necessity most of the education of children during these crucial years takes place in the home. If the home can do so much in the way of right-education during these formative years, its opportunity to furnish harmful education is equally great. Both in order to ensure right-education and to avoid mis-education of children by their parents, right-education of the parents—the adult population—is essential. If men and women are not properly instructed, at the very time when they are raising children, they will not only hand on to them the good habits they have but also the prejudices which they practice. What is more, they will be unable to offset the bad habits which may be instilled into their children outside of the home, or to discriminate in the selection of schools and teachers to whom to entrust their children.

Nothing better illustrates the prevailing attitude of the teaching profession to the problem of the adult than the title of an article in an influential educational journal, "What Shall We Do About Parents?"* The question is not a rhetorical one—it is one which teachers concerned with the unsatisfactory results of their labors, consider a most pressing, practical one. What does it really signify—that in order to enable the school to educate the children, the influence naturally exerted upon children by their parents must be neutralized? Or, that there is something terribly wrong not only with the modern parent but also with the modern school? Or, to put it in another way, that

* "Progressive Education," May, 1936.

the education of children *despite* their parents, is futile and hopeless? Sometime, somehow, re-education of the parents must begin. That, of course, is not the task of juvenile education. That requires adult education of a kind no present day institution in our communities is specifically organized to supply.

If, and when, we organize to supply it, normalization of living will begin. By mobilizing the educated minorities of our communities to furnish leadership in grappling with the really major problems of adults; by furnishing them the technical help for dealing with them with which our universities are, or ought to be, abundantly supplied; above all by inspiring them with a vision of what re-education of the adult population might do, normalization of the individual and the family, the community and the nation, and ultimately humanity as a whole, will become possible.

SCHOOLS OF LIVING: *The Organization of Re-Education*

Greater than hatred, greater than force, is an idea whose time has come.—Victor Hugo.

A School of Living is first of all a fellowship—a fellowship in precisely the same sense in which a Christian congregation is a brotherhood. The members of this fellowship, like the members of such a brotherhood, should be united by a great ideal. But whereas the great idea with which Christianity is concerned is life hereafter, (as the fundamentalists logically insist and the modernists illogically ignore), the great concern of the fellows of a School of Living is life here and now.* It is not hell-fire hereafter which should trouble such a fellowship—it is hell right here and now.

The tragedy of the Carol Kennicotts in the thousands of Main Streets—big and little—with which the nation is dotted, is precisely that; they are revolted by *things as they are*; they aspire to civilize and humanize their communities—to fill them with light and hope; and they are crushed by the fact that there is in “Main Street”† no fellowship of like spirits; no plan by which they might realize what they envision; no instrument

* It is my own profound conviction that if there be a life hereafter, living like normal human beings, as members of a normal family, in a normal community, cannot possibly be inconsistent with what hereafter requires of us here and now.

† MAIN STREET, by Sinclair Lewis, (Harcourt Brace & Co., 1920), may be a novel, but it is also a sociological diagnosis of what is wrong with our small towns.

through which they can try to move their community from where it is to where it should be. They starve spiritually in a materialistic barbarism which is ironical past all the genius which Sinclair Lewis put into its depiction simply because there is no School of Living into which they can pour the spirit by which they are animated. They—and not the mass of two-legged animals about them—are the only human beings in the community. They are human not because they are like their fellow townsmen but because they are unlike them. *They dream dreams and try to realize them.* The most distinctively human thing about *homo sapiens*—the thing in which he differs most from other animals—is not his plantigrade posture; not his ability to read; not his mastery of machines, but his memory, his understanding, his *imagination*.



What now is the great idea—what the method of realizing it?

The great idea is simply *the teaching of normal living*; the method of realizing it—not revolution, (with its hatred and bloody violence); not legislation, (with its pathetic faith in coercion), but *adult education in Schools of Living*.

I HAVE already emphasized the need of a complete system of education; a system which begins at the cradle and ends only with death. But such a concept of education does not call for the continuance of class-room teaching into adult life. Juvenile education can be organized that way; re-education of adults cannot. Real adult education must be, paradoxically, *organized-informal education*. It must be organized if it is to prove adequate, and informal if it is to reach those who are most in need of it. It has to take into account, firstly, the fact that the “student body” which has to be dealt with consists of mature men and women; of individuals who are busy earning their livings, running their homes, and raising their children; that few of

METHOD

them can afford to devote specific hours of the day to attending school; that the "student body" consists of individuals who must be re-educated, so to speak, "on the run."*

Secondly, it must take into account the fact that nearly all adults today, and particularly those who need re-education worst of all, will resent the very idea of a school devoted to such a purpose as learning how to live. Why, they will naturally ask, did they go to common schools, high schools, and even colleges? Yet since most of what they learned in school aimed primarily at equipping them to *earn* a living, no matter how proficient their juvenile schooling, they need just the sort of education which Schools of Living should supply.

There is an old saw: "You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink."

The pedagogic method which has to be used in adult education must begin by dealing with this problem; it has to be totally different from that which works in juvenile education. For children have to go to school; their families and every social influence bearing upon them predisposes them to take it for granted that going to school is their only serious business in life—until they can graduate from school altogether. The teacher, therefore, does not have to do anything to persuade them to subject themselves to instruction.

The situation with adults is almost the exact opposite of this. They are conditioned to go to business and conditioned *not* to go to school. They have graduated; they think they have already finished their education; the men—and most of the women too—have their livings to earn; homemaking women have husbands, children and houses to absorb their time; and all of them, no matter what they may do, are subjected by advertising and salesmanship to ceaseless suggestions about what is the proper and sensible way in which to spend time. They have been filled with desires which they believe represent far more enjoyable ways of spending time than the study of living. On balance, education comes out second best in competing with the comic strip, the radio and the automobile.

* The education of Deans for local Schools of Living is, of course, quite a different matter. To equip them for such leadership, they will have to give much more time to preparation than the rank and file of the public; they will have to turn to the Universities—perhaps to special teachers' colleges, as candidates for the ministry turn to seminaries—for the special courses they will need.

Adult pedagogy must take account of this situation. Before it can educate, it must create a conviction in people of the need of education. As in old fashioned evangelism, before people can be saved, they must be filled with a conviction of sin. Until the teacher can make people not only recognize their ignorance of how to live but also the dire danger into which mis-education has thrust them, he may organize the best school in the world, but he will have no student body.

Thirdly, it must take account of the fact that most people do not now live in normal communities; they live either in cities too large, or in villages and rural communities too small, to be normal. Re-education cannot take place if this situation is complacently accepted and the problems it creates ignored. Any program of adult education which refuses to deal with the question of where people should live, refuses to deal with what is perhaps the most important immediate problem in normalizing modern life.

HOW can these dilemmas be resolved? What actually must those concerned about this problem do? What is the most effective method of dealing with it which they can use?

I. DECISION

In the very beginning they are confronted with the problem of a decisive step: *establishing productive homes and homesteads in communities small enough for normalization.*

Establishing themselves and their families in productive homes is necessary if they are to free themselves from total dependence upon money-making—from servitude to their present jobs—so that they will feel free to devote sufficient time to study and re-education.

If they already have jobs and live in cities abnormally large, they must either leave them or work toward their decentralization; toward their reduction in size; toward their normalization. If they live in communities which are abnormally small, but which contain natural resources sufficient to sustain normal populations, they must begin working to enlarge their populations and to equip them with the institutions which will complete and as nearly as possible perfect them.

Modern education, and modern values, ill-equip the intellectuals of the nation to make any such decision. It is almost wholly directed to specialization and success in a big city. The small community, and even the small city, is considered merely a place where the am-

bitious individual, (and particularly the ambitious teacher, preacher, doctor, writer, artist of any kind), should obtain the experience which may enable them to succeed in a large city. But it is not true, as we have been taught to believe, that this kind of material success is really essential to real satisfaction in life. Nor is it necessarily true that men and women of exceptional ability, and even of genius, must abandon their homes and communities to render the world the greatest possible service. Even when society as a whole, rather than a single community, can make best use of the talents of great geniuses, it does not follow that they must establish themselves in a great metropolis. Oberlin devoted himself to a group of obscure hamlets in the mountains of Alsace; Kant refused to leave a little university in the city of Koenigsberg; Goethe was most of his life a citizen of a provincial capital, Weimar. Yet all exerted not merely a local but a world-wide influence upon mankind.

Arthur E. Morgan puts the case very well:

Sometimes, but not always, exceptional ability should have the widest possible range of action. Sometimes even great ability can be most effective with small groups. In some cases parents who are persons of exceptional quality may have the greatest total influence by deeply impressing great character upon the children of their own family, rather than by having slight influence over a very large number of children. A great teacher may do his best work by very intimately transmitting his spirit to a few students. The founder of Christianity was able to transmit his teachings, not chiefly because he spoke to the multitude, but because he lived intimately with twelve disciples, and gave them an intense and intimate acquaintance with his spirit. In many cases a man may do his best work by concentrating his efforts in a small community, thereby bringing about a penetrating and fairly complete perpetuation of his own quality; whereas if his influence had been country-wide it might have been superficial and might quickly fade away.†

IN the second place, if they are to solve these problems, they must prepare themselves. They are undertaking nothing less than to show men and women how to go about solving social problems of the very existence of which they may be unaware, and how to solve personal problems which most of them think have already been solved. *Preparation for them begins with learning how to define these problems.* They must learn how it is possible to bring the valid knowledge of

II. PREPARATION

* THE SMALL COMMUNITY, Arthur E. Morgan; Harper & Brothers, 1942; p. 83.

mankind to bear upon them. They cannot possibly, no matter how much they now know nor how much time they devote to preparing themselves, learn all the answers to them—any more than the best lawyer can know all the law, or the best engineer all the data he may have to use in his work. *But they must know where to find them.* They must know how to use specialists who have answers, very often to problems outside of their own special fields. Since in most small communities they cannot find all these men, they must affiliate with Universities with the necessary resource leaders. Finally they must have a *felt view* of not only what is wrong in their own communities and the world at large, but also a *living vision* of the transvaluation of values and transformation of society at which they aim.

Perhaps it ought not to be necessary to add this postscript regarding preparation, but unless they are prepared in this regard, they are almost certain to experience a sense of frustration at how slowly people change and how difficult it is for communities to be rebuilt: *they must have infinite pity not only for the sufferings but also for the febrile amusements to which most people will insist upon clinging; for their misunderstanding and bitter opposition to change and right progress, at least in the beginning; and be able to express real appreciation for whatever people may do toward the normalization of their own lives, their families, their community and so toward the world at large.*

BUT no matter how predisposed to change may be the community selected nor how well they may have prepared themselves before approaching the public, the first actual step in re-educating people must be *to attract their attention.* It is not enough for them to say: "We will teach those who come of their own accord to be taught," nor to say, "We will be satisfied to teach by example." The situation we face calls for much more. *Time is running out.* The barbarians are already everywhere. This generation, as well as future generations, has to be taken into account. Those who are willing to wait for the future; who are indifferent to what is happening to people now, and what will happen to them in the immediate future if the present trend toward centralization is permitted to continue, have not yet prepared themselves for their responsibilities as leaders and teachers.

III. ATTENTION

They must therefore learn how to attract the attention of the people of the community. They have to learn how to do a better job of attracting attention than the demagogues and the financiers who are now distracting them, in the first case in order to obtain political support, and in the second to sell them something. In competing with them, they must face the fact that they labor under a handicap: they cannot, as can politicians and advertising men, deceive people or lie to them. They must do nothing and say nothing which conflicts with what they believe to be the truth. *They must rely solely upon the truth well-told.*

But they can sincerely and honestly use the same powerful spurs to human action upon which "the world, the flesh and the devil" rely; they can deal with *fear, sex, vanity, and greed*. Only they have to play upon people's *fears* for other purposes than to get themselves elected to public office. They have to play upon *sex* for some other purpose than to get them to buy perfumes, hair tonics, nail polish, and soap guaranteed to eliminate B.O. They have to play upon *greed* and *vanity* for some other purpose than to get them to buy the latest styles in clothing and the newest and biggest automobiles on the market. They can use these stimulants to action to make people see that the planning of family life, the building of a homestead, and the normalization of their community will mean the difference between satisfaction and frustration for them.

In many respects they can "outdo Herod;" *they can legitimately be more dramatic*. For there is nothing more dramatic than the crisis through which the world is passing at this time, and the ideas for dealing with the crisis which they have to suggest to people.

They can attract attention by being timely—they can always begin with whatever problem is of most immediate interest to the individual and the community, and from that beginning carry on to every subject which people can be shown bears directly or indirectly upon the problem's solution. They can hold back all the implications which they see until people learn that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" and are ready to "drink deep of the Pierian spring."

Finally, they can be *festive*. This is a serious book; I personally am temperamentally a rather sober person; topic and personality combine to make the tone of what I am saying heavy. But nothing

Nietzsche ever wrote is truer than, "Since humanity came into being man hath enjoyed himself too little: that alone . . . is our original sin." The concerned men and women to whom this book is addressed, may have the most serious task in the world—they have to save a civilization moving with accumulating speed towards its own destruction—but they do not have to go about it with long faces. If they do, they will fail to win a hearing from the public. Fanatics—full of zeal, and usually hate, and with no sense of humor—have never won a people. When Christian love and joy began to change into Christian hate—of Paganism and the Gentile world—it ceased to win people. The triumph of the Church came, after Constantine embraced it, not by persuasion but by fire and sword. The triumph of the hate brewed by Marx and Engels out of the hell-broth of Industrialism and Urbanism, is coming not by persuasion but by conspiracy, by revolution, by ruthless tyranny and coercion, by what—without the faintest realization of its gargantuan absurdity—lunatic *intellectuals* call "the dictatorship of the *proletariat*."

Now the distinguishing mark of a truly normal person is not the steely glitter we find in the eyes of zealots; it is a sense of humor and proportion; the ability to laugh; the realization of not only the tragic but also the comic aspects of living. Enthusiasm the members of Schools of Living must feel; but that is something very different from the certitude of bigotry. And this enthusiasm, and willingness to laugh, can be dramatized in festivals, in processions and pageants, in folk dances and folk sings. Nothing is more abnormal than the synthetic commercial gayety of the radio, the movie, the comic strip. To normalize the community, people must learn again to play—they must discover the absurdity of paying people to do their playing for them. No norm is more important than this occupational norm: *Laugh, sing, dance!* There will be time enough for work even if time is taken for play. What is more, life as a whole will be more normal.

FOURTHLY, once they have the people's ears, they must arouse their interest. There is literally no activity more interesting and fascinating than grappling with a live personal or public problem—not in preparing to grapple with it but in actually undertaking its solution. Nor is there anything which arouses and holds interest more

IV. INTEREST

than telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about such problems. None of the cheap sophistries of advertising and salesmanship can compete with truth well told, for the truth is in fact stranger than fiction.

The interest which they arouse can be held and deepened by the adequacy and completeness of the method by which they seek fundamental and not superficial solutions of problems. There is a tremendous and terrifying fascination in the working and even the mere presence of someone who is sincere and genuinely profound. This fascination they can make people feel because they do not have to rely upon pretense and pretentiousness. Only the proud can stoop. Real knowledge and wisdom makes both pride and humility possible, and makes humility something other than a pious posture.

FIFTHLY, they must create in people *desire*—the desire to live like normal human beings. But desire cannot be created by arguing with people; it can only be created by persuading them to want what they are wanted to want. Giving people a chance to “sample” what is proposed to them is undoubtedly the most effective way of creating desire. But it can also be created in people by making them talk; by listening patiently to their analysis of what is wrong and what they think of various plans for dealing with a problem; by using their instinctual drive for self-expression to reveal to them the extent of their own mis-information; by leading them to discover ideas which are really adequate solutions of the problems with which they are faced; by making them feel that the ideas are theirs and the world’s, not merely the School’s.

FINALLY, they must be able to *move people to action*; to practice and to implement the ideas which they have been persuaded to accept. Without action, all the previous steps in the direction of re-education become futile; they are reduced to the status of intellectual entertainment. It is action which makes satisfaction possible; which breaks barriers of frustration; which dignifies man’s dreams by attempting their realization; which sustains individuals and groups in struggling with obstacles and overcoming initial failures. The crucial element

in this final step in re-education is that of *transforming what in the beginning are verbalisms into proposals for action which call for an affirmative "Yes" from individuals and from groups.*



Once the people of a community have begun to implement their ideals, the task of the School is not finished; in a sense the whole process has to be repeated over and over again for at least five compelling reasons: (I) because each new generation of adults has to be taught how to deal with the problems they are in turn facing; (II) because every new idea and everything newly learned by the group—no matter how old the new discovery may be—calls for evaluation and consideration; (III) because life is not static, and history—no matter how much it repeats itself—always presents problems which call for action; (IV) because no matter how far the individual, the family and the community may each have been perfected, the task of normalization will not have been completed until everybody even in the remotest regions of the whole world has been normalized; and finally (V) because of the overwhelming evidence that normal living for *homo sapiens* calls not for the crystalization of the community's culture but for an ever-rising culture in which both ideals and means of realizing them have always to be transcended.



THE implementation of new ideas in education involves not only formulation of the functions to be fulfilled but also of the organizations which have to be established in order to realize them. This, for instance, was the case with the idea, formulated by John Locke, which was realized through the organization of the English "Public" Schools. It was also the case with the idea of the Danish Folk School as it was conceived by Nikolaj Grundtvig. And it was also the case with the "New Education" as Progressive Education was called when John Dewey launched it on its conquering way. The idea of Schools of Living—of real adult education—requires similar formulation not only of its purposes, (a subject which has been fully discussed), but also of the means appropriate to their realization.

ORGANIZATION

As I envision these means, they involve, firstly, a *School of Living in every community*.

In a sense the land, buildings, institutions, and financial resources of the entire community* can be conceived of as the School's potential *endowment*; the entire adult population of the community, its *student body*; the community's educated minority, its *faculty*; the personal and public problems of the entire population, the *subject matter* with which the School has to deal; the solution of these problems, the School's *immediate task*; the normalization of the whole world—individual by individual, group by group, nation by nation—the School's *ultimate goal*.

The first step in the establishment of a School may well be the formation of a study group by a small number of concerned men and women. The members of such a group would be, so to speak, scholars of living; once they had devoted sufficient time to study to have defined for themselves the thirteen major problems of living and to have explored at least some of the many alternative solutions of each of them, they become, so to speak, bachelors of living.

Organization of such groups should "begin where we are," in such cities and communities, however abnormal, as we already have. The process should ultimately result in decentralizing cities which are too large and in shifting their surplus populations to communities which are too small. This does not preclude the creation of entirely new, planned communities—decentralization will create demand for the creation of an enormous number of additional small communities.

Any group which has familiarized itself with the concept of education for living—and the group may be as small as two or three persons—may take the initiative in organizing a School, in affiliating themselves with the existing "mother" School, and in raising funds to employ a trained leader, (if possible a couple previously trained to serve as Deans in Schools of Living), who would devote themselves, apart from whatever time they spend in homesteading and housekeeping, primarily to the work of building and equipping the School, enlarging its membership, and completing its panel, so that the School might begin the work of normalizing their community.

* A community can be conceived of, (as it is today), as a set of business enterprises; as it used to be, a parish; as it is becoming, a government district; as it should be, a school—a group of people engaged in learning how to live.

Each School is to have the right to confer upon those *scholars of living* who have finished their basic study of the major problems of living, the degree of *bachelor of living*; a committee representing any three Schools, other than the School of which a candidate is a member, may confer upon a bachelor the degree of *master of living*; and a committee designated for that purpose representing the Schools of a whole state, may confer upon a master the degree of *doctor of living*.

Each School is to call to its leadership a trained Dean of Men and Dean of Women. As soon as possible, it should also employ a Research Librarian who could also serve as School Clerk or secretary.

Each School should have an extension relationship with a nearby University.

By this I mean simply that it has to be able to call upon a university for resource leaders—for men and women to serve upon its panels if all the experts it needs are not already resident in the community. Time may prove *university extension* one of the really seminal educational ideas of the past century.

Each School is to have a panel of resource leaders—of experts in various vocations, sciences, arts. This panel should be as complete as possible, though in dealing with most of the problems which will come before them only a few members of the whole panel will be needed. The following list of experts in various fields of skill and good taste is suggestive rather than definitive:

Philosopher	Population Scientist
Theologian	Historian
Psychologist and Psychiatrist	Political Scientist
Sociologist and Social Worker	Jurist and Attorney
Cultural Anthropologist	Criminologist and Penologist
Educational Scientist	Police and Military Scientist
Public Relations Counsellor	Political Economist (<i>Chrematistike</i>)
Poet-Orator-Writer	Home Economist (<i>Oikonomikos</i>)
Musician and Dance Master	Agriculture and Forestry Scientist
Painter and Sculptor	Financier and Banker
Actor-Dramatist-Director	Accountant (C.P.A.)
Industrial Designer	Architect and Landscape Architect
Hygienist	Appraiser
Nutritionist and Bio-Chemist	Business Management Specialist
Physician	Engineer
Sexual and Eugenic Scientist	Insurance and Investment Counsellor

Each is to be equipped with a Research Library containing both the great classic studies of the major problems of living, and the latest books, periodicals, pamphlets, and catalogs dealing with them and their solutions. The Library should definitely *not* be a general collection of books—it should be a collection strictly limited to material which throws light upon the problems with which the School has to deal, and the collection should be classified and indexed first in terms of the major problems of living, and then by the various species and sub-species of problems in each of the thirteen major problems thus far defined.

Every School—however modest its beginning, however temporary its first home—should eventually have its own expressive and impressive building. That building should be, if possible, in the very center of the community, perhaps even its geographic center, the visible symbol of the community's leadership. It should bear the same relationship to the community of the future which the cathedral bore to the *medieval community*; which the biggest bank, the town shopping center, or the factory with the largest pay-roll bears to the *modern community*; and which the capitol—the seat of political power—will bear to the *socialized communities* of the statist society toward which the pseudo-liberals of today—the Government Interventionists, Socialists, and Communists—are pushing the whole world.

An infinite variety of designs may all prove suitable for the buildings, grounds, and equipment of Schools of Living, but certain features should probably be incorporated in all of them: a dignified meeting room, a number of seminar or committee rooms, a research library, office rooms, and perhaps a homestead for the occupancy of the staff. Architecturally, preference should undoubtedly be given to indigenous styles—to styles which are in the tradition of the region and which fit the local scene.

If there is a School homestead, the building, its kitchen and work shop, its out-buildings, gardens, and livestock, should make it a model productive home. It need not be immediately adjacent to the School. But if separated in order to obtain enough land, it should be within easy walking distance of the School and community center. Such a homestead would serve the School in much the same way that a parsonage serves its church, and in much the same way it would contribute to the solution of the problem of financing the School. A parsonage only furnishes shelter; a homestead not only shelter but most of the food, perhaps some of the fuel, and other goods which can be domestically produced.

Each is to conduct a *perpetual survey*—a sort of perpetual inventory of the state of the community—and to make a *perpetual plan*—revised continuously—of what the community is to become.

The Perpetual Community Survey. The idea of surveys is so well developed that no great space needs to be devoted to its discussion. But there are two developments of the idea which seem to me essential if surveys are to be used as basis for the normalization of communities: the first is the substitution of a perpetual survey for a static one—of a perpetual inventory of the state of the community for an inventory certain to become obsolete shortly after it has been completed; the second, substitution of surveys which are deliberately restricted to information essential to the normalization of communities for those which literally drown people with masses of data of every imaginable kind. The data probably essential is really of only two kinds: (I) *people*, by households and places of work—all the people of the community and not merely those who are potential clients for social workers; and (II) *land-use*—all the land in the whole community, plot by plot and farm by farm. With regard to people it should show (I) where they live and where they work; (II) the number of persons on each plot or farm, and (III) their ages and sexes. With regard to land-use, it should reveal (I) whether it is owner-occupied or rented; (II) what the actual nature of the land may be—site-land, mineral-land, plow-land, pasture-land, woodland, etc.; (III) what the nature of the occupancy, whether agricultural, mineral, mechanical and manufacturing, trade and commercial, professional, educational, transportational, residential, etc.; and (IV) the number of persons who live or work on every parcel in the community. *And every time there is a change of use or ownership, or of occupancy by people by reason of marriage, birth, death, or moving and migration, the survey should be revised—it should always be an inventory of things as they are, not as they were at some date which daily recedes further and further into limbo.*

For such a survey to mean much to a community, it should consist of discoveries made by the men and women and, above all, by the leaders of the community themselves. The idea that specialists should be brought into the community to make the survey is a mistaken one. Facts become felt—and inspirers of action—only if they are realized by those who themselves should act upon them. One way to avoid superficiality and yet to have the survey made by the people themselves would be to call upon skilled specialists to act as resource leaders; to have the School of Living, through its university affiliation, secure experts to help in the planning of the survey, but to have the actual facts gathered by local committeemen from each section of the community, or better still, to turn the job over to the school teachers of the community and have them direct their students in doing the work. Community surveying could be a regular school project, and the senior classes each year would thus keep the survey perpetually up-to-date. (In passing, mention must be made of the fact that studies of the community's equipment and institutions, its management, its size and membership, are in a sense surveys, but if the basic inventory is available, no special project needs to be launched to obtain this kind of information).

If the survey is not to gather dust on library shelves, it must be both graphic and inescapable. A large community map, constantly revised as property changes hands, the people occupying a plot move, or the land-use of a plot changes, is the answer to this problem. One whole wall of the School's meeting room, unbroken by openings of any kind, might well be used for this map. By using watercolors, changes could be readily made and readily followed and the question as to whether they represent improvements or impairments of the community intelligently discussed.

The Perpetual Community Plan. If the conditions revealed by the survey and graphically portrayed on the community map are bad—as they will be in nearly every community, big and little—it is obvious that they call for correction *through a community plan*. Such a plan of what the community is to become, drawn to the same scale and in no greater detail, should face the map of the community as it is. Reality and ideal would thus always be before the people as they meet at least once a week in dedicatory service.

The American community today is for the most part nothing but a speculators' Utopia. Its conception, planning and realization with few exceptions has been wholly motivated by the question of how the maximum profit might be extracted from the sale and resale of land, first by those who acquired title to the undivided land, and thereafter by their successor-speculators in plots purchased or inherited by them. The few exceptions include some of the early New England towns, some of the Georgian communities in Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas, the Mormon towns built on the Plan of Zion, and other communities established by religious and perfectionist groups.

In spite of the rise of the town planning movement; in spite of the development of the new profession of city—if not town—planning; in spite of the fact that most of our large cities now have city planning departments, no real change has taken place in town and city planning—it still aims not at normalizing living but at raising, or at least keeping up, real estate values. To plan how to enable the people in cities to transport themselves and the goods they produce and consume; how to enjoy some of the amenities of life in spite of the congestion in which they live, is not to improve matters in the long run—it is simply to make possible further congestion; to use the skill and ingenuity of a learned profession for the purpose of crowding two human beings into the same limited area in which one human being is now being squeezed. What is needed is the development of a profession of community, not city, planning; more specifically, of the planning of normal communities. Unfortunately the profession thus far has devoted itself almost wholly either to re-planning big cities, or the planning of "model" cities, like Port Sunlight, which stem from the necessities of a single factory, in this instance, devoted to the noble purpose of manufacturing soap. There is something painfully distressing to me in the very idea of organizing a whole community around the manufacture of soap—or of any of the other things to which modern man attaches similar importance. As to lavishing much thought upon making it possible for our already overgrown cities to eliminate the blighted areas which they have developed, that seems to me only a little less distressing.

Our cities do not need preservation; what they need is abolition.

City planning ought to be directed to transferring city activities and city populations—the surplus of population over that which should normally occupy the land in a metropolitan area—to the country and into the smaller towns of the nation. *Our city planners need to be reborn.*

The very unit of planning which they accept seems to me all wrong. If a man from Mars were to ask, "Why is a 25-foot lot?" it would be embarrassing to have to tell him the truth. For the most part, the unit of land *sale*, of land *use*, and land *planning* in the United States is a lot—a plot often only 20 feet wide, usually 150 feet deep, with the narrow side fronting the street. The whole concept this lot represents has nothing to do with the proper use of land or the needs of those who are to live upon it; it is an invention wholly produced for the purpose of enabling speculators to obtain the maximum profit out of the subdivision of a given area of land. (It would be almost, though not quite, as embarrassing to answer the question of "Why a 160-acre farm?" As to land use, this is an absurdly large unit in the fertile regions of the nation, and an absurdly small unit in all regions suitable only for grazing or forestry).

There is, therefore, both a great need and a great opportunity for right community planning; for persuading people, community by community, to make not five-year but twenty-five and perhaps hundred-year plans for their communities. What is needed are not five-year plans to be pushed through by the dictatorial methods used by Soviet Russia, but one, two and three-generation plans—foundation plans which the present generation initiates but which succeeding generations are taught to gradually bring closer and closer to perfection.

The planning should, however, be deliberately limited to a rate of change and improvement which is never so rapid as to make life miserable for the existing generation. The planning should call for gradual execution; changing or razing highways, streets, factories, businesses, homes, farms should take place only after those involved become convinced of the desirability of the plan, or objectors move, or death takes them away and the improvement can be made with the least possible violence to sentiments which ought to be respected.

That a community plan should never be considered unalterable, is obvious. That is the reason I think not of a *plan* but of *perpetual planning*. As the level of the culture of the community rises, the conception of what constitutes improvement will also rise. The present generation makes its plan guided by such light as it has and can obtain; it should leave to succeeding generations the opportunity to perfect what it has begun. If the school children today are enlisted in the making of the community survey and community maps—perhaps even to the extent of making scale models in relief on topographic lines—their imaginations would be stirred, and they would subconsciously prepare themselves to take part in the work of realizing the community plan as they grow up and become adult members of the community.

For the purpose of suggesting some of the things which might be embodied in such long-range planning, Shirley Miles has drawn this re-plan of Jefferson Township in Montgomery County, Ohio. The township adjoins Dayton, Ohio—a city of over 300,000 population. As it is now, the township, like so many others near large cities, is a typical realtors' paradise, planned by and for real estate subdividers with practically every landowner holding his land in the hope of sale at a rise in price to a subsequent speculator.

In place of the helter-skelter of subdivisions; of business sections, public institutions, homes, and farms now in the township, the diagram, (c.f., p. 668), divides the township into a number of neighborhoods within short distances of the community center. The second drawing, (p. 669), on a larger scale, diagrams the community center. In place of the usual hodge-podge of business structures, the center consists of a School of Living; a library and museum; a common, vocational and high school; auditorium, churches, hotel, etc., etc.

Separating the township from those adjoining it, is a community forest and forest belt. If such a forestry program were introduced all over the nation, every community could use land least suitable for farming to provide itself with at least some of the lumber and wood it now uses. Managing the forest, cutting timber, lumber-milling, and woodworking with local lumber, could furnish part-time employment in the community to many of its members. In addition, such a forest would improve the ecology of the whole region. Finally, common pastures are suggested to replace the present wasteful use of land for grazing. Such pastures, together with the forests, administered co-operatively, would make it possible for every family—even those on very small homesteads—to keep livestock, and to be able to provide themselves with enough wood to at least keep their hearthstones from growing cold.

The School's activities, if they are to cover the whole field and not a mere fragment of living, will fall into three categories: the

first, *instructional*, which deals with the present; the second, *festal and commemorative*, which has its roots in the past; and the third, *inspirational*, which looks to the future.

Instructional Activities. There are two quite different kinds of instructional activities in which every School will have to engage—one, systematic instruction of study groups in the ideology and implementation of Normal Living, and the other, consideration—with incidental and informal instruction—of specific personal and public problems. The first has already been discussed. The second probably calls for a procedure beginning with (I) formulation, definition and classification of the problem; (II) analysis and discussion of the available alternatives for dealing with it; (III) either immediate solution of the problem and recommendations for implementation, or reference to a committee—preferably of one—for research if no solution can be immediately furnished, and finally (IV) guidance of the individual, family or institution involved. The School's perpetual survey and perpetual community plan fall into this second category of activities.

Festal and Commemorative Activities. In the broadest sense, all festal days, all holidays, funerals and memorial days, weddings and anniversaries, christenings and birthdays, have in common the fact that they are days and occasions set aside for ritualistic, ceremonial and liturgical acts and activities designed to intensify feeling for events considered important either by individuals and families, groups, or the community as a whole. In the sense in which I am using the words *ritual* and *rite*, a birthday party, a dance, a picnic, a fair are as truly rites as are banquets, funeral services, christenings. A School of Living does not truly serve its community unless it furnishes leadership in this area of living as well as in those which seem, but are not in fact, more important.

Inspirational Activities. If Schools of Living are not to fail in their most essential task—that of inspiring their people to live like normal human beings—once a week they will have to conduct what might be called a dedicatory service—a formal lecture followed by an open discussion, a folk sing, perhaps also a folk dance, and even a folk dinner or supper. The lecturer may be one of the Deans of the School; some guest speaker; or some member of the School or leader in the community, (perhaps a minister or public official). The subject, however, should be chosen by the School; the speaker should be prepared to defend his thesis in the discussion period; his object should be not only to enlighten but to enliven the congregation. In such a service, poetry and eloquence—oratory in the best sense of the word—is as necessary as information; the group must not only *understand* but *feel* what the speaker has to say.

Since the only day in the week, in our culture, during which whole families are free to attend such a service is Sunday, that is, perhaps, the day upon which the School should conduct it. That this would put the School in competition with the community's churches, at least insofar as this service conflicts with those of churches, is perfectly true. Local conditions may make it advisable, for a time, to conduct it at an hour of the day which would not conflict with church services, or advisable not to conduct the service on Sunday at all. But the fact cannot be ignored that the School, like a church, is an inspirational institution, and that it may have to join in what should be in a genuinely civilized community a fraternal competition for the support of the public. The fact also must be recognized that in most communities, there is a large public which does not go to church. Every community large enough to be normal ought to be able to provide a congregation for the School without depriving churches of theirs.

From one standpoint, the need for Schools of Living grows out of the fact that the churches as a whole have failed to furnish the leadership which man-

kind needs. By the very nature of a religious, or eschatological, approach to the problems of the living, they cannot furnish it. Only in those communities where one church is in fact the dominant institution of the whole community, (as is the Roman Catholic Church in many French Canadian communities), does a church furnish what I think of as a substitute for such leadership.

It cannot furnish the leadership required because, in most communities, religion is not a harmonizing but a divisive force. Each religion has its own creed, and each believes that its own creed represents the only certain way to salvation. In a sense, all Christian churches are of two kinds only—they are either *fundamentalist* or *modernist*. The Catholic Church is fundamentalist, as are not only the zealots of Protestantism—the Holy Rollers, for instance—but many individual congregations in the larger Protestant denominations. Theirs is unquestionably the more logical position of the two. The Christian cannot both believe and disbelieve in the creed of his church. In this respect the Catholics are consistent—their creed consists of dogmas to be accepted, not questioned. What conflicts with dogma is false, no matter how weighty the scientific evidence to the contrary.

The modernist is in a hopelessly illogical position. He accepts science, yet he clings to the church, which cannot subordinate its own revealed truths to the primacy of truths established scientifically. He can, of course, justify continuance of church membership for social and for charitable purposes. But the truly logical thing for such individuals to do—and for whole congregations and their ministers who are in this predicament—is to frankly change over into Schools of Living, and to look upon Jesus and the whole body of Christian thought, not as the only ultimate source of truth but as merely one source of knowledge and wisdom. For two thousand years we have had churches in the communities of the Western World. For over two centuries, modern science has been undermining the very foundations of the fundamentalist position. Neither religion nor science has concerned itself with what is the desperate need of men and women today—some method and some instrument which concerns itself primarily neither with the world hereafter nor the merely material things of life but with the problem of leading mankind to live like normal human beings here and now.

Churches are in fact, though not in theory, institutions for adult education, (even though it is a very special kind of education). The preacher cannot avoid being a teacher. The word *rabbi* actually means teacher, and Jews call going to services, going to school. It is not without significance that the schools and systems of education which we accept today as primarily secular were originally denominational. Benedict and Loyola deserve as much a place in the history of education as Pestalozzi and Froebel.

A church has its congregation, its preacher; its auditorium; its text, all of them singularly paralleled by a school with its students, its teachers, its classrooms, its text books. It is true that the church exists for purposes of worship and that it is denominational rather than communal. But three things have happened during our own times, and are continuing at increased speed, which are profoundly modifying the functions which churches are fulfilling in their communities: the first is the increased concern of all denominations with social problems which all have in common, accompanied by a decrease in emphasis upon the sectarianism which divides them; the second is the tendency toward union and the establishment of community churches; and the third, the awakening of church leaders to the threat of Progress—to the danger represented by industrialism, urbanism and materialism in the modern world.

The simple truth of the matter is that in the modern world, the church has lost its function. In the great controversy between religion and science, the church made the mistake of separating itself from the intellectual growth of

mankind. But this is not all. The spread of the concept of the brotherhood of man has ironically made the concept of denominationalism absurd. If everybody is a member of this universal brotherhood, differences of religion and of denomination become mere accidents; their continuance is traditionally but not intellectually justifiable. Black and white men may differ racially; Americans and Englishmen may differ nationally; Christians and Buddhists may be different religiously; but no matter how different genetically, politically, or culturally, it is inhuman to go on conducting churches as though differences for which individuals may not be responsible, can yet result in their damnation. No denominationalist can assert today—without stultifying his intelligence—that the failure to subscribe to his creed and to join his church makes salvation impossible. It is not through denomination but through his manner of living that the individual is saved or damned. The more genuinely religious a minister is today, the more conscious he must become of the fact that it is not by sectarianism but by right education that men are saved. Conversion may still be necessary, but in a world in which commerce and science have universalized human relations, the conversion must begin with a conviction of ignorance, issue in consecration to study, and end with devotion to truth, to goodness, to beauty.

It seems to me that without necessarily disregarding the rich traditional inheritances of their denominations, each church might well make itself not merely a community church but a School of Living. Maybe the time has come to fully implement what Jesus said: "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath."

Every School should be financially independent of church, state, and business, so that no vested interest or pressure group—denominational, political, commercial, industrial or agricultural—can control its activities.

The principle which should govern the financing of Schools of Living seems to me plain: *they must be supported by those who are most concerned and who have most at stake—by the educated minority of the community; by the families with culture, imagination, ideals; whose members are concerned about truth, goodness, beauty; who are social minded; who are not consumed with the mere gratification of their own immediate desires but try to fulfill their obligations to their children and parents; who are, in sum, what I have called quality-minded.* These families have most at stake because unless the community as a whole is taught to value the great heritages of civilization, life in the community for them and their children becomes drab, and living in the community fruitless; they find themselves driven to larger and larger cities which furnish at least synthetic substitutes for what the average community—the community without life and vision—fails to supply them.

This is the principle—the principle of support by those most concerned—which governs the organization and financing of churches here in America.*

* The norm to which the evidence points is two-fold: *those who have the greatest interest in an institution—either a private interest, or a social interest, or both—should be the people who support it, and those who either have no interest in it, or disbelieve in the institution, (other than the institution called government as long as it governs in accordance with universal law), should not be compelled to support it.* A state supported or subsidized church violates the norm; so does a state supported school system.

There is an equally important norm for which there is even more conclusive

Families who believe in the church's creed—as the educated minority of families in a community should believe in right education for themselves and for everybody else—support them. They become church members. They each obligate themselves for an annual contribution. The income from these "dues," plus that from collections and endowments, (diocesan and national as well as local), maintains the church, pays the minister's salary, and supports the church's activities.

Contributions by church members varies between city and country, between one section of the nation and others, between denominational and denomination. In 1944 contributions ranged, (Bulletin of the Department of Research, Federal Council of Churches, Vol. XXIV, No. 28), from \$12.08 to \$55.95 per member per year. The average for all denominations was \$16.57. Churches composed mainly of families whose circumstances are substantially the same as those of families belonging to what I call the educated minority, probably averaged around \$25 per member.

How much might reasonably be anticipated from the contributions of members to a School of Living? Membership should in time average considerably higher than in the average church since there are no denominational barriers to restrict admission. If we assume a membership of only 200, and annual contributions of only \$25 per family, that would give the School an income of \$5,000 per year from one source only. In the church study to which reference was made only 64% of the income came from subscriptions; 27% came from collections; 9% from endowments and other sources. Schools of Living can look forward to at least four sources of income: income from (I) contributions of corporate and associate fellows; (II) tuitions from study groups and collections at meetings and services; (III) rentals of classrooms, auditorium, etc., (IV) donations and endowments. These should furnish ample funds with which to employ a Dean of Men and a Dean of Women, particularly since they would be obtaining a large part of their livings on their homesteads and would not therefore need full-time salaries; to maintain the School buildings, and to carry on its educational activities.

Such a program for financing Schools of Living would not only solve the practical problem which looms so large in our eyes today, but would also finance them in a manner which leaves them entirely free to teach "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."



This conception of a fellowship organized in local Schools of Living and consecrated to right-education, is, of course, *a dream within a dream*—"It lights my life, a far illusive dream, moves as I move, and leads me on forever."

But, who knows?

If it be a dream worth realization, perhaps men and women who can make a reality of it are waiting—for just such a challenge as it represents.

evidence: *No institution should be dependent for its support upon any interest which has interests different from that of the institution. A school intended to teach impartial truth should not be dependent upon business, political, or religious interests because each has "an ax to grind."*

EDUCATION AND LIVING:

Challenge to the Teachers of Mankind

. . . . the crusade to which we are called is nothing less than to procure a moral, intellectual and spiritual revolution throughout the world. The whole scale of values by which our society lives must be reversed.—Robert M. Hutchins to the Faculty of the University of Chicago, 1944.

IN every unit of society, large or small; in every family; in every business enterprise; in every association or organization; in every political party or movement; in every religious denomination; in every nation, state and community, the problem of leadership develops. Every functioning and every organized group must necessarily consist of individuals of different characters, different capacities, and different means. If people are to deal with the problems with which they are confronted in a changing and evolving world, they must have leaders. And in every instance, the abler and more powerful individuals in a group will tend to assert their leadership, and the less assertive and less capable accept the leadership of those with some capacity for leading.

The dictionary definition of a leader is *an individual who either goes before a group to guide or show the group the way, or one who actually directs a group of individuals in their movements or activities*. Using the word in this commonly accepted sense, it is possible to distinguish clearly six types of leaders:

I. Leaders like Tenskwatawa, the "prophet,"* and the myriads of shamans and "medicine" men unknown to written history; leaders like Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Jesus, Saint Paul, Gregory I, Luther, Calvin, John Fox, Mary Baker G. Eddy, John Alexander Dowie, Billy Sunday, and Aimee Semple McPherson, whose appeal was religious, I think of as *religious leaders*.

II. Leaders like Tamerlane, Kublai Kahn, Alexander, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Napoleon, Cortez, Pontiac, Tecumseh, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Clive, Nelson, Santa Anna, U. S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and Hindenburg, whose positions were the outgrowth of their capabilities as warrior chieftains, this type I think of as *military leaders*.

III. Leaders like Asoka, Cleopatra, Nero, Caligula, Marcus Aurelius, Queen Elizabeth, George III, Philip V, Louis IX, (Saint Louis), Peter I, (the Great), Ivan I, (the Terrible), Czar Nicholas II, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hirohito, and countless lesser hereditary kings and nobles; this type I think of as *hereditary leaders*.

IV. Leaders like Cornelius Vanderbilt, Russell Sage, Hetty Green, Andrew Carnegie, J. Pierpont Morgan, Armour, Swift, Cudahy, John D. Rockefeller, Leland Stanford, Harriman, Sir Thomas Gresham, Jacques Coeur, Cosimo de Medici, Fugger the Rich, the Rothschilds, Cecil Rhodes, whose leadership was the outgrowth of their business and financial capabilities, this type I think of as *business leaders*.

V. Leaders like Pitt, Gladstone, Bismarck, Clemenceau, Samuel Adams, Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Buchanan, Lincoln, Tweed, Mark Hanna, Theodore Roosevelt, Boise Penrose, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and

* His brother, Tecumseh, was the secular, while he was the religious, leader of the great Indian confederation organized in 1807 to stop further conquest of Indian territory by the United States.

a host of lesser political figures whose positions were bureaucratic and not forensic; this type I think of as *political leaders*.

VI. And finally, leaders like Aristophanes, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, Copernicus, Comenius, Galileo, Newton, Pestalozzi, Oberlin, Froebel, Grundtvig, John Locke, Rousseau, Bacon, Shakespeare, Darwin, Huxley, Marx, Tolstoy, Henry George, Horace Mann, John Dewey, Titian, Michael Angelo, Rembrandt, Phidias, Rodin, Benjamin Franklin, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thoreau, Confucius, Sun Yat Sen, Gandhi, whose leadership was the outgrowth of their study, their creative works, and their teaching activities; this type I think of as *educational leaders*—as teachers of mankind.

CLASSIFIED, however, not by characteristics like *source* of leadership, or *historic origin*, or the *field of activity* in which leadership is exercised, these six types of leaders fall into two fundamental categories: (I) *official leaders*—leaders who hold public office; who are publicly supported; or who are publicly designated or privileged to lead, and whose decisions are either binding upon the community, state or nation, or legally enforceable upon the population, and (II) *unofficial leaders*—leaders who hold no office; who are neither publicly supported, nor publicly appointed or privileged to lead, and whose leadership is exercised by influencing the perceptions, the feelings, the thoughts, and the activities of individuals around them. In sum, a leader is either an individual who (I) exercises *power* over, or (II) exerts *influence* upon, other individuals.*

* Further classification, (in terms of these two fundamental characteristics), gives us not only two *species of leaders*—official and unofficial—to consider, but also ten, rather than six, *varieties of leaders*, as follows:

- I. State supported and state subsidized religious leaders, (*official*).
- II. Privately supported religious leaders, (*unofficial*).
- III. Military leaders, (*official*).
- IV. Hereditary leaders, (*official*).
- V. Privileged, chartered, franchised business leaders, (*official*).
- VI. Private, unprivileged, business leaders, (*unofficial*).
- VII. Office-holding political leaders, (*official*).
- VIII. Privately supported, opposition political leaders, (*unofficial*).
- IX. State supported or state subsidized educational leaders, (*official*).
- X. Privately supported educational leaders, (*unofficial*).

If individuals are to act like rational human beings in dealing with the actual conditions they face—if they are to face the fact that they live, at present, in a world in which criminals and potential criminals exist, and in which life and property needs therefore to be protected; in which hostile nations and potentially hostile nations are realities which make defense against invasion and protection against aggression necessary—both official and unofficial leadership is necessary.

But official leadership is needed only in dealing with those matters in which power must be exercised; in which force may have to be used; in which decisions must be enforced. With regard to all other matters, and even with regard to leadership in establishing the policies and the laws which are to be enforced by official leaders, unofficial leaders should lead. Teachers, rather than policemen, should stimulate the emotions, develop the thinking, and activate the wills of individuals and so influence them to act like free and responsible persons.



All leadership in education, in business, and in religion ought to be unofficial; all the evidence indicates that to whatever extent this norm is violated, we suffer from official propaganda in teaching, inefficiency and exploitation in business, intolerance and persecution in religion. In fact, however, some educational leaders and teachers are public officials, are publicly supported, or are publicly subsidized, while others are not. Some business leaders and businessmen enjoy special privileges, (like tariffs), or monopolies, (like franchises and patents), while others in business do not. Some religious leaders are publicly supported, publicly subsidized, publicly appointed, while others are not. Where church and state are united, or where there is an established church, the religious leader or priest or pastor has an official status; where church and state are separate, as is the case for the most part in the United States, religious leadership is unofficial. In the United States, where the public school system is governmental but where private schools—both parochial and denominational, and secular and non-denominational—also exist, part of the nation's educational leaders, (and most of the nation's

teachers), exercise official leadership; part unofficial. If the concept of education, however, is broadened to include the full field of education; if all those who influence any considerable number of people are included, as they should be, in the classification of educational leaders; if all the writers, public lecturers, preachers, artists, actors, advertising and salesmanagers, as well as teachers in private schools are taken into consideration, *so long as we have free speech, free press, free assemblage*, most of the educational leadership of the nation will be—as it should be—unofficial. To whatever extent these three types of leaders—educational, commercial, clerical—are permitted to use the state's authority or privileges which the state confers upon them, they cease to rely upon influence and instead rely upon the exercise of power to maintain their leadership. The nation, state or community which permits this violates one of the most important of all norms of living.



On the other hand, hereditary, military, and political leadership are each of them by their very nature either official or potentially official. The evidence as to these three types of leadership can be very briefly summarized: *hereditary leadership violates almost every single principle of universal law*—almost every single natural law or moral principle which the experience of mankind has evolved; hereditary leadership should be abolished. Military leadership—insofar as it involves the subordination of civil to military leadership—is equally violative of universal law. Political history is for the most part not much else than the record of the misery which military usurpation of leadership has inflicted upon mankind. The indicated norm is: *Military leadership should never be a total leadership; it should be a leadership restricted to that of military establishments only; to the command of armies, navies, airforces, fortresses. Finally, all national military establishments should be abolished; they should be transformed into police establishments—into world police forces on one hand, and local police forces on the other.*



We come now to political leadership—a kind of leadership which is always either overtly or potentially official. However much the un-

pleasant truth may be glossed over by calling attention to the fact that public officials always, *in the long run*, govern with the consent of the governed, the fact remains that they command rather than influence people; the authority they exercise is primary, the influence, secondary. When political leadership is not official; when it is exercised by leaders who are not in power—by the leaders of the parties in opposition, it is potentially official; it is exercised by leaders aspiring to office and to the exercise of power. It is for this reason that no social function which can be fulfilled by a voluntarily organized institution should ever be assigned to government—and to the arbitrament of politics—for fulfillment.

JUST as there are really only two basic *kinds* of leaders—official and unofficial—so we have seen that there are really only two basic *methods* of leadership. The first method involves the exercise of power; the use of legalized compulsion and coercion; of authority, either actual or implied; the second, the exercise only of influence and persuasion. Men may be influenced to see and to feel and to think and to act in many different ways, but power can be used in only one way—to force them to act or to refrain from action. Power calls for statutes, rules, regulations enforced either by the threat of physical coercion or by its actual imposition and use. Power and official leadership, no matter how much the mailed fist is hidden in a velvet glove, means nothing else.

Influencing men, on the other hand, means affecting, modifying, changing, stimulating their perceptions, their emotions, their intelligences, and their activities *without force, by mental suasion only*. It is by its nature restricted to the realm of psychology alone. But while it operates psychologically, persuasion can be used to rationalize, to sanction, and to supplement the exercise of coercion. It is used in every imaginable way to supplement public officials in their leadership by justifying the use of law, the imposition of taxes, the resort to police, to penal, and to military coercion. It is even used to supplement the leaders of mobs by stimulating hatred and justifying property destruction and deadly violence. When used by businessmen—by an employer or banker—it may make those who are being led do as they are desired to do by making them fear the

loss of their jobs, the foreclosure of loans, the loss of sales, the loss of savings and investments. When used by religious leaders, threats of hell and promises of paradise often make those who are being led do what their leaders desire. But even when influence is abused—as it often is—it is still not the same as power *so long as those who may be abusing it cannot resort to threats of, much less to actual, coercion.* When this is permitted to take place, and those who are being led are deprived of the freedom to disregard what a particular leader desires them to do, that leader is no longer exerting influence; he is in fact exercising power. To whatever extent a leader crosses this line, he ceases to be an unofficial leader; he ceases to teach and begins to command.

NO VISION of what the educational leadership of mankind, CHALLENGE community by community, might do to solve the great social, political and economic problems which constitute “the crisis of our age” can be formed if we consider only what teachers can do on the narrow—and safe—stage represented by our existing schools and institutions of higher learning. The true vision comes only if we consider the part which they should play upon the much broader, more important—and more dangerous—stage represented by the adult world; the world of individual, family and social life; the world of labor, of agriculture, of business, of politics, of international affairs; the world of religion, of art, of science and of the application of science to every need and desire of mankind.

The role of the teacher in society cannot be considered in a timeless vacuum. Even less in terms of the never-never world of childhood. “Time marches on.” Events in the adult world which are shaking civilization to pieces cannot be disregarded.

The question is, *what is the part in life which those whom I have been calling teachers should play?*

I have addressed this book to *teachers*—to those whom I call teachers not because they teach *in schools* but *because they*

teach. I have addressed it to them because the things which they teach *and which they fail to teach*—no matter whether their teaching is restricted to children in a home or apprentices in a craft; no matter whether it reaches groups assembled in classrooms and congregations; no matter whether it is delivered by pictures, by the printed page, or by word-of-mouth perhaps over winged waves—determines what mankind wants, what mankind believes and values, and what mankind does and fails to do. Most of those whom I am calling teachers may not know that this is so; many of them may deny responsibility even when it is called to their attention; they may even believe that it should not be so. But what they think about the matter does not alter by a jot or tittle the fact that it is so, nor the fact that in the inmost hearts of those who are professedly teachers there must be at least some faint trace of a feeling of special responsibility from which they cannot escape and which they cannot shift to any other persons, no matter how exalted their positions, nor to any institution, no matter how great its powers.

To all those who are in any degree what I have called teachers of mankind; who must individually bear some share of the responsibility for the state of mankind, and who cannot avoid wielding some of the influence exerted by teaching upon mankind, I address this challenge.



It has been said of men, “the tree is known by its fruit.”

By our fruits—by the hearts and minds and behavior of the generation we have taught—we stand condemned. For it is men whom we have taught, whose minds and hearts we have shaped, and whose behavior we have influenced, who have plunged the world into wars and revolutions and made the fair green earth an arena in which hate and murder crucify life

and love, and greed and ignorance trample upon knowledge and wisdom.

Teaching is no mere "job" to which it is possible to turn merely because we need to earn money. Teaching is the greatest responsibility which anyone can assume. Those of us who have assumed this responsibility, no matter how petty or noble the motives which first led us into the work of influencing our fellowmen, can no longer afford to postpone the assumption of the leadership in community and society essential to the discharge of that responsibility to the uttermost farthing. The time has come when the teacher must cease to be a mere hireling. *The time has come for the teacher to lead.* The time has come when the leadership which the priest lost to the warrior, the warrior to the merchant; the merchant to the banker, and which the banker is now losing to the bureaucrat, must be taken over by the teacher. A new world must be built. And the castle-centered and church-centered world of the past, and the money-centered and government-centered world of today, must be replaced by a school and university centered society.

And in that new world which we should now start to build, the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of mankind, (entrusted in part into the hands of each one of us), must be made supreme in the hearts and minds and over the behavior of mankind. To us the building of this new world, individual by individual, family by family, and community by community, calls as to a crusade. It calls not only for a moral, intellectual and spiritual revolution in the hearts of those whom I am calling teachers; it calls upon them for triumphant creative action. But triumph in this educational crusade must come quite differently from triumph in the great crusades to which men have been called in the past. It cannot come by compulsion through the use of arms and police forces, nor by playing up-

on man's fear of hell and hope of heaven, and certainly not through material plenty, material security, and boundless material progress. By its very nature—if stultification is to be avoided—it must come only through persuasion and only as a result of influence and leadership.



At every crisis in history, mankind needs leadership. But a crisis, even so grave a crisis as that which we face today, is merely a more acute manifestation of the continuous crisis which constitutes the history of the human race. The acuteness of any particular crisis is directly proportioned to the extent to which mankind has previously failed to deal correctly with its daily and local problems—to choose correctly between alternative methods of dealing with them from day to day, individual by individual and group by group. At every moment of history, at every place on earth—in the smallest communities as in the capitals of the greatest of nations—mankind not only needs leadership, *it follows leadership of some kind.*

The problem at this moment, as at all times until mankind finally learns the correct solution, is

“Who shall lead?”

Upon the answer to this question depends the future of our present civilization.

Shall the leaders be priests or warrior chiefs as was the case during the primitive infancy of mankind?

Shall the leaders be hereditary nobles and kings as was the case up until the last two hundred years?

Shall they be businessmen—or politicians and revolutionists—as has been the case since the Age of Revolution?

Or shall they be teachers — *teachers who have equipped themselves to lead?*

INDEX TO NORMS

ASSOCIATIONAL

Adoption, norm of, 492.
Divorce, norm of, 518.
Illegitimacy, norm of, 492.
Independence, norm of, 123, 361.
Leadership-Followership, norm of, 703.
Orphanage, norm of, 492.

CIVIC

City, n. of decentralization, 615; norm of size, 614.
Community, norms: c., jurisdiction of c., 574-6; economic functions, 583; size, 603; center and area, 604; membership, 638-9, 648; institutions, 663.
Harmony and Peace, norm of, 626.
Jurisdiction, norms of j.: coercive vs. voluntary implementation, 579, 622; war, 633; speech, assembly, religion, occupation, possession, 633; trade, travel, seas, air; allegiance; military establishments, 621, 635; police powers, 621; mineral resources, 636.
Leadership, norms of civic l.; community, l., 655-6; hereditary l., 707; military l., 707; official l., 707-8.
Management, norm of civic, 660.
Population, norms: density, 563-4; p., unit size, 603; p., unit center and area, 604; p., unit functions, 580.

EDUCATIONAL

Adult Education, norm of, 27-8, 67-8.
Child (Home) Education, n. of, 72-84.
Common Schooling, norm of, 92.
High School and College, n. of, 105-7.
Leadership in Education, norm of, 706.
Professional Schooling, n. of, 108-111.
School in Society, normal role of, 15.
Teacher, normal role of, 11-12, 14-15.
University Education, norm of, 68-9.
Vocational Schooling, norm of, 93-94.
Youth, n. of education during y., 362-3.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL

Truth, norm of, 12-13.

ESTHETIC

Decadence, norm of, 122.

ETHICAL

Adoption, norm of, 367.
Agriculture, n. of, (law of return), 345.
Delinquency, norm of, 122.
Eugenics, norm of, 649.
Marriage, norm of, 483-4.
Migration, norm of, 649.
Philanthropy, norm of, 524.

GREGATIONAL

Family, n. of individual vs. f., 293; n. of f., organization, 468; minimum size, 478; maximum size, 480; family management, 498-9; admission into membership, 510; dissolution, 518; income and property, 520.
Gregational vs. Civic Action, n. of, 579.
Private vs. Gregational or Civic Action, norm of, 579.
Religious Leadership, norm of, 706.

OCCUPATIONAL

Action, norm of, 317.
Business Leadership, norm of, 706.
Dwelling, n. of place, 323, 550; n. of renting, 536.
Independence, (vs. dependence), n. of independence, 123, 361.
Maintenance, norm of self-m., 121-2, 434-5, 583.
Income Distribution, n. distribution during majority period of life, 378.
Youth, n. for support during y., 361-2.

ONTOLOGICAL

Integration, norm of, 32.

OPERATIONAL

Centralization, norm of, 203, 276.
Decentralization, norm of, 202-3, 276.
Competition, norm of, 656.
Cooperation, norm of, 657.

POSSESSIONAL

Children, n. of possession of c., 83, 353.
Commonwealth, (Earth, Land), 571.
Debt, norm of debt, 538-9.
Distribution, (Marketing), 207
Endowment, (Birthright, Dower, etc.), n. of e., of youth, 443, 524; right of endowment, 525-9.

Financing, n. for private, philanthropic and government financing, 701-2.
 Land, n. of commonwealth, 571; n. of community area, 603; n. of community center and region, 604; n. of partition of the earth—community, region, world, 619-620
 Paraphernalia, n. for possession of, 528.
 Speculation, norm of, 538.

PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL

Celibacy and Nulligravida, n. of, 364.
 Childhood, n. span of period of, 352.
 Child Rearing, n. of home and family, 331; adoption, 367.
 Conception, n. period for c., 348; n. for spacing children, 369-370.
 Diet, principle of wholes, 346; n. d., for infants, 320, 341, 350, 351.
 Death, norm of, 395.
 Eugenic Span, normal, 368.
 Hemophilia, n., for victims of, 492.
 Living, normal individual, 122; self-preservation, self-reproduction, self-expression, 294, 308; n. of action, 316; law of return, 345; principle of wholes, 346; harmonic norm, 346.
 Majority, n. period of, 374-8.
 Marriage, n. age, 355-6; n. age of mates, 372; n. of selection of mates, 489.

Maternity, normal span for, 369.
 Maturity, n. period of, 379-384.
 Menstruation, normal span of, 357.
 Organic Span; men, women, 357.
 Pre-Natal Period, n. for pregnancies, 348-349.
 Progeny, n., minimum, 364; n., maximum, 365; n. of contraception, sterilization, nulligravida, 367; n. for primiparæ, 368.
 Puberty, (Adolescence), n. span of period of puberty, 354-5.
 Senescence, (vs. senility), n. of., 392.
 Seniority, n. period of, 384-392.
 Sex, n. of, 328; n. of male and female s., association, 337; n. of s., in childhood, 353; n. of sex in old age, 387.
 Sublimation, n. for s., of self-preservation, 312; of sex, 313-4; of self-expression, 314-5.
 Survival, biological norm of, 119.;
 Urban Birth Rate, norm for, 363-4.
 Weight, n., men's and women's, 319.
 Youth, n. span of period of, 360.
 Youth, n. span of period of, 360; sexual and genetic n. of youth, 363-374.

TELEOLOGICAL

Normal Living, law of, 294; functions, 405; right- vs. mal-progress, 196-7.

INDEX TO REFERENCES

ABILITIES OF MAN, THE, 160
 ABSTRACT OF THE CENSUS, 423
 Abulfaragius, (Bar-hebraeus), 6-7
 Adams, Clifford R., 372
 Adams, Henry, 16, 85
 AGRARIANISM, 225
 AGRICULTURE IN MODERN LIFE, 225, 436, 472, 533-4
 AGRICULTURAL TESTAMENT, AN, 345
 Aldrich, C. Anderson, 351
 Alexander, F. Matthias, 113
 Alexander the Great, 628, 704
 Alexiev, Kiril M., 147
 "American Journal of Sociology," 137, 138, 156, 567
 'Amr, 6
 Amundsen, Roald, 397
 ANALECTS, THE, 277
 ANCIENT LAW, 465

Angelo, Michael, 303, 705
 Anthony, Susan B., 332
 APPEAL TO SOCIAL REFORMERS, 285
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 627
 ARCHITECTURE AND MODERN LIFE, 548
 Aristippus, 399
 Aristotle, 12, 400, 475-6, 495, 705
 Arnold, Matthew, 290
 Asia, 60-1
 Aspley, John Cameron, 255
 Athanasius, 6
 Augustine, Saint, 6
 Aurelius, Marcus, 625
 AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE, THE, 431
 BABIES ARE HUMAN BEINGS, 351
 Baker, O. E., 225, 472, 533-4
 Bailey, Liberty Hyde, 565-6

- Balzac, Honore de, 329
 Beard, Charles A., 401, 454
 Bebel, August, 424-6
 Belloc, Hillaire, 126, 527
 Benedict, Saint, 700
 Berle, Adolf A. Jr., 236
 Bergengren, Roy F., 538
 BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE, 329
 BIG BUSINESS, EFFICIENCY AND FASCISM, 214
 Bismarck, Otto L. von, 396, 655, 705
 Blackstone, Sir William, 449, 606
 Blakewell, Robert, 595
 Bliokh, Ivan S., 625
 Blumer, Herbert, 144
 Boeckh, E. H., 571
 BOOK OF FESTIVALS, THE, 392
 BOSTON, THE PLACE AND PEOPLE, 99
 Breasted, James E., 429
 Brookings, Robert S., 225
 Browning, Elizabeth Barrett, 42
 Bryan, William Jennings, 178
 Brydon, Patrick, 369
 Buck, Pearl, 59, 60-1
 Buddha, 303, 399, 552, 627, 704
 Bullock, C. J., 204
 Bunzel, Bessie, 169
 Burch, G. I., 364, 366
 Bury, J. B., 184-5, 628

 Calverton, V. F., 368
 Campbell, Thomas D., 225
 CAPITAL, 221
 Carnegie, Andrew, 704
 Cauley, Troy J., 225
 Chase, Stuart, 257
 CHEMISTRY OF FOOD AND NUTRITION, 346
 Cicero, 387-8, 400
 CHINESE CLASSICS, THE, 26
 Ching-Yueh Yen, 137-8
 Churchill, Winston, 184, 633
 Clinard, Marshall B., 134
 Coates, Albert, 61, 62
 Coeur, Jacques, 704
 COLLECTED WORKS, Lenin, 7
 Collins, Kenneth, 257
 Comenius, John Amos, 76, 77, 353, 705
 COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA, 356
 COMMENTARIES, 449
 "Common Ground," 444-5
 COMMUNICATION SUR LE VOYAGE AUX ETATS-UNIS, 247
 COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, 182
 Comte, Auguste, 183-4, 556

 Condorcet, Marquis de, 184
 Confucius, 25, 277, 303, 391, 392, 400, 552, 705
 Cooley, Thomas M., 617
 Constantine, Emperor, 690
 Copernicus, Nikolaus, 284, 705
 Corey, Lewis, 222
 COSMOS, DESCRIPTION OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD, 396
 Creece, James, 69
 CRIMINALS WE DESERVE, THE, 132
 CRISIS OF OUR AGE, 169, 175, 335, 554
 CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS, 222
 CRITO, 70
 Crocker, Lucy H., 335
 Cruikshank, Amos, 595
 CUNA EMERGES, 538
 Cushing, Harvey, 380
 Cushing, John P., 99
 Cyprian, Saint, 6

 Dali, Salvador, 175
 Darwin, Charles, 185, 284, 303, 396, 705
 DAS BUCH VON ES, 369
 DAWN OF CONSCIENCE, THE, 429
 Debay, A., 368
 DECLINE OF THE WEST, 266
 DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS, 631
 DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, 631
 DELINQUENCY AREAS, 134
 Democritus, 284
 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 594
 DENMARK, THE COOPERATIVE WAY, 54-5
 DE SENECTUDE, 387
 Devine, Edward T., 103, 383
 DeVries, Arnold, 351-2, 353
 Dewey, John, 1, 2, 3-4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 48, 49, 81, 113, 138, 705
 Dickens, Charles, 499
 DIDACTICUS MAGNUS, 76
 DIE FAMILIE, 411
 DIE WAHLVERWANDTSCHAFTEN, 454
 Dill, Samuel, 259
 Diocletian, 6
 DISTRIBUTION AGE, THE, 128
 Droke, Maxwell, 256-7
 Dublin, Louis I., 169
 Dunham, H. Warren, 156
 DYNAMICS OF POPULATION, 365
 DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY, 56
 EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM, 465
 ECONOMICS OF CONSUMPTION, 256-7
 EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, 430
 EDUCATION FOR DEATH, 10
 EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS, 16

- Eggen, Dr. Blake, 368
 Einstein, Albert, 13
 Eliot, Charles W., 59
 Ellis, Havelock, 401, 454, 484
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 598
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 93, 108, 308, 309, 645, 705
 Engels, Friedrich, 690
 ERZIEHUNG UND UNTERRICHT, 10
 ESQUISSE D'UN TABLEAU HISTORIQUES DES PROGRES DE L'ESPRIT HUMAIN, 183
 ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION, 366
 EUGENICS PROGRAM FOR THE UNITED STATES, 470-1
 EXPECTATIONS OF MENTAL DISEASE, 155
 EXTENSION OF UNIVERSITY TEACHING, 69

 Faris, Robert, 156
 FLIGHT FROM THE CITY, 436
 Forbes, John Murray, 99
 Ford, Henry, 225
 FORWARD TO THE LAND, 94
 FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH, THE, 351-2
 Fowler, Bertram B., 58
 Francis, Saint, 303
 Franklin, Benjamin, 396, 705
 Freud, Anna, 17
 Freud, Sigmund, 172, 173, 284, 313, 314, 329, 350, 443, 458
 Friedenthal, H., 395
 Froebel, Friedrich W. A., 700, 705
 FUTURE OF WAR, 625

 Galileo, 284, 705
 Galpin, C. J., 530, 531, 549
 Garis, Dr. Mary de, 369
 Gasset, Jose y, 366
 GENEALOGY OF MORALS, 272
 Gentile, Giovanni, 8, 9
 George, Henry, 565, 567, 600, 601, 705
 Gesell, A. L., 17
 Giddings, Franklin H., 559, 560
 Gladstone, William E., 396, 704
 GOD HELPS THOSE, 58
 Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, 331
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 396, 400, 454, 484, 687
 Goldschmidt, Walter R., 639
 Goldsmith, Oliver, 595
 GREAT LEARNING, THE, 25
 Groddeck, George, 369
 Grotius, Hugo, 631

 GROWING UP IN NEW GUINEA, 50
 GROWTH OF THE SOIL, 472
 Grundtvig, Nikolaj F. S., 54, 92, 571, 692, 705
 Gumpert, Dr. Martin, 385, 393

 Haeckel, Ernst H., 395
 Halbwachs, Maurice, 170, 173
 Hamilton, Alexander, 228, 704
 Hamsun, Knut, 472
 Hantzu, 399
 Hauser, Philip M., 144
 Hayek, F. A., 126, 527
 Hegel, George W. F., 184
 HIS LIFE, (Harvey Cushing), 380
 HISTORY OF INDIA, 598
 HISTORY OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE, 628
 Hitler, Adolf, 184, 188, 239, 654
 Hobbes, Thomas, 16, 290, 399, 618, 631
 Holmes, Oliver Wendell II, 27, 72, 431
 HOLY EARTH, THE, 565-6
 Hoover, Herbert, 239, 522
 HOUSE OF EXILE, THE, 517
 Howard, Sir Albert, 344-5, 374, 381
 Howe, M. A. DeWolfe, 99
 HOW TO PICK A MATE, 372
 Hutchins, Robert Maynard, 703
 Hugo, Victor, 279, 683
 HUMAN BREEDING AND SURVIVAL, 364, 366
 HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, 48, 49, 138
 HUMAN PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION, 134-6, 165, 168, 170-4
 HUNGARIAN PAGEANT, 392
 HUNGER AND HISTORY, 595
 Huxley, Aldous, 314
 Huxley, Thomas H., 179, 705
 Hyde, Major Robert W., 322-3
 Hypatia, 15, 303

 I CHOSE FREEDOM, 147
 IDEA OF PROGRESS, THE, 184-5
 "Ideal Weights for Men," 296, 319
 "Ideal Weights for Women," 296
 IF I WERE TWENTY-ONE, 256
 INTRODUCTION TO MARXISM, AN, 7
 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ECONOMICS, 204

 James, William, 284, 374
 Jefferson, Thomas, 400, 623, 632, 705
 Jerome, Saint, 6
 Jesus, 195, 303, 397, 399, 627, 704

- JOBS, MACHINES, UNEMPLOYMENT, 226**
 John the Grammarian, 6
 Johnson, Alvin, 566
 Joyce, James, 175
- Kandel, I. L., 9
 Karolyi, Alexander F., 392
 Kant, Immanuel, 687
 Kepler, Johannes, 284
 Kingsley, Lowell V., 322-3
 Kipling, Rudyard, 37
 Kold, Kristen, 54
 Kravchenko, Victor, 147
 Kropotkin, Peter, 290, 424
- LA FOLLETTE'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY, (Robert M. LaFollete), 59**
 Lamont, T. W., 174
 "Land and Home," 597
 Lao Tze, 303, 309
 League of Nations Committee on Nutrition, 350
 Lee, Robert E., 704
 Legge, James, 26
 Lenin, Nikolai, 7, 238, 704
 LePlay, P. G. F., 479
LES CAUSES DU SUICIDE, 170
LES MANIFESTATIONS FONCTIONNELLES DES PSYCHONEUROSE, 160
 Letourneaux, Charles, 327
LEVIATHAN, 16
 Lewis, Sinclair, 683-4
 "Life-Cycle of the Farm Family," 480
 Lincoln, Abraham, 400, 645, 704
 Lindberg, Anne, 182
 Lindsey, Ben B., 357-8, 359, 484
 Lippman, Walter, 366
 Locke, John, 509, 556, 692, 705
 Lockridge, Frances, 492
 Lombardo-Radice, 8
 Lombroso, Gina, 136, 137, 328, 335
 Loyola, Ignatius, 700
 Ludevici, Anthony M., 340, 368, 369
 Luther, Martin, 98, 303, 627, 704
- McCann, Alfred W., 317
 McCarrison, Sir Robert, 381
 McEvoy, J. P., 63
- Machiavelli, Nicollo di B., 399, 556
 Mackay, Henry D., 135
 Maine, Sir Henry J. S., 465, 592
 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 441, 442, 459
 Malthus, Thomas R. 366, 481
 Malzberg, Benjamin, 154, 155
- Mann, Horace, 399, 463, 705
MANU, A STUDY IN HINDU SOCIAL THEORY, 377
 Martin, Frederick Townsend, 223
MARX, CAPITAL AND OTHER WRITINGS, 7
 Marx, Karl, 123, 184, 185, 205, 221, 229, 237, 238, 399, 556, 690, 705
MAXIMS FOR REVOLUTIONISTS, 410
 Maxwell, William, 256
 Mayo, Elton, 134, 135-6, 165, 168, 170-4, 178, 381
 Meade, Margaret, 49, 50, 356, 369
 Means, Gardiner C., 236
MELTING POT, THE, 490
 Mencius, 400
MENTAL DISORDERS IN URBAN AREAS, 156, 157
 Miles, Shirley, 417, 667
 Mill, John Stuart, 206, 400
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, THE, 236
 Mohammed, 399, 627
 Montessori, Maria, 353
 Montesquieu, Charles de s., 556
 Morgan, Arthur E., 102, 687
 Mott, Lucretia, 332
 Motwani, Kewal, 377
MOVIES, DELINQUENCY AND CRIME, 144
 Muller-Lyer, Franz, 411, 413
 Mussolini, Benito, 239, 654
MY PEDAGOGIC CREED, 14
- NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION IN ITALY, 9**
NATIONAL MALNUTRITION, THE, 317
NATURAL CHILDBIRTH, 369
 Newton, Isaac, 13, 284, 303, 705
 Nicholas, William H., 641
 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 286, 556
 Nietzsche, Frederic, 244, 245, 399, 690
NORMAL LIFE, THE, E. T. Devine, 383
NOTHING BUT THEIR CHAINS, 147
NUDE CULTURE, 353
NUTRITION AND PHYSICAL DEGENERATION, 318, 386
- Oberlin, John Frederic, 56-7, 687, 705
 Oppenheimer, Franz, 566, 567, 573
ORIGIN OF SPECIES, THE, 185
 Osborn, Frederic, 470, 471
 Osler, William, 380, 395-6
 Owen, Robert, 229
- Packard, Vance O., 372
PASSING OF THE IDLE RICH, THE, 223

- Paul, Saint, 303, 704
 PAY DIRT, 345
 Pearce, Innes H., 335
 PECKHAM EXPERIMENT, THE, 335
 Pendell, Elmer, 364, 366
 PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY, THE, 314
 Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich, 700, 705
 Peterson, Elmer T., 94
 Pythagoras, 379
 Picasso, Pablo, 175
 Pitkin, Walter B., 366
 Plant, J. S., 173
 Plato, 15, 111, 293, 451, 455, 625, 626, 628, 705
 Pollock, Horatio M., 155
 Pope, Alexander, 305
 PRAGMATISM, 284
 Prentice, E. Parmalee, 595
 Price, Weston A., 318, 386
 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY, 137-144
 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, 232
 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, John Stuart Mill, 206
 PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT, THE, 462
 PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, 421, 467
 "Printers' Ink" 254
 PROBLEMS OF EDUCATIONAL READJUSTMENT, 251-252
 PROSPERITY AND SECURITY, 126, 129, 436, 446
 Protagoras, 289
 PSYCHO-ANALYSIS FOR PARENTS, 17
 PSYCHOLOGY OF THE YELLOW JOURNAL THE, 143
 Pufendorf, Samuel, 631

 Quigley, D. T., 317

 RANGE OF HUMAN CAPACITIES, THE, 299, 341, 360, 375, 380
 Read, Grantley Dick, 369
 RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS, 133, 421
 REPORTS ON THE CAUSES OF CRIME, 135
 RESEARCH BULLETINS OF THE SCHOOL OF LIVING, 214, 436, 541, 542, 543
 REVOLT OF MODERN YOUTH, THE, 357, 358, 484
 REVOLT OF THE MASSES, THE, 366
 REVOLUTION BY EDUCATION, A, 8
 Rhodes, Henry T. F., 132
 ROAD TO SERFDOM, THE, 126, 527
 Robbins, C. L., 98
 Roberts, J. Baylor, 641

 ROMAN SOCIETY IN THE LAST CENTURY OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE, 259
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 184, 239, 362, 433, 585, 704
 Ross, A. E., 421, 467
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 290, 565, 705
 RURAL SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 549
 Ruskin, John, 536
 Russell, Bertrand, 430
 Rust, Dr. Bernhard, 9, 10

 Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de, 229
 SALES MANAGERS' HANDBOOK, 255
 Sanchez, George I., 8
 Savage, Adam, 598
 Scheinfeld, Amran, 333, 335
 Schmalhausen, S. D., 368
 SCHOOL AND SOCIETY, 1, 5
 SCHOOL AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION, 98
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 551, 552
 Schroeder, Clarence W., 156
 SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF URBAN LAND VALUATION, 571
 Segwick, Mrs. Walter Nelson, 166
 SERAPHITA, 329
 SERVILE STATE, THE, 126, 527
 SEX AND CHARACTER, 333
 SEX AND REPRESSION IN SAVAGE SOCIETY, 441, 442, 459
 SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES, 369
 SEX IN CIVILIZATION, 368
 Shackleton, Sir Ernest, 397
 Shakespeare, William, 115, 338-9, 343, 400, 705
 Shaw, Clifford, 134, 135-6, 156, 158, 171
 Shaw, George Bernard, 410
 Sherman, Henry C., 318, 346
 Simpson, Kemper, 213-4
 Sinclair, James, 595
 Singh, Rev. J. A., 17
 CENSUS, 1940; 365, 466, 467
 SIXTY MILLION JOBS, 585
 Smith, Adam, 205, 206, 556
 Smith, Theobald, 161
 Snedden, David, 251-2,
 SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL DISEASE, 154
 Socrates, 15, 70, 705
 SOIL AND HEALTH, 344-5, 374
 Sorokin, Pitirim A., 169, 175, 198, 335, 381, 554, 556
 SOUL OF WOMAN, THE, 328 335,
 Souvarine, Boris, 424
 Spearman, C., 160, 341

- Spencer, Herbert, 184-5, 556
 Spengler, Oswald, 266, 486
 Spicer, Dorothy G., 392
STALIN: A CRITICAL STUDY OF BOLSHEVISM, 424
 Stalin, Josef, 184, 188, 629, 704
 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 332
STARVING AMERICA, 317
STATE, THE, 573
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1944-45; 153
 154, 248, 349, 395, 423, 470, 472, 538
 Steffens, Lincoln, 655
 Stein, Gertrude, 175
 Steinach, E., 387
 Stirner, Max, 399
STUDIES IN MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY, 322-3
 Sturgis, Captain William, 99
 Sumner, William Graham, 1
 Sutherland, Edwin Hardin, 136, 137, 144, 381

 Taussig, F. W., 232
 Tawney, R. H., 618
 Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 462, 498
TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, 226
 Tertullian, 6
 Thackeray, William Makepeace, 499
 Theodosius, 6
 Theophilus, 6
 Thomas, W. I., 143
 Thompson, Warren S., 472
 Thorpe, Willard, 213, 214
 Timmons, John F., 531, 532
TO BE OR NOT TO BE, 169
 Tolstoy, Leo, 285, 286, 287
 Tompkins, Dr. J. J., 58
 Touqueville, Alexis de, 593-4
TOUR THROUGH SICILY AND MALTA, 369
TOWNSEND CRUSADE, THE, 389
 Townsend, Dr. F. E., 389
 Trotsky, Leon, 704
TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH, THE, 340, 368
 Tugwell, Rexford, 183

UGLY CIVILIZATION, THIS, 214, 435, 542, 543, 610, 646.
UPANISHADS, 377
URBANIZATION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, 134

USE OF THE SELF, THE, 113

 Van der Plas, Charles, 597
 Veblen, Thorstein, 521
VEDAS, 377
VILLAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST, 592
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN, 332
 Voltaire, Francois M. A. de, 396, 400
 Voronoff, S., 387

 Waln, Norah, 517
 Wallace, Henry A., 284, 585
 Ward, Lester F., 56, 556
WASTE PRODUCTS OF AGRICULTURE, THE, 345
WAVE OF THE FUTURE, THE, 182
WEALTH OF NATIONS, THE, 205, 206
 Wechsler, David, 299, 341, 360, 361, 375, 380
 Weininger, Otto, 333
 Weld, L. D. H., 254
WHEEL OF HEALTH, THE, 317, 320, 341, 350
 Whelpton, P. K., 472
WHITHER MANKIND, 401, 454
 Wilson, M. L., 225, 472
 Wilson, Woodrow, 606
WOLF CHILD AND HUMAN CHILD, 17
WOLF CHILDREN AND FERAL MAN, 17
WOMAN UNDER SOCIALISM, 424, 426
WOMEN AND MEN, 333
WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA, 551, 552
WORLD SOCIAL ECONOMIC CONGRESS, 227
 Wrench, G. T., 317, 341, 350
 Wright, Frank Lloyd, 548, 600
 Wright, Quincy, 625
 Wyand, Charles S., 256, 257

 Yen, Ching-Yueh, 137-8
 Yen, James, 59, 60, 61
YOU ARE YOUNGER THAN YOU THINK, 385, 393

 Zangwill, Israel, 490
 Ziemer, George, 10
 Zingg, Robert M., 17
 Zoroaster, 399